Arms Control & Disarmament

A QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABSTRACTS AND ANNOTATIONS



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PREFACE

Arms Control & Disarmament attempts to bring under bibliographic control a large and growing body of literature in an important subject area. It is prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section of the Library of Congress, through the support of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Each quarterly issue contains abstracts and annotations of current literature in the English, French, German, and Russian languages, as well as abstracts and annotations of current literature in all languages published in English translation. Author and subject indexes appear in the first three numbers of each volume, with the fourth number containing cumulative author and subject indexes.

To facilitate the use of this bibliography the title of each foreign language entry is preceded by its English translation in brackets. Titles in the Cyrillic alphabet are transliterated according to the Library of Congress system, but with ligatures omitted. For the convenience of readers in the Library of Congress, call numbers are given for all cataloged and classified materials. Uncataloged and unclassified materials are designated by symbols indicating the custodial divisions of the Library in which they can be found. A list of these symbols appears on the next page.

Matters of fact and opinion presented in *Arms Control & Disarmament* are solely the responsibility of the authors of the items abstracted, and their inclusion does not constitute endorsement by either the Library of Congress or the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Information about the periodicals cited can in most instances be obtained readily from standard reference works.

The bibliography is compiled from a survey of the literature received by the Library of Congress that is likely to be available in the larger research and public libraries in the United States. Sources surveyed include trade books, monographs, selected government publications, publications of national and international organizations and societies, and approximately 1,700 periodicals. With the exception of materials delayed in arriving at the Library, the literature cited has been published in the 3 months preceding the month in which a number is sent to press. Entries are chosen under the assumption that arms control and disarmament is a subject area encompassing related topics such as weapons development and basic factors in world politics. The coverage is not exhaustive, however. It excludes articles in newspapers and the reporting of day-to-day events in newsmagazines.

The abstracts are written by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section, except that abstracts or summaries published with the articles to which they relate may be used verbatim or in a modified form; they are designated "author's abstract," "author's summary," etc.

Library of Congress Location Symbols

(Uncataloged and Unclassified Materials)

Chi Kor	Chinese and Korean Section
LL	Law Library
Newsp	Newspaper Reading Room
P&GP RR	Periodical and Government Publication Reading Room
Sci RR	Science Reading Room
Slav Rm	Slavic Room

CONTENTS

	Page
Preface	iii
I. The international political environment	333
A. General analyses of basic factors in world politics	333
B. Foreign policies of states and international political organizations	338
1. General analyses	338
2. Unilateral policies	342
3. Bilateral and multilateral policies	350
II. The strategic environment	354
A. Modern war	354
1. General analyses	354
2. Major war	356
3. Limited war	356
4. Unconventional war	356
B. Modern weaponry and related technological developments	357
C. National security policies and military strategies of states and international political organizations	365
1. General analyses	365
2. Unilateral policies and strategies	367
3. Bilateral and multilateral policies and strategies	380
4. Related policies and problems	389
D. Consequences of national defense policies and war	396
1. General analyses	396
2. Political	398
3. Military	398
4. Economic	399
5. Ethical and social	403
6. Biological	404
III. Institutions and means for the maintenance of peace	406
A. International law	406
1. Pacific settlement	406
2. Adjudication	406
B. International organizations	407
C. International peace and security forces	409
D. Other processes, plans, and proposals	411
IV. The historical background	417
A. General studies	417
B. The background up to World War I	418
C. The interwar period and the League of Nations	419
D. The post-World War II period and the United Nations	419

Page

V. General analyses and basic approaches 421
A. General analyses 421
B. Approaches and proposals 425
1. Comprehensive measures and proposals 425
2. Noncomprehensive measures and proposals 425
a. Regional 425
b. Outer space 426
c. Other measures and proposals 426

VI. Specific problems and related measures 428
A. Negotiation of arms control and disarmament measures 428
B. Reduction of the risk of war 428
1. Escalation 428
2. Miscalculation and accidental war 429
3. Surprise attack 429
4. Proliferation 429
5. Communication 433
6. Command and control of weapons 433
C. Violations of agreements and responses 433
1. Violations, inspection, and verification 433
2. Enforcement 435
a. By international organizations 435
b. By other means 435
D. Consequences of arms control and disarmament measures 436
1. General analyses 436
2. Military 436
3. Political 436
4. Economic 436

Author index 438
Subject index 448

I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

A. GENERAL ANALYSES OF BASIC FACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS

1469
Aranguren, José L. OPENNESS TO THE WORLD: AN APPROACH TO WORLD PEACE. Daedalus, v. 95, spring 1966: 590-606. Q11. B7, v. 95

Argues that peace must not be made dependent upon the reconciliation of opposing political and economic ideologies. "Our intellectual labor on behalf of a world order should consist in absorbing the shocks, in lessening the tensions, in clearing the way for intelligent solutions by means of an open dialogue rather than in trying to achieve what is now beyond reach--universal agreement with respect to a univocal system of values on which an unshakeable ideal order could be based." Aranguren feels that the quest for peace will be unending, that as long as man is man opposition and variance will preclude world stability and complete international integration.

1470
Aron, Raymond. [COMMENTS ON POLYCENTRISM] Remarques sur le polycentrisme. Preuves, v. 16, Mar. 1966: 3-10. AP20. P74, v. 16

Polycentrism, a convenient if ambiguous term, describes the deterioration of quasi-absolute Soviet authority within the Communist "bloc." How have the Sino-Soviet split and the increasing autonomy of East European states affected international relations? In Communist Europe the trend toward diversity has its limits. Political-economic regimes will continue to be of the same order. Nationalism, even suppressed, continues as East Europe's vital force. Under present international conditions the Communist Parties are securely in power and every country is happy to have support in its shared fear of Germany. Having little power, East European countries are relegated to playing a secondary role on the world scene. To the West their greater liberty is insignificant in comparison with the repercussions of the Sino-Soviet schism, where the direction of the Communist world is at stake. China's challenge has left the Soviet Union with two alternatives: to appear more radical than China, or to outbid it in moderation and show the world that China is a dangerous firebrand. The present leaders have chosen the second course. Sino-Soviet competition is bound to persist for a long time, and thus a disunited West confronts two different major strategies, not to mention the various strategies of smaller, so-called Marxist-Leninist countries in Asia and Europe. Since 1947, intrabloc diplomacy, diplomacy between blocs, and diplomacy between blocs and the nonalined have been the three major areas of international relations. Polycentrism has visibly affected each. At least polycentrism has attenuated tensions in Europe and wakened hopes for an authentic peace. Exactly opposite has been its effects in the Third World. The former "double hegemony" of the two superpowers "created at least an apparent order." Now local quarrels are made more bitter because Communist is fighting against Communist, while neither has ceased fighting the anti-Communist. Many countries, especially in Southeast Asia, may be engulfed in the ensuing chaos. Even while small wars proliferate, the fear of general war is diminishing. In growing ever more complex "this world promises to be an analyst's paradise and a statesman's hell. The former will demonstrate their subtlety and the latter will discover that their power is limited."

1471
Aron, Raymond. THE ANARCHICAL ORDER OF POWER. Daedalus, v. 95, spring 1966: 479-502. Q11. B7, v. 95

Excerpts "from a major article commissioned . . . by the editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica."

Technologically 20th century man has advanced far beyond the level of previous civilizations, but the international order he knows has been inherited without basic changes. It is anarchical because composed of sovereign actors and oligarchical because rights within it derive from power. However, modern events have forged an order out of international anarchy, "an order favoring the limitation of armed conflicts, subject to an oligarchy camouflaged by democratic phraseology." Restraints on interstate violence provide the key to anarchical order and these are enabled by the dialectic of three weapons: the submachine gun (standing for guerrilla warfare), the tank (representing regular army fighting), and the nuclear bomb. Each weapon has its function. The atomic bomb deters total war; the tank permits states to maintain order and protect frontiers and also provides nuclear powers with an alternative to the apocalypse. Changes in the status quo have been wrought successfully by guerrilla forces. Vacillation between the extremes of major war and true peace is deplored by many. However the historian contemplating the last 20 years tends "even to hope secretly that this ambiguous conjuncture, this limitation of violence should continue." "Peace through fear," which has been so efficient under the thermonuclear duopoly, is not necessarily endangered by nuclear weapons proliferation. If "peace" is to be maintained despite this three sets of conditions will have to be satisfied: "technical--the maintenance of the balance of terror; strategic--the acceptance by all heads of state of the so-called graduated response doctrine, of progressive retaliation; and political--the nature of the conflict and the stakes." Nuclear weapons may someday be used between states, where the stakes are not as high, but if the superpowers maintain equilibrium in their qualitative arms race they will not allow themselves to be forced into a war of mutual destruction. The real danger arises out of decision-makers' attitudes toward nuclear weapons and not out of the physical spread of these weapons. Hopes for peace depend on the continuation of the psychological "atomic taboo," which makes men view nuclear weapons as defensive to be used only in the last resort. Probably "the military distance" between great and small nuclear powers will diminish and disunity will thereby increase. With nuclear weapons proliferation the superpowers will have to abandon policies of global presence. We cannot predict the course of history--

collective suicide or peace--nor can we know whether man would achieve "fulfillment or perdition if he were to arrive at the Promised Land of the world-state of technology."

1472
Bouthoul, Gaston. [PEACEFUL COEXISTENCES] Les coexistences pacifiques. Revue de Paris, v. 73, Mar. 1966: 52-60. AP20.R27, v. 73

Types of peace vary according to political and social conditions and other circumstances. Multicephalic coexistence is that state of affairs in which numerous independent states abide by tacit or formal conventions limiting or barring war. Examples of this are Greek relations from the period after the protohistoric invasions until the Peloponnesian War and feudal Europe. In these periods war was acceptable, but in general the antagonists abided by rules of courtesy that limited its effects. Post-feudal Europe evolved toward a new type of "almost peaceful coexistence"--pluricephalic coexistence, a balance of power guarded by great kingdoms. War became a less frequent phenomenon, but made up for this in intensity. The period of royal wars (limited and usually bilateral) was one of successive and unsuccessful attempts at establishing hegemonies. Even these conflicts were not catastrophic because rules of courtesy still limited them. The war of 1914-18 was the last example of the courteous war, a custom that had made it possible for any sovereign state to declare war when and where it willed. New weapons unable to discriminate between soldiers and civilians have made such actions (unless by a madman) impossible. Bicephalic coexistence is another form of peace, but historically not durable. In all previous cases when two strong and opposed alliances or hegemonies have together governed the known world they have split from within, been challenged by the rise of outside powers, or clashed and irretrievably weakened each other. Only a world state can impose a complete world peace. But efforts to establish this in the name of peace are unjustified, for not even the world state is exempted from violence. It is faced with the praetorian threat of bored armies taking over the government, the danger that warlords will fight among themselves, and the threat of a civil war as devastating as was international war.

1473
Broch, Tom, and Johan Galtung. BELLIGERENCE AMONG THE PRIMITIVES: A RE-ANALYSIS OF QUINCY WRIGHT'S DATA. Journal of peace research, v. 3, no. 1, 1966: 33-45.
P&GP RR

In this article the data on 652 primitive societies presented in Quincy Wright's A Study of War are analyzed by means of the techniques of multi-variate analysis and index-construction. Thirty-three percent of the societies are characterized as 'belligerent' in the sense that they are reputed to engage in aggressive warfare for economic or political purposes. An index of primitivity was constructed based on information on economic, political and social organization in the societies, and the level of belligerence varied from 0 percent at the most primitive level to 95 percent at the least primitive level, which corresponds roughly to what today is often referred to as 'traditional societies'. If in addition degree of contact with other societies is considered, the level of belligerence varies from 0 percent in the most primitive and isolated societies to 100 percent in the least primitive and least isolated societies. These findings are then discussed. (Authors' summary)

1474
Buchanan, Keith. THE TWO-THIRDS AND THE THIRD. VOICES FROM THE THIRD WORLD: (A) LATIN AMERICA. Eastern horizon, v. 5, Mar. 1966: 35-40.
AP8.E23, v. 5

Pleads for a better understanding of the hungry two-thirds of the world, an understanding of which is said to be the key to the future of international relations. "The character of the last third of this century will be determined by the manner in which . . . the affluent societies confront the problem posed by this uneven division of humanity into rich and poor, into men and less-than-men, into those who decree or deal death from the skies and those who die in the forests and the ricefields beneath the napalm or phosphorous fire." Indifference blocks human solidarity. The United States perhaps has come to realize that the world's unrest is not the product of a vast Communist conspiracy; now it must recognize that the tide of violence cannot be stemmed by dollars or the Marine Corps. All the world's people want social justice and human dignity.

1475
Bull, Hedley. INTERNATIONAL THEORY: THE CASE FOR A CLASSICAL APPROACH. World politics, v. 18, Apr. 1966: 361-377.
D839.W57, v. 18

Contemporary approaches to international politics can be dichotomized into the classical--"theorizing that derives from philosophy, history, and law"--and the scientific--aspiring "to a theory of international relations whose propositions are based either upon logical or mathematical proof, or upon strict, empirical procedures of verification." Critics say that most of the writings of the scientific theorists are "tortuous and inelegant," that their motives are "impure," and that they seek to advance a particular military or foreign policy. Such criticisms are unjust. Still the scientific approach "is likely to contribute very little to the theory of international relations, and in so far as it is intended to encroach upon and ultimately displace the classical approach, it is positively harmful." By excluding what they have termed "intuitive" knowledge (judgment) the scientific theorists have widely separated themselves from the real stuff of international politics and contented themselves with the periphery of international politics. In cases where the scientific theorists have thrown light upon the substance of international politics they have done so by transcending the boundaries of scientific rigor and utilizing the classical approach. Due to the wholly unmanageable number of variables involved, the resistance of the material to controlled experimentation, the ephemeral nature of international phenomena, and the fact that theorizing itself can alter these phenomena, the scientific approach is unlikely even to live up to the promise claimed for it by its practitioners. They have mired themselves in the building of models, none of which "could not just as well have been expressed as an empirical generalization." Also the scientific school has made a fetish of quantification. Although a need for rigor and coherence in international politics is obvious in the sense of defining terms and making assumptions explicit, this need can easily be fulfilled within the classical framework. Lastly, the scientific theorists, by setting themselves apart from history and philosophy, "have deprived themselves of the means of self-criticism, and in consequence have a view of their subject and its possibilities that is callow and brash." They are parochial and to some degree insensitive to the conditions that have produced

them. Their approach grows, perhaps from an attitude toward international politics that is fundamentally American and fundamentally simplistic. It need not be condemned; yet it need not be accepted, for its elements that contain value can easily be accommodated within the classical approach.

1476
CHINA TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 22, June 1966: 2-87.
TK9145. A84, v. 22

Contents.--The economy.--The population.--The development of agriculture.--Science and education.--Internal politics and foreign policy.--Impressions of the new China.

"Attempts the broader and more difficult task of evaluating not only military and scientific developments but also the political, economic, and social changes of an area encompassing one-fifth of mankind." The editors of the Bulletin exhort "that it is of the utmost importance for Americans to learn as much as they can as soon as they can about China." The 13 articles are based on papers presented to the International Conference on Mainland China, University of Chicago Center for Continuing Education, Feb. 8-11, 1966.

1477
Couwenberg, S. W. THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALISM AND SUPRANATIONALISM. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 11, Feb./Mar. 1966: 45-47.
UA646. F5, v. 11

Political nationalism seemed to be a dying concept following the Second World War, yet today it is reviving in the former colonial territories of Asia and Africa, in the Communist world, and even in the West. The nationalism found in the old colonial regions is essentially negativistic, based on a reaction against foreign domination rather than a common culture. The patterns of these new states evidence some of the preconditions of totalitarianism. In the West the attempt to subdue nationalism has been voluntary but has suffered many setbacks during the 1960's. Communist nationalism has sprung up in spite of Marxist theory, which expects the end of national states. Political nationalism is the real obstacle to disarmament, and supranational authority--whether beneficial or disastrous--is the only possible foundation for a peaceful world. The hard fact must be faced that "planetization" of human existence grows inevitably, although its progress is laborious.

1478
Davis, Robert H. THE INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE PROCESS: HOW RELEVANT IS THE CONTRIBUTION OF PSYCHOLOGISTS? American psychologist, v. 21, Mar. 1966: 236-243. BF1. A55, v. 21

"Paper (slightly modified) read as Division 19 special invited presentation at American Psychological Association, Los Angeles, September 1964."

Assuming deterrence to be "a matter of influencing the decisionmaking behavior of other human beings," the potential contribution of the psychologist is major. Of course deterrence is only one aspect of the international influence process, which falls into the two basic categories of deterrence and encouragement. In analyzing the process of influencing international decisionmaking psychologists have taken four primary approaches. The first, the building of analytical models, is an approach that simplifies a complex field of inquiry. For the most part international influence models have been verbal rather than mathematical. Unfortunately no research consensus exists concerning the building of social science models. Yet if the social scientist is to be heard at all in a "world in which many men will admit no bounds to their spheres of competence," he may not always adhere scrupulously to the demands of scientific rigor. A second approach open for investigating the international influence process is simulation of content. The most common usage of this technique, environmental or operational simulation, "seeks to preserve the complexity of the environment rather than abstract it away." Simulations remain expensive and cumbersome, and much doubt has arisen as to their applicability to the real world. The possibilities of influencing decisionmaking in international relations can also be studied through traditional behavioral research, since theoretically these decisions are made by individuals subject to general psychological principles. Game theory is the final major approach to the international influence process. In zero-sum games the play is highly competitive, since cooperation can lead only to lower rewards. Psychology is irrelevant; the players are "rational automatons" who are motivated solely by greed and whose strategies can be readily deduced within the theoretical framework. Non-zero-sum games, on the other hand, are greatly complicated by the influence of social interactions among the players; hence they can only be studied empirically. International decisionmakers operate in a complex and dynamic environment; most situations involve problem solving rather than highly structured bargaining or negotiation. And individual policymakers function on the basis of their own perceptions of reality and not necessarily from "reality" itself. None of the psychologist's approaches to the international influence process can prescribe the correct action for the decisionmaker. At best they can help him "formulate more complete models of reality."

1479
Dorlet, Louis. [CONFRONTATION] Confrontation. Défense de l'homme, v. 19, Mar. 1966: 1-2.
AP20. D37, v. 19

In the era of revolution (the century of Louis-Philippe) men who still believed in human perfectibility warned against the stagnation of humane thinking (Alexis de Tocqueville) and against spending more money and time on war than on peace (Emile de Girardin). Despite them the world has psychologically prepared itself for apocalyptic dangers--it does not react and is not astonished. A "nuclear logic" that builds satellites and weapons of mass destruction has emerged. Speed is the single vice man has today to differentiate him from his ancestors. "The demon of speed is pushing man more and more madly; soon he will no longer have time to live. Already he lives in the most magnificent incoherence." Reaction against nuclear logic and dehumanization must come quickly if at all.

1480
Froelich, J.-C. [THE ARMY IN POWER IN AFRICA] L'armée au pouvoir en Afrique. Afrique et l'Asie, no. 72, 4th quarter, 1965: 13-21.
DT1. A85, 1965

Details and analyzes the events and causes of the recent military coups in Dahomey, the Central African Republic, and Upper Volta. The results of such upheavals in a continent where minor military strength is an all-powerful political factor have been that there is now no chief of state who does not suspect his general chief of staff and that widespread anarchy and

political arbitrariness ("Congolization") threaten to overcome black Africa. Unless the coming wave of military leaders prove themselves first-rate statesmen Africa's situation may become that of Latin America where dictatorship and putsch succeed each other.

1481
Halle, Nils H. SOCIAL POSITION AND FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF FRANCE, NORWAY AND POLAND. Journal of peace research, v. 3, no. 1, 1966: 46-74.
P&GP RR

The article discusses a cross-national use of an index for social position (a center-periphery index), some hypotheses about social position and foreign policy opinion, and some selected findings from a comparative three nation study. The discussion is based upon data from a three nation survey, turn of the year 1964/65, with data from France (N=1,209), Norway (N=1,000) and Poland (N=2,749); national representative samples. The objective of this study was to make a comparative study on 'Public Opinion and the Consequences of Disarmament' or the 'Image of a Disarmed World'. The index for social position, previously only used in Norway, proved to 'work' quite as well both in 'big power' France and 'socialist' Poland. The absolutism-gradualism hypothesis stating higher degree of gradualism in the center was confirmed and revealed some pronounced similarities between the countries. Parts of a theory for attitude and opinion propagation were tested and confirmed. Two hypotheses about 'socio-logic', stating different kinds of foreign policy 'logic' in the center and the periphery, were only partly confirmed; the difference was clearly demonstrated but not the pattern of the difference. The selected findings from the study displayed differences and similarities between the three countries, related to foreign policy on peace and disarmament, and social position. Sometimes these findings brought France and Poland more close together than Norway-France, or Norway-Poland. This was for instance particularly clear when the countries were compared with regard to relative impact, within each country, of social position on the questions used. Finally, a hypothesis stating overselection by the center of majority views was confirmed and further discussed. (Author's summary)

1482
[HANDBOOK FOR THE LECTURER ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS] Spravochnik lektora-mezhdunarodnika. Moskva, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1965. 185 p.
JX1308.S65

Partial contents.--The problem of war and peace: the fundamental problem of today.--Disarmament: the summons of the times.--Role and place of the United Nations in resolving international problems.--The aggressive military blocs of the imperialist powers.--Calendar of some important events in the struggle for peace.--Brief dictionary of diplomatic terminology.

The compilers offer this handbook as an auxiliary aid to lecturers on international affairs. In its first section the principal international problems are presented. Here the reader will find material that will serve as something of a foundation for the elaboration of lectures and discussions on the urgent problems of world politics and international relations. The second section presents reference data that can be used in propaganda lectures. (Translation of supplied summary)

1483
Harrigan, Anthony. DEFENCE AGAINST TOTAL ATTACK. [Cape Town] Nasionale Boekhandel Beperk, 1965. 96 p.
UA11.H35

Contends that war is the natural activity of mankind and must therefore be faced realistically, without the prejudices and sapping of the will to win that have characterized the West since the end of World War II. Western man is naturally superior to men of the more primitive darker civilizations, Harrigan asserts, but he must utilize all the weapons at his disposal to defeat the insidious psychological and human-wave strategies of the expansionist East.

1484
Harsanyi, John C. GAME THEORY AND THE ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS. Australian journal of politics and history, v. 11, Dec. 1965: 292-304.
DU80.A945, v. 11

Rational behavior on the part of all players is assumed in the theory of games, although in real social situations such an assumption is invalid. Yet if only the actual policy objectives of countries can be known, as well as the weight each attaches to its goals, game theoretical analysis may bring some light to bear upon international conflict. Most international conflict falls into the category of the mixed game, which can be played as either a cooperative or a noncooperative game. Herein lies the greatest import for analysis of international politics: under what conditions will players utilize cooperative strategies? In the ordinary mixed-strategy game rational players will of necessity mistrust each other and play a noncooperative game unless agreements between the players can be made binding. This situation, known as the "Prisoner's Dilemma Paradox," comes about because the payoff structure of the game promises the greater reward to the player who uses a noncooperative strategy when his opponent uses a cooperative strategy. Thus mistrust, wars, arms races, and other forms of international conflict do not stem from the irrationality of policy-makers, as has often been assumed. Such an assumption "leads to serious underestimation of the political forces actually generating and maintaining international conflicts." Since the mutually noncooperative strategies represent the players' best reply to one another, even if the cooperative solution of the game will provide the highest rewards rational players will not choose it. Complicating the situation still further is the fact that a noncooperative equilibrium is highly sensitive to any disturbance, and the players will always be wary of changes in the status quo unless they can be convinced that the opponent's demands lead to clearly limited objectives. Since mutual distrust is built into the mixed-strategy game, it can be overcome only by altering both the fundamental attitudes of the players toward double-dealing in international politics and the payoffs connected with the game.

1485
Herberichs, Gérard. [THE THEORY OF PEACE ACCORDING TO PIUS XII] Théorie de la paix selon Pie XII. Préf. de Charles de Visscher. Paris, A. Pedone, 1964. 248 p.
JX1952.H44
Bibliography: p. 243-248.

Partial contents.--Characteristics of peace--Peace and pacifism.--The phenomenon of natural law.--Is natural law the foundation of the international society?

An analysis of Pope Pius XII's views on peace, which essentially were based on two ideas: that peace is primarily a spiritual problem and that the world is

becoming unified. The author cites Pius XII and other commentators who concur in the "elementary truth" that prospects for peace ultimately reside in the actions of millions of men, great and small. Admitting that world political unification is centuries away, Herberichs still considers the Pope's theories on international organization valuable; their function is to "help men to understand reality and to define an ideal which will prevent them from being satisfied with the present."

1486
Hoffmann, Stanley. THE STATE OF WAR: ESSAYS ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. New York, Praeger [1965] 276 p.
JX1395. H62

Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents. --Theory and international relations. --Minerva and Janus. --Rousseau on war and peace. --International systems and international law. --The study of international law and the theory of international relations. --Roulette in the cellar: notes on risk in international relations. --Restraints and choices in American foreign policy. --Terror in theory and practice. --The sound and the fury: the social scientist versus war in history.

Essays on international relations centered around the theory that "international politics is 'a state of war'--a competition of units in the kind of state of nature that knows no restraints other than those which the changing necessities of the game and the shallow conveniences of the players impose." Hoffmann deals exclusively with this "dominant" aspect of world politics, thereby excluding discussion of the attempts (international organization and transnational integration) that have been made to overcome the state of war. One most vital question is: What are the effects of nuclear weapons on the rules of the international game? "Needless to say, we have no final answers, but the study of both the unique and familiar features of the present international system, of both the factors of stability and the forces of disruption in our world, is of theoretical and practical importance." Hoffman addresses himself to this task.

1487
Milgram, Stanley. SOME CONDITIONS OF OBEDIENCE AND DISOBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY. Human relations, v. 18, no. 1, 1965: 57-76.
P&GP RR

A significant theme throughout history is the situation "in which one agent commands another to hurt a third." Indeed it might be said that all organized hostility, including war, is based on the triad of authority-executant-victim. A series of experiments recently conducted at Yale University sought to analyze one expression of this triad in a laboratory situation. The results of this experiment were startling. To describe the experiment in brief, a "teacher" (the subject) is ordered by an "experimenter" to administer electric shocks of varying degrees to a "learner" (the experimenter's accomplice) in a simulation of a learning experiment. The accomplice "protests" vocally as the simulated shocks administered go up the scale. Before the inclusion of vocal protests almost all subjects blithely proceeded to the highest levels of shocks despite written designations on the control panel: "Extreme Shock" and "Danger: Severe Shock." The protests were built into the experiment to answer the need for something that would increase the level of disobedience. Experimental conditions were varied: the victim unseen and unheard, the victim heard but not seen, the victim both visible and audible, and the victim being physically forced by the subject to place his hand on a shockplate. This variance produced significantly different results, with disobedience on a continuum of a minimum in the first condition and a maximum in the last. Nonetheless a high level of obedience was manifested in all situations. No experimental situation could be devised, in fact, in which a proportion of subjects--about one quarter at the least --did not administer the highest possible shock level. "With numbing regularity good people were seen to knuckle under the demands of authority and perform actions that were callous and severe . . . . If in this study an anonymous experimenter could successfully command adults to subdue a fifty-year-old man, and force on him painful electric shocks against his protests, one can only wonder what government, with its vastly greater authority and prestige, can command of its subjects."

1488
[OIL AND INDEPENDENCE] Neft' i nezavisimost'. Aziia i Afrika segodnia, v. 9, June 1966: 4-25.
DS1. S7, v. 9

Contents. --Subversion by the kings of oil, by D. Kasatkin. --The map of "black gold" changes, by Iu. Ershov. --"Fifth-fifty"-colonialists' cryptogram, by B. Rachkov. --Monopolies-foes of independence, by N. Vasin. --Against omnipotence of monopolies, by L. Muroshova. --Zigzags of petroleum politics, by T. Sattarov. --Fountain of prosperity, by G. Drambiants. --The people protest, by L. Frolova. --The keys to one's house, by I. Mikhailenko. --Under cover of embargo, by L. Korneev.

Recounts the difficulties experienced by former colonies and semicolonies in their struggle to gain freedom from dependence on organized world petroleum interests. Economic expansion of control by oil magnates in developing countries is condemned, while friendly help by the Soviet Union is commended.

1489
Rapoport, Anatol. RESEARCH FOR PEACE. Listener, v. 75, Mar. 31-Apr. 7, 1966: 455-456, 475, 504-505, 508.
AP4. L4165, v. 75

A science of conflict is required to carry out systematic peace research. Conflict itself can be viewed in three main ways: (1) As a "fight" that appears to be essentially self-propelled--a reaction to stimuli or an "accident-triggered disaster" rather than a reasoned policy. (2) As a strategic "game" with options for either war or peace, in which case it becomes the province of the rational calculation of policymakers. (3) As an ideologically inspired "debate" in which the objective is not to eliminate (fight) or outwit (game) the opponent but rather to modify his views. In peace research those subscribing to the cataclysmic theory would study the mechanics of the self-propelling process of war and construct indices of international attitudes or tensions whose fluctuations would warn of coming danger. The cataclysmic approach is limited, however, because wars frequently do contain nonaccidental components. The strategic approach--analysis of statesmen's decisions to wage or refrain from war--would apparently fill in the gaps left open by the first. However it is not normally suited to peace research because, unlike the ideological approach, it does not ask the basic question: Is the game worth playing? The contribution of the ideological approach to peace

research is its potential ability to highlight the complementarity of rival ideologies. A genuine debate might show that each of two hostile ideals is legitimate and that both are compatible.

1490
Singer, J. David, and Melvin Small. FORMAL ALLIANCES, 1815-1939: A QUANTITATIVE DESCRIPTION. Journal of peace research, v. 3, no. 1, 1966: 1-32. tables. P&GP RR
Bibliography: p. 24-27.

Although students of world politics have come increasingly to speak of their empirical domain as a social system, little effort has gone into the systematic observation and measurement of its formal or informal structure. One structural attribute of the international system which leaves a definite trace and is therefore readily measurable, is that of alliance patterns. This paper examines all written (peacetime only) alliances among system members, describes the procedures for classifying them, and then transforms such information into quantitative indicators of alliance aggregation for various forms of the international system for every year between 1815 and 1939. Such data make it possible to treat this particular system attribute as either a dependent or an independent variable for purposes of hypothesis testing or exploration in world politics. (Authors' summary)

1491
Skinner, B. F. CONTINGENCIES OF REINFORCEMENT IN THE DESIGN OF A CULTURE. Behavioral science, v. 11, May 1966: 159-166.
BF1.B4, v. 11

Excessive eating, excessive procreation, and excessive pugnacity, according to Professor Skinner, are the results of reinforcement patterns which once had survival value and so were selected for in the process of evolution. In our day of abundance, overpopulation, and war, these reinforcement patterns are a threat. The dangers of overindulgence in food, sex, aggression, and related behaviors have been dealt with by three traditional methods. The author proposes a fourth method based on contingent reinforcement. (Abstract supplied)

1492
Van Dyke, Vernon. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. 2d ed. New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts [1966] 527 p.
JX1395.V3, 1966

Asks two basic questions: Why do states behave as they do, and how do they pursue their objectives? in light of the assumption that "the problem of war is the major problem faced in international politics." In this, the second edition of a work first published in 1957, the great changes that have since taken place in the world are recognized--"changes in the role and importance of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America; in the relationships of the United States and the Soviet Union, and of each of them with other states, including actual or former allies; in the technology of war; and so on." The final portion of the book considers "prospects for peace."

1493
Zinnes, Dina A. A COMPARISON OF HOSTILE BEHAVIOR OF DECISION-MAKERS IN SIMULATE AND HISTORICAL DATA. World politics, v. 18, Apr. 1966: 474-502. tables.
D839.W57, v. 18

Tests 13 hypotheses concerning hostile behavior by utilizing two sets of data: one derived from simulation runs based on a loose bipolar system and played by high school students; the other from the documents exchanged during the 6-week crisis leading up to World War I. Many of the hypotheses proved valid in both studies, indicating that (a) a decisionmaker's perceptions of hostility correspond in large measure to actual hostility; (b) high school decisionmakers and national decisionmakers tended to behave similarly in similar situations; and (c) "the simulate and historical worlds are comparable, or isomorphic."

B. FOREIGN POLICIES OF STATES AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. General Analyses

1494
Alexandros, L. [EXPEDITION THROUGH THE NEAR EAST] Streifzug durch den Nahen Osten. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, May 10, 1966: 293-295.
U3.W38, v. 10

Our Middle East correspondent L. Alexandros conveys in his report an up-to-date picture of events, projects and plans in some of the Near East centres of tension. Writing of the Gaza Strip Alexandros reports, for example, that the Egyptian Government has earmarked some $120 m for the construction of a major harbour and naval base in Gaza, though Middle East observers are still unsure of the basic reasons for this decision. The Israeli Navy is expanding its submarine fleet through the purchase of two reconditioned long-range vessels from Britain (the former "Turpin" and "Totem"). Brief comments on the rising figures for Egyptian aircraft crashes and a discussion of the possible causes are followed by an account of the present military situation in Yemen. Exact figures for the strength and losses of the Egyptian expeditionary forces are given. Finally, our correspondent gives a detailed description of Czechoslovakia's efforts to sell arms to Egypt. The Czechs are seeking to underbid the Soviets in arms exports and to establish entirely independent trade relationships, a move which has not exactly been received with enthusiasm in Moscow. Czech offers to Egypt include armoured trucks, 82-mm multi-purpose guns and armoured cars. Following this offer to Egypt, other military missions from the Near and Far East are reportedly interested in weapons and equipment from Prague. (Abstract supplied)

1495
Babakov, A. [ANTICOMMUNISM IN THE SERVICE OF IMPERIALIST REACTION] Antikommunizm na sluzhbe imperialisticheskoi reaktsii. Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, v. 47, May 1966: 75-80.
U717.R9A27, v. 47

Anticommunism, the major ideological and political weapon of imperialist reaction, draws from two sources: the militaristic dicta of men like Barry Goldwater, who regards victory over communism as the main objective of U.S. policy, and more liberal theories of writers such as Walt W. Rostow and Raymond Aron, who advocate measures likely to negate the social and economic differences between the United States and the Soviet Union, thus preparing the way for a world system based upon a blend of capitalism and communism. The future world envisaged by Rostow and Aron is capitalist to a great degree, strangely enough, while Socialist elements seem lacking. This variety of anticommunism is but another example of the export of ideology increasingly favored by imperialist strategists in the cold war and one more attempt to devise a strategy of conflict under modern conditions. In West Germany anticommunism has raised anew the

Bonn militarists' hopes of acquiring nuclear weapons. Von Hassel knew how to play upon sentiment when he recently warned that West Germany cannot serve as the "bastion against communism in Europe" without nuclear arms. Anti-Communist hysteria has been fostered throughout West Germany to prepare the ground for revanchist policies and to ready the people for a fratricidal war against the German Democratic Republic. Having failed in its frontal counterattack on the Socialist system, U.S. monopolists have decided to shift their aggression to the so-called "outlying zone": the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Here anticommunism is relied upon to suppress the national liberation movement, which bourgeois theoreticians constantly deplore as likely to lead to world conflict and nuclear war. But Marxist-Leninists understand that the more actively and resolutely the peoples of the world oppose imperialism, the weaker will become its position, and the smaller its chance of driving mankind to world nuclear catastrophe.

1496

Blumenson, Martin. TWO GERMANIES OR ONE? In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Military review, v. 46, Apr. 1966: 29-38. Z6723.U35, v. 46

Gives the background of the German reunification problem. Various proposed solutions are discussed, as well as the current status of Communist and Western attitudes toward the issue. The author's prognosis is that German reunification is "in conflict with reality and an impossibility in the foreseeable future."

1497

Brykin, Vladimir A. [AN AFRICAN DIPLOMAT AT THE U.N.] Afrikanskii diplomat v OON. Moskva, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1965. 240 p. JX1977.2.A4B7

This is a book on the diplomacy of the young African states during a stormy period in their history, a period rich in events of national liberation revolutions. In the United Nations Africa manifests all the diversity of the social life of its peoples, who are struggling for freedom and independence. At the same time complex processes are unfolding in the United Nations itself. The diplomacy of the African nations, characterized by an anti-imperialist trend in foreign policy, has actively promoted the adoption of U.N. resolutions in the interest of preserving the peace and strengthening the security and cooperation of peoples. The Soviet Union and other Socialist nations have, with free Africa, defended these resolutions. Of special interest are the pages that tell of the clash in the United Nations between the young diplomacy of Africa and the reactionary, bourgeois diplomacies of the West; on one side there is fervor, an ardent faith in lofty ideals, and an indomitable desire to uphold the rights and dignity of the peoples of an entire continent; on the other side there is cold calculation, hypocrisy, and the aspiration to order the destinies of the new nations. The book notes the inconsistency that can characterize the diplomacy of an African nation when its activities are regulated by interests foreign to Africa, its hopes and aspirations, and how this adversely affects even the work of the United Nations. (Translation of supplied summary)

1498

Caulais, Jacques. [SECURITY OR UNIFICATION: GERMANY BEFORE A NEW "REALPOLITIK"] Sécurité ou unité: l'Allemagne devant une nouvelle "Realpolitik." Année politique et économique, v. 39, Apr. 1966: 40-50. D410.A6, v. 39

Thinking men in Germany are reconsidering the priorities of German politics. Inflation threatens the economy and the East-West division of Germany chafes the emotions. What has the Bundeswehr done to promote unification? It is an army "that dissuades no one, not even the Soviet Union, is ineffective against whatever exterior danger lurks, and constitutes a real economic burden." The alternatives are security, which would consist of close alliance with the United States and a nuclear weapons program, and reunification, which would begin with a European détente. The signs point to ever-greater support in Germany for the latter choice, a support brought to public consciousness by the recent theological declarations concerning recognition of the Oder-Neisse boundary and coexistence. Many Germans are labelled "Gaullists" because they advocate a European settlement achieved by Europeans rather than one gotten through a U.S.-led NATO. Franz Josef Strauss presses for a European Defense Organization, but this, however original and bold a concept, is all the same "a part of the old idea of 'security'" before unity, an idea that scares away the Eastern Socialist states. A political strategy of unification is indispensable to the goal. Dr. W.W. Schuetz's study office, Indivisible Germany, advocates just such an approach, to be directed by a reunification cabinet. Cultural and psychological unity would prepare the way for political accords. Erhard cannot about-face, but he has already admitted that only European unity can assure long-term security. What is happening in Germany is "the beginning of a spirit of coexistence unknown to the world since the end of the war." This renewed German conscience gives substance to the strategy of reunification. Germany's hope for unity resides not in military preparations but in being known as "the great European nation of nonviolence."

1499

Clark, Joseph S. THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE. Orbis, v. 10, spring 1966: 27-41. D839.O68, v. 10

Americans suspect peaceful coexistence with the Communist states on the grounds of the untrustworthy and aggressive nature of international communism. They seem to forget that the United States has changed from an isolated North American state with no serious foreign ambitions--which it was prior to the Spanish-American War of 1898--to a power whose economic and military expansion encompasses the whole globe. Today the United States operates as the good provider for the non-Communist nations and the policeman bent on containing the political and military ambitions of Russia and China. The rationale behind this fantastic expansion of U.S. interests is obsolescent and will soon be obsolete. U.S. disarmament talks with the U.S.S.R. are stalled from lack of real effort on either side to close the gap between their different approaches. However some hope is seen in the limited test ban, evidence of the Kremlin's abandonment of plans for hegemony by force in Western Europe, and, especially, in the fact that Russia is now a "have" nation. In the trouble spots of Vietnam and Germany one can hope for a solution which is both honorable and not unrealistic only if it is pursued by a skillful and forward-looking diplomacy. To achieve a just and lasting peace the U.S.S.R. and the United States must stop overconcentrating on deadly "gamesmanship" and replace diplomacy based on conflict and suspicion with one based on greatly intensified efforts for international cooperation.

1500
Doernberg, Stefan. [THE GERMAN QUESTION AND EUROPE'S FUTURE] Die deutsche Frage und die Zukunft Europas. Einheit, v. 21, May 1966: 605-614.
HX6. E4, v. 21

Europe's future depends on solution of the German problem, which arises first from Bonn's aggressive goals and second from the German Federal Republic's military interdependence with the United States. The former has been evident in Bonn's "growing activities in ideological subversion," in its territorial claims, and its striving for control over nuclear arms. The latter serves the interests of both German and American imperialism and thus constitutes a great danger not only to the peace of Europe but world peace. Contrary to Bonn's contention, neither Germany's partition nor the existence of two German states and two different social systems in Germany and Europe represents a threat to European peace. Without a change in Bonn's policy and normalization of relations between the two German states no permanent relaxation of tensions is possible. The German Democratic Republic bases its views of Europe's future on the following considerations: (1) Two different social systems will stay side by side in Europe for a long time to come. (2) Most important for the future of Europe at present is the establishment of a European security system. (3) The most urgent task today is to prevent any further dissemination of nuclear arms, which can best be accomplished by establishment of an atom-free zone in Central Europe. Europe's future requires that its political configuration be based on nation states; these have been by no means outmoded by history. Europe requires full recognition of national sovereignties and the equality of states. "Neither economic power, nor large territory, nor population strength should give any particular state in Europe special privileges, still less justify its tendencies toward hegemony" over the other states.

1501
Friends, Society of. American Friends Service Committee. PEACE IN VIETNAM: A NEW APPROACH IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. New York, Hill and Wang [1966] 112 p. DS557. A6F7
Bibliography: p. 108-112.

Contents. --Vietnam--current perspectives. --Nationalism in Southeast Asia. --The need for socio-economic change in Southeast Asia. --The role of China. --History of United States involvement in Vietnam. --The negotiation puzzle. --Possibilities for a settlement.

A survey of the situation in Vietnam at present and a criticism of U.S. policy there, prepared by a working party (Bronson P. Clark, Woodruff J. Emlen, Dorothy Hutchinson, George McT. Kahin, Jonathan Mirsky, A. J. Muste, W. Allyn Rickett, and Clarence H. Yarrow) appointed by the American Friends Service Committee "to study in depth the complex problems of ending reliance on military force." The authors conclude that the problems in Vietnam are of a political and economic nature, untouched by military power. In the poor nations revolutions are brewing. Dogmatic anticommunism will not answer these nations' needs. "The tragedy of Vietnam shows that revolutionary forces can turn to civil war, and civil war can lead to outside intervention, and intervention can lead to an ever-widening arena of conflict, with the specter of the H-bomb looming as the ultimate debacle--all this unless the forces of change are channeled into constructive courses." Beyond this the United States must abandon the idea that by economic or military power it "can determine the course of the whole world."

1502
Guetzkow, Harold, and Lloyd Jensen. RESEARCH ACTIVITIES ON SIMULATED INTERNATIONAL PROCESSES. Background, v. 9, Feb. 1966: 261-274.
D839. B4, v. 9

A "revision and updating of Harold Guetzkow's manuscript, 'Toward the Acceleration of Research in SIMULATED INTERNATIONAL PROCESSES,' presented on October 15, 1964 to the Inter-Agency Group on Strategic Studies of the Joint War Games Agency."

Evaluates current developments in the simulation of international processes. Two and one-half pages of references conclude the article.

1503
Hacker, Jens. [LEGAL STATUS OF THE SOVIET OCCUPATION ZONE OF GERMANY] Die Rechtslage der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone. Hrsg. vom Bundesministerium für Gesamtdeutsche Fragen. Bonn [1964] 36 p. JX4084. G4. H3
Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents. --Moscow's and East Berlin's arguments. --Is the "German Democratic Republic" a state in the context of international law? --The right to self-determination in the German view. --The theory of two [German] states. --The claim to international legal recognition.

Analysis of the status under international law of the "Soviet-occupied zone of Germany." The author regards the zone's claim to statehood as baseless under the law of nations. East Germany's continued separation from West Germany and its public administration system are illegal and violate the German people's right to self-determination. Diplomatic recognition of "the so-called German Democratic Republic" amounts to intervention in the domestic affairs of the German Federal Republic, whose authorities alone represent the entire German people and its sovereign rights.

1504
Howard, Richard C., ed. BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ASIAN STUDIES 1964. Journal of Asian studies, v. 24, Sept. 1965: 1-379. DS501. F274, v. 24

A general and country bibliography of periodicals, books, and articles on Asia and the Far East. Included under many of the headings are sections on military and naval policies and programs and foreign relations. The major headings are: Asia, Far East, China, Hongkong and Macao, Taiwan, Tibet, Mongolia, Central Asia and Soviet Far East, Korea, Japan, Southeast Asia, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Burma, South Asia, Ceylon, Pakistan, Himalaya, and India.

1505
Khoman, Thanat. AN ASIAN LOOKS AT COMMUNISM. Free world, v. 15, no. 3, 1966: 14-15.
AP8. F69, v. 15

The tyrannical force of communism--a concept bred by two disgruntled thinkers, Marx and Engels, at a time when the West was going through its industrial revolution--is casting a spell of danger over free Asian nations. The problems to which Marx and Engels addressed themselves have largely been corrected and, in addition, have no bearing on situations

facing the nations of Asia. To substitute a dictatorship of the proletariat for one of another type only brings in a different party to abuse power. Besides, actual examples of Communist society show only industrial inefficiency and ruthless exploitation of the worker, who is required to fill a quota set by a member of this new ruling class. Unfortunately the Communists have not dropped their ultimate goal of establishing their form of government throughout the world. Experience indicates they will use any device or means to overthrow an existing government. While the older Communist movements are not as zealous as the new, the revolutionary fervor of the Asian Communists poses a direct and present danger as they openly advocate and are presently employing force to overthrow governments in Laos and South Vietnam. They have broken the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962, and it is only with the help of the United States and other allies that the "liberation" hoax and violent encroachment upon their neighbors perpetrated by North Vietnam and China can be exposed and stopped. "Communism represents another recrudescence of totalitarianism," and is "anti-historic and as such inhuman." The evolution of mankind is toward greater freedom, and while "the challenge of communism is undoubtedly grave . . . it can be overcome."

1506
Laffay, Jean. [POLITICAL MUTATIONS] Mutations politiques. In his L'Ere communiste? Paris, Nouvelles éditions Debresse [1965] p. 53-76.
HC240. L26

After the Cuban crisis demonstrated U.S. determination and ended the practice of dangerous risktaking by the Soviet Union, the cohesion of the Western bloc loosened. A corresponding movement in the Communist bloc has occurred as a result of the Sino-Soviet confrontation. Greater equality in NATO serves the cause of the alliance, but who can say how independence will affect the Communist world where national feelings are replacing ideology? International politics is destined to become more complex. De Gaulle's conception of one Europe extending from the Atlantic to the Urals seems at first scarcely realistic. But from the long-term Soviet viewpoint it is conceivable. The China of tomorrow, strong but crowded and hungry, will eye the sparsely populated lands of Soviet Asia. Thus wisdom would dictate that the Soviet Union seek security in Europe--détente and desatellization. The United States would profit from collaboration with the U.S.S.R. Indeed the peace that is unattainable while the Soviet Union and China are in one camp would then be assured; the United States, freed of its military obligations in Europe, could devote its resources to containing China in Asia. But the Europe envisaged by De Gaulle is not the one that would emerge, for the Soviet Union would insist on being the dominant power. To achieve this position Russia would give Germany the option of all (reunification) or nothing (status quo), and naturally both Germanies would choose the former. The condition of this reunification would be neutrality, in short a weakening of the Western camp. Another factor to be reckoned with in reading the future is a resurgence of nationalism, an economic rather than a political nationalism. This is a phenomenon for which the free world must prepare.

1507
Lerche, Charles O. AFTER THE COLD WAR. Nation, v. 202, June 6, 1966: 673-676.
AP2. N2, v. 202

The cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union is now nearing its end. Ideological confrontations and war scares will now give way to "the bit-by-bit accumulation of small advantages that is historically the norm of international relations." The superpowers must now "find a way to keep alive enough of the cold-war mystique to guarantee consensus at home and leadership abroad, while simultaneously gaining enough freedom of action to build a new basis for dealing with each other." Neither Washington nor Moscow has been able to achieve its utopia; the traditional state system "has finally vanquished both its Marxist and its Wilsonian opponent." Necessarily the arms race will be replaced by joint U.S.-Soviet efforts to stem proliferation of nuclear weapons. Washington and Moscow will then discover that arms control agreements must be "born out of a political setting marked by assumptions of good will on either side" and will seek compromise on other political differences. The German problem and the problem of assistance to underdeveloped nations will be the most prominent among these differences. Joint action in foreign aid and development can enhance the prestige of both powers (beneficiary states would no longer be able to play one off against another) and "might also make a significant contribution to stability and peace in the non-Western parts of the world." Dangerous forces now building in Germany, Korea, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia can be assuaged by combined U.S.-Soviet resources. France and Communist China, the revisionist rivals of the two superpowers, will no longer be able to exploit "the shadow zone left by the cold war between Moscow and Washington." The revolutionary concepts that have determined the strategic pattern of postwar relations will thus yield to a resurgence of classical patterns of international relations.

1508
Reese, Howard C. THE ARAB ISRAELI DISPUTE AND THE MAJOR POWERS. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 46, Apr. 1966: 53-64.
Z6723. U35, v. 46

Serious regional difficulties that involve direct or indirect contacts between the Soviet Union and the United States cannot fail to concern the two superpowers. What then can they do to prevent open Arab-Israeli hostilities? As in Central Europe, peace in the Middle East depends on political and military balance. The dispute, which "is a legacy of the establishment of Israel as a state in 1948," has three major facets--the issue of Arab refugees, Israeli use of the waters of the Jordan River, and Arab refusal to recognize the state of Israel. The latter is the primary component of the dispute, manifesting itself in the Arab boycott and blacklist of countries trading with Israel. Although Israel has in many ways compensated handsomely for this disadvantage, neither side seems to show any understanding of what the dispute means to the other. The American position in the dispute is strongly on the side of maintaining peace, since the United States is, for economic and security reasons, committed to the territorial integrity of all the disputants. British Middle East policy, on the other hand, seems to be in a state of flux. Yet London will probably end by following a middle-of-the-road policy similar to that of the United States. The Yemen dispute indicated British-U.S. differences in the region, but they are largely theoretical. France, because of such factors as Egyptian support of the Algerian FLN during the Algerian

war and Nasserite anti-French propaganda, has been largely pro-Israel. West Germany has also been a strong supporter of Israel, primarily for psychological reasons connected with the atrocities of the Third Reich. The attitude of the Soviet Union--the only major power bordering the Middle East--tends to be pro-Arab, motivated primarily by opportunism. The policies of the major powers with interests in the area, then, tend to contain any outbreak of hostilities, since the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 would immediately be invoked and the mechanism of the United Nations brought into play. Hopefully tensions will die down as time goes on. The United States would like to see Arab-Israeli negotiation, and although the Soviet Union has heretofore applied little pressure toward this end, the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East may convince Moscow that a settlement of the dispute is essential.

1509
Roll, Christian. BUDDHISM AS POLITICAL POWER IN ASIA] Der Buddhismus als politische Kraft in Asien. Aussenpolitik, v. 17, June 1966: 360-370.
D839.A885, v. 17

Asian political revival has been accompanied by a renaissance of Buddhism as religion, at least partly because of the frequent participation of Buddhist orders in national independence movements. In this way Buddhists have come in contact with movements of all persuasions, and especially with the Socialists. Such contacts were maintained in many countries even after independence was achieved. That foreign governments, particularly those of Socialist nations, try to influence Budhism politically is evident all over Asia. There has also been some Communist infiltration of certain monastic orders, for example in Vietnam. Some Buddhist mass lay movements, such as those in Japan and South Korea, are politically powerful. On the whole Buddhism shows great potential of becoming "a unifying power in today's Asia" and contributing in substantial measure to the world peace. (Translation of supplied abstract, modified)

1510
Vernant, Jacques. [PEKING, WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW] Pékin, Washington et Moscou. Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, Apr. 1966: 704-708.
D410.R45, v. 22

Western governments' (Paris, Washington, and Moscow) evaluations of the political, military, and psychological changes in Europe lead to similar conclusions. But their views on China diverge widely. Having vigorously defended Chiang's China, the United States sees in Mao Tse-tung's China a concerted attempt to extend political and ideological control throughout South Asia. Conversely France draws no such drastic distinction between the two regimes--China remains China. To be sure Communist Chinese propaganda is virulent. Nonetheless domestic tasks preclude a foreign policy of conquest and expansion. China defines three foreign policy objectives: (1) control of all its national territory, including Formosa; (2) removal of the U.S. presence from Asia; and (3) restoration of its international rights, including those outlined in the U.N. Charter. A policy of expansionism is hardly proven by nuclear weapons production, large active conventional forces, or revolutionary declarations. These are just as easily, and more probably, defensive manifestations against avowed U.S. goals of being itself an Asian power and containing Communist China. Nor is China going to permit the Soviet Union to become an Asian power. "Between Peking, Washington and Moscow a triangular game is being played, which seems unlikely to turn into a diplomatic alliance of any two against one."

2. Unilateral Policies

1511
Barnett, A. Doak. THE CASE FOR "CONTAINMENT BUT NOT ISOLATION." War/peace report, v. 6, Apr. 1966: 3-5. P&GP RR

Excerpts from a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 8, 1966.

Isolation of Communist China has proved unwise, unsuccessful, and unlikely to moderate Chinese attitudes, reduce tensions, or elicit from China "more normal patterns of international intercourse." The United States can better serve these ends by practicing a policy of containment without isolation: by extending de facto recognition to the government of mainland China and expressing a desire to extend de jure recognition and exchange diplomatic missions when the Chinese inclination is mutual. The Chinese revolution has been in progress for 100 years, ever since Western imperial power deprived it of its primacy among Asian nations. China's drive to return to major-power status, based upon the strategy of exporting revolution, suggests a long period of military confrontation with the West. But the new generation of leaders soon to succeed the original revolutionary group in Peking may favor more fluid policies and show less revolutionary militancy. "Where the Chinese Communists have been dogmatically and rigidly militant in the recent period, they have suffered a series of major setbacks and policy defeats." Because China is far from superpower status it will probably use its new nuclear capacity for political ends, hopefully "to deter and cancel out the significance of American nuclear power in Asia." Although anxious to avoid conflict with America China's leaders will risk major war whenever they feel their vital interests threatened. "In view of this uncertainty, it is essential that the United States exercise great restraint in the use of its power, especially in North Vietnam, and demonstrate by deeds as well as words that we are determined to avoid provoking any direct American-Chinese conflict." The United States must reverse its stand on Communist Chinese membership in the United Nations before voting in the General Assembly brings about a major U.S. political defeat. Peking and Taipei should be offered seats in the Assembly, even though neither will probably accept such a solution. In time international pressures may induce both successor states to submit to this condition.

1512
BLUEPRINT FOR A HOUSE DIVIDED. Current scene, v. 3, Sept. 17, 1965: 1-11. P&GP RR

Basic to Communist China's concept of international relations is the principle that the world is divided into two camps, each warring against the other in the struggle for domination of the world. "Using Peking's terminology, the 'rural' areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America would be aligned against the 'cities of the world.'" In keeping with this view Premier Chou En-lai has suggested a reorganization of the United Nations. Afro-Asian nations would become a second, "revolutionary" United Nations. Communist China has definite ideas with regard to the world organization; for example it condemns U.N. interest in reconciling the Vietnamese conflict. Yet, there was a time when Communist China was very concerned about U.N. membership and the status attached to it. Now it seems that Peking, being unwilling to accept the concomitant responsibility, is not as anxious to attain

admission. Peking's position on Taiwan's U. N. membership has not changed at all, and the problem remains unsolved. There is reason to fear that Communist China's presence in the United Nations would be a disruptive one and dangerous to the Organization's continued stability.

1513
BRITAIN EAST OF SUEZ--SPECIAL ISSUE. International affairs (London) v. 42, Apr. 1966: 179-260.
JX1.153, v. 42

Contents.--Britain's strategic problem East of Suez, by Michael Howard.--Britain in the Indian Ocean, by Alastair Buchan.--A United States view, by George K. Tanham.--The Commonwealth and Britain East of Suez, by Maurice Zinkin.--Some South-East Asian attitudes, by Michael Leifer.--An Australian view, by J. D. B. Miller.--Some Chinese attitudes, by W. A. C. Adie.--Britain East of Suez--facts and figures, by Hugh Hanning.

To all appearances Britain is going to maintain a military presence east of Suez, at least in the immediate future. But there continue to be many different views on whether Britain can or should maintain that presence--on which Hugh Hanning provides some relevant facts and figures--and some of those views are reflected in this issue. Professor Michael Howard maintains that Britain has now virtually no specific long-term national interests in the area commensurate with her military expenditure there, but that she does have short-term commitments which it would be unwise to abandon hurriedly. Alastair Buchan argues that Britain should not be in Asia (or Africa) merely to buy influence in Washington, while Dr. George K. Tanham holds that the immediate preference of the United States is that Britain should continue her peace-keeping role in the Indian Ocean. Maurice Zinkin says that Britain cannot leave the Indian Ocean tomorrow, but that in the long run the countries in that area will have to do more to defend themselves. Michael Leifer discusses the attitudes towards the British presence east of Suez of those South-East Asian countries which would be most directly affected if it were modified. Australia would be in like case, and Professor J. D. B. Miller points both to her wish to retain Britain as a military and diplomatic ally in the area and to her suspicions of Chinese intentions there. On those intentions W. A. C. Adie puts forward the view that 'Discussions about "east of Suez" are often vitiated by failure to think about . . . the dichotomy between what China seems to be saying and what she seems to be doing.' (Editor's summary)

1514
Bundy, William P. THE CHALLENGE OF COMMUNIST CHINA. Air Force and space digest, v. 49, Apr. 1966: 73-77, 79. UG633.A65, v. 49

The world order envisaged and promoted by the United States unfortunately clashes with the international objectives sought by Communist China. A U.S. desire to create a community of free and independent nations is opposed by Peking's plan to extend its control over all territory once controlled by the Manchu Empire. Arguments that Communist China merely intends to establish hegemony among its neighbors, not outright domination, ignore the experience of Eastern Europe, where similar Soviet aspirations demanded complete subjugation in keeping with the "Communist logic that does insist on total control, that will not tolerate anything other than the imposition of the full Communist totalitarian system." Success in Southeast Asia then would inexorably drive Communist China to threaten India and Japan. The policy of containment used by the United States to preserve Europe from Soviet domination after World War II--military and economic assistance and guarantees against external attack--must be applied to restrain Communist China. The United States has had some 128 meetings at the ambassadorial level with representatives of Peking at Geneva and Warsaw; "it is fair to say that it is more of a dialogue than we could expect to have if we were to recognize Communist China, if the experience of Western diplomats in Peiping is representative." Although Chinese belligerence and demands for Taiwan have rendered these discussions fruitless, the United States continues to envisage Chinese participation in multilateral discussions on subjects such as disarmament when Peking actually does develop a constructive program. In the meantime Chinese Communist membership in the United Nations continues to be thwarted by such unacceptable conditions demanded by Peking as expulsion of Taiwan and U.N. reorganization. Attempts to establish contact with China through a bilateral arrangement (travel permits, exchanges, and the like) have been vitiated by the Communists. The Chinese response to trade arrangements with the United States has been consistently and unequivocably negative. Until a new and perhaps less belligerent generation of Chinese leaders emerges the problem of the Chinese Communist threat "must be considered basically in the same way we did that of the Soviet Union."

1515
Burchill, Charles S. CHINESE AGGRESSION--MYTH OR MENACE? Minority of one, v. 8, Apr. 1966: 14-18.
AP2.M55985, v. 8

The Chinese consider the charge of aggression, which the United Nations levies against them, a fabrication. Imagine that a capitalist North Mexico invaded a crumbling puppet-controlled South Mexico and that a strong Soviet force reinforced by other Warsaw Pact contingents arrived to drive the northerners back and then changed its war aims to include conquest of the northern country. Imagine that these forces went so far as to bomb bridges leading to Texas and to threaten invasion of the United States. Would a U.S. action to repel these troops be aggression? Neither do the Chinese consider their participation in the Korean War aggression. Chinese aggression in India is mythical, and while Chinese actions in Korea and Tibet were real, "the extent to which they were aggressive depends on the point of view." That China promotes revolution is used against it in debates on its U.N. admission. More truthfully it is poverty and disinterested governments that cause revolution--"every time we profit by a drop in the price of coffee or sugar or cocoa; every time we raise a quota against imports from 'low-wage countries'; every time we supply some petty dictator with the weapons to subdue unrest; every time we manipulate an election to ensure the victory of a 'satisfactory' government in a backward country--we are doing more to promote violent revolution than any Chinese missionary with a copy of Mao's poems in his pocket or a few grenades in his satchel." Chinese policy is cautious and therefore nonaggressive although presently intransigent in its hostility to the West and the United Nations. This last is a function of the visible Western and U.N. hostility which China has experienced over the last 17 years. The United Nations has not managed to live up to its inherent idealism. Members hold law and order in contempt if it is not in their sovereign interests; the "clique of

230-967 O - 66 - 2

white prosperous nations" manipulates the United Nations for its own advantage. If justice and peace are desired no nation can be excluded from the world organization and procedures for impartial and enforceable law must be developed. In both international and revolutionary wars "the only hope of peaceful solutions seems to lie in a revitalized United Nations, universal in membership and devoted to the interests of mankind rather than to the support of a faction."

1516
Clubb, O. Edmund. CHINA: A STRANGER AND AFRAID. Columbia University forum, v. 9, winter 1966: 4-10. AS30. C59, v. 9

The China of today, just as the China of yesterday, rejects the fundamental concepts of a Western world whose background in no way resembles its own. As a Communist state China conducts its foreign relations much the way it did in the times of empire and republic. Peking's ruling aim is to restore the former dominance of the "Middle Kingdom." Nonetheless Maoism has not been widely accepted, for the Chinese Communist propaganda on which it must rely has sounded with increasing bellicosity in a world striving for peace and economic security. Even though Peking stresses the conversion of the underdeveloped lands, its fate will in reality depend upon relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. But the Chinese leaders have already alienated Moscow, despite their nation's almost untenable economic situation. As for the United States, it is China's "Enemy No. 1." America, of course, must share part of the blame for the intense mutual hatred between China and the United States. Both nations seem driven to oppose each other ever more actively in Asia. The dilemma of China, actually a militarily weak nation, is harsh. Either it can attempt to win an absolute commitment from Russia to "extend the Soviet nuclear umbrella over China for protection against the United States until China had built up its own nuclear capacity," or it can seek a Sino-American détente. Neither alternative seems feasible. Peking has too long antagonized Moscow to come to terms with it; and until the United States makes at least some concessions to China peaceful coexistence in Sino-American relations will be impossible. Currently, then, China is attempting to coerce Soviet support through mustering "revolutionary" public opinion over the Vietnam issue. As Moscow is unlikely to take this bait, both the Chinese and American courses in Southeast Asia come ever closer to a full-scale confrontation. The eventual admission of Red China into the United Nations may ameliorate the situation, but "if China is not brought soon into the organized world community, that community will probably cease to exist."

1517
Cohen, Bernard C., ed. FOREIGN POLICY IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: READINGS. Boston, Little, Brown [1965] 204 p. (Introductory readers in American politics) JX1417. C58

Selected readings focusing mainly on four aspects of American foreign policymaking: issues and problems, the Executive branch, specialized functions, and "contexts and constituents" (including Congress, interest groups, and the press).

1518
CONTAINING CHINA: A ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION. Commentary, v. 41, May 1966: 23-41. DS101. C63, v. 41

An edited transcript of a roundtable discussion, moderated by Norman Podhoretz, on "whether the purpose of American policy in the Far East is to contain Chinese expansion or to halt the spread of Communism." Participants were Bernard B. Fall, Richard N. Goodwin, Senator George McGovern, and John P. Roche. U.S. interests in Asia, the likelihood of a Sino-American war, "North Vietnamese Communist imperialism," and Chinese strategy and tactics in Asia are among the subjects examined.

1519
Davies, John Paton. FOREIGN AND OTHER AFFAIRS. New York, W.W. Norton [1966] 219 p. E744. D27, 1966

A former U.S. diplomat's criticism of American foreign policy "from a carpentry shop at the foot of the Andes--lending, if not enchantment, some measure of objectivity to an underlying affection." Mr. Davies states that in the early 1960's "in only two major respects did the conduct of American foreign affairs depart from somnambulism"--the strengthened U.S. military superiority over the U.S.S.R. and the fruition of the U.S. contribution to the recovery of Western Europe and Japan. Other major policies he describes as sleepwalking--the Grand Design for U.S. partnership with a "vaguely united Europe," the "making over of Latin America," and "the nightmare of our rigidly pushing against the spectral monolith of international communism lest it crash down upon us, crush and bury us beneath a solid bulk that was not." In the chapter entitled "Imbalance of Terror" Davies evaluates problems of nuclear deterrence, strategy, arms control, and war. The Soviet Union, Communist China, the problems of Europe, and, at home, the problems of conducting foreign policy are discussed in subsequent chapters.

1520
Encausse, H. Carrère de. [THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST] L'U.R.S.S. et le Moyen Orient. Orient, v. 10, 1st quarter 1966: 7-25. DS1. O44, v. 10

A documented study of Soviet theory, attitudes, and perceptions regarding the Middle East during the last few years.

1521
[EUROPE WITH DE GAULLE?] Europa mit de Gaulle? Politische Studien, v. 17, Jan./Feb. 1966: 7-45. H35. P66, v. 17

Contents.--De Gaulle--initiator of a new Europe? by Christoph Büchenbacher.--The European policy of Gen. de Gaulle, by Christian Perroux.--De Gaulle and France's claim to European leadership, by Robert G. Neumann.--De Gaulle and Europe from the German viewpoint, by Ernst Majonica.--De Gaulle and Europe from the viewpoint of a small European nation by Peter Meraviglia.

Articles on De Gaulle's ideas and policy with regard to Europe. Büchenbacher sketches De Gaulle's biography, the general's wartime and postwar policies with regard to Communists, Anglo Saxons, Italy, Germany, and Europe as a whole. Perroux discusses the premises of his opposition to institutional integration of West Europe. Neumann considers De Gaulle's policy toward the European Economic Community, NATO, and the Atlantic alliance to be unrealistic and the French nuclear deterrent "a suicide threat." He hopes France will someday return to the policies initiated by

Schuman and Monnet. De Gaulle lacks understanding, according to Majonica, of the elementary principle of European federation (such federation would be more than just the sum of component states) and misconceives the nature of communism. Majonica also warns that De Gaulle's policy could create dangeous repercussions for German domestic affairs.
Mr. Maraviglia assesses the French President's policy from the standpoint of the small nation's interests, concluding that these are best served by conditions of economic and political stability in surrounding states and that European integration offers far more of a chance for that stability than does De Gaulle's "Europe of the fatherlands."

1522
Falk, Richard A. U.S. IN VIETNAM: RATIONALE & LAW. Dissent, v. 13, May/June 1966: 275-284.
HX1.D58, v. 13

Settlement of the Vietnamese War requires adoption of a "reasonable bargaining position" by each side. For the United States this means recognition of the primarily civil character of the war and hence of the legitimate independence of the National Liberation Front (NLF). Since the 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine was instituted crusading anticommunism has provoked the United States to a policy of unilateral self-discretionary intervention anywhere. The obvious result has been to undermine U.N. concepts of collective security. In the Dominican Republic (clearly an internal conflict) and in Vietnam we are witness to "the extreme militancy of U.S. doctrine and practice with respect to using military power--even in comparison to China, the state alleged to be the most destructive of minimum conceptions of world order." That the United States is obligated to unilateral actions under the banner of SEATO regional responsibilities is a self-perpetuated and unsubstantiated myth. If the principle of collective self-defense includes "interventions on the side of insurgents in a civil war" then the United States is assuming a tremendous global burden. Armed attack by a state should be challenged by collective self-defense; against external support for insurgency only proportional counterintervention is legitimate.
Policymakers claim that weakness in Vietnam will scare countries dependent on U.S. collective self-defense commitments. This claim is nonsense predicated on the invalid assumptions that South Vietnam was attacked and that its government is legitimate (rather than a creation of U.S. military and economic power more dependent on external support than is the NLF) and therefore competent to claim self-defense. Moreover conduct of the war through agonizing protractions based on successive escalation "is not very comforting to those countries truly counting on us. From the viewpoint of the victim of attack it is better to be defended effectively from the outset or not at all." U.S. leaders, conceding to public opinion, temper the use of force in such a way as to make their policies only moderately illegal, but ineffective and costly. "The result is a sort of compromise between pragmatics and law that leads to a failure of achievement and erodes the most basic limitations imposed by international law upon the discretion of states--rules governing the use of military force." If the hawkish outlook cannot totally prevail then the United States would do better to reorient its policies toward excluding the use of military force except in cases of genuine armed attack and leaving the problem of civil war to local or regional action.

1523
Figueres, Leo. [FOR A TRUE POLICY OF PEACE AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE. editorial] Pour une vraie politique de paix et d'indépendance nationale. Cahiers du communisme, v. 42, Apr. 1966: 3-9.
HX5.C26, v. 42

De Gaulle's decision to withdraw from NATO's military integration has been demanded by French Communists, and other peacelovers, for some time. However, other aspects of Gaullist foreign policy must be criticized by those democrats whose real interest is peace, for example nonparticipation in disarmament negotiations, construction of a national nuclear force, and nonadherence to the partial nuclear test ban treaty. "The superiority of the foreign policy advocated by democratic forces over that conducted by Gaullism must show up in its coherence, its logic." The left cannot allow De Gaulle to claim all the credit for policies of disengagement and independence and thus gain the electoral support of leftist citizens. The Communist Party does not renounce the Atlantic alliance or the Common Market; even within their frameworks the causes of peaceful coexistence and national sovereignty can be promoted. A policy of independence that is carried out in the spirit of disarmament and coexistence will do more than De Gaulle's to foster international equality, confidence, and tension reduction.

1524
[FIRST REPLIES TO THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC'S NOTE OF MARCH 25, 1966, CONCERNING GERMAN PEACE POLICY] Die ersten Antworten auf die Note der deutschen Bundesregierung vom 25. März 1966 zur deutschen Friedenspolitik. Europa-Archiv, v. 21, June 10, 1966: D277-D298.
D839.E86, v. 21

Gives full texts of replies made by the United States (April 2, 1966), Great Britain (April 12), Poland (April 28), Czechoslovakia (May 7), and the Soviet Union (May 17), to the note they received from the German Federal Republic on German peace policy. The American and British notes welcome Bonn's initiative seeking peace, security, and disarmament in Europe through improvement of relations between the German Federal Republic and Central and East European countries. Both replies emphasize the importance of German reunification under freedom (the British note refers to the principle of self-determination) for the security and preservation of peace. The Polish, Czech, and Soviet replies contend it is "absurd" (the word used in Polish note) for the Bonn government to hold itself up as a messenger of peace in view of the fact that the German Federal Republic has failed to reconcile itself to the consequences of the war lost by Germany. They charge it has refused to recognize the present German-Polish and German-Czech boundaries and the existence of the German Democratic Republic, has harbored revanchist and aggressive plans, and has striven for nuclear arms.

1525
FOCUS OF U.S. IMPERIALIST GLOBAL STRATEGY SHIFTED FROM EUROPE TO ASIA. In U.S. Consulate. Hongkong. Survey of China mainland press, no. 3631, Feb. 4, 1966: 28-30.
DS777.55.U52, 1966

Released by the New China News Agency, Peking, Feb. 1, 1966.

U.S. imperialism is shifting the focus of its global strategy to Asia. "As the result of the vigorous development of the anti-U.S. revolutionary movements in Asia, and as the result of China's resolute opposition to U.S. imperialism and its support for the revolutionary struggles of the peoples, Washington's original global strategy, with Europe as the foundation, has been upset." Additional deployment of U.S. forces in Asia is necessary to forestall the outbreak of a second or third Vietnam as the reactions of enslaved Asian peoples threaten to create a domino effect. As the Christian Science Monitor has observed, Washington is striving to create an anti-Chinese coalition, with the Khrushchev revisionists, Japan, and India at its core. "In order to further strengthen its collusion with the Soviet leaders, the United States frequently praises the Soviet Union, and makes political deals with it on such important political questions as the 'prevention of nuclear proliferation' treaty, the World Disarmament Conference, and a permanent U.N. standing army." As the United States is forced to divert greater numbers of its forces from Europe to Asia the European nations will find it possible to escape from U.S. domination, thereby weakening American influence throughout the world. The attempt to form a holy alliance against China is floundering because of the great difficulties besetting its potential members; the Soviet revisionists are "in dire straits both at home and abroad"; the Sato government is being lashed by wave after wave of anti-U.S. feeling among the Japanese people; India must devote all its efforts to providing for its own subsistence; the Western European nations exhibit no desire to be drawn into conflict with China; and the antiwar movement and political quarreling have disturbed the United States. "U.S. imperialism is on its last legs. By shifting the emphasis of its global strategy to gamble on a desperate struggle in Asia, it will only hasten its own doom."

1526
FOUR AGAINST THE RED CHINA LOBBY. National review, v. 18, May 31, 1966: 513-528.
AP2.N3545, v. 18

Contents.--Introduction, by Theodore Lit.--The China problem today in United States policy-making, by David N. Rowe.--United States policy toward China, by Walter H. Judd.--Communist China, Vietnam and United States Policy, by Franz Michael.--United States relations with Communist China, by George E. Taylor.--Conclusion: Red China's reaction.

Reproduces testimony offered before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee by four spokesmen who do not support the policy of "containment without isolation" in regard to Communist China.

1527
Freund, Ludwig. [COEXISTENCE AND DÉTENTE: HOPE OR PERIL?] Koexistenz und Entspannung; Hoffnung oder Gefahr? Würzburg, Holzner-Verlag, 1966. 286 p. (Der Göttinger Arbeitskreis. Veröffentlichung Nr. 338) DK274.F74

Contents.--Style change in Soviet ideology and the latter's relation to foreign policy.--Weak points in the West's position.--Conclusions.

Points out the diverse meanings given "coexistence" and "détente" in both the West and the Soviet Union. The author outlines different stereotypical reactions in both camps toward these concepts and analyzes the political motivations behind them.

1528
Hamm, Harry. [THE REALM OF 700 MILLION; ENCOUNTER WITH TODAY'S CHINA] Das Reich der 700 Millionen: Begegnung mit China von heute. Düsseldorf, Econ-Verlag [1965] 358 p.
DS711.H355

Bibliography: p. 344-350.

Partial contents.--Society in transition.--Alpine dream of the mass.--Trade with the West.--Education in service of revolution.--White devils and colored brothers.--Opposition to Moscow.--Theory of "Interzones."--Peking and the Western powers.

An appraisal of Communist China's domestic and foreign policies combined with the author's firsthand report on local conditions and attitudes toward the outside world. In its analytical parts the book deals with Peking's so-called "Interzone theory," a rationale for China's setting itself against both nuclear superpowers and for its efforts to prevent the "Interzone" (viz the zone between the United States and the Soviet Union) from being dominated by either Washington or Moscow. The implications of the theory for China's policy toward Germany are discussed at length. Peking hopes Bonn will eventually free itself from United States influence. The Communist Chinese have favored the return to Germany of its lost eastern territories, and until recently they dissociated themselves from Soviet and East German attacks on West Germany. This notwithstanding, the German Federal Republic, the author feels, cannot change its policy toward China alone but must do it in concert with other allies. The West's long-range policy, Hamm concludes, should take into account the capacity of Chinese communism for change.

1529
HOW THE NEW MEN RUN RUSSIA. Business week, no. 1925, July 23, 1966: 138-144.
HC431.B87, 1966

Since Khrushchev's ouster 21 months ago a new spirit manifesting "realism, economic incentives, reform" has been filtering out from the Kremlin to Soviet factories, farms and institutions. If things continue the way Communist Party boss Brezhnev and economist Premier Kosygin want them to, by mid-1970's the Soviet Union will bear a different stamp, with many more decisions in the hands of managers instead of Party planners. Leading to a less monolithic society, a broad range of economic programs is being pushed. Ideological fetters have been removed from basic research, and contacts with Western scientists are increasing. In foreign affairs the emphasis has switched from bombast to quiet diplomacy. By holding quiet discussions with Communist leaders from other countries, the Russians have maintained a position of leadership in the Communist world, and have avoided turning the dispute with China into the noisy, destructive, complete split that Khrushchev threatened. At the same time they have managed to double-think the Vietnam War into a kind of political limbo, keeping their lines of communication open to the United States in spite of propaganda barrages against United States policy. Even recent U.S. bombing of oil installations at Hanoi and Haiphong failed to elicit a violent Kremlin response. Whether the new spirit will really take hold is still open to question, however. The new leadership has little in the way of actual results to show beyond a cogent, long-range program. In planning the emphasis is still on heavy industry, not consumer goods,

even though Kosygin calls for a 5-year growth of 43 to 46 percent in this sector. Political democracy remains a myth. Artists and writers are as insecure as ever. Volunteers, organized right down to apartment-house level, still make their reports to Party headquarters. The principal goal of the change appears to be to permit the Communist economic machine to run more smoothly by building into it an element of self-accommodation.

1530
Jaspers, Karl. [HOPE AND APPREHENSION: WRITINGS ON GERMAN POLICY, 1945-1965] Hoffnung und Sorge; Schriften zur deutschen Politik, 1945-1965. München, R. Piper [c1965] 370 p.
DD257.4.J35

Contents.--First writings, 1945-1947.--The problem of guilt, 1946.--Writings since 1956.--Freedom and reunification, 1960.--Writings since 1962.

Appraises the effects of Germany's postwar situation on the German people's national political consciousness and goals. From this standpoint the author analyzes Germany's major problems, including, among others, the feasibility of German reunification and the problem of the nation's eastern boundaries. Only the policy of rapprochement toward Germany's eastern neighbors can bring about a viable solution to those problems. Neither optimistic illusions nor apathy, both the result of a distorted perception of reality, can usefully serve the purpose of securing the peace. The goal of peace can be won only through freedom and that only through truth.

1531
Korionov, V. G. [SOME PROBLEMS OF THE POLITICAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF U.S. IMPERIALISM IN LATIN AMERICA] Nekotorye voprosy politicheskoi strategii i taktiki imperializma SShA v Latinskoi Amerike. Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, no. 3, 1966: 37-46. Dl.A3525, 1966

V. Korionov discusses some peculiarities in the political strategy and tactics of U.S. imperialism in Latin America in recent years which have been brought to life by the challenge of the national-liberation movement, above all, the revolution in Cuba. The partisans of the "flexible" policy propagating "peaceful and controlled revolution" were hoping to avoid social conflicts and strengthen their influence through the "Alliance for progress". Yet their hopes failed and Washington again resorted to the "hard course" which is associated with Thomas Mann, special assistant of the President for Latin America, and President Johnson himself. Open manifestations of the Johnson--Mann doctrine are the intervention in Santo-Domingo, the efforts to built inter-American military forces and rude interference with the domestic affairs of other Latin American nations. (Abstract supplied)

1532
Kroker, Werner. [DISCUSSION IN THE SOVIET OCCUPIED ZONE ON THE CONCEPT OF "NATION"] Zur Diskussion über den Nationsbegriff in der SBZ. Deutsche Studien, v. 4, Mar. 1966: 10-34, 121-122.
P&GP RR

Documentation (p. 25-34) contains long excerpts from writings by Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Rosa Luxemburg, Lenin, Stalin, Karl Radek, Hermann Heller, Albert Norden, and others.
Bibliography: p. 121-122.

A proclaimed goal of the Socialist Unity Party [East Germany's ruling party] has been to solve the German nation's vital problems. In the program "German nation" implies all Germans, East and West. This concept of "nation" deviates importantly from longstanding Communist doctrine, which, based on historical materialism, considers a nation under capitalism and one under socialism to be in two distinct categories, each a product of a separate phase of economic evolution. Thus the [East] German Communists have attempted to revise and reconcile their traditional doctrine of "nation" with the Socialist Unity Party's political claims to the whole German people while at the same time preserving intact the relevant postulates of historical materialism reflected in that doctrine. Stalin's celebrated definition of "nation" (first published in 1913) has thus far represented the official position of the Socialist Unity Party on the matter. The following elements, according to Stalin, together compose a nation: a historically formed, stable community of people that is based on a common language, territory, and economic life, and that has a common psychic cultural individuality of its own. To accomodate Stalin's doctrine with the postwar reality of partitioned Germany Fred Oelssner, then the Socialist Unity Party's leading theoretician proposed in 1951 that two entirely different kinds of nation have developed since 1917. The first is the socially incohesive bourgeois nation characterized by unceasing internal class struggle, nationalist hostility toward other nations, and a national cultural life open only to the ruling class. The second is the Socialist nation, devoid of any class antagonism, devoted to the ideology of internationalism (thus friendly toward all nations), and possessed of a national culture open to all its members. (The last allows the German Democratic Republic to be the sole legitimate inheritor of all cultural heritage from the past.) In the official discussion that developed in 1962 Stalin's doctrine was subjected to strong criticism, but efforts to formulate a uniform definition satisfactory to all concerned (Communist philosophers and historiographers and those conducting the national policy) met with failure. Some leading participants admitted finally that in a given situation Stalin's doctrine of a nation was still the best. The latest philosophical and historical publications of the Eastern Zone accept Stalin's definition word for word, although they tend to omit mention of his name,

1533
Masannat, George S. SINO-ARAB RELATIONS. Asian survey, v. 6, Apr. 1966: 216-226.
DS1.A492, v. 6

Chinese Communist activity in the Middle East, markedly on the upswing since 1956, is aimed at supporting revolution, reducing Western and Soviet influence, and buttressing China's world position. In wooing the radical Arabs China supports their struggle against Israel and imperialism in Southern Arabia; it also extends significant economic and cultural aid, most generously in the case of the United Arab Republic, Algeria, and Yemen. The Chinese campaign in the Middle East has aided their cause in the United Nations, but the Arab States have proved reluctant to break ties with either the Soviet Union or the West to please China. Arab nonalinement will probably persist because it is founded on solid reasons--a fear of involvement in a great power war, uncertainty as to the future shape of world power relationships, suspicion and jealous guarding of newly acquired independence and sovereignty.

1534
Mendiaux, Edouard. [AFRICA WILL BE CHINESE] L'Afrique sera chinoise [Bruxelles] Editions Sineco [1965?] 328 p. DT389.C5M4

General comments on Chinese tactics and penetration in Africa followed by case studies of individual African countries in their relations with Communist China. The author considers his book "a warning cry" that bears witness to Chinese penetration and influence achieved in the record time of 5 years.

1535
Meyer-Landrut, Andreas. [AFTER THE 23D CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION] Nach dem XXIII. Parteitag der KPdSU. Aussenpolitik, v. 17, May 1966: 275-282.
D839.A885, v. 17

With the 23d Party Congress and the adoption of the new 5-year plan for 1966-70 the Soviet leadership has turned away from utopian plans of the Khrushchev era and drawn closer to sober realities. This is reflected in the softened tone of Soviet activity toward both China and the Third World; it is by no means contradicted by the harsher voice with which the Soviet Union addresses the United States and the Soviet unwillingness to compromise in Central Europe. This appraisal of the Congress was made by Dr. Andreas Meyer-Landrut of Bonn immediately after the Congress closed. (Translation of supplied abstract)

1536
[AN "OPEN LETTER" BY THE GERMAN SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY AND AN "OPEN REPLY" BY THE GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY. ON THE QUESTION OF INTERCHANGE OF IDEAS BETWEEN POLITICAL FORCES IN GERMANY] Ein "Offener Brief" der SED und eine "Offene Antwort" der SPD. Zur Frage des Meinungsaustauschs zwischen den politischen Kräften in Deutschland. Europa-Archiv, v. 21, Apr. 10, 1966: D176-D188.
D839.E86, v. 21

Gives the texts of and reports on an exchange of open letters between the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) and the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) concerning the possibility of debating solutions to the German problem. On February 7, 1966, SED First Secretary Walter Ulbricht proposed in his "Open Letter to the Delegates to the German Social Democratic Party . . ." that both parties establish a joint debating team that would meet interchangeably in East and West Germany to find areas of possible agreement on the German question. The Executive Committee of SPD answered March 18, 1966, with an open letter accepting the offer provided that the debates be public, that the representatives of all other West German parties seated in the Bundestag be able to discuss freely and publicly in East Germany the problem in question, that East Germany's rulers ease the living conditions of their subjects, stop harassing West Berlin, and put an end to shooting people on the border between East and West Berlin. On March 26, 1966, the East German party answered that the dialogue between both parties "in principle has already begun." It questioned, however, the propriety of the West German Social Democrats' demands as to prerequisites for a debate.

1537
Pomeroy, William J. [THE PHILIPPINES: NATIONALISM OR AMERICANISM] Filippiny: natsionalizm ili amerikanizm? Aziia i Afrika segodnia, v. 9, June 1966: 30-31. DS1.S7, v. 9

More than six months have passed since the Nationalist Party candidate Marcos defeated his Liberal Party opponent ex-President Macapagal, in the Philippine presidential elections. Although both parties represent merely different sections of the ruling classes, still the Nationalist Party is, not unnaturally, identified with nationalism. The expansion of American aggression in South Viet Nam, the author points out, poses a number of important problems before the Philippine people. Whither may the pro-American policy lead the Philippines? Has not the time come to choose a road which would accord with the true interests of the people? (Abstract supplied)

1538
[PROPOSALS BY THE GERMAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONCERNING DISARMAMENT AND PRESERVATION OF PEACE] Vorschläge der deutschen Bundesregierung zur Abrüstung und zur Sicherung des Friedens. Europa-Archiv, v. 21, Apr. 10, 1966: D171-D175. D839.E86, v. 21

Presents the full text of a note sent March 25, 1966, by the German Federal Republic to all nations (except Albania, Communist China, the Republic of China, Communist Korea, Cuba, Outer Mongolia and North Vietnam) on West German peace policy. A brief account of reaction to the note among Bundestag leaders and in the world press is included. In the note the German Federal Government reviews its political and economic efforts toward improving its relations with East Europe. The political efforts, the note states, have been largely unsuccessful due to East Europe's unresponsiveness. The case in point is Poland's totally unacceptable demand that a prerequisite to any political talks would be recognition by Bonn of the Oder-Neisse line. Bonn's position is that in accordance with international law the Polish-German boundary of December 31, 1937, has been unchanged to date and will remain so until the government of the reunified Germany agrees with Poland at some opportune time on a mutually satisfactory boundary settlement. It asserts that Soviet threats against the German Federal Republic caused the latter to seek its security in NATO. The note appeals: (a) to all nonnuclear nations, members of either the Western or the Eastern military alliance, to follow Bonn's suit in renouncing nuclear-arms production; (b) for an agreement by the nuclear powers that no nuclear arms will be put under national control of nonnuclear states; (c) for an agreement by the nations concerned on gradual reduction of nuclear-arms stocks in Europe. The German Federal Republic, whenever it might supply fissionable materials to countries outside the area controlled by Euratom, will be ready to request (assuming other nations do likewise) that those supplies be subjected to control by the International Atomic Energy Agency in order to prevent their use for nuclear-arms production. Problems of security, disarmament, and arms control can best be solved by gradual, rather than all-embracing, approaches, such as diminishing one by one the causes of tension. In Europe the most important of these has been the problem of securing the entire German nation freedom of choice with regard to its political future.

1539
THE PURGE, AN INTERPRETATION: FOREIGN POLICY. China news analysis, no. 618, July 1, 1966: 5-7. DS777.55.C4469, 1966

Lin Piao is emerging as the strong man; will this affect Chinese foreign policy? He himself is not trained in the field and will have to rely on the experts under Chou En-lai and Ch'en Yi. Anti-Soviet attacks will continue, but the cold reception these are receiving in foreign countries and Communist front organization meetings should indicate to the Chinese leaders that they are overplaying this card. Mao Tse-tung is

being exalted as the leader and genius of the progressive world, which, "if it means anything, is that the chief enemies are the Russian communists" and not the United States. Lin Piao supports liberation wars; the Chinese policy of fomenting trouble wherever feasible without massive intervention is likely to remain the same. "It is always dangerous to give too much power to military men. But it would be much worse if the real, stupid diehards, who are being used now by him in the purge, were to come to power."

1540
Reuss, Henry S. TWO CHINAS. Commonweal, v. 84, May 20, 1966: 251-254.
AP2. C6897, v. 84

The dwindling majority in the vote to exclude Red China from the United Nations suggests that the United States might better pursue the policy of creating U. N. membership for both Communist China and the Nationalist government of Taiwan. If Communist China succeeds in winning membership under the existing arrangement, Peking will be seated as the sole representative of the Chinese people, the Nationalists will be expelled from the United Nations, Communist claims to the territory of Taiwan will be strengthened, and the United States will suffer a major diplomatic defeat and loss of international prestige. U. N. membership for Red China may make that body "a more useful instrument for international peace and stability" and may encourage moderation in future Chinese Communist foreign policy. The American policy of thwarting Chinese aggression has created international conditions under which a new generation of Chinese leaders may opt for more rational and less belligerent policies; the United States must now "see to it that the alternative of a peaceful role in the international order is available to China." Communist China, because of its "record of belligerence," should not be allowed to assume the seat in the U. N. Security Council now occupied by Taiwan. "The Security Council seat was originally given to China in 1945 because of its size and potential importance, and its contribution to the war effort." Taiwan is no more entitled to this arrangement than is Peking. As an alternative to either China's employment of a Security Council veto the United States might propose the seating of India. If admittance of Red China to the General Assembly should prompt Taiwan to resign from the United Nations, the seating of India would be facilitated. Finally, if the United States does not feel isolation of Mainland China is beneficial it should alter its policy so that it is "China, not the United States, who does the isolating."

1541
Soward, S. H. NEW TRENDS IN CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY? International studies, v. 7, Apr. 1966: 515-536. JX18. I55, v. 7

Canadian foreign policy in the last 10 years has demonstrated no new trends. Conservative and Liberal stances have been parallel. Each has tried to adapt Canada, a middle power that in 1945 was a great power in terms of armed strength and economic capacity, to changing world circumstances. All parties and all governments have enthusiastically backed the United Nations, participated in NATO, and supported the Commonwealth. The nation is obliged to maintain at least tolerable relations with Great Britain and the United States, although difficulties do arise, especially over defense (i. e., NORAD, NATO) and economic problems. Canada, "while it does not by its very size, strength and economic power decisively determine the big issues, nevertheless has the resources to enable it to play a positive and influential part in world affairs." The nation has found its calling in promotion of the "diplomacy of reconciliation." To strengthen the U. N. peacekeeping apparatus is a particular Canadian concern.

1542
Stillman, Edmund O., and William Pfaff. POWER AND IMPOTENCE: THE FAILURE OF AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY. New York, Random House [1966] 244 p. E744. S87

Urges the United States to take a long hard look at its foreign policy and revise it on the basis of a realistic appraisal of the international scene. America's current policy, in the view of the authors, is consensually built upon the concept of globalism, or interventionism, which mistakenly sees in the modern world a universal struggle between freedom and unfreedom. Political messianism has governed American foreign policy. Only the realization that it cannot singlehandedly "extirpate the bloody-mindedness of all the world" can save the United States from behavior that is today irrelevant.

1543
Ting, Kuang-hua. PEIPING'S NEW MOVES ON THE INTERNATIONAL FRONT. Chinese Communist affairs, v. 3, June 1966: 27-38.
DS777. 55. C4495, v. 3

Summarizes Communist China's propaganda offensive against the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, Japan, and the United Nations in recent years. Information is gathered from editorials and articles in the Chinese Communist newspapers People's Daily, Red Flag, and Liberation Army Daily. The author concludes that the belligerence of the Chinese, by making enemies, has foiled their plans for aggression throughout Asia and has contributed much to the diplomatic isolation of Communist China.

1544
[TOWARD THE REVERSAL OF ALLIANCES. editorial] Vers le renversement des alliances. Charivari, n. s. no. 7, Apr. 1966: 3-4.
P&GP RR

De Gaulle favors a "strip-tease" style of politics, revealing only single parts of his final project at a time. If his actions regarding the Atlantic alliance fall into this pattern they may indicate that he is considering the extreme action--total disengagement. Charivari feels that De Gaulle has "unloosed the process that is to lead France to the renunciation of its present friendships in order to orient itself more and more toward the East." Neither he nor the French public gives credence to a Soviet military threat. De Gaulle's policies in many respects appear valuable --NATO should be reformed, the French nuclear striking force can be useful, the blocs formed at Yalta without French or Eastern European participation must be broken up. But NATO reform must take place in the context of clear anticommunism while the French force de frappe and loosened alliances in Europe must be accompanied by a desire to truly unite Europe. "If General de Gaulle shows himself prolix on the recasting of NATO, the construction of a French deterrent force, and the destruction of what was achieved at Yalta, he is scarcely talkative on the other [corollary] points." It is his silence that is most to be feared.

1545
Werth, Alexander. DE GAULLE: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY. New York, Simon and Schuster [1966] 416 p.
DC373. G3W4

Portrays De Gaulle and his ideas. The French President's political development is traced through his most recent election and the Ben Barka affair.

1546
WHAT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS SAY ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS AND WAR AND PEACE. Revue de droit international, de sciences diplomatiques et politiques, v. 44, Apr./June 1966: 127-149.
JX3.R37, v. 44

Partial contents.--U.N.--"tool of imperialism."--U.N.--"a tool used by the U.S. and its collaborators to dominate the world."--U.N.--"headquarters of international gendarmes."--Disarmament--"a smokescreen for intensified arms drive."--Peiping's conditions for accepting U.N. seat.--"Political power grows out of barrel of a gun."--"Encirclement of cities by the rural areas."--No communist victory, no peace.--War--"great school" to temper people.--Better bombs --material and spiritual.--Non-alignment--"Trojan horse for U.S. imperialism."--Africa is exceedingly favorable for revolution.--Chinese Communist war policy--"No limits nor restrictions."--Chinese communists welcoming invasion of China by United States, India and Britain.

Excerpts from recent Chinese Communist statements on the United Nations, war, peace, and the Communist revolution. The Chinese "are convinced that Communism is on the march to victory and they are determined to destroy the existing international order by war and violence."

1547
Zhigalov, I. I. [FROM THE HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE AGAINST REACTIONARY FOREIGN POLICY IN BRITAIN 1955-64] Iz istorii bor'by v Anglii protiv reaktionnogo vneshnepoliticheskogo kursa (1955-1964). Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, no. 2, 1966: 17-30. Dl.A3525, 1966

Zhigalov uses mainly the British press and records of the Communist Party to demonstrate the growth of the movement for peace and relaxation of international tension, for friendship with the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries, and against the threat of nuclear war. He reaches the conclusion that resistance to the military and political plans of the British imperialists --resistance which intensified during the period under examination, the third stage of the general crisis of capitalism--had its impact on the failure of the Suez adventure and the subsequent fall of the Eden cabinet. The struggle of the progressive British public also made itself felt in termination of the rocketry program, in shaping a policy toward Cuba different from that of the United States, in signing the Moscow partial test-ban treaty, and, finally, in defeat of the Tories at the general elections of 1964. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1548
Zorin, Valerian A. [PROBLEMS IN CONSOLIDATING PEACE AND SOVIET POLICIES] Les problèmes de la consolidation de la paix et la politique de l'Union soviétique. Année politique et économique, v. 39, Apr. 1966: 1-20. D410.A6, v. 39
Speech delivered Jan. 18, 1966, in Paris.

The spirit of Tashkent--the renunciation of the use of force and the search for peace and détente in international relations--underlies Soviet foreign policy and should govern all foreign policies. The Soviet Union's interest in peace and friendship between peoples was evident in Lenin's first foreign policy action, his "Decree on Peace." Peaceful coexistence between different social systems can be maintained because forces stronger than social hostility operate in international relations--economic interdependence, noninterference in sovereign affairs, nonaggression, and peaceful settlement. Yet peaceful coexistence is not self-acting; it must be fostered by positive measures. For this reason the Soviet Union champions disarmament moves and collective security accords. Today's primary task is to strengthen European security. Concrete measures such as increased trade, scientific cooperation, cultural exchanges, and programs for the peaceful use of nuclear energy will pay off in increased political cooperation and the solution of outstanding and threatening problems. If revanchist West Germany controls nuclear weapons the hopes for a better climate will dissipate. "Whether the Bundeswehr acquires nuclear weapons through physical possession or ownership, whether the West German Army in any form participates in NATO's common nuclear forces or shares in the formulation of nuclear strategy, the heart of the problem stays the same": to satisfy West German nuclear ambitions would remove the barriers to nonproliferation. The Soviet Union stands firmly behind measures to halt proliferation but considers them as steps preliminary to general nuclear disarmament. Another cornerstone of Soviet policy is support of anticolonial movements and nonintervention in the affairs of others, "the most important condition of peace and peaceful coexistence between states belonging to two systems." Franco-Soviet cooperation is a fortuitous start toward overall European détente and positive collaboration.

3. Bilateral and Multilateral Policies

1549
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. THE NATO CRISIS. Commonweal, v. 84, June 3, 1966: 309-311.
AP2.C6897, v. 84

"Few would deny that the revival of European nationalism faces America with a mounting danger of becoming irrelevant to Europe's future." De Gaulle intends to restore French prestige, destroy the alliances that have divided Europe since 1945, and "establish the new European equilibrium based on France and Russia, involving the eventual exclusion of the United States from the European concert." German nationalism is also likely to revive in the long run, prompting a new generation of Germans to spurn U.S. declaratory policy toward reunification in favor of a direct approach to Moscow. East European nationalism, far from being a solely benevolent phenomenon, may result in the Balkanization of Europe and incitement of local conflicts. The Soviets will probably avail themselves of the situation created by Gaullism to attempt further fragmentation of the West, thereby intensifying the cold war. American policy has erred by concentrating strictly upon the Atlantic alliance and ignoring development of a future European system based upon but transcending the alliance. "Consequently, what is needed now is a broader policy of peaceful engagement designed to channel Western contacts with East Europe and the Soviet Union in the direction of more binding and enduring multilateral all-European relationships." Acceptance of territorial status quo, security arrangements to dispel Soviet fears of Germany, and cultural and social ties between East and West will further implement such a policy. Extending membership in European multilateral economic and social bodies to Eastern nations may be a first step toward political reconciliation. If this proposal were advanced by the United States,

it would demonstrate American interest in Europe, encourage joint Atlantic initiative, steal De Gaulle's thunder, give the West new purpose and direction, dispel charges that U.S. policy is Asian-centered and anti-Communist, and afford Communist nations an alternative to the cold war. The situation is not unlike that which faced President Truman in 1947-48: "by building on the constructive legacy of the Marshall Plan and the impetus originally provided by America to greater European integration" President Johnson can "chart a new course for American policy in Europe."

1550
CHINA VS. U.S.S.R., U.S. [editorial] Forbes magazine, v. 98, Aug. 1, 1966: 11-12.
HF5001. F6, v. 98

Asserts that the common bond of communism is no stronger than the monarchical bond of kings, who, despite their mutual belief in Divine Right, fought one another interminably. Communism has not changed man. The U.S.S.R. and Red China have more to differ about than to agree upon: their 4,500 mile disputable common border, the Chinese government's restiveness, and China's loss of face in foreign affairs, for instance. Thankfully, Americans' concern is shared by the Russians.

1551
Coudenhove-Kalergi, Richard von. EUROPE AS A THIRD WORLD POWER. Central Europe journal, v. 14, July/Aug. 1966: 219-222.
DB200.7.S74, v. 14

Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi, long known as an advocate and leader of the Pan-Europe Movement, expresses in this article his well-founded conviction that the time has come to correct the tragic "peace" of Yalta, actually a dictated peace "without Europe" indeed, "against Europe". Count Coudenhove-Kalergi cites Charles de Gaulle's trip to Moscow as an important move in the direction of a Yalta revision and mentions as other important steps on that road the "removal of the Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall" as well as the recognition of Europeans' right to self-determination. The author concludes with the reminder that America, whose president was behind the agreement of Yalta, is no longer interested in its perpetuation nor can America afford to keep a superfluous army going in Europe. Hence the question: Is Europe on the way to becoming a third world power? If so, then a Yalta revision is imperative.
(Abstract supplied)

1552
Defferre, Gaston. DE GAULLE AND AFTER. Foreign affairs, v. 44, Apr. 1966: 434-445.
D410. F6, v. 44

Challenges the Gaullist movement in France and looks toward its eradication from French domestic and foreign policymaking. The author feels that De Gaulle is an obstacle to the creation of a united Europe. After listing the many advantages that would accrue to Europe and to the world through a united Europe, Defferre points out some of the dangers of continued U.S. political and economic domination and the spread of nuclear weapons. "A creative European civilization, combining the most durable values of socialism with some of the more effective market techniques, would give peaceful coexistence a richer content than that of the balance of terror."

1553
Eckstein, Alexander. POLICY IMPLICATIONS. In his Communist China's economic growth and foreign trade; implications for U.S. policy. New York, Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by McGraw-Hill [1966] p. 243-274. illus.
HC427.9.E3
Bibliography: p. 335-344.

Neither China's economy nor its Communist leadership is on the verge of collapse; U.S. policy must realize that it is dealing with "a body politic, a society, and an economy" that are "here to stay for some time to come." Although the economy is still underdeveloped, China's gross national product (GNP), industrial production, and population size endow it with a military potential "which can, and indeed has, significantly altered the power balance on the Asian continent despite the fact that it may not permit the Chinese to challenge the Soviet Union and the United States in other parts of the world." Largely because the foreign trade sector represents only a small part of its total economy China cannot easily manipulate economic tools (trade, aid, and self-portrayal as a development model) for the purpose of furthering foreign policies. Conversely, and for the same reason, the country is not generally vulnerable to external economic pressure except in the military field. Imports have played a major role in military development to date. Strategic-goods trade controls by the West and reduction in military imports from the Soviet Union have increased the costs of China's military program, led to a deterioration in the quality of military equipment, and delayed acquisition of a nuclear capability. Nonetheless by sacrificing conventional capabilities or by diverting resources from agriculture and industry China can develop a French-type nuclear force, which would mean increasing reliance "on nuclear deterrence for her defense against the United States and for the pursuit of her foreign policy goals on her periphery." China's military capacity is politically determined by the decision on what part of the GNP shall be devoted to military projects. U.S. economic policy toward China (trade embargo and credit limitations), from which the Western allies are deviating more and more, cannot visibly affect Chinese military capacities but can increase China's propensity for aggression by heightening fears and tensions. Reversal of this policy could be the start of a normalization of Chinese-U.S. relations and could also give the United States and its allies a modicum of bargaining power in political dealings with China.

1554
Europäische Arbeitsgemeinschaft. [ODER-NEISSE; THE FACTS AND THEIR PATH IN INTERNATIONAL POLICY] Oder-Neisse; die Tatsachen und ihr Weg in der internationalen Politik. Berlin, 1965. 67 p.
DD801.Q35E8

Contents. --The population of the Oder-Neisse territories in 1939 and 1963, by Klaus D. Wiek. --Poland's and the German Federal Republic's interpretations of international law with regard to the Oder-Neisse problem, by Sigolf Wolter. --The Oder-Neisse Line and the foreign policy of the world powers, by Arndt Frommann. --The Oder-Neisse Line as it is judged by Germans, by Gerd Schwetje and Klaus D. Wiek.

Presents legal, geographic, political, and moral aspects of the problems of the German-Polish boundary and the Oder-Neisse Line. The authors feel that Polish-German relations, deadlocked so long, cannot be improved without a mutually satisfactory solution

to the problem of their shared boundary. Both sides are responsible for the present deadlock. The German Federal Republic, as well as its scientific and other organizations, should establish at the earliest possible time contacts with Poland and their Polish counterparts to find ways for improving German-Polish relations and solutions to the boundary problem. Probably the boundary problem could best be solved by Poland retaining the Oder-Neisse territories and allowing Germans to return to them. This would go along with the broad trend toward free population movement evolving today in West Europe.

1555
Europa-Haus-Schliersee. [UNITY AND UNIFICATION OF EUROPE: WORKBOOK FOR POLITICAL EDUCATION] Einheit und Einigung Europas; Arbeitsbuch für die politische Bildung. München, R. Oldenbourg [1965] 181 p. diagrs, maps.
JN15. E77

Contents. --pt. 1. The unity of Europe. --What is Europe? --The essence and existence of the European individuality. --pt. 2. Main features of, and the threat to, a European commonwealth. --Europe amid the 20th century. --Main characteristics of a modern European commonwealth. --Dangers threatening Europe from within and without. --pt. 3. The European commonwealth taking shape. --The goal. --The way. --The present result. --pt. 4. Questions and problems of European integration.

A comprehensive guide to West Europe's supranational institutions, their functioning, structure, and role in the gradual integration of Europe. The book gives the historical background of European integration, touches upon the difficulties to be overcome in advancement and realization of that idea, and discusses the need for integration. The best way of achieving that goal according to authors--would be through promotion of supranational institutions. Among others the following institutions are discussed: Euratom, European Free Trade Association, European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community, West European Union (Brussels Pact), NATO, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Council of Europe, European Defense Community, European Monetary Agreement, European Payments Union, Organization of European Economic Cooperation, and the Western European Union.

1556
THE ODER-NEISSE LINE. La ligne Oder-Neisse. Documents, v. 21, Jan./Feb. 1966: 41-126. map.
DDI. D65, v. 21

Contents. --The Oder-Neisse Line today, by A. Wiss-Verdier. --The end of a taboo, by Anne-Marie Seltz. --Bibliography. --On the eve of a reconciliation? --Letter of the Polish bishops. --Answer of the German bishops. --Slavs and Germans, by Wladyslaw W. Kulski.

Topical treatment of a key European problem, the recognition or settlement of the German-Polish boundary. The larger question of historical relations between these two nations is dealt with in this context.

1557
Portisch, Hugo. THE CHINESE-SOVIET GAP WIDENS. Saturday review, v. 49, July 2, 1966: 8-12. illus.
Z1219. S25, v. 49

"An eyewitness report, based on two months' travel inside Red China, of increasing friction and the possibility of border hostilities."

Visitors to the Sino-Soviet border will see heavy troop concentrations and movements and hear guns firing and soldiers marching. China's desire to rid itself of foreign domination, regain the territories seized by imperialist powers in the 19th century, and become the major power in Asia exacerbates friction between Peking and Moscow. The lands taken from China by the Russian czar afford the Soviets, in Chinese eyes, not only imperial status in Asia but the opportunity to assert claims to being the greatest Asian power. "What sense would it make to fight India about a piece of desert, but to forget these vast regions in the north?" Ideology provides another irritant. Had the Soviet Union backed Peking in Zanzibar, Algiers, and other areas, Chinese foreign policy probably would not have suffered its recent series of disasters. The Soviet Union, not the West, is the main obstacle to Chinese national and ideological ambitions. "China's conflict with the West might be solved, when each tries to understand what makes the other act or react. It will be much more difficult for the Soviets and the Chinese to find a similar basis of understanding. For both of them have their homes in Asia." Only a military attack on Communist China would be likely to reconcile the two Communist superpowers, for Moscow would "see its prestige in the Communist world completely ruined overnight" if it stood by while China was destroyed.

1558
Salter, Ernest J. [THE PERMANENT CONFLICT: THE ALTERCATION BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST GREAT POWERS] Der permanente Konflikt; die Auseinandersetzung zwischen den kommunistischen Grossreichen. [Frankfurt/M.] Ullstein Bücher [1965] 159, [1] p. HX518. R4S3
Bibliography: p. 159-[160].

Contents. --Ideological conflict or imperial struggle for power? --The tradition of conflict. --Why are the Chinese still holding fast to Stalin? --Why are the Chinese against Yugoslavia? --Through civil wars and through war to power. --The world revolution! concept, meaning and changes. --Coexistence: the new form of a world revolution. --Are the Chinese against "peaceful coexistence?" --The general line of Chinese communism. --Marxism and Chinese methods: are the Chinese Communists Marxists? --Chinese Communists and war. --Peking, East Berlin and the German question. --The Beria complex. --The Chinese theory of Interzone. --Conflict after the downfall of Nikita Khrushchev.

Reviews historical, ideological, and political causes of the Sino-Soviet feud. The author points out the differences in attitude toward West Germany and the solution of the German problem between the Moscow and East German Communist leadership on the one hand, and Peking on the other. The political chasm between the Soviet Union and Red China is too great today to be bridged in the near future. The Sino-Soviet struggle for leadership of the world Communist movement will be a long-lasting affair that may split communism permanently.

1559
Schaetzel, J. Robert. THE NECESSARY PARTNERSHIP. Foreign affairs, v. 44, Apr. 1966: 417-433.
D410. F6, v. 44

The establishment of a meaningful and working relationship among the countries of Europe and, secondly, between the United States and a united or federated Europe is receiving much attention on both sides of the Atlantic. Western Europe remains important to the

United States today for it is the only prosperous and stable region with which the United States can share the burden of maintaining international security and economic well-being. The trend toward European unity continues, though perhaps sporadically, as is apparent from a review of French, British, and German opinion. Basically future European-U.S. relations can take three forms: nationalism, Atlantic union, or Atlantic partnership. The "growing disparity in power--political, military and economic--between the United States and even the strongest of the European nations" heightens the disadvantages of the nation-state and Atlantic union systems. Unfortunately this disparity of power fixes the cost of maintaining security on the United States, for Europe cannot afford to share the burden equally. Partnership--as conceived by the late President Kennedy--is "the idea of a united Europe with which the United States could work in close cooperation and on equal terms." When these three alternatives are viewed in light of the four major U.S. interests--economic growth and maintenance of security, the German problem, problems of the third world, and relations with the East--the concept of an Atlantic partnership between national European states and the United States emerges as the clear choice. Movement toward such a relationship is stagnated, however, partly because Western Europe is not sufficiently strong to maintain its side of the partnership. What is also needed is "strategic direction"; the creation of a viable, unified European Economic Community and a European nuclear force awaits political inspiration and solution. Political innovation requires "audacity," which is presently lacking with regard to European unity--or federation--and partnership. "It is inconceivable to me that this nation, with its gift for political thought and record of successful political innovation, will be found wanting in the presence of a united Europe able and prepared to collaborate with us in the tasks that lie ahead."

1560
Schultz, Karl A. THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT: A PERSPECTIVE. International review of history and political science, v. 3, June 1966: 25-40.
D839.I54, v. 3

Interstate relations are characterized by efforts of one state to expand its power in relation to other states, with this power serving as a means to national goals. "Given the potential power of China, the implications to the Soviet Union are clear." Realpolitik is a better yardstick than ideology of Soviet-Chinese interactions. Throughout the history of communism in China half-hearted Soviet assistance can be viewed as an attempt to obligate and therefore control Chinese policies and to dampen Chinese strength. Of course ideology provides a common bond, but this will always give way when concrete interests clash. The cohesiveness of beliefs will bring the two powers together "when unopposed by specific national goals" and will impede a total split. But as China grows stronger (unlike France relative to the United States, China is potentially a greater power than the Soviet Union) conflict between the two states will intensify.

1561
Wolter, Sigolf. [POLAND'S AND THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC'S INTERPRETATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH REGARD TO THE ODER-NEISSE PROBLEM] Die völkerrechtlichen Auffassungen Polens and der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zum Oder-Neisse-Problem. In Europäische Arbeitsgemeinschaft. Oder-Neisse; die Tatsachen und ihr Weg in der internationalen Politik. Berlin, 1965. p. 23-29. DD801.Q35E8
Bibliography: p. 29.

The conflicting positions of Poland and the German Federal Republic on the Oder-Neisse Line are both argued from the standpoint of international law (positive and conjectural). In support of its position Poland invokes the Potsdam Agreement, the status quo, a nation's right to existence, its right to external and internal security, and "the right to a homeland" for Poles now living in the Oder-Neisse territories. The German Federal Republic points out the legal irrelevance of the Potsdam Agreement and its failure to instate a boundary between both nations, underlines the uninterrupted existence to date of "the German Reich" with its prewar boundaries, and expounds on the pertinence of the right of self-determination and the right to a homeland. The right to a homeland is said to have been contravened when Poland annexed the Oder-Neisse provinces and expelled resident Germans. According to Poland the Potsdam Agreement definitely recognized the Polish rights to the disputed territories that stemmed from unconditional surrender of the German forces, from the absence of "the German Reich's government there since 1945," and from the allied occupation powers' uniform consent on the matter. The allied powers superseded the German Reich as the bearer of sovereign powers over the Reich's former territory. In the view of the German Federal Republic the Potsdam decision on the Oder-Neisse Line (a provisional decision, made for the purpose of administering the area) does not bind the German Federal Republic, because the signatories of the agreement were not true bearers of German sovereign rights. No judicial authority exists today to which Poland and the German Federal Republic can turn for judgment in their dispute and from which they can expect sanction once the judgment is passed. Thus only when both sides agreed on a solution would the existence of any relevant norm they had invoked in their agreement become clear.

II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

A. MODERN WAR

1. General Analyses

1562

Barrett, Raymond J. THE PROBLEM OF LOWER SPECTRUM VIOLENCE. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 46, Feb. 1966: 90-93.
Z6723.U35, v. 46

Lower spectrum violence--below the level of conventional or formal war--has broken out 90 times since 1945. These conflicts have been diverse in "cause, form and role of violence, the relationship of force to outcome, duration, reasons for success and failure, and methods of termination and outcome." They have been connected predominantly with the developing areas and linked with social, political, and economic ferment. Communism has been involved in some but has not been a primary factor. To counter lower spectrum conflicts the processes of change must be understood and acknowledged as irreversible. Counterinsurgency must thus be much broader in scope and more complex than insurgency. Preventing lower spectrum violence is clearly a better way of dealing with it. American economic and military assistance to the emerging nations has consequently taken on a greater significance.

1563

Bouthoul, Gaston, and others. [WAR AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON] La guerre phénomène social. In Académie des sciences morales et politiques, Paris. Travaux et comptes rendus de ses séances, v. 118, 1st quarter, 1965: 69-82. AS162.P411, v. 118

Minutes of meeting of the Academy (Feb. 8, 1965) comprising a plea by Gaston Bouthoul for an objective study of war as a social phenomenon (polemology), comments from his audience, and his reply. Bouthoul distinguishes two traditional approaches to polemology, international law, which seeks to bring war under rules, and pacifism. The first known peace plan dates from the 13th century B.C. (between Ramses II and the Hittite king) and includes the ideas of arbitration, frontier guarantees, a nonaggression pact, right of asylum, nonintervention in internal affairs, and extradition. One can truly admire "the political imagination of that era. But one must also notice with melancholy the little progress made since that far-off time." In fact, however, most peace plans have been successful in preventing the types of war that preceded them. The Treaty of Westphalia, for example, eliminated religious wars between its signatories. But war simply reappears under new pretexts or forms: foreign, civil, ideological, colonial, revolutionary, dynastic, imperialist, religious, linguistic, racial, national. In fact war is not avoidable; "it seems that certain sociological conjunctions inevitably provoke collective impulses that cloud the critical mind and cause men to forget the importance of the stakes and the gravity of the dangers." War is conducted rationally, but its outbreak is usually due to fury, fanaticism, vainglory, or even a gaming spirit. Illusion and optimism invade the prewar mentality. At any rate the conscious war motive and the real cause, which is the internal social situation, cannot be confused. Pacifism has not cured interstate antagonisms that are normally dormant but occasionally explosive. Because pacifism preaches that good will suffices it is the worst enemy of peace. Only by knowing what social functions war fulfills can one hope to functionally prevent armed conflict. "If you want peace understand war." Commenting on these remarks, Raymond Aron objects to studying war as an abstraction outside the context of "civilization, society, or era." Jacques Chastenet, Pierre Renouvin, Gabriel Marcel, Jacques Rueff, Louis Martin-Chauffier, and René Poirier are the other commentators, speaking on subjects such as cessation of hostilities, contemporary war as opposed to previous wars, objectivity, aggressiveness, and national versus ideological wars.

1564

Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. WAR AND REVOLUTION TODAY, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO VIETNAM [by] Walter Millis. Followed by a discussion [by W.H. Ferry and others. Santa Barbara, Calif., c1965] 11 p. (Its Occasional papers)
DS557.A6C4

Searches for an understanding of the "real nature and functions" of war and revolution which have been precipitated by the nuclear age and the nuclear stalemate. Revolution comes from nationalist ambitions and elitist leaders, not from want and oppression and great uprisings of the masses. Confronted by the confusing status of the Vietnamese War a new meaning of war is sought--and must emerge.

1565

Droz, J.-P. [WAR AND PEACE] La guerre et la paix. Revue militaire suisse, v. 111, June 1966: 298-302.
U2.R5, v. 111

Long ago people began to yearn for lasting peace and disarmament; the difference today is that the desire is popularized. But the citizen who believes he can escape participation in modern war is suffering from delusions. The goals of war are increased power and wealth--coal, potash, ores, markets, spheres of influence. What is disturbing is that man has lost his control, he is dominated by the buildup of economic power. Faced with this situation how should we behave? Karl Barth's affirmation--"si non vis bellum, para pacem" [if you do not want war, prepare for peace] --is preferable to the ancient Roman dictim to prepare for war in order to achieve peace. Man must seek to improve the organization of peace, but realize that a new war may not be avoidable. If such be the case he must squarely face the alternative. If necessary the state is duty-bound to use armed force, and the responsibility of each man is to ask whether the recourse to force is really requisite at the time it appears imminent. Pacifists err in denying war in the abstract, in trying to isolate it from its environment. War and peace being the concern of all citizens, universal military service is needed to make war a "personal problem" for everyone.

1566
Hsu, Hsi-hui. ON WEAPONS. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Translations of political and sociological information on Communist China, no. 348, Mar. 30, 1966: (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 34,807) p. 1-4.
P&GP RR

"CSO: 3577-D."

"Translation of an article . . . in the Chinese-language newspaper Yang-ch'eng Wan-pao (Canton Evening News), Canton, 27 January 1966."

"Any strong weapon can under given conditions become [as soft as] a 'bean curd.' This can be called a law." Antiweapons have always succeeded new weapons in the history of military technology, and will continue to do so. One may be initially surprised and overwhelmed by a new invention, as were the British by German submarines in World War I, but to develop retaliatory techniques does not take long. Even the technologically and economically weaker side can devise "means to withstand the prowess of weapons of the superior side"; i.e., either counterweapons or skillful strategies and tactics such as demonstrated by the South Vietnamese peoples. For all its power not even the nuclear bomb is an ultimate weapon, because protective measures and countervailing means reduce its destructive effects. U.S. imperialist missiles are not invulnerable--in North Vietnam ordinary antiaircraft guns can shoot them down and modern science provides means for combating ICBM's. China already possesses antimissile missiles and is studying techniques for exploding missile warheads in the air and even for reversing the direction of flight. The people, not weapons, will determine history.

1567
Klingberg, Frank L. PREDICTING THE TERMINATION OF WAR: BATTLE CASUALTIES AND POPULATION LOSSES. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 10, June 1966: 129-171. JX1901.J6, v. 10

Disproves the hypothesis that there is a constant ratio "for defeated nations between battle casualties and population losses, before surrender, particularly in certain types of wars." At the same time the study raises a strong presumption that "certain trends in battle casualties throughout a specific war might be useful in helping to predict the end of that war." Originally undertaken just prior to the Japanese surrender, the analysis used historical data about casualties in such wars as the Thirty Years War, the Lopez War in South America, and World War I. Unfavorable trends including "casualty percentage ratios between the opposing belligerents, army-size ratios, proportion of battle defeats, and intensity of fighting" appear to presage the surrender of the losing side. If the world shortly enters a less revolutionary period of controlled, limited warfare, "the study of casualty data might help achieve limited objectives with the minimum expenditure of human life."

1568
Perré, Jean. [WITH THE COOPERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE PROSPECTIVE OPERATION OF JUNE 5-6, 1970] L'opération prospective, avec coopération des moyens nucléaires des 5/6 juin 1970. Revue militaire suisse, v. 111, Mar.-Apr. 1966: 97-115, 153-175. U2.R5, v. 111

Thoughts on the past evolution and present state of nuclear strategies and a summary of the effects on cities and populations of nuclear blasts. The author emphasizes the strategy of nuclear deterrence (an old and effective, although risky, principle) and the balance of terror as foundations for present nuclear relationships. The greatest danger inheres in the possibility of escalation, not from conventional to atomic, but from tactical atomic to thermonuclear weapons. In part 2 the author discusses the tactics, organization, and weapons that will be needed to conduct a tactical nuclear and antisubversive war. Mobility, dispersion, invisibility, secrecy, and surprise are stressed. Perré presents his vision of the unfolding of a NATO-Soviet war in detail. Finally he hypothesizes a battle in a 1970 war in which Soviet troops have advanced into northern France and are driving south. Probable offensive and defensive tactics, the effects of nuclear weapons on both sides, and psychological reactions under these circumstances are postulated.

1569
Reinicke, Adolf. [PERSPECTIVES: WORLD POLITICS FOLLOW WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY] Zukunftsperspektiven: die Weltpolitik folgt der Waffentechnik. Revue militaire générale, no. 4, Apr. 1966: 513-529.
U2.R48, 1966

Includes summaries in French and English.

"World politics follow weapons technology. The great political driving forces . . . have adapted themselves to relationships" deriving from the existence of nuclear weapons. Modern weapons development, singularly rapid in the nuclear age, is particularly vital in establishing the political strength or weakness of nations. Armed strength (dependent on technology) is the controlling element in negotiations; it determines the types of demands or concessions that will be made. The revolution in weapons' speed and power has created military and political alliances, quickened economic unions between allies, made weaker allies dependent on the strongest, and forced great-power leaders to concern themselves with violence occurring anywhere in the world in order to prevent its escalation. Military parity determines politics today, but experience teaches that such balance cannot last forever. It is highly doubtful, despite the prophecies from East and West, that future great wars will be nuclear wars. The more the means of mass destruction are perfected, the less likely it is that leaders will choose to use them. It follows that the political power of these weapons will shrink. New defensive weapons against missiles will be developed, but neither side will be able to achieve a much higher degree of defense effectiveness than the other. Probably air warfare will become in great part obsolete while ground capabilities, conventional weapons, national will, and mass armies will be correspondingly more important as factors of military strength. Even if perfected antimissile weapons do not soon materialize, deliberate nuclear abstinence heightens the chances of conventional wars. And there are always revolutionary wars, which are unsuited to use of nuclear weapons. In the future, then, different weapons and strategies may be expected. Tactical rather than totally destructive strategic strikes will govern the conduct of war. In order to fight such wars an attacked nation must possess flexible and well equipped troops and must implant a high morale in the whole population.

1570
Sushko, N. Ia., and S. A. Tiushkevich, eds. MARXISM-LENINISM ON WARFARE AND THE ARMY. Washington, U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1966. 315 p. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Soviet military translation no. 272)
P&GP RR

"JPRS: 35,777."
"CSO: 1850-S."
"Complete translation of the Russian-language book entitled Marksizm-Leninizm o Voyne i Armii . . ., Fourth Revised and Supplemented Edition, Voyenizdat, Moscow, 1965, pp 2-383."

Contents.--War as a socio-political phenomenon.--Social character and types of war in the modern era.--Wars in defense of the Socialist Fatherland.--The armed forces of the capitalist states and the new independent states.--The armed forces of the socialist states.--The military might of states under modern conditions.--Marxist-Leninist teachings on warfare and the methodological problems of Soviet military theory.--A chronology of wars, armed uprisings and military conflicts since the end of the 19th century.

"A systematic statement of Marxist-Leninist teachings on warfare and the army as a component part of historical materialism."

1571
Voznenko, V. [DIALECTICS OF DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE IN PATTERNS AND METHODS OF ARMED CONFLICT] Dialektika razvitiia i smeny form i sposobov vooruzhennoi bor'by. Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, v. 47, June 1966: 41-48.
U717.R9A27, v. 47

Patterns and methods of armed conflict from the earliest times depended on the level of industrial power, military weapons and technology, training of military cadres, and the political and moral state of the civilian population. New conditions, historically, tended to bring changes in tactics, strategy, and force structures. In recent years the rapid advances in physical and social sciences have accelerated innovation and adaptation of new methods. New developments in military technology proceed without pause and at times make significant leaps. Thus in the 1930's Soviet military art introduced important developments in tactics and operations in connection with the materialization of new weapons, different organization of combat units, development of deep deployment, uses of mechanization and armor, aerial envelopment, etc. The advent of nuclear missiles created a revolution in military affairs. It was a profound breakthrough in weaponry and military technology and led to development of entirely new methods and patterns for the conduct of ground, air, and naval operations. At all levels, these methods have no resemblance to those employed in wars of even the recent past. To the question of how a new world war would be fought should it begin without resort to nuclear weapons, one can answer with assurance that nuclear arms of tactical, medium range, and strategic designations would be in states of readiness for use at any time. This should preclude military leaders' copying combat methods of the preceding war and encourage them to an assiduous search for methods corresponding to conflicts of a different character.

2. Major War

3. Limited War

1572
Efremov, Aleksandr E. WESTERN THEORIES OF "LIMITED" WARS. Washington, U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1966. 50 p. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Soviet military translation no. 273) P&GP RR
"JPRS: 35,796."
"CSO: 1850-D."

"Translation of a Russian-language book . . . entitled Za Shirmoy 'Ogranichennykh' Voyn (Behind the Screen of 'Limited' Wars), Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, Moscow, 1960, pages 2-84."

"Discloses the substance of the theory of 'limited' wars and shows the danger which threatens the world from the schemes of its creators."

4. Unconventional War

1573
[FALSE FOG OVER A COUNTRY, ELECTRICAL FAILURE IN A CAPITAL CITY, FALSE ATOMIC ALERT, ETC. SOME INFORMATION ON NEW SABOTAGE TECHNIQUES] par le groupe XXX. Faux brouillard sur un pays, panne d'électricité d'une capitale, fausse alerte atomique, etc. Quelques indications sur les récentes techniques du sabotage. Planète, no. 28, May/June 1966: 58-66. P&GP RR

The great French scientist Joliot-Curie wrote in 1947: "The war of the future will be invisible. When its harvest has been destroyed, its industry paralyzed, its armed forces unable to act, a country will realize that it is at war and that it has just lost that war." Sabotage already plays a significant part in the cold war and in limited wars; U.S. and French counter-espionage services are convinced that the electrical blackouts in New York (November 1965) and the Netherlands (January 1966) were part of a "future concerted action." To sabotage a plane is a relatively simple business, and planes are ever disappearing in France, Switzerland, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Sabotage or accident? Ships too pose few difficulties to the saboteur's bombs or corrosives, and the nightmare of military men (although still in the realm of science fiction) is that neutral ships will be used to deliver nuclear bombs to busy harbors. Land-based sabotage is most widespread. Electrical systems are vulnerable and radio-telecommunications are simply jammed; the occasional cutting of telephone wires (vandalism?) is probably the saboteur's experimentation; trains are sometimes derailed; from time to time a suspicious number of English and German automobiles have been known to stop dead--inexplicably--perhaps because of hypersonic vibrations. Industry is another goal of saboteurs and can do little to protect itself. What of tomorrow's sabotage? A "betatron" emitting radiation could unloose a nuclear alert in a city and thus cause panic; a "carcinotron" that can completely jam radio, television, and radar over large areas could be placed by the Soviet Union on the moon to prevent U.S. missile launchings; meteorological warfare (e.g., causing thick fogs to form over strategic points) is also in the realm of possibility. One should not overestimate the potential of this weapon; nonetheless the panic and immobilism sabotage could insideously incur are considerable. The Soviet Union, the United States, and other countries are obviously concerned and seeking countermeasures.

1574
Mueller, Siegfried. [MODERN WAR] Der moderne Krieg. Revue militaire générale, no. 6, June 1966: 98-106. U2.R48, 1966
Includes summaries in English and French.

Despite the world's predictions the fall of the Axis powers did not bring war forever to an end. More than 50 separate wars have occurred since the founding of the United Nations. Against unconventional wars and Communist expansionism the nuclear might of the United States and the powerful conventional military

machine of the Western alliance have stood helpless. Modern war is revolutionary war for and by people, and it may someday affect Western Europe. Plans must be drawn up for countering subversion, plans that encompass offensive as well as defensive action. "Mankind is apparently not yet ready for eternal peace, although it is desired as ardently by military men as by civilians. . . . We will not survive the near future without military strength. That is not the fault of the military. Defense forces must be most effective in their own countries."

1575
NORTH VIET NAM: THE RED NAPOLEON. Time, v. 87, June 17, 1966: 32-36. illus.
AP2.T37, v. 87

Throughout South Vietnam "the Allies," spearheaded by American firepower and men, are hitting the Vietcong in areas previously abdicated by the Saigon government. The kill ratio has turned favorably to the allies, and, where victory for the Vietcong appeared near in June of 1965, the allied commitment has altered the picture. The Communist insurgency is authored by Hanoi and directed by Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, Commander in Chief of the North Vietnamese Army and Defense Minister and Deputy Premier of North Vietnam. Best known as a lifelong insurgent against French rule, he has gone down in history as the commander who drove the French out of Indochina in 1954. His guerrilla tactics, after harassing the French for many years, finally culminated in the shattering French defeat at Dienbienphu. Just a year ago Giap could look back over his successful completion (in Mao's handbook) of phase 1, grassroots political organization, and phase 2, guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and sabotage. He could decide the time had come for phase 3, "an escalation of the conflict into conventional war, attacking in large numbers for the kill." Giap began the movement of 12 regiments of North Vietnamese Army regulars down the Ho Chi Minh Trail to build up the Vietcong. Victory was expected in 1965. But in July America announced it would help South Vietnam "in full force." In the month-long battle at Plei Me Giap's troops were routed and pursued; 2,262 were slaughtered. Giap had tried his time-tested technique of attacking outposts and ambushing the force coming to the rescue; but he could not ambush relief forces who moved by rotor and not by road. The steady punishment by air of Vietcong and North Vietnamese bases and supply depots has created problems for Giap which cannot be answered by insurgency tactics--problems of supply along a hazardous 800-mile route harassed by American air and ground power. This and the slow destruction of North Vietnam's war industry and communication facilities have not only spoiled Giap's timetable of conquest in South Vietnam, but may force a reassessment of the whole insurgency.

1576
Rogers, Robert, and Ted Yates. THE UNDECLARED WAR IN GUATEMALA. Saturday evening post, v. 239, June 16, 1966: 30-33. illus.
AP2.S2, v. 239

Relates the authors' experiences with Communist guerrillas in Guatemala and describes the social and political conditions the insurgents hope to change. Some of the insurgent leaders and their exploits are depicted including the tactics whereby they intend to gain support from the peasant population.

1577
Schuldt, Erwin. [VIETCONG--ANATOMY OF A GUERRILLA MOVEMENT] Der Vietkong--Anatomie einer Partisanenbewegung. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, May 10, 1966: 290-292. diagr.
U3.W38, v. 10

The story of the guerilla fighting in Vietnam and the course of this "war without a declaration of war, without front and without rear" are well enough known. Less well known are the methods and organization of this new type of partisan movement, the Vietcong. The author takes the reader behind the scenes for the first time and shows him a development trend which Peking's rulers are claiming to be the only effective type of warfare for revolutions of the future--a trend which, according to Mao Tse Tung, will spread further and further throughout the world. This is the "theory of the coalescing oil patches" with which we may have to concern ourselves further in the not too distant future. (Abstract supplied)

B. MODERN WEAPONRY AND RELATED TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1578
ASTROLOG: CURRENT STATUS OF U.S. MISSILE AND SPACE PROGRAMS. Missiles and rockets, v. 18, Mar. 14, 1966: 25-31. UG630.M54, v. 18

Lists alphabetically U.S. space vehicles, satellites, and missiles, and gives their technical characteristics and stage of development.

1579
Barthel, F. [SMALL MODERN WARSHIPS--TWO BRITISH CORVETTES FOR GHANA] Modernes Kleinkampfschiff--Zwei britische Korvetten für Ghana. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Apr. 15, 1966: 260. illus.
U3.W38, v. 10

Gives details on the Corvette, a warship newly constructed in Great Britain for Ghana. Despite its small size the ship is well equipped with modern weapons, including the maneuverable three-barrel mortar "Squid MK" for underwater bombs. General data on the ship's equipment and performance are given. The author points out that it is designed to partially relieve bigger warships of certain smaller tasks. The new Corvette is especially suitable for small navies, particularly those of the developing nations.

1580
Belot, Raymond de. [CONCERNING A RUSSIAN CRUISE] A propos d'une croisière russe. Revue politique des idées et des institutions, v. 55, May 1966: 252-256.
H3.R38, v. 55

Statistics on the Soviet submarine fleet and its capabilities as demonstrated in the recent around-the-world journey made in one-and-one-half months by a squadron of probably six submarines. Today the nuclear submarine is thought to be the best deterrent available; in another decade new technology may have rendered it inefficacious, at least in its present state.

1581
Berg, Robert S. COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS AS AN AID TO WEAPON SYSTEM SELECTION. Air University review, v. 17, Mar./Apr. 1966: 49-55.
TL633.A66, v. 17

Illustrates "how cost-effectiveness techniques were applied in Air Force studies leading to the definition of a new weapon system, an advanced strategic aircraft."

1582
Bergman, Jules. IF ZEUS FAILS, CAN SPRINT SAVE US? New York times magazine, Mar. 20, 1966: 26-27, 57, 59-60, 62, 64, 66, 68.
AP2.N6575, 1966

Explores the problems of antimissile defense. The Nike-X system--composed of sophisticated radar and the Nike-Zeus and Sprint missiles--is described and placed in the context of the military, economic, and political ramifications of deploying an effective antiballistic missile system.

1583
Boone, W. Fred. NASA'S CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL SECURITY. Shipmate, v. 29, May 1966: 5-6, 8, 10, 12, 14. VA49.S53, v. 29

Emphasizes the importance of space research and development to national security and sketches the salutary effects of space programs upon U.S. industry, education, academic research, and government. Several areas in which the National Aeronautics and Space Administration supports the U.S. military services are cited, among these: participation in development of the XB-70 bomber, creation of satellite communications systems for the Defense Dept., and development of a manned orbiting laboratory.

1584
Brill, James H. INFANTRY ROCKET WEAPONS. Ordnance, v. 50, May/June 1966: 628-630.
UF1.O67, v. 50

Sketches historically the recognition of, and response to, the problem of equipping the infantryman with a simple, mobile, and lethal antitank weapon. This is followed by an up-to-date inventory listing the U.S. footsoldier's "personalized arsenal of missiles and rockets."

1585
Brownlow, Cecil. AMSA SHELVED IN FISCAL 1968 BUDGET PLAN. Aviation week & space technology, v. 84, May 2, 1966: 22-25.
TL501.A8, v. 84

Presents arguments for and against development of an advanced manned strategic aircraft as expressed by Secretary McNamara, the House Armed Services Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other military and government leaders. If Secretary McNamara holds to his present plans, the fiscal 1968 defense budget will "contain only $6 million for the project, down from the $11 million approved in the Fiscal 1967 request."

1586
CONTAINING ABM. Commonweal, v. 84, May 27, 1966: 271-272. AP2.C6897, v. 84

Fear that the Soviets may soon deploy antiballistic missile (ABM) defense systems around certain key cities--even though such a system would probably profit more from bluff than impregnability--pressures the U.S. Government to produce an ABM system in return. The debate over whether a U.S. ABM system should be developed and deployed has centered about two issues: aggravation of the arms race and the problem of nuclear proliferation. Deployment of even a skeleton ABM force (such as one aimed at blunting a possible missile attack from Communist China) by one superpower will almost certainly "stir up enough doubt in the opposing superpower to accelerate the arms race." The ultimate danger--that the Soviet Union may achieve a truly airtight system that would upset the balance of power--is hardly alleviated by deployment of the "far-from-airtight" system now possible. Arguments that ABM deployment will serve as an antiproliferation measure by rendering smaller nations' nuclear forces useless disregard the fact that considerations of prestige are the prime motivation for nations to join the nuclear club. In fact the military confrontations that threaten to cause nuclear proliferation do not involve the United States and the Soviet Union but India and China, Israel and Egypt, and South Africa and other African nations. Soviet deployment of a skeleton ABM network may well be aimed at an eventual attack by medium-range Chinese missiles. Such a system would not make ineffective the United States nuclear deterrent against the Soviets, for a U.S. nuclear attack on the U.S.S.R. would still destroy one-fourth of the Soviet population and two-thirds of its industry. "In a world so irrational that figures like these are part of normal political discourse, a plunge into a full-scale ABM system would only compound the madness."

1587
Coulomb, Jean. [FRENCH RESEARCH IN SPACE] Les recherches spatiales françaises. Nucleus, v. 7, Jan./Feb. 1966: 16-28. P&GP RR

The French National Center for Space Research (CNES), founded in 1962, views its major task as stimulation of national research. It gives technical and financial aid to scientific study, coordinates research, and lets contracts to industry for the necessary equipment. About 70 percent of its budget, which totaled NF226 million in 1965, goes to industry. CNES actively promotes international space cooperation through its participation in the European Space Research Organization and the European Launcher Development Organization and through bilateral programs (with Argentina, Japan, Pakistan, Germany, India, and the United States). Its scientific programs use ground observation equipment, balloons, test rockets, and satellites, and through them much meterological, biological, geodetic, astronomical, and communications information has been gathered. Although the orientation of CNES is primarily scientific, much of its work is directly preparatory to "the utilization of space technology for other missions" including telecommunications networks, navigation, and a meterological system.

1588
Dulberger, Leon H. ADVANCED STRATEGIC BOMBERS. Space/aeronautics, v. 45, June 1966: 62-75. diagrs.
TL501.A786, v. 45

Assesses, amid the controversy over its development, the advanced manned strategic aircraft (AMSA). The feasibility and requirements of AMSA and its nuclear armament, the short-range attack missile, are weighed in the context of bomber defense and the Nation's defenses as a whole. Designated the FB-111 (an adaptation of the variable-geometry wing F-111), the projected aircraft has yet to prove its strategic potential. "Beyond this adaptation of the tactical TFX to a strategic role, there's been limited work on AMSA." Still some proponents advance AMSA as the chief reinforcement to ballistic missiles in the U.S. deterrent force of the 1970's.

1589
Estes, Howell M. THE REVOLUTION IN AIRLIFT. Air University review, v. 17, Mar./Apr. 1966: 3-15. illus.
TL633.A66, v. 17

An assessment of the American capability to quickly deploy either large or small military forces materiel

to crisis areas, with emphasis on the newest developments in the airlift revolution and their strategic implications.

1590
EUROPE'S FALTERING BID IN SPACE. Business week, no. 1920, June 18, 1966: 110.
HF5001.B89, 1966

The European Space Vehicle Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) has encountered financial and technological problems that threaten to disrupt Europe's first joint venture into space research and development. Costs have exceeded extimates by $225 million; the first Europa I missile was destroyed in flight; Britain may withdraw from the project because of high expenses; the British and French feel that ELDO already lags behind U.S. and Soviet programs; and there are rumors that President De Gaulle may soon announce a Franco-Soviet cooperative space program. "And that could mark the beginning of the gradual withdrawal of France as well as Great Britain from ELDO." France now supports ELDO because in this way it can master new technology more cheaply. Also ELDO "helps keep France's scientists and its hungry electronics industry busy--and helps thwart what France fears would be U.S. domination of space communications."

1591
Evanzia, W. J. FASTER, LIGHTER 3-D RADARS IN SIGHT FOR TACTICAL WARFARE. Electronics, v. 39, June 27, 1966: 80-88.
TK7800.E4384, v. 39

Outlines the development and uses of 3-D radar systems. The newest of these systems are electronically scanned; some solid state, microminiature 3-D systems are being developed. The 3-D serves "many roles in modern warfare: detecting enemy missiles and aircraft, guiding interceptor aircraft and missiles to targets and evaluating the kill." The increased interest in radar that can quickly find the elevation, range, and azimuth of flying targets is promoted by the "escalation of the Vietnam war, the threat of new brushfire conflicts, [and] the growing use of missiles in tactical warfare."

1592
Gallavardin, Jean. [THE ORBITAL BOMB] La bombe orbitale. Stratégie, no. 8, Apr./June 1966: 62-82.
U162.S78, 1966

A technical evaluation of the "orbital bomb," which examines its ranges, compares it with ballistic missiles, and briefly discusses the possibilities of interception. The orbital bomb, however costly, is technically possible and by this very fact represents a "not negligible element of deterrence." Its principal advantage is that it can "without ever striking threaten many targets." The orbital bomb will have to be megatonic. We cannot know if an effective counterweapon is feasible; were it so, it would be extremely expensive.

1593
Getler, Michael, ed. MILITARY SPACE. Missiles and rockets, v. 18, May 30, 1966: 24-86.
UG360.M54, v. 18

Contents.--Survey.--Programs.--Research & technology.

Explores the present and future development of such military space programs as the manned orbiting laboratory, antisatellite weapons, early warning satellites, the cryogenic engine, and communications satellites.

1594
Getler, Michael. RADAR MAY ALTER POINT DEFENSE PLANS. Missiles and rockets, v. 18, Mar. 14, 1966: 15.
UG630.M54, v. 18

Describes the development of large-aperture phased-array radars, which may open the door to a hard-point defense system for U.S. ICBM complexes and command posts. The hard-point demonstration array radar (HAPDAR) now in the testing stage and the high-acceleration booster experiment (HIBEX) are parallel programs "to supply answers to DOD as to the availability of technology for building an effective terminal defense against ballistic missiles at a 'modest' cost." Employing such a system would possibly preclude the necessity of adding more ICBM's and silos to the U.S. missile force.

1595
Government Data Publications, Washington, D.C. ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE. Washington, 1965. 67 p.
V214.C6, 1965

Contents.--Introduction.--Navy ASW rundown.--Detection.--Destruction.--Platforms.

Gives the background and present status of Navy antisubmarine warfare programs. Organization and hardware are sketched.

1596
Guest, Alex. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE. Marxist quarterly, no. 17, spring 1966: 80-89.
P&GP RR

Without discussion or publicity the United States has reversed the injunctions against the use of biological and chemical warfare imposed by President Roosevelt. U.S. use of toxic chemicals in Vietnam promises to surpass the savagery of the Korean War, in which 84 percent of those killed were civilians. The toxic compounds used against agricultural products in Vietnam also have a lethal effect on the populace, for winds often spread these gases to inhabited areas. "One needs to be only vaguely acquainted with the late Rachel Carson's The Silent Spring to realize that almost all the common insecticides and plant poisons are toxic to humans in even low concentrations." The United States is also preparing agents of germ warfare for use against non-Western peoples; to contemplate the use of such hideous weapons against nations that have struggled for years to achieve even the slightest measures of public health "is an insult to human dignity." The argument that only the least toxic of these agents are likely to be used in the future is unconvincing; it is more probable that military efficiency will demand the immediate application of the most toxic weapons. The American Medical Association and individual physicians (ignoring the Hippocratic oath upon which their medical ethics are based) have uttered no word of protest against their government's barbarous programs. Many physicians have even aided the development of chemical and biological weapons. "This is a crime against humanity that must be challenged. Through every organization and every group of concerned citizens, we must demand that the United States government immediately stop its immoral acts that threaten the safety of the entire world."

1597
Heath, Sir Maurice. THE BALANCE IN BRITAIN'S AIR POWER--LAND-BASED OR CARRIER-BORNE? In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 111, May 1966: 124-127.
U1.R8, v. 111

230-967 O - 66 - 3

Britain's frail economic position and need for stringent economy in government spending will determine where the balance of its airpower will lie in the future. The overall defense commitment will be determined by the nature of Communist tactics, i.e. to avoid nuclear war but continue to subvert governments throughout the world by "peaceful" means. Experience has indicated that response by the West to a crisis situation requires speed, a quality which naval forces, particularly carriers, lack. Aircraft, however, with their increased load capacity and speed, have proven themselves capable of meeting these challenges. The idea of keeping large impregnable bases is a vestige of Britain's age of naval superiority; both are now outmoded. The cost of maintaining carrier forces far exceeds that of land-based squadrons, and their limited mobility renders them highly vulnerable. Land bases, while just as easily destroyed, can be rebuilt in less time and at much lower cost than would be needed to replace a carrier. All factors taken into consideration, land-based aircraft offer the better device to meet the peculiar challenge of Communist aggression which will continue to manifest itself in many different areas of the world.

1598
Heumann, Gert W. [THE BREGUET ATLANTIC 1150] Breguet 1150 Atlantic. Flug-Revue, no. 7, July 1966: 20-24. illus. TL503.C524, 1966

The commissioning of the first Breguet Br. 1150 Atlantic by Marineflieger-Geschwader 3 of the Federal Republic's naval air arm in January 1966 marks more than a simple step into another phase of this very important programme. No other programme in Europe has enjoyed more collaboration in which companies of four nations joined to form the needed organization, a company called SECBAT. Considerations of the operational requirement of this projected maritime patrol aircraft began in the mid-1950s when many forces operated the Lockheed Neptune. Owing to the changing demands in anti-submarine warfare the requirement called for a new aircraft which could replace the Neptunes in service with a number of the NATO partners as well as other aircraft serving this rôle. The specification was issued in March, 1958, and 18 different designs were submitted by 26 companies in June, 1958. Three designs were left in September, and in October the Breguet 1150 was selected for development. The Armaments Committee ratified this decision in January, 1959, and the French Government awarded the first contract before the other nations, concerned in this programme, had approved it. This speeded up the development work and at least ten months were saved. The consortium consisted of Breguet, Sud Aviation, Fokker, ABAP and Seeflug, and each partner took over his part in detail design and manufacture; the management was handled by Breguet. The first prototype took off for its maiden flight on October 21, 1961, three years after the selection of this aircraft's design. Owing to the loss of the second prototype in April 1962, a third prototype had to be built. This story gives all the details of the most modern maritime patrol aircraft, twenty of which will be in service with the Federal Republic's Bundesmarine and forty-two with the French Aéronavale. (Abstract supplied)

1599
[THE INVISIBLE ARMADA] Die unsichtbare Armada. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Mar. 10, 1966: 177-180. U3.W38, v. 10

The article . . . gives a survey of the present status of submarine construction throughout the world. A brief description of the early years of the submarine is followed by an appreciation for the importance of the submarine in modern naval warfare. The strength of the various fleets is given by number and type and classified according to fighting value, with special reference to the capabilities of nuclear-powered submarines. The author clearly reveals the superiority of the American nuclear submarine fleet as compared with all other fleets. At the same time he points out that the future significance of the submarine will depend very much on the development of new anti-submarine weapons. (Abstract supplied)

1600
Jackson, Willis. THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORT IN WESTERN EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA AND THE U.S.S.R. Nature (London) v. 209, Mar. 19, 1966: 1168-1171. tables. Q1.N2, v. 209

Summarizes a report prepared by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development comparing research and development expenditures and manpower for 1962 in Western Europe, North America, and the Soviet Union.

1601
Kaplan, Norman, ed. SCIENCE AND SOCIETY. Chicago, Rand McNally [1965] 615 p. (Rand McNally sociology series) Q125.K3
Bibliography: p. 581-595.

Readings on the interrelation of science and society. The first section presents background information relevant to both the "sociology of science" and the substantive problems involved in the field. Science as a social institution--its norms and values, the nature of scientific activity, etc.--is treated in the second section. The third section deals with research and the laboratory setting. In the fourth section national science establishments are discussed, while the fifth section touches upon national science policies. The sixth and final section looks to the future of science in an increasingly complex world.

1602
Lepotier, Adolphe. [REVOLUTION IN NAVAL STRATEGY] Révolution dans la stratégie maritime. Revue militaire génerale, no. 4, Apr. 1966: 530-540. U2.R48, 1966
Includes summaries in English and German.

A summary description of new weapons that have revolutionized the role of navies. Of particular importance is the nuclear submarine with missiles that can fire deep into enemy territory, missiles that can destroy the sea communications so vital to Europe's survival. The art of antisubmarine warfare is far from catching up with progress made in submarine capabilities.

1603
Leydon, John K. SPACE SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY--APPLICATION TO THE NAVY. Shipmate, v. 29, May 1966: 16-22. VA49.S53, v. 29

Reports on participation of the U.S. Navy in the U.S. space research and development program. Leydon describes the use of satellites to resolve problems of long-distance communication, the Navy Space Surveillance System (responsible for detecting hostile satellites crossing the United States), and the use of spacecraft in collecting oceanographic data. Cooperation between the Navy and the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration and Navy training programs in astronautics and aeronautics are sketched.

1604
Mahler, E. CAN ELECTRONICS INCREASE FIGHTING CAPABILITY? NATO's fifteen nations, v. 11, Apr./May 1966: 72-76: UA646.F5, v. 11

Explains the application of recent and possible future developments in electronics to military purposes. Innovations in communications, weapons production, fire control, navigation, and command and control are explored.

1605
[MODERN AIR DEFENSE: MISSILE TRAINING AT FORT BLISS] Moderne Luftabwehr; Raketenausbildung in Fort Bliss. Flug-Revue, no. 7, July 1966: 25-27. illus. TL503.C524, 1966

The development of high-speed aircraft flying at very high but also very low altitudes has changed the demands for air defence. Two basic type of missiles, developed in the U.S., are in service with the Bundeswehr: MIM-23A Hawk for lower altitudes and MIM-14A Nike-Hercules for high altitudes. (Nike-Ajax, the forerunner of Hercules, is no longer in production but still in service for exercise purposes.) Initial training was maintained at the missile shool at Aachen but geographical limitations within the Federal Republic made it necessary to transfer training to Fort Bliss, New Mexico. This place with a proving ground out in the desert, 37 miles wide and 185 miles long, offers the best facilities for this special training for the US-forces as well as the trainees of other NATO-partners. Up to 1965, about 600 German soldiers per year received their training at Fort Bliss, from 1966 on the yearly rate will be increased to 1200. This story describes the system of training and the details of the missiles concerned, their homing techniques and radar control means. (Abstract supplied)

1606
Morhagaer. [FRANCE AND ITS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS] La France et ses porte-avions. Aviation magazine international, no. 443, May 15, 1966: 22-25. TL502.A854, 1966

France's two light aircraft carriers Foch and Clémenceau along with the attack plane Étendard IV and the interceptor Crusader that are based on them comprise a discrete, mobile, rapid, autonomous, and largely invulnerable nonnuclear force. For the purpose of protecting its many interests and commitments outside the national territory while avoiding the escalation that would result from dependence on the United States for help in fulfilling these tasks France possesses no better weapon. But beginning in the early 1970's the planes now performing will become obsolescent. The decision for construction of a new model (or models) must soon be made. The best solution would be a variable-wing plane that could carry out both attack and interception missions. If a variable-wing plane that is suitable for the French Navy cannot be constructed within the present Franco-British program --and this seems the case in the light of recent British defense decisions--then France can manage it alone. The costs certainly would be high. However, such a decision would advance the nation technologically and would probably produce an important export product for the future. To fulfill its functions the naval air branch must at least be able to compete with planes of the MIG 21 or 19 types. Halfway measures that do not raise its level of capabilities waste money. The government should also consider very seriously the construction of a third and heavier aircraft carrier.

1607
NAVY SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE WEAPONS SYSTEMS. Data, v. 11, May 1966: 8-57. P&GP RR

A fiscal-year-end survey of U.S. Navy weapons systems. In interviews with the head of Navy research and development, the commanding officer of the Naval Ordnance Test Station at China Lake, Calif., the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) missiles division director, the commanding officer of the Naval Underwater Sound Laboratory, the director of the ASW torpedo office, the commanding officer of the Naval Underwater Weapons Research and Engineering Office, and the commander of the Navy Electronics Laboratory the whole arsenal of Navy weapons is discussed.

1608
NEW SYSTEMS FOR LIMITED WAR. Space/aeronautics, v. 45, Apr. 1966: 79-119. illus. TL501.A786, v. 45

Contents.--Advanced fighter-attack aircraft, by Leon H. Dulberger.--Tactical command and control, by Frank Leary.--Limited-war logistics, by Bernard Kovit.

Surveys new weapons systems necessitated by the Vietnamese War: a medium-weight, multimission aircraft designed to "permit countering aggression throughout the full spectrum of possible future limited wars," automatic data processing equipment to assist tactical command and control, and airlift vehicles (such as the C-5A cargo carrier) for battlefield support.

1609
Orlov, A. S. [MILITARY TRANSPORT AVIATION IN PENTAGON PLANNING] Voenno-transportnaia aviatsiia v planakh Pentagona. Vestnik protivovozdushnoi oborony, no. 2, Feb. 1966: 81-85. illus. Slav Rm

Examines the role of military air transportation under conditions of modern warfare and its usefulness to the U.S. strategy of flexible response. Various types of U.S. military transport aircraft are described; the importance of military transport to U.S. efforts to suppress "the national liberation movement" is assessed.

1610
Papenbroock, Günter. [KRAUSS-MAFFEI PRODUCES THE FIRST GERMAN POSTWAR TANK, THE "LEOPARD"] Krauss-Maffei baut den ersten deutschen Nachkriegspanzer "Leopard." Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Apr. 15, 1966: 254-256. illus. U3.W38, v. 10

The firm Krauss-Maffei AG derived in the course of years from two Munich locomotive factories. Today's main factory in Munich-Allach was established by the firm Krauss AG. The junction took place ten years later in 1931. Today Krauss-Maffei is mainly occupied with the series production of the new German combat tank "Leopard." Besides the production of the tank, the firm is engaged in instructing the soldiers in operating the "Leopard"; furthermore she has taken over the maintenance of the vehicles delivered to the Bundeswehr. The first "Leopard" built in Munich-Allach was delivered to the Ministry of Defense on May 9, 1965. 60 of this vehicle were provided for 1965 and 600 each for 1966 and 1967. This means that two new tanks come out of the Munich-Allach assemblage halls per day. (Abstract supplied)

1611
RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE. Data, v. 11, Apr. 1966: 6-52. P&GP RR

Examines U.S. sensor systems. A report is made on reconnaissance as a whole and on the year's developments in this field. The Commander of the Tactical Air Reconnaissance Center explains its equipment, mission, and future. The Army's sensor equipment is briefly discussed, and its research and development program in this area is explained. In the field of limited war, the Army's Limited War Laboratory at Aberdeen is currently working on a number of reconnaissance and surveillance projects; a report is made on this and on the work of the Naval Air Development Command. Lastly the head of the Reconnaissance Division in the Air Force Directorate of Operations explains its program.

1612
RESEARCH AND TESTING APPARATUS--NECESSARY RESOURCES OF A MODERN ARMY. Washington, Joint Publications Research Service, 1965. 31 p. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 32, 278) P&GP RR

"CSO: 11629-D."

"Translation of an unsigned report, published with an introduction signed by Pierre Messmer, French Minister of the Armies, in the French-language periodical Air et Cosmos . . ., No 107, Paris, 29 May 1965, pp. 1, 16-33, 46."
P&GP RR

In April 1961 the Directorate of Research and Means of Testing (DRME) was established in France as part of the Ministerial Commission on Armaments. Its purpose was to provide the armed forces with original and modern weapons by means of stimulating and coordinating research in the universities, state agencies, and industrial laboratories. From 8 to 12 percent of the national research effort is directly under DRME, but if the multiplication factor is taken into account the organization determines the direction of an estimated 20 to 30 percent of the scientific and technological research done in France. DRME contracts out work instead of operating its own laboratories. Though its work is directed toward the military applications of basic and technological research, much of what it achieves can be used in other fields. Although DRME is not responsible for the nuclear weapons program, DRME research might be used to solve some of its long-term problems. DRME supervises special coordinating offices for scientific and technological research. It also directs (1) the National Office of Aerospace Studies and Research, which conducts advanced research (currently it is particularly interested in atmospheric propulsion, sustained supersonics, and the physics of reentry) and gives technical assistance to industrialists; (2) the Interservice Operations Research Center, which studies problems of strategy and tactics and armaments problems; and (3) a Forecasting and Evaluation Center, which "represents the first attempt in France to apply the forecasting method to the direction of research programs." Its subdirectorate of testing means controls and orients the Firing Grounds Equipment Service and the operations of France's three missile testing sites. DRME's research budget has increased steeply since 1962.

1613
Rothschild, J. H. PROPAGANDA AND TOXIC WAR. Ordnance, v. 50, May/June 1966: 617-619. UF1.O67, v. 50

Observes that deliberation on whether the United States should employ toxic warfare in any form must include all factors--specifically political and military considerations. To the question of whether toxic warfare is acceptable as a means of modern combat the author concludes that toxics proved their military value in World War I. To determine whether their use is politically desirable requires "much more public education and discussion. Until Government policy is changed so as to encourage such discussion, the determination of the place of toxics in the enhancement of the over-all position of the United States will remain nearly impossible."

1614
Rougeron, Camille. [STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL PLANES] Avions stratégiques et tactiques. Forces aériennes françaises, v. 20, June 1966: 714-726. UG635.F8F66, v. 20

The military planner must choose weapons in accordance with future needs, and he must distinguish possible from desired tactics, as has been discovered in the Korean and Vietnam wars. Tactical air missions are directed against military forces and their supply lines; strategic missions aim at the power sources of an enemy--population, industry, and agriculture. Strategic strikes, nuclear or not, guarantee important results. The chemical destruction of U.S. agriculture, for example, would have further reaching consequences than the mere loss of 100 to 150 million people in a nuclear exchange. Tactical bombings in limited non-Western wars (Vietnam) are sometimes successful but oftentimes insignificant. The debate between the fighter bomber and the heavy bomber is becoming outmoded with the development of fast and powerful planes that can simultaneously carry out tactical and strategic bombing as well as fighting missions. The combination of plane and air-ground missile is a weapon well suited to nuclear and conventional wars. In ground fighting the plane can lend little support. But it is without rivals in strategic nuclear and conventional missions, especially when using chemical weapons.

1615
Rougeron, Camille. [THE VIETNAMESE WAR: GROUND-TO-AIR AND AIR-TO-GROUND MISSILES] La guerre du Vietnam: engins sol-air et engins air-sol. Forces aériennes françaises, v. 20, Apr. 1966: 410-420. UG635.F8F66, v. 20

The war in Vietnam offers the first chance for both offensive and defensive missiles to prove their worth. With deployment of the SAM-2 around the Hanoi-Haiphong complex the Soviet Union has so far been the only nation to use a ground-to-air missile. Similar in size and performance to the Nike-Ajax, SAM-2 is avoided fairly easily by U.S. pilots. Although through December 1965 approximately 150 SAM's were fired, they have knocked down only about 15 planes. Conventional air defense has had a better record of success. The U.S. Army and Navy are conducting around 10 study programs for air-to-ground missiles, programs designed to enable U.S. forces to hit any target, anywhere, day or night, in any weather. Missiles being employed or studied are the Sidewinder, the Super Falcon, and the Shrike anti-radar missile. The performance of the Shrike has proved unsatisfactory. New modes of guidance, especially by television and laser, are receiving much attention. "Having attained that degree of complexity where the ground-to-air missile is used abundantly against enemy incursions which employ air-to-ground missiles variously designed in order to escape the defensive missiles, aerial warfare

conducted with chemical explosives is going to become costly." Against buried targets tactical aerial bombing is wasteful. Not even strategic air attacks can hope to destroy Vietnamese communications. If the war were escalated other strategic objectives would be as vulnerable to considerably less expensive weapons as to those now being studied. Strategic nonnuclear bombing with economical weapons has not become an outmoded tactic.

1616
Schliephake, Hanfried. [TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT: INSTRUMENT OF LOGISTICS] Transporter; Instrument der Logistik. Flug-Revue, no. 7, July 1966: 28-29, 74. illus. TL503.C524, 1966

The mobility of a modern army depends on the flexibility of its means of transportation--mainly air transport. This lesson, learned during the Second World War by all combatants, led to the set-up of special transport units to meet all demands. The initial equipment of the Transport-Geschwader of the Bundeswehr consisted of C-47Ds and Noratlas transports, the latter of which still form the backbone of three Geschwader. The process of re-equipment of Transall C-160s will start in 1967. During peacetime, the tasks of these transport units are manifold, the majority of twelve different tasks is of military nature but certain cases of emergency may demand supply or rescue operations concerning civilians. The author gives a detailed description of the equipment and the logistic tasks of modern transports in service with the Bundeswehr which will procure a certain number of C-141A Star-Lifters which will serve as the 'long arm' to maintain a constant flow of bulky loads between the Federal Republic and the United States. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1617
Shein, G. N., and I. V. Vasil'ev. [GAS AND SEMICONDUCTOR LASERS] Lazery gazovye i poluprovodnikovye. Vestnik protivovozdushnoi oborony, no. 4, 1966: 81-84. illus. Slav Rm

Reviews the operating principles and functions of gas and semiconductor lasers and discusses some possibilities of their application to military problems.

1618
Sutcliffe, R. C. CONTROL OF WEATHER AND CLIMATE. Nature (London) v. 210, Apr. 30, 1966: 459-460. Q1.N2, v. 210

Reviews against a "background of world interest in meteorology" a U.S. National Academy of Sciences report entitled Weather and Climate Modification: Problems and Prospects. This report indicates that although "no decisive scientific step forward" has yet been taken in this area, extensive research into weather modification must take a high priority. Both the Soviet Union and the United States intend to invest in such research on a large scale, for the obvious reason that the ability to improve the climate of one's own country implies the ability to impair that elsewhere, "and there could be no more potent weapon."

1619
Swearengen, Thomas F. TEAR GAS MUNITIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL RIOT GAS GUNS, TEAR GAS PROJECTILES, GRENADES, SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION, AND RELATED TEAR GAS DEVICES. Springfield, Ill., C. C. Thomas [1966] 569 p. illus. TS538.5.S95

Provides technical data concerning chemical agents and gas ordnance. "It is a well known fact that the uses of tear gas are limited only by the ingenuity and technical knowledge of the person employing it."

1620
TENTH ANNUAL WORLD MISSILE/SPACE ENCYCLOPEDIA 1966. Technology week formerly missiles and rockets, v. 19, July 25, 1966: 42-144. illus. UG630.M54, v. 19

Reports on "U.S. space systems, missiles and rockets--including engines, drones and sounding rockets; foreign missiles, rockets, satellites and spacecraft; and satellites presently in orbit."

1621
Tiziou, Jacques, ed. [THE FRENCH SPACE EFFORT] L'effort spatial français. Aviation magazine international, no. 440, Apr. 1, 1966: 31-49. TL502.A854, 1966

Text, photographs, charts, diagrams, and timetables compiled in order to trace the history and predict the future of France's space program. Particular attention is devoted to the recently proven Diamant satellite launcher and to French participation in international space ventures.

1622
TOMORROW'S MISSILE SYSTEMS: A SPECIAL REPORT Air Force and space digest, v. 49, June 1966: 90, 93-94. UG633.A65, v. 49

Reports the advances being made in the Air Force's Minuteman III--the "most sophisticated strategic missile system"--and in the Defense Department's Advanced Ballistic Reentry Systems program--"a long-range, joint-service effort which has as its objective the development of the technological base for advanced reentry systems of steadily improving capability for the offensive-forces arsenal." The report is from the Air Force Systems Command's Ballistic Systems Division, Norton AFB, Calif.

1623
[TYPE 82 ANTIAIRCRAFT DESTROYER FOR THE ROYAL NAVY] Flugkörperzerstörer Typ 82 für die Royal Navy. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Apr. 15, 1966: 203. U3.W38, v. 10

Four new type 82 antiaircraft destroyers will be built for the British Navy. They are designed to serve in all weather conditions and to be fully "stabilized," as an aid in launching their weapons systems. Each will be equipped with the "Action Data Automation Weapon System" incorporating a new British-Dutch three-dimentional radar, which consists of components developed or produced in Great Britain, France, and Italy. In addition each will have the antisubmarine weapon system "Ikara" which was developed in Australia. West German contractors will produce the destroyers' gas turbines. Their tonnage will be greater than that of present destroyers of the "County" class, but due to their modern equipment they will require a smaller crew.

1624
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. ATOMIC ENERGY IN USE. [Washington, D.C., U.S. Govt. Print Off., 1965] 77 p. illus. TK9146.U55

A collection of articles originally prepared by the Atomic Energy Commission as newspaper feature stories to promote public understanding of the atom.

1625
U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Military Operations Subcommittee. MISSILE

AND SPACE GROUND SUPPORT OPERATIONS. Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 164 p.
TL4015.U5
Hearings held Jan. 25-27, 1966.

Presents testimony of Government officials relating to the ground support operations of projects relating to communications satellites, nuclear detection satellites, antimissile defenses, and the manned orbiting laboratory.

1626
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. NASA AUTHORIZATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 1966. Hearings, 89th Cong., 1st sess., on S. 927. Washington, Govt. Print. Off., 1965. 3 pts. 1117 p. illus., maps. TL521.312.A544
Hearings held Mar. 8-30, 1965.
Each part has special subtitle.

Contents:--Scientific and technical programs and program management.--Program budget detail.--Post Apollo planning documents and information relating to the fiscal year 1965 authorization.

Details proposed "appropriations to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for research and development, construction of facilities and adminstrative operation, and for other purposes." Testimony is presented by NASA and Atomic Energy Commission officials.

1627
Ward, Chester C. SPACE WEAPONS: U.S. POLICY VS. SOVIET ACHIEVEMENTS. Washington report (American Security Council) Mar. 7, 1966: 1-4.
P&GP RR

While the Soviets have announced their compliance with the U.N. resolution of October 1963 banning orbital weapons of mass destruction, Izvestiia has observed that the resolution by no means proscribes manufacture of such weapons. To date the United States has spent about $30 billion on its space efforts, some $9 billion of which has gone into military space programs. However no U.S. space weapons systems have been developed. In light of this fact the Soviet statements late in 1965 about Russian possession of "a monstrous new terrible weapon" described as an "orbital missile (whose) warheads can deliver their surprise blow on the first or any other orbit around the earth" are highly meaningful. Such statements must be considered alongside the fact that Moscow has proven its ability to put up with one rocket more payload than the United States launches with 3 space vehicles. And they must be seen in relation to the fact that only a small part of American defense resources is devoted to space warfare. When asked in 1964 how much money the United States was investing in studies of orbital bombardment vehicles the Director of Defense Research and Engineering stated "we have not more than three or four people working in one of the contract organizations studying this question. We are not doing any hardware work. So that I would be surprised if more than a couple of hundred thousand dollars in fiscal 1964 is being spent on this, and certainly no more than that is planned for 1965."

1628
Watt, D. C. THE ROLE OF THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER IN SOME RECENT BRITISH MILITARY OPERATIONS. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 111, May 1966: 128-131.
U1.R8, v. 111

Surveys the role of the carrier in four of the five major crises in which Britain has been involved over the past 20 years: Suez (1956), Jordan (1958), Kuwait (1961), and East Africa (1964). Assuming Britain will continue to exercise influence in non-European affairs, Watt argues "that without the carrier and the Commando ship no such role can be played; any more than it can be played without a strategic reserve in a permanent state of being en état de partir, or an R.A.F. Transport Command with aircraft adequate to move elements of that reserve with their weapons to wherever they may be needed."

1629
WHAT ARE THEY UP TO? Economist, v. 219, May 14, 1966: 677-678. HG11.E2, v. 219

During the past 2 years the United States and the Soviet Union have both carried on massive series of underground nuclear tests. Washington has detonated more than half of its 30 tests within the past 6 months, Moscow at least 3 since January. Why? The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission's public explanations cite testing new bombs, measuring explosions, experimenting with detection instruments, and studying the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives. Yet 30 tests--3 in 1 week alone--seem inordinate if everything is going right. Evidently the United States is wrestling with some tough design problem, probably in the yield of smaller warheads such as are used for the Polaris missile. America's big missile warheads were fully tested before the test ban, but Polaris, which at most packs one megaton, could stand some beefing up. Because of the space limitations in the submarine, Polaris' punch can only be upgraded by reducing the warhead's volume; this is what the Americans are working on. The Soviets, on the other hand, are probably testing an antiballistic missile and may announce very soon that they have ringed key cities with impregnable missile defenses, a claim hardly likely to be tested. In fact it is the obvious ploy in the light of Chinese nuclear tests and American missile superiority.

1630
Wilson, George C. SENATE MAY FORCE NEW ANTI-MISSILE POLICY. Aviation week & space technology, v. 84, May 2, 1966: 28. TL501.A8, v. 84

Reviews recent reaction in the U.S. Senate, Dept. of Defense, and Senate Armed Services Committee to the U.S. antiballistic missile (ABM) effort. Estimates of Soviet intentions to deploy an ABM system and fears that the Soviet Union may stage a technological coup "in ABM and other fields while the U.S. provides minimum funding for many of its promising military projects" have prompted the Senate to recommend more funds for the Nike-X program than requested by the Johnson administration for fiscal 1967.

1631
Yank, Li. PEACEFUL USE OF ATOMIC ENERGY IN COMMUNIST CHINA. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Translations on Communist China's Science and Technology, no. 302, Mar. 24, 1966. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 34,696) p. 57-62. P&GP RR
"CSO: 12136-D."
"Translation of an article . . . in the French-language periodical Energie Nucleaire (Nuclear Energy), Paris, Vol 8, No 1, January-February 1966, pp 40-43."

Information on the control system of Communist China's "Hun-Long" nuclear reactor, a new neutron

spectrometer developed by the nuclear division at Lu-Chow, an improved procedure for the fabrication of thorium nitrate of nuclear purity, and a nuclear-powered coastal vessel that is being designed (with Polish, Czech, and Rumanian assistance) for coastal shipping in the China Sea between Tientsin and Shanghai. The author reports that French recognition of the Communist Chinese government has aroused in Peking the hope that France will assist China with the equipment and scientific personnel required for the development of nuclear power.

C. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES AND MILITARY STRATEGIES OF STATES AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. General Analyses

1632
Beaufre, André. DETERRENCE AND STRATEGY. Translated from the French by R. H. Barry. New York, F. A. Praeger [1966, c1965] 173 p. illus. (part col.) U162.6.B413, 1966

Contents.--pt. 1. The laws of deterrence.--Deterrence, the key to contemporary strategy.--Analysis of bilateral deterrence.--Multilateral deterrence.--pt. 2. The consequences of deterrence.--Military consequences of deterrence.--The strategic consequences of deterrence.

A study in depth of the strategy of deterrence, which is "the decisive component of nuclear strategy which itself is the keystone of contemporary military structure." Because the rules of nuclear weapons have been misunderstood, confusion and disillusionment have set in; "we have been driven to take refuge at one time in the great illusion of disarmament and at another in the abdication of our responsibilities, handing over the security of Europe to the United States." Europe must reestablish belief in the function of defense. It is the threat of nuclear weapons that today keeps a stable peace. The strategy of deterrence is to maintain a judicious mixture of danger (which creates stability) and stability (which recreates danger) through the possession but nonuse of nuclear weapons. Of course this strategy has no purpose outside of political goals and so is subordinate to politics. Over a long period of time multilateral deterrence, although feared by the two great nuclear powers, may be capable of bringing stability to Asia and Africa just as bilateral deterrence has brought stability to Berlin and Formosa.

1633
Benoit, Emile, and Harold Lubell. WORLD DEFENSE EXPENDITURES. Journal of peace research, no. 2, 1966: 97-113. tables. AS9.J6, 1966

Provides a picture of expenditures throughout the world on defense programs. Functional breakdowns, expenditures measured in real value, and adjustments "for conceptual comparability and coverage" are given. The total world expenditure for defense was found to be approximately $133 billion. Seventy percent of this sum was spent by the United States and the Soviet Union, a concentration that "probably gives an ineradicably bipolar structure to the arms race, despite the loosening of alliances and military blocs."

1634
Chesneaux, Jean. [DIRECTION AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM] Sens et conséquences de la guerre du Vietnam. Pensée, no. 127, June 1966: 3-23. AP20.P36, 1966

The meaning of the Vietnamese War extends far beyond the borders of that Asian country. Historians will probably judge it to be as important a turning point as the 1929 economic crisis or the Fascist moves in Europe and Asia from 1936 to 1939. The war will prove to have exerted a significant impact on Asian and world international relations, the domestic politics of many countries, the tasks of leftist forces in Western countries, and the future of the Third World. The U.S. position in Vietnam and its tragic escalation of the war to the north are untenable, an example of manifest sophism. America is fighting with three long-term objectives in mind: (1) To prove that wars of national liberation cannot succeed in the Third World and that decolonized peoples will not be free to pursue the Socialist road; (2) To test new weapons and military theories; and (3) To "roll-back" Socialist Asia or to retaliate for the "loss of Asia" in 1949. The oppressed throughout the world can learn much from the experiences of the National Liberation Front about the relative roles of political and military force, about the struggle in the countryside and in the city, and about timing. But the lack of any one pattern for successfully waging a revolutionary war stands out. The prodigious U.S. technological effort that has been brought to bear on the war is of little use; its failure has once again demonstrated the supremacy of the human factor over technological development. This local war provides a focus for the capitalist-progressive confrontation, and before it the capitalist forces have disintegrated while the anti-imperialist forces have proved their indivisibility. The crisis of the capitalist world has been quickened by U.S. fighting in Vietnam. Extraordinary war expenditures compromise the "Great Society" and are precipitating a new anti-"American system" political renaissance in the United States. In France, Germany, and England as well dissenting voices are stirring up the lethargic political scene. American aggression in Vietnam is becoming the concern of all.

1635
Galtung, Johan. EAST-WEST INTERACTION PATTERNS. Journal of peace research, no. 2, 1966: 146-177. AS9.J6, 1966

In this article the system consisting of the 15 nations in the NATO-alliance and the 8 members of the Warsaw Pact is analyzed. First, the ranking pattern of the nations in each alliance is examined to see to what extent the nations that are defined as big powers also rank high on all other dimensions. In general this appears to be true, but more so for the Warsaw Pact nations than for the NATO nations. Then a general hypothesis is tested: that the interaction between the two blocs will be mainly between the big powers, less from big powers to small powers and only very little between the small powers. This hypothesis is tested on data from fifteen different types of interaction: diplomatic relations, restrictions on diplomats, expulsion of diplomats, state visits, exchange of notes, interaction in the UN, trade agreements, trade restrictions imposed and cancelled, trade volume, cultural agreements, cultural institutions closed, visa requirements, tourist restrictions imposed and cancelled, tourist volume and flight connections. The hypothesis is confirmed in almost all cases that involve governmental initiatives, and partly disconfirmed for the cases that involve non-governmental or individual initiative, like tourist volume. In the beginning of the article a general system of propositions concerning relations between two alliances, each headed by one or more big powers is developed. At the end of the article this system together with the

general findings from the article is used to develop a system of peace proposals designed to strengthen relations between the two blocs and make the total system more invulnerable to violent conflict. (Summary supplied)

1636
Lavergne, Bernard. [U.S. DESIRE FOR WORLD DOMINATION AND U.S. AGGRESSION AGAINST CHINA ARE BECOMING LESS AND LESS IMPROBABLE AND THUS SO IS NUCLEAR WAR. THE WITHDRAWAL OF FRANCE FROM NATO] La volonté des États-Unis de domination mondiale, l'agression des États-Unis contre le Chine, donc la guerre nucléaire, sont de moins en moins improbables. Le retrait de la France de l'O.T.A.N. Année politique et économique, v. 39, Apr. 1966: 21-39. D410.A6, v. 39

The central fact of international affairs is the "obstinate desire of U.S. leaders and generals to attain world domination," a goal that is born of a sense of superiority and anti-Communist missionary zeal. Latin America, Europe, and Asia are the special targets of this drive. In Europe the instrument of domination is NATO, which has succeeded in assuring the destruction of its European bases in case of war. General de Gaulle has pulled out of NATO in order to spare France the consequences of a Sino-American war and to reassert French independence. An important consequence of this decision is that it denies NATO the opportunity for aggression against the Soviet Union, because such action logistically requires the French hinterland. In the present state of international relations war could erupt in four ways: U.S. attack on China and Soviet passivity; U.S. attack on China and Soviet intervention; U.S. attack on the Soviet Union; and Chinese attack on the United States. In any case French nuclear weapons are useless except as an instrument of diplomatic strength. Eventually the United States will be driven from Asia. If this is done voluntarily, through the pressures of the few perspicacious U.S. opponents of present policies, peace can be maintained; if it is forced by Chinese instigation of a nuclear war, then innumerable lives will be lost.

1637
Moulton, Harland B. ARMS: HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH? War/peace report, v. 6, Mar. 1966: 14-15. P&GP RR

Reviews Julius Duscha's Arms, Money and Politics and Daniel Lang's An Inquiry into Enoughness: of Bombs and Men and Staying Alive, and reiterates the dilemma of "enough" in the current Soviet-U.S. arms competition. Many other questions are involved such as the role Congress plays in the determination of the Nation's defense budget, the pressure for increased arms spending that is exerted by the military-industrial complex in the United States, and the benefits for increased national security that might be derived from arms limitation or selective disarmament. The arms race goes on, for neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can ever feel safe. "Attempts to quantify requirements for deterrence and damage limitation founder on the shoals of uncertainty concerning enemy military capabilities and his willingness to risk nuclear war."

1638
Quester, George H. ON THE IDENTIFICATION OF REAL AND PRETENDED COMMUNIST MILITARY DOCTRINE. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 10, June 1966: 172-179. JX1901.J6, v. 10

Unrealistic military statements made by the Communists since the introduction of nuclear weapons may in actuality have been nothing more than a dissimulation required by the strategic environment. Assuming rationality--taking an "economic" viewpoint rather than a "sociological" one--the various stages of nuclear development may require varying assertions, some of which will be dishonest, about perceptions of the military value of nuclear weapons. In theory, when a country possesses no nuclear weapons it will deny any military significance to them, asserting conventional force to be superior and decisive. The pain-inflicting effects of these weapons will also be minimized. When a nation acquires its first primitive nuclear arsenal it will continue to depreciate the importance of counterforce but will shift its view of countervalue attacks, emphasizing the painful effects of its nuclear weapons (no matter how few) on the enemy's population. A third stage arises when a nation approaches a nuclear status equal to its rivals. Countervalue effects will still be emphasized, but the counterforce significance of nuclear weapons will be appraised more realistically as well. In the stage when nuclear superiority is close to attainment the counterforce doctrine is stressed, and, in order to make a first-strike capability credible, countervalue effects are depreciated. Soviet behavior since 1945 has fit this model quite well. At present they appear to be in the third stage. The Chinese, on the other hand, apparently felt in 1957 that they had moved directly from the first, nonnuclear, stage into the fourth stage, for they began to acknowledge the military decisiveness of nuclear weapons and continued to shrug aside their effects on the civilian population. When it became evident that the Soviets were not going to share their weapons with Peking, the Chinese reverted to the nonnuclear stage and came into the second stage only after the detonation of their first weapon. Presumably they will enter the third, "sensible" stage once their missile force is established. Attitudes toward escalation are closely related to this paradigm.

1639
Reynolds, Clark G. SEA POWER IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 111, May 1966: 132-139. U1.R8, v. 111

Surveys the field of naval historiography and concludes that since the death of Alfred Thayer Mahan in 1914 the rush of events has prevented a much needed effort to update and reinterpret naval theory. His six principles of seapower and its historical interpretation laid the foundations of naval theory. Scholars are only now attempting to analyze events since 1914, however, and offer a much needed reinterpretation in light of technological and strategic developments. Five additional factors are suggested to amplify Mahan's ideas, which, although sound for an overall understanding of seapower throughout history, have fallen prey to new variables just as these will succumb to changes in the future. They are: (1) "Specific national conditions conducive to a naval establishment," (2) "National political objectives and degree to which sea power can be employed in their realization," (3) "Material and technological capacity," (4) "Effective application of material to naval uses," (5) "Quality and training of naval leaders."

1640
Sengupta, Rabi. ANGLO-AMERICAN ATOMIC STRATEGY. Modern review, v. 119, Mar. 1966: 209-219. AP8.M6, v. 119

During the Anglo-American nuclear monopoly the United States maintained a superior role in the cold war with the Soviet Union. The strategy of "preventive war" was brandished before the Soviets lest they attempt aggressive action. By the early 1950's, however, the Soviet Union had achieved nuclear status and was quickly catching up, both in production of bombs and delivery vehicles. By 1954 a reappraisal of U.S. atomic strategy was made to take account of the Soviet ability to respond in like manner to nuclear strikes. The strategy of massive retaliation followed "preventive war," but even it was short-lived. Impressive only when the United States exercised a real superiority, massive retaliation was effectively challenged by Soviet nuclear strength. The possession of nuclear weapons by countries other than the United States neutralized the possibility of their use, destroyed their efficacy as "offensive" weapons, and even limited their use as defensive weapons. Their value now lay in deterrence, and it was thought necessary and important to have nuclear weapons for this purpose. In 1957 Henry Kissinger noted that shifts in the balance of power had come to be determined by technological developments within a given state rather than by acquisition of new territory. When large nuclear weapons became impossible to use, Kissinger suggested the employment of tactical nuclear weapons in local wars. The United States recently turned to belief in a countercity strategy and confining the use of tactical nuclear weapons to battlefields. "They [Americans] forget that the Socialist camp, which abhors atomic wars and would never resort to one except as a retaliatory measure, will provide no such concessions knowing fully well that its superiority has created conditions not for a limited use of these weapons, but for their total abolition." As long as the factor of "self-preservation" is operative in the conduct of war, two nations possessing totally destructive weapons systems will be deterred from using them. The policy of the Socialist Camp is to obtain a ban on these weapons, a policy to which the Anglo-Americans pay only lipservice.

1641
Smith, Dale O. PREVENTIVE WAR: AN ESSAY. Aerospace historian, v. 13, spring 1966: 15-16.
UG633.A1A515, v. 13

A nation that believes it faces ultimate attack and defeat by a potential enemy may initiate war in the belief it is staving off disaster at a later date. Often such wars could have been avoided or put off. American entry into World War I, Russia's mobilization in 1914 and Germany's reaction, and Hitler's forays against his neighbors are good examples of actions motivated by the idea of preventive war. We must also include the "ardent arms controllers" who advocate destruction of Red China's fledgling nuclear power plants in order, they believe, to prevent a militant China from attacking the United States at some future time. "Preventive war may prevent what it is intended to prevent, but it always creates new problems as grave as the old. There is an elusive hyperbolic aspect of war which tends to change conditions and the purposes as it is being waged." Should the initiator of the preventive war lose, the guilt will be placed upon that nation, even though its action was predicated upon an aggressive move on the part of the victim. The concept of preventive war provides the rationale for American action in Vietnam today and perhaps in Southeast Asia in the future.

1642
Van Cleave, William R. THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEBATE. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 92, May 1966: 26-38. illus.
V1.U8, v. 92

Classifies and categorizes the views of writers on the development and use of nuclear weapons. On the question of deterrence and defense Van Cleave ranges current writings on pacifism, deterrence, strategy, and defense from the extreme views of "radical pacifists" to the anti-Communist crusaders who propose preventive nuclear war against the Communist bloc. The author feels that "nuclear weapons have utility at least for deterrence, and the possibility of their use in deliberate, controlled warfare should not be rejected off hand."

2. Unilateral Policies and Strategies

1643
[AUSTRALIAN REARMAMENT] by J. H. Le réarmement australien. Perspectives, v. 22, June 4, 1966: 1-7.
HC10.P4, v. 22

Separately paged.

Australia is undertaking a considerable peacetime rearmament drive as indicated by the progression of its military budget from less than 200 million Australian pounds before 1962 to an estimated 450 million in 1966-67; by peacetime compulsory military service laws; and by the manpower and equipment goals set for the three services. The country will require a number of years and will have to spend large sums of money in order to achieve a significant increase in military strength. Why then has the decision to rearm been made? Behind the official statements of purpose (security, anticommunism) lies the real reason: "Australia--rich, not far from the poor masses, in a strategic position that means involvement in any generalized conflict, the champion of the white race vis-à-vis colored peoples--is, for these reasons, exposed to serious threats." Rearmament and alliance are to assure survival. Although not immediately menacing, Indonesia, Japan, and China pose potential military threats regardless of the nature of their political regimes. Great Britain and the United States are the only (white therefore dependable) allies who can plausibly help Australia defend itself. To keep their support Australian troops are fighting in Malaysia and Vietnam. According to all indications the rearmament trend will continue and even accelerate, and this will have a profound effect even beyond the region.

1644
Bertrand, Maurice. [FOR A FRENCH MILITARY DOCTRINE] Pour une doctrine militaire française. [Paris] Gallimard [1965] 185 p.
UA700.B44

Bibliography: p. 181-182.

Partial contents.--The importance and nature of the problem.--Risks of war in the modern world.--Definition of national objectives.--Nature and conditions of the arms race.--Conditions of security.--Conditions of independence.--Military means: definition of the French military apparatus.--Economic means: reduction of the budget.--Diplomatic means: the military problem and transcending nationalism.--Questioning nationalism.

Defines the choices open to French military doctrine. The author outlines the "military" way as follows: (1) Morally it defends nationalism and claims that, if France cannot achieve total sovereignty, Europe must

strive for a dignified and total independence from the United States. (2) Strategically it names Soviet-European confrontation as the world's major danger and says Europe must be prepared to cope with this in case the United States reneges. (3) As to means the military solution advocates a complete European military apparatus, which would include a strategic nuclear force, tactical nuclear weapons, and conventional forces. Bertrand quarrels with the military approach. He argues that to transcend nationalism is the sole way to solve the problems posed, and this means that the European path and the Atlantic path must be joined. The military danger arising from the capitalist-Communist confrontation will be manifested in the Third World rather than in Europe. Therefore the French defense forces must be reduced "to the minimum compatible with a reasonable participation in the forces of the Atlantic alliance." This will permit economic, scientific, and cultural development.

1645
Borchgrave, Arnaud de. A DISSENT FROM THE DISSENTERS. Newsweek, v. 67, June 6, 1966: 32-33.
AP2.N6772, v. 67

The arguments, slogans, and banners raised in support or condemnation of the American presence in Vietnam obscure the Nation's "fundamental interest and the fundamental issue." The fundamental interest is to contain Communist China. The fundamental issue is U.S. ability to support constructive ventures in underdeveloped areas and at the same time devise means of preventing the forceful overthrow of states by Communist "wars of national liberation." "The Communists are in for the long haul." To call for either an all-out commitment or a pull-out ignores certain facts. In Vietnam evidence refutes the contention that the National Liberation Front has large-scale support among many South Vietnamese. If this is true, why have the Vietcong had to kill 20,000 local South Vietnamese officials? Why do Buddhist leaders point out that "no one of prominence has joined the cause?" And if this movement is indigenous to the South, why must support, recruits, and leadership be supplied by North Vietnam? America is doing better militarily, and defections among the Vietcong have increased to an all-time high. Even North Vietnamese General Giap acknowledges that Hanoi is facing serious problems of its own. While many Buddhists do not want the Americans to pull out, neither do they want them to stay any longer than is necessary. The big question is whether the American people will decide to leave, or stay and finish the job of defeating the Communist-led insurgency and maintaining the U.S. position in Asia.

1646
Burke, Arleigh. ALTERNATIVES IN VIETNAM. Ordnance, v. 50, May/June 1966: 611-613.
UF1.O67, v. 50

Rejects U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, by which Adm. Burke feels the Nation would lose its leading position in the world, as well as the present policy of "piecemeal escalation," which runs the risk of "bringing in Red China by piecemeal decisions on her part." Slow escalation is also cast aside by the former Chief of Naval Operations, because "if there is any one lesson of past cold-war crises it is that we should act swiftly before the Communists compound and complicate a crisis." His alternative is to increase the intensity of the ground war, blockade North Vietnam, mine the Haiphong harbor, destroy all military installations in North Vietnam, and use all necessary means to prevent Communist supplies from coming into South Vietnam through Laos and Cambodia. The United States must convince the North Vietnamese and their sponsors that it intends to prevent their takeover of South Vietnam.

1647
Cabanier, Georges. [THE FRENCH NUCLEAR SUBMARINE] Le sous-marin nucléaire français. Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, Apr. 1966: 595-605.
D410.R45, v. 22

France's decision to build a nuclear-powered submarine fleet was made in 1963 in view of the political advantages of an effective nuclear force and the nation's technological capacities. A submarine destined to launch nuclear missles can attain sufficient secrecy, mobility, and thus invulnerability only as a nuclear-powered vessel. No mode of detection now operable or envisaged is equal to the abilities of the nuclear submarine. Nonetheless the use of this weapon poses some difficult problems, particularly concerning communications and security at the support bases. France has been able to proceed with its program on schedule and with satisfying results. In addition to increasing the nation's deterrence capability research has developed techniques and products that are useful to many other enterprises. The best means for combating a nuclear-powered submarine is a faster nuclear-powered submarine chaser. France intends to construct at least one of these before 1970, and beyond this at least five submarines should be built for the regular nuclear fleet. At the same time the surface fleet will remain a vital military instrument. "A new equilibrium between submarines and surface ships will establish itself; it is this equilibrium that the French Navy is striving to realize as harmoniously as possible in order to stand ready to fulfill all the missions the nation can assign."

1648
Candlin, A. H. S. THE CHINESE NUCLEAR THREAT. Army quarterly and defence journal, v. 92, Apr. 1966: 50-60.
U1.A85, v. 92

The Chinese, by raising foreign exchange currency through the sale of heroin on the world crime market, purchased the equipment which enabled them to construct and explode a nuclear device a few years earlier than expected. The fundamental aim of the Chinese Communists' is "conquest of the world" and they view war as "the supreme form of struggle to solve contradictions in a given state of development between classes, races, countries and political blocs." To the Chinese "politics is bloodless war while war is politics with bloodshed." This dictum appears to authorize the use of nuclear weapons when the time is right. Yet the Chinese tend to underestimate the effects of such weapons. Even the Soviets appear alarmed by the extremity of the means espoused to bring about Communist world rule. It would be a mistake to underestimate the ability of, or the size of, the Chinese nuclear effort. Samples from the Chinese tests reveal a greater degree of sophistication in nuclear capabilities than originally anticipated. Chinese proximity to a "trigger device" for future high-yield weapons, coupled with the presence of scientific manpower knowledgeable in nuclear weapons technology might present the West and Russia with a China militarily able to assert itself in international life to a far greater degree and at an earlier time than even the experts anticipate.

1649
Coffey, Joseph I. STRATEGIES AND REALITIES. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Proceedings, v. 92, Feb. 1966: 34-41.
Vl. U8, v. 92

Reflects on some of the changes of the last decade that have altered the framework of American strategic thought and examines the three primary concepts of "counterforce," "limited war strategy," and "no-war strategy." The author advocates greater realism in developing the conceptual base for American defense, hoping that in the long run this might bring about a "more explicit linkage among strategic concepts, theories of deterrence, and patterns of communist behavior than is more commonly recognized." Coffey recommends increasing awareness of the influence strategic concepts have on political-military affairs and practicing a subsequent restraint in action. He also would like to see a reassessment of the role America's allies will play within this framework.

1650
Dulac, Philippe. [INTERSERVICE INTERVENTION FORCE] La force interarmées d'intervention. TAM; terre, air, mer, no. 85, Mar. 10, 1966: 34-37.
P&GP RR

A sketch of the French Interservice Intervention Force (FII)--its missions and its singular organization, which integrates naval, air force, and army units into one coordinated fighting force. Overseas responsibilities and commitments make this force necessary as a supplement to direct defense of the nation. FII is designed to enable a French "strategy of presence" overseas without the large-scale deployment of troops.

1651
Eliot, George Fielding. THE RESPONSIBILITIES--AND BURDENS--OF POWER. National guardsman, v. 20, Mar. 1966: 6-9. UA42. N24, v. 20

Reasons that the United States will have to continue to bear a disproportionate share of the burden of defending the free world against Communist expansionist moves. The United Nations lacks the political and military authority to assume the role of a truly international peacekeeping body. Some rethinking of the present concepts on the responsibilities of power is necessary, for a mobile American military capability to support of national policies is essential. "Hesitation is hardly a quality which commands respect; the advice of professional military men in such matters may well turn out to be more valuable that the advice of gifted civilians who lack military experience." Clearly the United States will have to continue to protect weak neighbors and allies from being overwhelmed by stronger aggressive powers, and it must continue to support its armed forces, supply them with the latest devices, and afford them the mobility to strike at an aggressor. In this way, for some time to come, the United States will be expending a huge portion of the national budget.

1652
FALLOUT OVER PEKING. Economist, v. 219, May 14, 1966: 678-679. HGll. E2, v. 219

Chinese nuclear explosions have at last lost their shock value, due in part to the fact that, no matter how much technical progress Peking may make, a genuine intercontinental threat from China is still years off. Peking will, of course, soon be able to threaten Southern Asia with its bombs, but this region is not the target of a Chinese nuclear arsenal. Until China develops a full-fledged thermonuclear weapon and a trans-Pacific intercontinental missile everyone--including China, Russia, the United States, and the rest of the world--will remain happy. But when China must be admitted to superpower status, even though it would still be unlikely to initiate nuclear warfare, "the honeymoon of relative security" will be over. The exceedingly high costs of the nuclear program have pulled the teeth of China's all-around economic development, however, and in nuclear stalemate "the power game is also played with economic weapons of trade and aid." China is further hampered by its inordinate stress on politics and ideology at the expense of professionalism and expertise. Mao Tse-tung has so far managed to hold China together, but when he dies the negative effects of ideology--China's "spiritual bomb"--must be faced. If great-power status is to be the goal of Chinese leaders, "sooner or later they must shift the balance back from 'red' to 'expert.'"

1653
Féral, Colonel. [AMERICAN MILITARY THINKING AND STRATEGIC DOCTRINE] La pensée militaire et la doctrine stratégique américaines. Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, Apr. 1966: 620-633.
D410. R45, v. 22

Lessons from the American Civil War deeply influence U.S. military thought. Americans have learned to value economic and technical superiority as a decisive military factor. Politically U.S. strategy is impregnated with the idea of defending human freedom and the free economy. "Present American strategy rests essentially on technical realizations and possibilities," which offer an almost unlimited field of action. Teams of analysts and electronic computors, aided by numerous strategic "think factories," arrive at strategic doctrines through the study of multiple parameters. But "technical imperatives don't always correspond to political considerations." Since World War II American strategic concepts have gone through four phases, from massive retaliation to a doctrine of flexible response that is made possible by a constant 3 or 4 to 1 technical nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union and that is applicable to all three types of war--nuclear, conventional, and subversive. Because America is concerned over the political and economic ideologies of the whole world its military system is global. U.S. strategy is composed of deterrence, the ability to fight at any level, and a strong, supple economy. Generally the successful conduct of war or deterrence at any level implies the control of escalation rather than destruction. Two considerations enter into the strategy of nuclear deterrence: the ability to inflict unacceptable destruction on the enemy and to limit domestic damage. Refined calculations as to the means and costs of fulfilling these tasks have been undertaken. U.S. nuclear-age military strategy has two ingredients: (1) tangible "nuclear and conventional weapons systems constantly provided and improved upon by an enormous industrial and economic potential," and (2) the artificial "dialectic which is based on scientifically calculated and proven givens but also on reasoning adapted to momentary technical or political conditions and which tries to make use of all known psychological factors."

1654
Fink, Daniel J. THE MILITARY SPACE PROGRAM. Vital speeches of the day, v. 32, June 15, 1966: 518-521. PN6121. V52, v. 32

Although the Department of Defense Military Space Research and Development Program is far from solving all space-related R&D and operational problems, the Government can now address itself to the functional aspects of using space militarily. It is beginning to understand and exploit the great impact space systems can have on strategy, tactics, and weapons systems that operate chiefly on earth. This is true already with respect to information systems based on the use of satellites for long-distance communications and for meteorological investigations. The same can be said of space platforms employing sensors for the detection of ballistic missile launches and nuclear tests. The overall approach adopted by the Defense Department's Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering has not been to place all space programs under one "Space Czar," but rather to assign these programs to technically or operationally oriented groups on a case-by-case basis

1655
Fix, Joseph E. CHINA--THE NUCLEAR THREAT. Air University review, v. 17, Mar./Apr. 1966: 28-39. TL501.A5574, v. 17

Before its first atomic test Peking had found itself at a severe disadvantage because of its position on nuclear arms. Maintaining almost to the time of its own acquisition of atomic weapons that they were worth little, China nevertheless was precluded from joining in the test ban treaty by its "compulsive desire to obtain nuclear status." Peking thus put forward, solely for propaganda purposes, extravagant and unacceptable counterproposals, emphasizing in particular a world summit conference that would ban the use of nuclear weapons. Today Chinese nuclear technology may well be more advanced than is generally believed. There are even indications that China may be able to make the quantum jump from fission to fusion far sooner than anticipated. Analysis of future detonations will ascertain the validity of this hypothesis. Likewise it is probably overly optimistic to assert that China's delivery capability is inconsequential. The size and weight of Chinese weapons, given the apparent state of their technology, can readily be reduced to fit them into bombers already available to Peking. Taking a longer view, evidence indicates that China will not be slow to develop a missile capability. The advantages that would accrue to Peking from missiles are so numerous and so obvious that, although they could probably develop a hydrogen bomb in fairly short order, the Chinese will probably opt for intensive effort in the area of delivery vehicles. China is expected to act belligerently and irrationally once a truly credible nuclear capability is in its hands. Yet all previous evidence points to Communist Chinese use of military power in a political rather than an overt military way. Peking will probably tend to practice nuclear blackmail on its neighbors, who for the most part will be paralyzed with fear. An analysis of classified Chinese Army Work Bulletins by Alice Langley Hsieh uncovered little to support the thesis of recklessness and irrationality. To believe that a nuclear-armed China will act wildly is "unrealistic and enervating." Peking represents a serious threat to world order, to be sure; but the correct mixture of military and diplomatic approaches may convince the Chinese leaders that nuclear blackmail produces but little profit.

1656
Friedensrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. MEMORANDUM OF THE PEACE COUNCIL OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC ON THE DANGER OF WAR PROCEEDING FROM WEST GERMANY. [Berlin, 1965] 15 p. UA710.F76

In the past few years the Federal German Republic has undertaken preparations for war. It represents a veritable threat to the German Democratic Republic and other peaceloving nations of Europe and the world. West Germany's policies and goals include revision of the existing frontiers, extension of "German imperialism," and provocation of potential conflict situations in Europe. The Bundeswehr's forward strategy "comprises the planning, preparation and waging of an aggressive war." The military command has urged that NATO forces and plans be such as would facilitate the implementation of this forward strategy, the essence of which is nuclear aggression. West Germany's demands for nuclear weapons and the power over their disposal are linked with these aggressive aims. In reality Bonn favors escalation to nuclear conflict in Europe at the "soonest" possible moment. The stocks of nuclear weapons and carrier vehicles in West Germany are already formidable, and its demands mount in intensity. An element of the forward strategy is the "undercover war," defined in a Bundeswehr document as "a critical situation heightened to a crisis of civil-war-like character in which the aggressor does not operate with large units but uses his forces below the level of conventional war and applies the fighting principles of underground and guerrilla fighting." As final evidence of West Germany's preparations for aggressive war a series of emergency laws have been instituted, presumably for the care of people threatened by the consequences of war. They are, in fact, another means by which the Bundeswehr is setting up a military dictatorship and denying the people their democratic liberties. Established by the emergency laws, the Civil Defense Corps is a "third army in the West German Federal Republic," one which is to be used against its own people. The German Democratic Republic appeals to all to aid in preventing the accomplishment of West Germany's militaristic plans.

1657
Gavin, James M. MILITARY POWER: THE LIMITS OF PERSUASION. Saturday review, v. 49, July 30, 1966: 18-22, 64. Z1219.S25, v. 49

If the American people are to exercise their global power with restraint and wisdom they must understand its economic, technological, and military components. This understanding will be found not in things past but in a profound search for the meaning of the era now being entered. This understanding will be won in part by wiping away the myth that war is a continuation of politics by other means, the myth that an enemy's will is overcome by destroying the proper proportions of his population and property, and the myth that the ultimate in sophisticated and useful weaponry is megatonnage, missiles, and manned aircraft. To be sure the Nation needs military means that enable it to cope with "limited wars, guerrilla wars, and other types of conflicts that we cannot yet anticipate with accuracy, but which will not be total war." Technology is significantly changing the balance between economics and military might, however. Today America's total diplomatic and political power is an amalgam of a dynamic industrial base, a healthy society that solves a variety of problems including those confronting the aged and the young, and an external policy that melds foreign economic assistance and the exportation of products and know-how. Applied to current concerns a true appreciation of the relationship between military power and economic programs will benefit the United States as it locks horns with dilemmas such as

Vietnam, the Atlantic alliance, and the relaxation of tension between Washington and Moscow. For example, the International Control Commission set up by the Geneva Conference of 1954 should be so equipped with modern aircraft and communications equipment as to be able to do its job effectively. A quite different example is afforded by the European Common Market, the growing political and military strength of which demands recognition within the structure of the Atlantic alliance.

1658
Gerasimov, G. PENTAGONIA, 1966. International affairs (Moscow) no. 5, May 1966: 24-30.
D839.I465, 1966

President Eisenhower's remarks on the perils posed by the increasing influence of the military-industrial complex in U.S. society have indeed proved prophetic. U.S. business and American militarism have united to produce the greatest danget yet to threaten world peace. Founded upon anticommunism and aided by the "big lie" tactics once used by Goebbels, U.S. state monopoly has realized superprofits from arms exports, military production for use in wars of aggression, and other activities deleterious to international peace and security. The Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency, serving the interests of U.S. business and the military establishment, have replaced the State Department as the maker of foreign policy. Applying the strict methods of the business world to the Defense Department, Robert McNamara has perfected Pentagon tactics throughout the world, yet has failed to achieve desired political results. Perhaps it is true, as David Halberstam of the New York Times has remarked, that McNamara understands everything "except men and ideas." McNamara's failure to appreciate the effect that the antinational and aggressive character of U.S. intervention would exert in Vietnam has caused the Vietnamese War to take a turn unforeseen by the Pentagon, despite its thorough material and technical preparations. In the meantime the proponents of escalation and overkill continue to counter plans (e.g., the proposal by Seymour Melman of Columbia that the U.S. military budget be cut to $34 billion) to introduce rationality and logic into American defense spending. The Vietnamese War will supply an even greater pretext for militarizing the United States completely.

1659
Getler, Michael. MCNAMARA SAYS SOVIETS ERR ON ABM. Missiles and rockets, v. 18, May 2, 1966: 12-14.
UG360.M54, v. 18

The Nike-X antiballistic missile (ABM) system will not be deployed despite the fact that Moscow is very likely to possess an ABM of its own. Rather American offensive missiles are to be improved as a countermeasure against Soviet defenses. Secretary of Defense McNamara asserts that, if the Russians have decided to deploy an ABM, they are making a serious error. Defense Department officials feel that Moscow has gone all out on a defensive system "as an extension of the traditional obligation of the U.S.S.R. to defend itself in whatever way possible from an attack by the U.S., despite a realization that any ABM system would at best be partially successful." Yet many observers feel that a Soviet ABM system should not be underestimated. Confusion over possible American ABM systems has arisen because of contradictory statements about the uses of the "light attack version" of the Nike-X. Such a system would presumably be deployed against an Nth-country threat. On the one hand Secretary McNamara is reported to have said that the light version could be used later on as part of a full-blown ABM system. On the other hand "very-high-ranking U.S. officials" have stated that this system deployed against an "unsophisticated threat" could not be "a building block of a system that would be deployed against a sophisticated threat." Both lawmakers and public have been confused by this ambiguity. Members of Congress are now urging clarification of this highly controversial issue.

1660
Ghosh, T. C. WHAT'S WRONG WITH OUR DEFENCE PREPARATIONS. Caravan, no. 338, June 1966: 11-16.
AP8.C25, 1966

Every year defense costs go up. India, as an underdeveloped country, cannot aiford large military expenditures, especially if the measures taken are inadequate. Before independence Britain oversaw Indian defense needs. The separation of British India into Pakistan and India not only disorganized the army but sent expenditures soaring. India formerly had a fine army, but the separation, the dearth of high-ranking officers, and insufficient emphasis on defense procurement all worked against it. The period 1949-62 was ideal to rebuild and reorganize the armed forces, but the lack of trained personnel, petty rivalry among officers, and the meddling of ignorant politicians prevented progress. A much-needed reassessment was made when the Chinese invasion revealed these hidden deficiencies. The function of regular armed forces is to bear the brunt of attack and give the nation time to mobilize. Defense preparations should take three stages. First, prepare for the impending threat. Second, continue this preparation and gather supplies and resources. Third, complete necessary long-range planning. "Our leaders and people worry more about prestige and face-saving considerations than military wisdom." The real danger comes not from Pakistan, but from China. The former is more a political threat, while China is clearly a military one. China is a good example of what India could have become except for fatalists and other Indians "indulging in petty squabbles and religious bigotry." While China built its armed might, India appeased and lost military power and political influence. Until India acquires the resources to maintain a well-equipped army it will have to rely on manpower to stem the invader. India must first train men, then procure the necessary equipment. Compulsory military training in practical and expedient methods, dictated by experienced soldiers rather than inexperienced and ignorant politicans, must be instituted. The nation should also forego moral inhibitions and acquire nuclear weapons to lower dependency upon a large standing force and conventional weapons. "We should be prepared to be ruthless if the good of our nation demands it. . . . If we have to defend our country then let us prepare for it adequately by manufacturing nuclear weapons."

1661
Gilbert, Marc. [BATTLES FOR URANIUM] Batailles pour l'uranium. Nouvel observateur, no. 76, Apr. 27, 1966: 19-21.
AP20.O2, 1966

President Johnson's refusal to allow the delivery of enriched uranium that was ordered by France in 1957 has set the French nuclear-powered submarine program back by perhaps 2 years. The French nuclear submarine has had a long history, beginning in 1954 with an unsuccessful attempt to develop a reactor utilizing natural uranium. But in 1964 the prototype performed beyond expectations. Without sufficient uranium government estimates of a nuclear submarine

fleet--three ships by 1975 equipped with Polaris-type sea-to-ground missiles--will prove overly optimistic. The Pierrelatte production plant cannot be expected to deliver adequate amounts of enriched uranium before 1969--uranium needed for both the submarine's reactors and the missile warheads. While France has been forging ahead on its program with the expectation that this submarine would constitute the "ultimate weapon," strategic conditions have continued to evolve. The Soviet Union and the United States have progressed far in techniques for detecting and destroying submarines. The absolute weapon has become, like all others, a relative weapon. But the experience gained by the military in the nuclear propulsion field may one day benefit the merchant fleet.

1662
Goldstein, Walter. THE DILEMMA OF BRITISH DEFENSE: THE IMBALANCE BETWEEN COMMITMENTS AND RESOURCES. [Columbus] Ohio State University Press [1966] 98 p. (The Social Science Program of the Mershon Center for Education in National Security, the Ohio State University. Pamphlet series no. 3) UA647.G56

Contents. --The limits of British economic expansion. --Britain's military capabilities. --Britain's limited influence upon the super powers. --Britain's conflicting defense programs. --Britain's basic defense premises. --Britain's defense options. --The imbalance of resources and commitments.

Surveys Britain's military capabilities in Europe and east of Suez and the long-range objectives of British security policy. The author argues that Britain must choose between influence in Europe and a "special relationship" with America and the Commonwealth, between nuclear status and conventional capabilities. "The myth must be finally dispelled that the nation is sufficiently wealthy to exploit each of its future defense options simultaneously."

1663
Gretton, Sir Peter, Lord Bourne, and Sir Ralph Cochrane. THE DEFENCE WHITE PAPER. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 111, May 1966: 117-123. Ul.R8, v. 111

A review by three retired officers (navy, army, and air force respectively) of the British Government's Defence White Paper of 1966 in light of force commitments at home and overseas and the country's economic viability. Changes affecting the various services are noted. Vice Admiral Gretton agrees with some of the proposals, but believes that Defense Minister Healey "has been made the victim of one of the biggest confidence tricks of modern times" in his decision to substitute land-based aircraft for carriers. Gretton elaborates the pros and cons of both types of aircraft with emphasis on how each would fill Britain's defense needs in the Indian Ocean. General Bourne surveys how the army fares in equipment and personnel and concludes that "properly disposed, the Army, with its new weapons and if it can recruit its proper strength, is just adequate for the tasks it is certain to have to face." Air Chief Marshal Cochrane stresses the recent developments in aircraft design and cites instances where they will be utilized by the over-all plan outlined in part 2 of the White Paper. The idea to organize the armed forces so that they can operate as a unified operational force he believes "is probably of greater practical interest to the Air Force than to the other services, for inescapably the air, as an element, enters into naval and military operations."

1664
Harbron, John D. SMALL NAVIES AND SOVIET STRATEGY. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 111, May 1966: 149-150. Ul.R8, v. 111

The war potential of "Communist-supplied and directed navies in Asia has escalated considerably since the years of the Korean conflict," so that they are capable of inspiring a "first-class international crisis as the attacks in the Tonkin Gulf revealed." Soviet naval strategy is strongly defensive in tone, with emphasis on small ships designed for coastal defense or for support of clandestine insurgent operations. Large warships are used for home defense. But the Soviets also dominate the navies of strategically placed smaller nations such as Indonesia. Soviet submarines are considered an appendage of coastal defense. However "just how 'offensive' so-called 'defensive' naval tactics can become 25 years later is best understood . . . by the fact that Hitler and his admirals went to war with only 50 submarines and the Russians could do so with half a thousand." Communist China has frankly admitted it will probably lack a navy of any offensive consequence for at least 10 or 20 years.

1665
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 1965 AEC ANNUAL REPORT. Nuclear news, v. 9, Mar. 1966: 15-20. QC770.N75, v. 9

Summarizes the important facets of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission's 1965 annual report, including expenditures, employment, regulation, nuclear power, space and nuclear explosives, isotopes and radiation, and international cooperation.

1666
Hinterhoff, Eugene. [WHITE PAPER ON BRITISH MILITARY POLICY] Das Weissbuch über die britische Militärpolitik. Aussenpolitik, v. 17, May 1966: 283-288. D839.A885, v. 17

Reviews the British White Paper on Defense of 1966 and points out the political considerations that, together with the requirements of modern strategy, influence British military policy and armaments.

1667
Hoffman, Fred S. THE MEGADEATH MATHEMATICS OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY. National guardsman, v. 20, Mar. 1966: 2-5, 38-39. UA42.N24, v. 20

Civilian and military experts, in computing the results of a nuclear attack, estimate the casualty lists in megadeaths. Actually how many millions will be killed will vary with the nature of the attack. An idea of American strategic thought can be grasped from the January testimony of Secretary of Defense McNamara before a House Armed Services Subcommittee investigating his plans to cut back the present strategic bomber force. He believes it would be virtually impossible to provide a penetration-proof defense against the technical attack capability of the Soviets. However, "so far as the Red Chinese threat is concerned, Pentagon experts believe that U.S. casualties conceivably could be held close to zero with a $10.5 billion antimissile missile system like the Army's NIKE-X and fallout shelters." And American experts view China as the nation constituting the future threat, not Soviet Russia. Yet, although experts predict it will take about 4 years to deploy an effective antiballistic missile (ABM) system, McNamara has postponed the decision of whether to do so until late this

year (at the earliest). Thus "when 1970 rolls around the United States is almost certain to be without protection against a missile assault." Two concepts have evolved out of American defense planning: "assured destruction" and "damage limitation." The former, the vital first objective, "is the responsibility of the national nuclear striking force and aims at deterring under all foreseeable conditions, a deliberate nuclear attack on the United States or its allies. 'Once enough forces have been assured to provide high confidence of an Assured Destruction capability,' McNamara said, 'we can then consider the kinds and amounts of forces which might be added for reducing damage to our population and industry in the event deterrence fails.'" Even without the use of bombers, McNamara feels, American missile capability is sufficient to assure destruction of the Soviet Union. According to his plan the current fleet of bombers would be reduced by 1971 to a size just sufficient to force the Soviets to maintain their present level of antibomber defenses. If the present plan to build 210 FB-111's (the bomber version of the TFX) turns into reality, the United States would have a fleet of 465 B-52 and FB-111 bombers by late 1971. This would be desirable if the Soviets were to improve their antibomber defense significantly.

1668
Holmberg, William C. CIVIC ACTION. Marine Corps gazette, v. 50, June 1966: 20-28.
VE7.M4, 1966

Dissects the "consequences inherent in Marine Corps civic action programs at various levels of commitment" in Vietnam. Four alternatives, beginning with the consequences resulting from not having any civic action program and ending with a full-fledged counterinsurgency civic action program, are discussed. The Nation now recognizes civic action as a political, social, economic, and ideological instrument which vitally complements military power when dealing with an insurgent movement. In the past the Marine Corps has engaged in this type of program and today in Vietnam is aiding in the fight against famine, disease, and injustice.

1669
Howard, Michael. ARMS & MEN. Encounter, v. 26, June 1966: 5-7. AP4.E44, v. 26

Defense Minister Denis Healey will see through to completion a number of radical measures for maintaining Britain's armed forces within the limits imposed by economic circumstances--measures such as the coordination and rationalization of the military services and the costing of their programs. But in the broader aspects of defense policy Healey is likely to remain "solidly conservative." Given his basic commitment to "The Alliance," on which he and his colleagues believe the nation's security rests, he cannot reduce defense expenditures by cutting foreign obligations but can only "seek more ways of covering the same amount of bread with a pat of butter." So far as the Conservatives are concerned, their policies are no longer guided by survivors from the "wartime Grand Alliance." They probably will follow Mr. Heath's lead "into Europe" without bothering too much about the cost. Since the saving of much of the 300 million per annum now spent East of Suez would change the dimensions of Britain's economic predicament, it is essential to ask whether the nation should plunge itself into debt in order to remain a world power and thus please the Americans. Other, related questions that must also be posed include the desirability and necessity of abandoning overseas bases and all attempts to maintain peacekeeping forces except on a Canadian or Swedish scale; of recalculating Britain's contributions to the defense of Europe and the vanity of an "independent deterrent"; and of reconsidering a European weapons system, should an independent deterrent still prove economically nonviable. The lodging of these interrogations, especially by the Opposition, might initiate "that Great National Debate about 'Britain's place in the world' which, as the Prime Minister reminded us before the election, is long overdue."

1670
Huan, Claude. THE FRENCH SUBMARINE FORCE. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 92, Feb. 1966: 42-53. illus.
V1.U8, v. 92

Traces the post-world War II development by the French Navy of a small but effective conventional submarine fleet, and its preliminary work toward constructing and developing an undersea nuclear-deterrent force employing nuclear-powered submarines as a launching platform. "The submarine fleet will remain the government's principal tool for the achievement of its political aims," in keeping with the French belief that security depends upon seapower. "And to preserve her independence and ensure her defense, France must rely on the deterrent force represented by her nuclear submarines."

1671
[IS THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER ON THE WAY OUT?] Steht der Flugzeugträger auf dem Aussterbeetat? Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Apr. 15, 1966: 262.
U3.W38, v. 10

Reports on the opposition in British Government circles to the new naval strategy recommended by the British white paper on defense. The British Government's decision to dispense with the aircraft carrier in the 1970's is said to be based on the growing importance of rockets and ballistic missiles. "Today's strategic thinking has been determined by possibilities resulting from new types of combat rather than by tasks each weapon has been designed to perform."

1672
IS U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM LEGAL? War/peace report, v. 6, Mar. 1966: 16-17.
P&GP RR

Presents the "pro" positions of the State Department and the American Bar Association and the "con" position of the Lawyers Committee on American Policy Towards Vietnam. "Most of the debate over the Vietnam War has been on questions of morality and strategy, but in recent weeks the argument has sharpened over whether the U.S. position is legal under international law."

1673
Ivanov, V., A. Ovsiannikov, and M. Galkin. [THE 23d CONGRESS OF THE CPSU: ON WAR DANGERS AND PROBLEMS OF STRENGTHENING DEFENSE CAPABILITY OF THE NATION] XXIII s"ezd KPSS o voennoi opasnosti i zadachakh ukrepleniia oborono-sposobnosti strany. Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, v. 47, June 1966: 8-16.
U717.R9A27, v. 47

Interprets the proceedings of the 23d Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The authors charge that, while the U.S.S.R. conducts a peaceloving policy, imperialism's aggressiveness intensifies the danger of war. The CPSU and the Soviet people cannot ignore the imperialists '--especially the

United States--practice of recent years of brazenly interfering in other nations' affairs without so much as pausing prior to committing armed intervention. Citing figures to show that strategic offensive weapons production absorbs the lion's share of U.S. military expenditures, the authors claim the arms race dominates any capitalist economy. They regret that militarism increasingly subordinates to its will the educational facilities of capitalist nations; the unprecedented peacetime establishment of military blocs and groups is seen as the clearest expression of the existence and development of the danger of war. Stating boldly, "the growth of the defensive might of the nation is one of the chief problems of the five-year plan," the authors declare that steadfast war readiness of the armed forces is a vital condition for the nation's security. They conclude with a list of measures taken by the CPSU and the government affecting ground, air, and naval arms in the interests of improved defense capabilities.

1674
Kuzin, N. U.S. NAVY AND "FLEXIBLE RESPONSE" STRATEGY. Soviet military review, no. 5 (17) May 1966: 55-57. P&GP RR

Examines the role of the U.S. Navy in implementing the strategy of flexible response. Activities of the U.S. 7th Fleet off Southeast Asia, the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean, and the 2d Fleet in the Caribbean and off Latin America are reported. Major Kuzin finds that the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America is forcing U.S. strategists to revert to a "gunboat diplomacy," based primarily upon Navy and Marine detachments, in their attempt to preserve the imperialist order.

1675
Lacoste Lareymondie, Marc de. [MIRAGES AND REALITIES; FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS] Mirages et réalités; l'arme nucléaire française. Paris, Éditions de la serpe [1964] 215 p. illus. UF767.L23

Contents.--pt. 1. History.--From secrecy to Reggan.--At the sign of the Force de Frappe.--pt. 2. Technical dossier.--To scientific origins.--The nuclear panoply.--Economics of uranium.--Effects of nuclear weapons.--pt. 3. Strategy and politics.--Givens of nuclear strategy.--Nuclear-age concepts.--Deterrence and war.--Do we have a defense strategy?--France's deterrent capacity.--Is it necessary to manufacture bombs?--A goal for France.--appendix 1. Nuclear weapons chronology.--appendix 2. Known nuclear explosions.--appendix 3. Principal U.S. nuclear delivery vehicles.

In consideration of France's economic capabilities and the strategy of nuclear weapons, criticizes De Gaulle's military and foreign policies. To sacrifice territorial defense and the intervention forces to the exigencies of an autonomously built and ineffective strategic nuclear deterrent can lead only to incoherence, the author claims. France's security will best be assured with a varied panoply of weapons and this can be achieved by closer collaboration with NATO. A French tactical nuclear force would be more in keeping with the nation's defense needs and means, and would permit French adherence to the Moscow test ban agreements. Pursuit of extreme "national independence" is a dangerous policy that might isolate a defenseless France and perhaps provoke nuclear war.

1676
Larionov, V. [DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS OF ARMAMENT AND U.S. STRATEGIC CONCEPTIONS] Razvitie sredstv vooruzheniia i strategicheskie kontseptsii SShA. Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 6, 1966: 74-81. HC10.M5357, 1966

Examines U.S. attempts to use nuclear weapons to the best political, diplomatic, and military advantage during the postwar years. The strategies of massive retaliation, flexible response, preventive strike, and counterforce, as described by various Western writers, are surveyed. Herman Kahn's views on escalation receive particular attention. The author declares that since 1959 U.S. military specialists have pressured Congress and the Government to grant top priority to military space programs. Western strategy throughout the past 20 years is said to have been grounded in the desire to discover a feasible way to wage nuclear war against the Socialist bloc. Although many political and military leaders of the North Atlantic bloc now understand that thermonuclear war cannot be used to achieve political objectives, they still have little voice in determining the course of military-political concepts in the capitalist nations.

1677
Lens, Sidney. THE MYTH OF CHINESE AGGRESSION. Liberation, v. 11, summer 1966: 35-37, 49. P&GP RR

U.S. State and Defense Department spokesmen assisted by America's mass media have branded China an unrepentant aggressor actively striving to achieve world domination. The recent statement by Lin Piao on wars of national liberation is adduced as evidence of this intent. Were the American public allowed to see the actual text of Lin's remarks, they would realize that the U.S. Government has quoted Lin out of context and has ignored his conclusion: that revolution cannot be exported and that wars of national liberation arise from indigenous roots. Historical examples of Chinese aggression are likewise colored by American attempts to force Chinese actions into a preconceived pattern. Chinese domination of Tibet was tolerated in Washington when suggested by Chiang; Mao's implementation of that idea evoked quite an opposite response. Chinese intervention in Korea was prompted by General MacArthur's schemes to conquer North Korea and violate the Yalu sanctuary. The Ladakh incident, in which Chinese troops occupied a disputed area to which both India and China attach strong historical claims, "does not conjure up an image of a goliath ready to push far and wide on a campaign of unbridled military conquest." Guerrilla action in Thailand (if there is such) and Vietnam cannot be attributed to Chinese strategy, especially when one realizes that the Vietnamese battle against the French began 3 years before Mao came to power. China's present policy is founded upon a desire to secure economic viability and internal organization by eradicating the effects of the decades of aggression it endured from imperialist powers. What China wants is a Monroe Doctrine for the Pacific area and an opportunity to improve the lot of its people. China is dangerous to the United States, because, despite its dictatorial and oppressive regime, its existence encourages other nations still under foreign domination. "Admit as we must its desire to aid national revolution whenever and wherever it rears its head, and we must still concede that it is not China which is aggressive against the United States, but the other way around."

1678
Li, P'ing. WE ARE NOT AFRAID OF HOSTILITIES WITH THE US SOON AND ON A MASSIVE SCALE. In U.S. Consulate, Hongkong. Survey of China mainland press, no. 3627, Jan. 31, 1966: 28-31.
DS777.55.U52, 1966
Translated from Wen-hui Pao, Jan. 26, 1966.
Chi Kor

For 16 years U.S. imperialism has sought to strangle China. The blockade imposed against China, the network of military bases established on Asian soil, and the wars in Korea and Vietnam are all part of the encirclement the United States deems prerequisite to launching a major war against the Chinese people. Military experts in the Pentagon have argued that the United States should not fight a number of small wars with China and postpone the final struggle, for in 5 or 10 years China may be too strong to oppose militarily. Some have argued that the United States, mindful of its defeats in Korea and Vietnam, will lack the resources and the courage to attack China. But although the United States is a "paper tiger," the rabid nature of imperialism will inexorably drive it to its doom. Like Hitler and Tojo the American imperialists will use surprise attack in an attempt to achieve a quick advantage. The argument that the United States cannot act so precipitously because it must secure Congressional approval for national mobilization ignores the evidence that America has become a Fascist country, as demonstrated by the undeclared war being waged in Vietnam. "It is therefore very natural for our people to make mobilization moves and prepare for resisting invasion." The people of China, dedicated to their fatherland and their revolutionary heritage, will not fear to fight U.S. imperialism "early and on a massive scale." China has the determination and courage to achieve the final victory even if the enemy chooses to wage nuclear war or fights on many fronts. Though China should be opposed by a coalition of U.S. imperialists, Soviet revisionists, British colonialists, Indian reactionaries, and Japanese militarists, the Chinese People's Liberation Army will not hesitate to wage a just war against unjust wars.

1679
Liu, Hua-ch'iu, and Shih Chen. LOOK, HOW U.S. IMPERIALISM IS STEPPING UP PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACKS ON CHINA! In U.S. Consulate, Hongkong. Selections from China mainland magazines, no. 507, Jan. 17, 1966: 1-3. P&GP RR
Translated from Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien [China Youth] no. 23, Dec. 1, 1965.
Chi Kor

Recounts supposed U.S. actions undertaken in preparation for attacks on Communist China. The authors quote U.S. officials and publications (Wall Street Journal, Saturday Evening Post) on the possibility and efficacy of extending the Vietnamese War to mainland China, cite the probable U.S. war plan against China as reported by the U.S. News & World Report, list the number of U.S. military bases and troops in Asia, and describe American aggression in Vietnam as a preamble to an attack on China. The United States is said to foster Japanese reaction and militarism in order to secure an ally in the forthcoming aggression. The Japan-Korea treaty, the "Three-Arrow Plan," and the "Flying Dragon Plan"--all part of the overall anti-Chinese U.S. strategy--are described.

1680
Macmillan, Norman. [CONSIDERATIONS AFTER THE ELECTION] Die Bedenken nach den Wahlen. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, May 10, 1966: 275-276.
U3.W38, v. 10

The return to power of the Labour Government with an overall majority of 97 confirms the defence policy it laid down before the election. Accordingly, British defence commitments will be confined within a fiscal limit of 6% of the gross national product or 2,000 million at 1964 prices. As prices continue to rise, expenditure on paper will also rise.--The Royal Navy is planning for large use of gas turbines to power its destroyers and frigates of the future. The first such ship, the frigate "Exmouth", should be at sea in about two years' time, with one Olympus for full power and two Proteus engines for cruising. It will be the first such warship in the world to be so powered. Britain's first nuclear-powered Polaris submarine should be in commission by mid-1968, with three others to follow at half-yearly intervals. In addition, the Royal Navy will have five nuclear-powered submarine-killer submarines.--Bristol Siddeley Engines and SNECMA have set up a direct data link to speed up their joint engine developments for the Concorde. (Abstract supplied)

1681
Macmillan, Norman. [THE BRITISH WHITE PAPER ON DEFENSE] Das britische Verteidigungsweissbuch. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Apr. 15, 1966: 197-199.
U3.W38, v. 10

If the Labour Government is returned to power on March 31, its defence policy (already outlined) is one of retrenchment and withdrawal to keep within an expenditure rated at 6% of the gross national product in the 1970s. Overseas bases will be given up or reduced as soon as conditions permit, though Britain will maintain her present forces in Germany if foreign exchange is made available more freely. However, the nuclear strike force of V-bombers will be withdrawn about 1969-70, when the four nuclear-powered Polaris submarines will become the British deterrent contribution to NATO. The SBAC [Society of British Aircraft Constructors] is much perturbed over this programme, since it contends it will limit Britain's freedom of choice in relation to new aircraft. By 1970 the great majority of modern RAF aircraft will be American, which will induce purchase of U.S. ground equipment, training aids, simulators, test and electronic equipment and will encourage development of further American types to compete with Anglo-French designs. The Royal Navy is no happier at the decision that it shall have no new aircraft carriers. After the present carriers and their life in the 1970 it looks as if the Naval Air Arm will be a helicopter force and little more. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1682
McNamara, Robert S. VOLUNTARY SERVICE FOR ALL YOUTH. Vital speeches of the day, v. 32, June 1, 1966: 484-488. PN6121.V52, v. 32
"Delivered before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Montreal, Canada, May 19, 1966."

Canadian-U.S. experience offers the "reductio ad absurdum of the concept that military hardware is the exclusive or even the primary ingredient of permanent peace in the mid-20th century." U.S. military capabilities, though they afford massive superiority over potential enemies, are not central to American national security; a heavily armed nation must look to its relations with other nations as the intrinsic factor in its

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security. Especially important to U.S. interests is the evolution of developing nations from primitive, fractured societies to modern, sophisticated societies possessing industrial and agricultural self-sufficiency. Although tension and conflict anywhere in the modern world immediately affect global international relations and endanger the security of nations on the other side of the earth, the United States must not assume that it enjoys a charter to act as an international policeman. U.S. military aid to developing countries must provide for, in addition to defense, training in civic action: the use of military forces for national projects toward social and economic development in areas such as sanitation, health, education, agriculture, and the like. No single nation will be able to maintain international peace in the years to come; multinational peacekeeping operations, directed by regional and international organizations, must replace unilateral police actions. Building bridges between East and West through trade relations, diplomatic contacts, and perhaps exchanges of military observers "reduces the danger of potentially catastrophic misunderstandings, and increases the incentive on both sides to resolve disputes by reason rather than by force." One step toward realization of a "community of effort" might well be taken by the young generation of the United States. "It seems to me that we could move toward remedying that inequity by asking every young person in the United States to give two years of service to his country--whether in one of the military services, in the Peace Corps or in some other volunteer developmental work at home or abroad." Other countries might do likewise, thus affording the possibility of exchange programs. Such a program would not only underscore the U.S. purpose in Vietnam and wherever coercion and injustice exist, but would elucidate the essence of security and draw man closer to the realization of a global free society, determined by mutual interest, mutual trust, and mutual effort.

1683
Mathiot, Lt.-Col. [U.S. AERIAL DEFENSE] La défense aérienne des États-Unis d'Amérique. Forces aériennes françaises, v. 20, May 1966: 575-588.
UG635. F8F66, v. 20

Outlines the structure of U.S. air defense: its organization (NORAD, CONAD); the combat equipment commanded by the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Canadian forces; the detection and alert systems (BMEWS, DEW Line, PINE-TREE); and the control system (especially SAGE). What differentiates the U.S. air defense system from that of other nations is its global character and the extraordinary abundance of means devoted to it.

1684
Maurel, Christian. [MESSMER'S SILOS] Les silos de Messmer. Nouvel observateur, no. 77, May 4, 1966: 22-23. AP20. O2, 1966

On the plateau d'Albion (Provence), "one of the most magnificent natural landscapes in France, they are installing . . . a missile parking lot." Messmer, the "minister of deterrence," will presumably have the ground-to-ground ballistic missiles, the second generation of the force de frappe, operational here by 1969. General N'Guyen Van Hinh of the air force enumerates the advantages: "We are going to carry civilization to a savage region. From heaven manna will fall to the underprivileged. Manna, modern sanitation, a gold mine. And our missiles won't be seen. The silos' covers will be painted lavender and surrounding them will be only a little cattle wire." But risks remain in spite of official denials, and the area will become an enemy (what enemy?) target. Passivity, however, has replaced initial futile petitions and demonstrations.

1685
[NAVAL AIRCRAFT] Marineflieger. Flug-Revue, no. 7, July 1966: 16-19. illus.
TL503. C524, 1966

The re-establishment of the Bundesmarine together with the Bundeswehr and Luftwaffe of this army, led to the establishment of a naval air arm (which had not existed during the Second World War) to fulfil special duties: search and rescue operations, limited transport and liason duties, defence in the Baltic area and anti-submarine warfare. Five Marineflieger-Geschwader have been established to serve these different duties: the MFG 1 and 2, based at Jagel and Eggebeck, destined to defend the shallow waters of the Baltic, MFG 3, based at Nordholz, for anti-submarine duties, MFG 4 and 5, based at Kiel-Holtenau, the first serving in the anti-submarine and mine-sweeping rôle, the latter in the search and rescue as well as transport and liaison service. The initial equipment of MFG 1 and 2 consisted of Hawker Seahawks, MFG 3 operated Fairey Gannets. These aircraft were replaced by modern ones; MFG 1 and 2 received F-104 Gs, MFG 3 in the process of re-equipment by which the Gannets will be replaced by Atlantics. The MFG 4, still a test unit, is operating the S-58 helicopters, and the MFG 5's equipment consists of S-58s, Bristol Sycamores and Grumman Albatrosses for rescue whereas the Do 27s and Pembrokes serve in the transport, liaison and training rôle, the latter of which has also the offer a new Piaggio P. 149s and Magisters. This article deals with the specific tasks each unit has to fulfil, the organization, the facilities and the problems of the equipment. (Abstract supplied)

1686
Niu, Sien-chong. THE DEFENSE OF JAPAN. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 11, Feb./Mar. 1966: 58-65.
UA646. F5, v. 11

Presents a picture of Japan's geographical environment, historical background, post-World War II development, rearmament, defense organization, Army, Navy, Air Force, manpower, military potential, nuclear fears, relations with the United States, and future defense prospects.

1687
Niu, Sien-chong. THE DEFENSE PROBLEM OF AUSTRALIA. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 11, Feb./Mar. 1966: 36-40.
UA646. F5, v. 11

Surveys Australia's defense policies and problems. The island nation's situation is relatively secure at present, Niu concludes, but "the future outlook is not so optimistic in the face of the gathering storms over the South West Pacific Ocean."

1688
Nossal, Frederick. CANADA'S BOLD DEFENSE EXPERIMENT. Reporter, v. 34, Mar. 24, 1966: 36-38. D839. R385, v. 34

Canada's new Defense Minister Paul Hellyer found awaiting him armed forces run by a hodge-podge of almost 300 committees. Hellyer decided to run things his own way, and in altering the Canadian defense structure undertook a unique experiment: over the next 10 years Canada's armed services will be integrated into the "world's first single land, sea, and air service." Many of the nations that have talked vaguely

for years about such a step are now studying Hellyer's trailblazing White Paper outlining the program. The new defense look is not based on expectations of nuclear war, since Hellyer believes that "thermonuclear battles would not be rational for any nation or group of nations." The military chain of command has now been streamlined. In the second step of the program the field commands were cut from 11 to 6: Mobile, Maritime, Air Transport, Training, Matériel, and Air Defense. New equipment is also programed, including fighters, helicopter-equipped destroyers, and armored personnel carriers. The "Hellyer revolution" has of course drawn protest, particularly from "die-hard" military men. Canada's opposition leader, John Diefenbaker, asserts that military morale is at its lowest ebb. Yet the press and the public have backed Hellyer to the hilt. One major stumbling-block in the plan is that "integration could result in larger Canadian equipment procurement in the United States. This would have the effect of reversing the favorable balance that Canada presently enjoys under the defense sharing program." If Hellyer can keep the yearly defense budget down to $1.5 billion, as he has promised, the problems will be minor.

1689
Pergent, J. [AMERICAN ARMED FORCES] Les forces armées américaines. Perspectives, v. 22, May 21, 1966: 1-9; May 28: 1-9. HC10.P4, v. 22
Separately paged.

Less than half a century ago U.S. Armed Forces were small and land-based; today they are the most powerful in the world and heavily weighted in favor of air and naval strategies. The greatest financial efforts are devoted to the strategic forces, the elaborate weapons and weapons systems used by the Air Force, Navy, and Army. The U.S. military budget is enormous. What influences U.S. priorities is its geostrategic position as a continental country that must launch distant interventions. The forces based "at home" differ substantially from foreign commands; the first jealously guard their particular Army, Navy, or Air character, and the latter are closely integrated. The most important strategic weapons are intercontinental ballistic missiles (especially the Minuteman), bombers which permit a flexible response, and nuclear submarines with Polaris missiles. The ground forces do not possess strategic weapons. All in all U.S. military nuclear potential has reached approximately 35,000 megatons and will soon be served with 2,600 delivery vehicles comprised of planes, submarines, and missiles. U.S. military commands embrace a new concept of integrated wartime functioning in peacetime. To realize this preparedness the nation is engaged in what has been referred to as "pactomania." U.S. commitments have been given to 43 countries through 5 major treaty organizations and 4 bilateral treaties; military assistance and base arrangements extend U.S. concerns to many more countries. A third of U.S. forces are stationed abroad in NORAD, the Caribbean Command, the Atlantic Command, the European Command, the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Command, and the Pacific Command. Vietnam is taking more and more of its share, but any gaps are filled by the flexible and efficient American reserve system.

1690
Pergent, J. [THE VALUE OF COMMUNIST CHINA'S MILITARY POTENTIAL] La valeur du potentiel militaire de la Chine communiste. Est & Ouest, v. 18, Mar. 1/15, 1966: 19-21. D839.A822, v. 18

China's bellicose doctrines belie its actions. How prepared is China militarily to realize its vaunted ambitions? The country is divided into 10 military regions, the strongest in terms of manpower being located opposite Formosa and north of Korea. In addition, Sinkiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Ningsia (south of Outer Mongolia), and Kiangsi form "autonomous regions" in which defense forces are very active. According to estimates the total regular armed forces number 3 million with 2,550,000 in the ground army, 300,000 in the air force, and 210,000 in the navy. The preponderant role played by the ground forces is also signaled in the military budget, which allocates only a one-sixth portion to air and naval forces. Technological backwardness (in contrast to an energetic nuclear program) has been noticeable since the cessation of Soviet aid. Information on divisions and functions within each of the services is confused. The best equipped units are located in insecure zones. Planes and ships are outmoded or rudimentary. The size of the Chinese militia is inestimable, but certainly it constitutes a large trained reserve in the event of open war. The conclusion to be drawn is that Chinese military power is archaic but very capable of defending the mainland guerrilla style. To speak of a "yellow peril" is exaggeration, yet to engage China in a war on its own territory would be extremely hazardous.

1691
Perlo, Victor. WHO WON THE MISSILE CRISIS? Minority of one, v. 8, July/Aug. 1966: 14-17.
AP2.M55985, v. 8

The Cuban-Soviet-U.S. missile crisis of 1962 brought mankind closer to nuclear warfare than it has ever been. Western accounts attribute the crisis to Soviet desires to upset the balance of nuclear power by installing missiles in Cuba. In reality Khrushchev deployed the missiles to thwart an imminent U.S. invasion of Cuba, to keep his promise to Castro that the U.S.S.R. would go to war with the United States if that invasion did occur. Khrushchev's tactics were successful; less than 48 hours before its launching the Cuban invasion was called off. In the West the Kennedy administration is credited with a convincing victory over the Soviets for having wrung a unilateral retreat from them. But, as Elie Abel reports in his The Missile Crisis, nuclear war was averted by a quid pro quo agreement. The Soviet Union "made an overt tactical retreat by removing its IRBM's from Cuba, from which the U.S. has gained considerable propaganda advantage. However, the United States made a prearranged and equal tactical retreat shortly thereafter, by removing missiles from Turkey and Italy." Some 45 U.S. Jupiter missiles, roughly the number of missiles the Soviets removed from Cuba, were thus affected. In return for his propaganda gains Kennedy was forced to give an effective promise not to invade Cuba. During the Cuban crisis the United States "made a strategic retreat, perhaps without precedent in its history, by agreeing to give up a plan for conquest it had already started to execute."

1692
[RED NAVY SECOND STRONGEST IN THE WORLD] Die Rote Flotte ist die zweitstärkste der Welt. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Apr. 15, 1966: 261-262.
U3.W38, v. 10

Assesses the current status of the Soviet Navy and touches upon recent developments in the U.S., French, Finnish, and Red Chinese navies.

1693
Roucek, Joseph S. [SOUTHEAST ASIA'S GEOPOLITICS IN AMERICAN SIGHT] Die Geopolitik Südostasiens in amerikanischer Sicht. Aussenpolitik, v. 17, May-June 1966: 310-317, 371-380. D839.A885, v. 17

The United States is now much more deeply engaged in Southeast Asia than all the former colonial powers that are still active there. Prof. Joseph S. Roucek, head of the institutes of political science and sociology at the University of Bridgeport, considers the Far East a sort of American Far West on the basis of special interests to which Washington will adhere no matter how its policy is misunderstood at home and abroad. The first article deals exclusively with the general political and geopolitical situation in Southeast Asia. The second focuses on political tactics in the region, especially with regard to Vietnam and Malaysia. The author sees the budding understanding of U.S. Vietnam policy that is being shown in foreign countries as the promise of positive developments on a diplomatic level. (Modified translation of supplied abstract)

1694
Servais, A. [BELGIUM'S MILITARY PROBLEM] Le problème militaire belge. Revue militaire générale, no. 4, Apr. 1966: 482-493.
U2.R48, 1966
Includes summaries in English and German.

Recommends the reorganization of Belgian defense forces into small, highly trained, commando-type territorial defense units and the establishment of a civil defense service. The author discusses the budgetary, organizational, and international ramifications of his suggestions. Even though war in Europe appears presently improbable, vigilance is required.

1695
Sheldon, Charles S. AN OVERVIEW OF THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM. Shipmate, v. 29, May 1966: 28-32, 34-35. illus. VA49.S53, v. 29

Recounts the historical beginnings, intentions, civil and military applications, and economic burden of the Soviet space program since the launching of Sputnik I in 1957. Appended tables compare U.S. and Soviet space launchings, summarize Soviet spacecraft by name or mission, and compare U.S. and Soviet manned space flights. Dr. Sheldon thinks it fruitless to attempt to know whether the United States or the Soviet Union leads in the space race, because there are "differences in program philosophy, priorities, and objectives" between the two countries. He feels that space research and exploration places no undue strain upon the economies of either nation and "helps to make these nations vital and growing."

1696
SPECIAL REPORT--THE AEC FISCAL '67 BUDGET. Nuclear news, v. 9, Mar. 1966: 12-14.
QC770.N75, v. 9

Publishes and comments upon the fiscal 1967 budget for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

1697
Stabler, Elizabeth. FRENCH MILITARY POLICY. Current history, v. 50, Apr. 1966: 232-237, 246-247.
D410.C82, v. 50

In large part France's current military policy is a reaction to military shortcomings revealed by the two world wars and by postwar experiences in Algeria and Indochina. France needs the U.S. nuclear umbrella but has been disappointed by the Atlantic alliance's treatment of the French viewpoint on such issues as German rearmament, Suez, Indochina, and Algeria. French officials distinguish between the alliance, which is necessary, and NATO, which must be reformed. Presently France is striving to make its individual voice in world affairs more audible through acquisition of "visible power." Acceleration of the nuclear weapons program was De Gaulle's most significant military decision. Despite doubts voiced elsewhere French strategists defend the ability of the force de frappe to deter European-directed aggression. Chief of Staff Ailleret opposes the strategy of flexible response and advocates massive French retaliation against "any move above the level of border incidents" as a means of averting large-scale destruction and occupation in West Europe. According to some French strategists, conventional military organization and equipment have been ignored, resulting in a dangerous weakness. The number of men in the armed services has been drastically reduced. The French have planned to compensate for these reductions by reorganizing and modernizing army divisions to make them highly mobile and capable of rapid intervention outside France, but lack of funds has retarded these efforts. The future of French military policy is beset with questions. Many observers feel that the planned military programs cannot be carried through with an estimated expenditure equal to 5 percent of the gross national product. They think the government will have to increase the military budget or sacrifice part of its conventional forces modernization project. Either course would spur on existing opposition to the military program and exacerbate already open interservice rivalries. Only a minority completely opposes the force de frappe, but awareness of its costs has been growing in recent years. De Gaulle's military policy has perhaps "substituted new myths for old myths" and thus prepared the way for future unrest and instability.

1698
[STATEMENT ON U.S. AGGRESSION IN VIETNAM ISSUED BY THE 23RD CONGRESS OF THE CPSU] Zaiavlenie XXIII s"ezda KPSS po povodu agressii SShA vo v'etname. Partiinaia zhizn' Kazakhstana, v. 36, Apr. 1966: 49-50.
HX8.P25, v. 36

The 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union condemns, in the name of all Soviet Communists and the Soviet people, the barbarous aggression of the United States in Vietnam. In an attempt to extirpate the national liberation movement in Southeast Asia the U.S. militarists have broken the elementary norms of international law, threatened the security and sovereignty of states, interfered in the internal affairs of Laos, brought military and political pressure to bear upon Cambodia, and aggravated international relations. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union demands the immediate withdrawal of U.S. interventionists from Vietnam, lest imperialist adventurists, already interested in other areas of Southeast Asia, create a situation fraught with danger to the general peace. The United States must cease its bombing of North Vietnam, withdraw its armed forces from South Vietnam, terminate all interference in Vietnamese affairs, and recognize the 1954 Geneva Accords. The National Liberation Front of South Vietnam must be recognized as the sole legal representative of the South Vietnamese people. Communist parties throughout the world must act in unison to counter this latest expression of imperialist aggression.

1699
Tarr, David W. AMERICAN STRATEGY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. New York, Macmillan [1966] 140 p. (Government in the modern world)
E744. T3

Primarily an analysis of the development and employment of American military power, placed in the general context of foreign policy with the concept of deterrence providing "the main thread of the story." U.S. emphasis on military strategy in recent years, Tarr asserts, is a justifiable response to the danger of nuclear war and "persistent threats mounted by the Soviet Union and its allies."

1700
Thomas, John R. LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR IN SOVIET STRATEGIC THINKING. Orbis, v. 10, spring 1966: 184-212. D839. O68, v. 10

Soviet views on the possibility of a conflict involving the bilateral use of nuclear weapons are shaped partly in a vacuum, partly by extrapolations and projections of World War II and Korea, and partly by the more recent developments in weaponry and politics. The Soviets question whether any direct confrontation between their own and U.S. forces can be prevented from escalating into general war. Their doubts about the feasibility of limited nuclear war, however, should not be misinterpreted as indicating that the Soviets would not accept limitations if this route were open and advantageous to them. Indeed they would prefer limitations, both to spare their homeland from cataclysmic devastation (which would far exceed the impact of World War II that at one time put the survival of the Soviet system in peril) and to have the chance of seizing a viable Western Europe in order to add its capability to their own. The latter development would make it possible for the Soviets to engage the United States in a protracted conflict if general nuclear war with instantaneous catastrophe were averted. The Soviets are pessimistic, however, that events would develop in a way permitting such limitations to operate. This suggests that the United States should be prepared--by a flexible posture before, and restrained action during, any conflict--to demonstrate that the limitation route is open to the Soviets if they choose to use it.

1701
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. HEARINGS ON MILITARY POSTURE, AND H.R. 4016, TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS DURING FISCAL YEAR 1966, FOR PROCUREMENT OF AIRCRAFT, MISSILES, AND NAVAL VESSELS, AND RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS. [Washington, For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1965] 1556 p. illus., map. UA23. 3. A513, 1965
Hearings held Feb. 2-Mar. 22, 1965.
"No. 7."

Contains Department of Defense program projections for the next 5 years and budget proposals for fiscal year 1966 as given in testimony by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and other officials of the Department and the Armed Services.

1702
U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. NASA AUTHORIZATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 1967. Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d sess., on S. 2909. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 717 p. illus., maps. TL521. 312. A545
Hearings held Feb. 28-Mar. 4, 1966.

Details proposed "appropriations to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for research and development, construction of facilities and administrative operations, and for other purposes." Testimony is presented by NASA officials.

1703
UPDATING THE WORLD'S BIGGEST MILITARY MACHINE: CHANGES IN THE THEORY & TECHNOLOGY OF U.S. MIGHT. Time, v. 87, June 3, 1966: 34-35. AP2. T37, v. 87

Assesses recent and future changes in American strategy and policy, outlines the extent of the American commitment throughout the world, and judges the nature of the challenge to be met. Through bitter experience, the United States has learned that military means alone do not prevent or win wars. The most important part of U.S. military action "is the political framework within which we use our power." Secretary of Defense McNamara has pointed out that "in a world of haves and have-nots, military power alone cannot purchase security." International order and stability are not possible at this time, however. Despite efforts toward this end and all the talk about disarmament, to which the United States is basically receptive, "the hard facts of international life require the U.S. to prepare to sustain indefinitely a large and powerful military machine, and to re-examine it constantly."

1704
Vogt, M. [DOES "WESTERN" DEFENSE EXIST?] La défense "occidentale" existe-t-elle? Revue militaire suisse, v. 111, Mar. 1966: 137-139.
U2. R5, v. 111

The NATO crisis stems from "an insufficient political cohesion, apparently divergent strategic interests, and an unequal sharing of the burdens." Members' views are especially in conflict over nuclear matters. These observations were made by German representatives at German-Swiss talks held recently in Freiburg. The Swiss delegates defined the two most important factors influencing Switzerland's defense policies as smallness and neutrality. Because the country is so small it can hardly regard war as a solution to conflict, nonetheless its defense planners must strive to compensate for size disadvantages with modern weapons. Swiss neutrality means that defense policies must be self-sufficient and capable of meeting any threat from any side. The first concern of strategists must be deterrence. On the conventional level Switzerland is well endowed, although dangerous gaps remain in its ability to deter unconventional attack. If Swiss policy is to defend its independence then its efforts cannot be determined by supposed financial limitations but by what "an effective and reasonable defense demands."

1705
Wettern, Desmond. THE MEANING OF BRITAIN'S NEW DEFENSE POLICY. Navy, v. 9, Apr. 1966: 26-29.
VA49. N28, v. 9

Britain's fiscal 1966-67 Defense White Paper sets forth a policy that threatens to render the Royal Navy almost totally ineffective. The Polaris submarine program will continue, but that is virtually the only encouraging note in the new naval policy. The Labour government will not build the proposed new attack carrier CVA-01, and Defense Minister Denis Healey's justification for the abandonment of the project is shot with inconsistencies. In his view the American F-111, soon to be purchased by the Royal Air Force, will

replace naval aircraft in the Far East. Yet it is doubtful that he can maintain anywhere near his predicted number of aircraft on operational status. Drastic reductions are proposed in the Mediterranean Fleet as well. Without carriers it will be impossible to provide close air support for British ground troops operating in potential African or Middle Eastern troublespots. Navy aviators have been demoralized by the new policy, and many are expected to resign. It may even be necessary, according to the Defense Minister, to send Air Force crews to sea. The new ships planned by Healey are of a type the Navy does not want, and have been announced "simply so the government could assert that the Navy 'will have more big ships in the 1970's than it would have if the new carrier were built.'" In fact the Defense White Paper seems to indicate that some "book cooking" has taken place; for example two nuclear attack submarines that were listed as operational are not yet ready for duty. The White Paper thus represents "Britain's abdication from the maintenance of any effective form of sea power and thus of her ability to retain any significant influence in world affairs." The Royal Navy will resist, as it must if Britain is to have a future on the world scene.

1706
WHAT DOES US BIG DEBATE ON CHINA POLICY SIGNIFY? In U.S. Consulate. Hongkong. Survey of China mainland press, no. 3678, Apr. 15, 1966: 35-37.
DS777.55.U52, 1966

Released by New China News Agency, Peking, Apr. 9, 1966.

Chinese Communist reaction to the congressional debate on U.S. policy toward China and the testimony of witnesses before Senator Fulbright's hearings on Communist China. Communist China views the proposed "containment without isolation" strategy as a formula for promoting increased aggression in Asia while applying "counter-revolution" tactics to "browbeat or deceive the Chinese people."

1707
Zitzewitz, Horst von. [DANISH DEFENSE] Die Verteidigung Dänemarks. Revue militaire générale, no. 5, May 1966: 645-671.
U2.R48, 1966

Outlines Denmark's defense needs, problems, resources, and policies. Among the major topics discussed are Denmark's special relationship with NATO, the geographical difficulties inherent in defending the nation and the strategic importance of its geographical position, and the size and organization of its defense forces. The author contends that Denmark has failed to solve its most pressing defense problem, which is the inability to react instantly to aggression.

1708
Zygielbaum, Joseph L. THE SOVIET PROGRAM FOR MILITARY APPLICATIONS IN SPACE. Journal of the astronautical sciences, v. 13, Jan./Feb. 1966: 37-41.
TL787.A6A3, v. 13

Explains Soviet preoccupation with manned space flights (the only area of space research in which the Soviet Union leads the United States) as being based on the desire to establish manned space stations for military purposes. The history of Soviet achievements in development of manned spacecraft, maneuverable satellites, and reconnaissance vehicles is briefly recounted.

3. Bilateral and Multilateral Policies and Strategies

1709
Alexandros, L. [SOVIET MISSILE SHIPS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN] Sowjetische Raketenschiffe im Mittelmeerraum. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Apr. 15, 1966: 257-259. U3.W38, v. 10

For the past two years Moscow has been supplying both the Egyptian and the Syrian navies with craft of various kinds on very favourable terms (prices some 45% below world levels, long-term credits, payment in agricultural produce). Egypt has received--or will receive--destroyers (though not of the newest Kynda or Krupny class which she wanted), Z-class submarines, missile ships of the Osa and Komar class and missilefiring landing craft, and is negotiating for a "loan" of a Sverdlovsk class cruiser. Syria has received--or will receive--two destroyers, six Komar boats, 4 to 6 missile-firing landing craft under a recent agreement, in addition to earlier deliveries. Total strength is estimated at roughly 2000. (Abstract supplied)

1710
Bader, W. B. NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHARING AND "THE GERMAN PROBLEM." Foreign affairs, v. 44, July 1966: 693-700. D410.F6, v. 44

The 700 Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) still aimed at Western Europe must be offset; whether this objective can be realized only at the cost of complete European dependence on American might is the crucial issue facing NATO. The public and the press have conceived of collective nuclear forces as devices to deter West Germany from acquiring influence in nuclear matters. U.S. preoccupation with West German interests has raised the suspicion that Washington advocates nuclear sharing in NATO merely "to provide a convenient way of giving the Germans nuclear weapons." If the United States continues to treat the German issue as though it is synonymous with the larger problem of European nuclear defense, French hostility will increase, German unification will be postponed, and the trend toward political and economic diversification among the countries of Eastern Europe will be reversed to provide for collective defense against a German nuclear threat. Although its precarious geographical position vis à vis the East argues for "an assured nuclear-weapons defense," West Germany lacks the political incentives to develop nuclear arms. But Bonn needs the threat of acquiring nuclear weapons as a lever with which to pry German reunification from the Soviet Union. In attempting to solve the MRBM problem in Europe the United States must consider these factors: (1) The force of the arguments that led France to undertake a nuclear program may be lost on Germany, where national goals and circumstances are different. (2) As long as the Soviets deploy MRBM's against Europe a Western response will remain necessary. The NATO Special Committee (which now enjoys no official mandate to deal with problems of nuclear sharing) may establish "an information base on nuclear affairs" from which multilateral discussion of the problem of nuclear sharing will benefit, thereby giving that problem the NATO-wide significance it deserves and reducing preoccupation with "the German problem."

1711
Ball, George W. THE LARGER MEANING OF NATO CRISIS. Vital speeches of the day, v. 32, June 1, 1966: 492-495. PN6121.V52, v. 32

"Delivered before the American Society of International Law, Washington, D. C., April 29, 1966."

Unless the United States rejects pragmatic approaches to foreign relations and concentrates on the long-term implications of policy it will find itself "repeating old mistakes in a world where mistakes by great nations can mean world destruction." U.S. security depends upon European security, which, in turn, requires extirpation of the national rivalry that has disturbed the peace of Europe since the Treaty of Westphalia. But forces have recently arisen to oppose the idea of European unity, "in particular the decision of the government of one European nation state to separate itself from the others and to seek a special position of primacy in Western Europe." The actions of that government will hinder common European defense and weaken the Western deterrent but are unlikely to resolve the unfinished business of a European settlement. "For it is clear to anyone who has closely followed the events of the past decade that the gradual changes taking place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have been hastened, not delayed, by the firm and common purpose of the West." The attack on NATO is symptomatic of a more serious disorder--"the resurgence of a self-centered nationalism." The United States has realized that prospects for peace depend on whether the European peoples can "put aside those corrosive national rivalries that have been the cause of past disasters and sublimate their energies in a common purpose and new unity." European interests will not be served by the reappearance of a number of competing, independent nation states; unification alone can secure first-power status for the nations of Europe. A united Europe "will be a third large center of power and purpose--capable, because it is strong, of bringing about a European settlement, competent to come to terms with the East on a basis that will dismantle the Iron Curtain and reunify the German people as equal members of a great community." The voice of an independent Europe would not always echo that of the United States, but the ideals and beliefs shared by the Atlantic nations would guarantee agreement on the basic issue--achievement of a world of peace and freedom that is founded upon liberty and the dignity of the individual.

1712
Beaufre, André. [FRONTIER AND HINTERLAND: FRANCE AND GERMANY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF DEFENSE POLICY] Vorfeld und Hinterland: Frankreich und Deutschland von der Warte der Verteidigungspolitik. Wehrkunde, v. 15, Mar. 1966: 113-118. U3.W396, v. 15

Presented to the 3d international Wehrkunde meeting in Munich, Jan. 29-30, 1966, and published as a chapter in Armee Gegen den Krieg--Wert und Wirkung der Bundeswehr, edited by Wolfram von Raven (Stuttgart, Seewald Verlag, 1966).
UA710.R34

New strategic dimensions, especially the speed and destructiveness of modern weapons, have transformed continents into single war theaters. These new dimensions have special meaning for Germany and France. The German Federal Republic is, for France, a forward post against aggression from the East, and France (as well as Belgium) represents a rearguard for Germany. Large-scale aggression in Europe is unthinkable, but crises, which would not fall under NATO's concept of military aggression, could embroil Europe both politically and militarily. National defense depends on the ability to manipulate national political and military weapons so as to achieve a deterrent effect. Clever playing of the trumpcards at the critical moment is presently possible only at the national level, because the "nation state is the single concrete expression of sovereignty in peacetime." Since French and German defense needs are inseparable, preparations must be made to suit current exigencies. Political obstacles to this defensive unity are serious. In general France is a satisfied and defensively oriented nation; Germany is a dissatisfied nation, troubled by the need to reconcile apparently conflicting demands (e.g., nuclear security and reunification). The German problem should be considered as part of the whole, to be solved only after Europe has rediscovered its unity. Satisfaction of German nuclear demands first would make unity impossible. NATO must be reconstituted so as to guarantee nuclear retaliation against aggression from the East. But Europe's major worry today is how to control spontaneous peacetime crises. Attempts to deal with these should lead to an eventual European defense organization--first international studies on crisis prevention and management, then nuclear strategy discussions, and finally all-inclusive defense planning. Europe might be able to reach an agreement on common weapons production and development. However Germany must choose the path of European unity before any of this can occur and the wounds of World War II be healed.

1713
Beaufre, André. [NATO AND EUROPE] L'OTAN et l'Europe. Stratégie, no. 8, Apr./June 1966: 5-12. U162.S78, 1966

Those who seek to solve the NATO crisis must be mindful of contradictory imperatives: Europe wants to heal the wounds of World War II, which requires détente and unification; in order to endow European nations with a feeling of identity and a sense of responsibility the defense function must be replaced, as far as technically possible, within the national framework; and U.S. participation in Europe's defense is requisite. NATO's original purpose was defense against aggression. But now the escalation of crises, and not aggression, poses the only serious threat to Western European security. Instead of concentration on integrated wartime strategies NATO's main efforts must be directed toward peacetime coordination of "deterrence strategies conducted by each of the allies in full independence" with a view to effective crisis management. Europe's peace depends, in large part, on a solution to the problems of German reunification and the security of the Soviet satellites. In turn the working out of these problems is a function of East-West European unification, which is blocked by NATO. "Because Europe's politico-strategic problems are exclusively under NATO's competence the diverse European allies have been led to rely on American protection and thereby not to become fully conscious of their common interests, which are, up to a point, distinct from American interests." One component of a reformed NATO must be strictly European; it can serve as the base of a "future European defense community which will render the Atlantic alliance compatible with European perspectives." Whatever the solution it must take into account the Atlantic, European, and national levels. In order not to antagonize Eastern Europe NATO cannot appear as an aggressive war machine; at the same time Europe, concerned with its own problems, cannot afford to alienate the United States.

1714
Bonnet, Henri. [NATO CRISIS] La crise de l'O.T.A.N. Revue; littérature, histoire, arts et sciences des deux mondes, no. 10, May 15, 1966: 174-180. AP20.R243, 1966

Takes the view that the French withdrawal from NATO was a mistake because the two systems of security (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) form an indispensable background to the search for peace and European unity.

1715
Chung, Ho. DE GAULLE'S NEW CHALLENGE. Peking review, v. 9, Mar. 15, 1966: 22-23.
DS701.P42, v. 9

De Gaulle's moves to dissociate France from NATO --prompted by a reaction to U.S. strivings for hegemony, new military circumstances, and the fear of involvement in Vietnam--have thrown the imperialist camp into turmoil and substantially reduced NATO's military power. U.S. imperialism has overreached itself. "All those suffering U.S. aggression, control, intervention and bullying will not miss the opportunity to stand up against an 'overlord' whose hegemony is declining sharply."

1716
COMMUNIQUÉ ON THE MEETING OF THE WARSAW TREATY POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE. New times, no. 29, July 20, 1966: 31-40.
D839.N483, 1966

Report on the activities of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact nations at its meeting in Bucharest on July 4-6, 1966. Two declarations issued by the committee are reproduced: on strengthening peace and security in Europe and on U.S. aggression in Vietnam. A list of representatives from the various Warsaw Pact nations is included.

1717
Couzy, J. H. THOUGHTS ON STRATEGY. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 11, Apr./May 1966: 28-35.
UA646.F5, v. 11

Contends that NATO has no strategic concept, that nuclear war is becoming increasingly unlikely, that conventional war in Europe is "impracticable," and that NATO is "unprepared for modern war"--wars of liberation. The author urges that every measure be taken to remedy this situation without jeopardizing the present strength of the alliance's nuclear defenses.

1718
THE CURRENT CRISIS. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 4, summer 1966: 156-228.
D839.A85, v. 4

The views of Western statesmen regarding the NATO crisis precipitated by the proposed French withdrawal. The U.S., French, Belgian, British, and German views are presented.

1719
Doty, L. L. JORDAN'S PURCHASE OF F-104 ADDS TO JUMBLE OF ARAB ARMS BUILDUP. Aviation week & space technology, v. 84, Apr. 11, 1966: 34.
TL501.A8, v. 84

Jordan's purchase of U.S. F-104 interceptors increases the already great variety of the Near East arms buildup. In choosing the U.S. plane Jordan ignored the urging of the United Arab Command (UAR, Syria, and Iraq) to buy the Soviet MIG-21. Although Israel is the sole target of the United Arab Command, given the Command's failure to drive Israel out of the Near East the situation is becoming increasingly political. The fighter aircraft inventory in the Near East breaks down this way: Lebanon has French Mirage 3E fighters; Saudi Arabia has Britain's Electric Lightning fighters, U.S. F-86 fighters, and U.S. Hawk ground-to-air missiles; Israel has the Mirage 3E's; Iran has U.S. F-5A fighters; Iraq has MIG-21's. The pilots of these countries are receiving Soviet, French, American, or British training. Saudi Arabia appears to be the only country setting up a missile air defense system.

1720
Eyraud, Michel. [THE NATO CRISIS] La crise de l'OTAN. Stratégie, no. 8, Apr./June 1966: 83-117.
UJ62, S78, 1966

Chronicles the NATO crisis precipitated by De Gaulle's March announcement of French withdrawal. Eyraud describes the immediate and considered official reactions of all the NATO governments and documents selected reporters' and politicians' analyses of the crisis.

1721
[THE FUTURE OF THE LUFTWAFFE] L'avenir de la Luftwaffe. Air & cosmos, no. 147, Apr. 9, 1966: 29-30.
P&GP RR

Germany's status in NATO illustrates the fact that European participation in the Nuclear Strike Forces is allowed by the United States as a means of both increasing cohesion and imposing U.S. leadership. The American flexible response and anti-escalation strategies demand considerable conventional capacities, which, according to the U.S. Dept. of Defense, can be enhanced if European air squadrons are reserved for conventional support duties. To assign these air forces to the tactical nuclear force would "constitute a fatal weakening of nonnuclear defense." With the French withdrawal from NATO the problem of distributing air forces between the two defense functions becomes sharper. Perhaps Mr. McNamara, underlining the sufficiency of U.S. airpower, will try to remove European aviation from any participation in the Nuclear Strike Forces. What is concluded in this respect will decide the fate of the Luftwaffe, whose cost effectiveness depends on "its quantitative participation in the tactical force." A greater allied air force integration leading to a standardized U.S.-European force with missions divided according to geographic zones could lead to solution of military, technical, economic, and financial problems. But the degree of European unity needed for such integration is far from today's reality. Luftwaffe officials are studying the successor to the F-104 and seem to have put their hopes on a variable wing plane (the F-111 or what will be produced if Franco-British cooperation materializes). Washington's interest in the Luftwaffe has been spurred by German references to this European-produced variable wing plane. French military policy has not caused Bonn to abandon all hopes of a European force, even if it proves unattainable in the current political climate.

1722
Grigor'ev, E. [FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE] Za mir i bezopasnost' v Evrope. Kommunist Ukrainy, v. 40, May 1966: 37-42.
HX8.K575, v. 40

Examines the threat to European peace and security posed by the "Washington-Bonn axis." The author accuses the West German Government of assisting the United States with arms and supplies in the Vietnamese War to increase German chances of acquiring a nuclear capability from America in return. West German revanchism and neonazism is discussed and condemned. In accordance with the decrees of the 23d

Congress of the CPSU the Soviet Union opposes the nuclear arming of Germany in any form, calls for a European conference on peace and security, encourages peaceful relations between the nations of Europe, and continues its effort to remove the traces of the Second World War through a German settlement.

1723
Hirschfeld, Oswald. [THE NATO CRISIS--EXPOSURE OF A FICTION?] NATO-Krise--Enthüllung einer Fiktion? Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, June 10, 1966: 344-348. U3.W38, v. 10

Renouncement of nuclear weapons could end Bonn's political immobilism. World-wide anti-Gaullism is losing more and more of its persuasive power. The unvarnished realities have now forced even sworn NATO partisans to re-assess the value and usefulness of the Atlantic Alliance. Swinging between self-assertion and subservience, Bonn--as might be expected--reacts with plaintive but vague laments. The Defence Minister is met in Washington with demands which amount virtually to a reprimand; the Foreign Minister allows his almost pathological Francophobia to dictate a note which he does not even dare to show to the Cabinet. Even the U.S. State Department is beginning to be irritated by the constant clamouring of Bonn's emissaries for co-ownership of the foreign atomic cudgel. Such is the background to a suggestion which looks as if it might be capable of resolving a dangerous trauma of the Germans, replacing a fictitious NATO equality by an equally fictitious atomic potential, though admittedly at the cost of nuclear neutralization--which could certainly produce a substantial measure of relief in both East and West, without the slightest risk. As described in the present article, this concept suggests that the Federal Republic should acquire a number of F-111 long-range bombers, to be maintained with non-German crews as a combat-ready nuclear deterrent force on American territory. Needless to say, the power to order nuclear operations would remain with the U.S. President alone. The Polaris submarines deployed in the Western hemisphere complete the range of atomic weapons. The latter could be used to counter any possible offer of atomic protection by France, if such offer should ever be repeated. Under this new theory of nuclear cover all nuclear weapons--including above all tactical weapons--would be withdrawn from non-French European territory, and Washington could resume its talks on the problem of non-proliferation with good prospects of success. The White House could doubtless count on the consent of Britain, not to mention Benelux and the other NATO countries. This might perhaps some day stop the Federal Republic from being the only country in the Atlantic approaches to play watchdog for the USA, constantly yapping about communism. Provided, of course, that Bonn ever gets around to realizing the role it has hitherto been playing. (Abstract supplied)

1724
HOW THE NEW MOBILE FORCE CAN BLEND WITH A NEW NATO. Canadian business, v. 39, May 1966: 33-38, 43-44, 46, 48, 50, 52. HFl.C22, v. 39

Contents. --NATO--a peacekeeping agency, by John Holmes. --The evolution of a mobile force, by David McIntosh.

Examines the relevancy of Canada's new mobile task force to the new NATO and studies the effect of De Gaulle's decision to close NATO bases in France upon the Canadian defense budget. If NATO becomes--as seems likely--"a European parallel to the permanent United Nations peacekeeping agency," Canadian experience with U.N. forces and Canada's "new domestic military structure" will particularly suit the nation for an important role in the Organization.

1725
Huntley, James R. THE NATO STORY. Produced in cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. New York, Manhattan Pub. Co. [1965] 64 p. UA646.3.H8

Contents. --Backdrop for NATO: an Atlantic civilization. --Civil war in Europe. --Europe's struggle to recover. --Peace . . . and there is no peace. --Early years. --NATO today. --NATO's civil impact. --Shield for peaceful pursuits. --World peace. --Suggested reading list.

Traces the background of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the context of several hundred years of European history. Optimism and success underscore the author's description of the Organization, including its many functions and activities. Yet its work is still unfinished. "NATO, in the late sixties, will somehow have to adjust its purposes and structure to face two increasingly urgent world issues: the spread of nuclear weapons and the change in the character of the communist threat." NATO is not dead! Along with its contributions as a military alliance in Europe NATO has influenced efforts for international cooperation and the pursuit for peace.

1726
Kirk, Peter. RETHINKING NATO. World today, v. 22, Jan. 1966: 28-32. D410.W63, v. 22

NATO's most recent pre-Christmas meeting of Foreign, Finance, and Defense Ministers was scarcely marked by seasonal cheer; rather it was, as usual, pervaded by "the utmost gloom." NATO ails because it has been too successful. Europe is safe for democracy, and the French withdrawal serves only to bring the ills of the alliance to a head. The paramount question shaking NATO has been the issue of nuclear sharing. Many West Germans believe that the Federal Republic cannot be indefinitely deprived of the means of self-defense, and this factor lies behind many British suggestions concerning mixed manning. NATO exists for the Atlantic area, but "the world struggle has now moved on to a different stage." War is just as likely to break out over the bombing of Hanoi by the United States as over the destruction of Moscow by France; in either case Europe will be equally involved. Thus the alliance as a whole must share the burden of worldwide strategic planning. If the scope of NATO is widened to a global basis, and if Europe is given a share in the existing nuclear deterrent, some of the American and French objections to various aspects of nuclear sharing may be silenced. NATO's membership would of course have to be wider than at present --at a minimum such countries as Australia, New Zealand, Iran, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Thailand would have to be included. Yet a worldwide NATO system may be the only realistic defense of the free world's interests.

1727
Laloy, Jean. [EVOLUTION OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE] L'évolution de l'alliance atlantique. Preuves, v. 16, June 1966: 29-42. AP20.P74, v. 16

By nature the Atlantic alliance is neither a purely military alliance nor a political community; its ambiguity prompts crises deriving from both centrifugal and

communal or integrative currents. Legally and technically military integration in peacetime does not much affect members' sovereignty. Politically, however, some autonomy is lost. What limits sovereignty is the nature of modern warfare, technical exigencies rather than the existence of a supreme command. The Atlantic alliance was created to keep intact the 1948 status quo; its collective machinery is to go into action only in case of attack against one of its members and not in case of a member's attack against another state. Whether the most powerful state could use the alliance to draw its allies into other conflicts is problematical, but the examples of Korea and Cuba are reassuring. Germany is the ally most adamant about changing--albeit peacefully--the status quo. Peacful change requires real military power, a sure knowledge of all conditions, and coordinated political plans. Political and power divergencies between the members under the protection of East-West nuclear equilibrium and the expansion of strategic choices have provoked the present crisis. The problem "is to find in the political arena methods of common planning sufficiently efficacious and precise to compensate for the fact that, technically, in time of crisis a monopoly [of decisionmaking power] is inevitable." The survival of the alliance depends on whether its members value it highly enough, and think their security would be threatened without it, on whether security is rated higher than independence and on whether nations are willing to make the necessary efforts and sacrifices required for technical reform. Political and technical changes must be made --improved political consultation, structural reorganization, strategic planning, weapons sharing. As long as the German division creates tensions, strategic divergencies, as serious as they are, can be overcome. "An alliance in which institutions and appropriate agreements assure political consultation, strategic planning, crisis control, and the sharing of military responsibilities seems a better tool of stability than the proliferation of independent nuclear forces." This alliance must be an instrument for assuring peaceful relations between its members as well as East-West equilibrium. If its members consider it thus, as an embryonic political organization, then nuclear-strategic problems will not be deemed important enough to break it up.

1728
Lavergne, Bernard. ANY FUTURE FOR NATO? International affairs (Moscow) no. 5, May 1966: 31-34.
D839.I465, 1966

America's preoccupation with its self-imposed mission to eradicate the "heresy of Communism" has prompted that country to commit a series of mistakes since World War II, the most serious of which was the division of Germany. In violation of the Potsdam Agreement the United States, then anxious to secure new allies against the aggression it mistakenly expected from the Soviet Union, created the autonomous West German state that was eventually to demand participation in Western nuclear planning. The arming of West Germany by NATO adversely affected world peace, just as the continued division of Germany prevents the achievement of real European security. No reasonable man continues to believe that a Soviet threat against Western Europe provides NATO with its raison d'être; "NATO is but a U.S. instrument for intimidation and domination of the West European countries, with the exception of France, who has resolutely opposed such efforts." Because of President de Gaulle's foresight and his refusal to provide logistical support for NATO, there is now less likelihood that the Bonn militarists will be able to involve the United States in a war of aggression against the East. There will be no real peace in Europe, however, until the armed forces of all nations are withdrawn from their foreign bases. "In our opinion, the greatest service NATO could render the world would be to disappear without delay."

1729
Lieber, Robert J. THE FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCE: A STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL EVALUATION. International affairs (London), v. 42, July 1966: 421-431.
JX1.I53, v. 42

The bitter experiences of the world wars prompt the nations of Western Europe to oppose any theory of deterrence that enhances the possibility of conventional warfare. "The essence of the problem is less that the Europeans do not understand the concept of flexible response than that they comprehend and reject it." Though of scant military value at present (and likely to become militarily less valuable during its second generation), the French nuclear force may help deter the Soviets by confronting them with "two allied but independent centres of decision" (Washington and Paris), thereby inspiring the sting of uncertainty that enlivens the credibility of nuclear deterrence. But the chief importance of the French force is political. Acquisition of nuclear weapons will provide France "with international prestige and independence, a probable trigger for the American nuclear arsenal, influence over United States strategic policy (especially in obstructing flexible response), and a concrete basis for the assertion of primacy among her European partners." Domestically, the French nuclear program will probably draw the armed forces closer to the nation, foster the nationalism De Gaulle hopes to inspire, and stimulate scientific and industrial development, thus helping to free France from technological dependence upon the United States. Though Franco-American friction may temporarily preclude American participation in the French nuclear program, U.S. aid (blueprints, guidance systems, missile parts, etc.) could "encourage the eventual establishment of an independent European nuclear force, as well as maintain long-run co-ordination and goodwill."

1730
Luchsinger, Fred. OLD TRUTHS IN DANGER [editorial] Swiss review of world affairs, v. 16, Apr. 1966: 1-2.
D839.S9, v. 16

De Gaulle's policy of elimination of American influence in Europe and disruption of NATO's integrated defense system can be justified neither by West Europe's or France's security interests nor by the old and still valid truths that have been proved by experience. Basing West Europe's defense system on merely bilateral arrangements would be a gross underestimation of the serious threat Soviet military potential in East and Central Europe still poses to West Europe's security. Internal developments in both the Soviet Union and East Europe by no means exclude "every danger of aggression and conflagration, especially in the state of European-Soviet imbalance that is bound to result from a serious weakening" of NATO. Without a physical American presence on the Continent no prophylactic protection of West Europe is possible. For the United States to deter aggression by operating exclusively as a distant power, as postulated by De Gaulle, would mean the adoption of the obsolete "Fortress America" concept at the expense of the sound strategy of flexible response. Hence Washington's determination to preserve NATO's integrated defense system is right. Another effect of De Gaulle's thrust against NATO is the upgrading of

the German Federal Republic within the Atlantic alliance (the "Bonn-Washington axis"); this may have adverse repercussions on the overall situation in Europe. "It would be a miracle if the Soviets were to allow the West to carry out its reconsolidation without some disturbance."

1731
MacCloskey, Monro. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, GUARDIAN OF PEACE AND SECURITY. New York, Richards Rosen Press [1966] 127 p. (The Military research series)
UA646.3.M2

Explains the purpose, structure, history, problems, and accomplishments of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

1732
Michelet, Guy. [CONCORDE AND GALION] Concorde und Galion. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Apr. 15, 1966: 196-197. U3.W38, v. 10

Although many people in France found reason for optimism in the British White Paper, thanks to the prospects it holds out for continued Anglo-French cooperation, others take a more gloomy view of the probable effect of the British Government's defence decisions on the future of Europe's aircraft industries. On the one hand it is feared that the joint variable geometry project may be jeopardized by the simplified version of the F-111 which General Dynamics is known to have in its drawers; on the other, concern has been caused by reports that BEA is considering either a stretched version of the Trident or the Boeing 727-200, which would delay the need for the proposed airbus. Meanwhile, however, the Concorde programme has passed the point of no return, so can be regarded as safe. Sud-Aviation has announced details of its Galion project, Dassault has given details of progress with the Mirage 3 V (quantity production still impossible because the lift engines are not yet ready) and the Mirage 3 F 2 (the French Air Force is now interested in a twin-engine version), and one of the Transall prototypes has successfully completed cold-weather trials in Sweden. (Abstract supplied)

1733
Miksche, Ferdinand O. INTEGRATION--THE CRUCIAL PROBLEM OF NATO. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 11, Feb./Mar. 1966: 81-82.
UA646.F5, v. 11

The West must develop a strategy that, to be politically serviceable in all situations, is based both on strong conventional forces and nuclear weapons. Even France, with all its desire for autonomy, can accomplish this only within a supranational framework. Thus the relationship between West Europe and the United States is crucial; the problems of the 1970's cannot be solved within an obsolescent alliance structure. If the burden of the Atlantic pact were halved--if NATO consisted of an alliance between the United States and a "Western European Defence Community," each capable of acting autonomously--Western strategy might be rendered more flexible. Both Europe and America would benefit by making a nuclear power of West Europe. It could be accomplished either by a transfer of weapons from the United States to the European group, an eventuality that seems unlikely, or Europe could develop its own nuclear weapons. Joint European development would not be easy yet could be accomplished, especially if the existing French program were used. The massive conventional force needed to defend Europe could be fairly readily raised by the nations concerned. Integration would not end national armies but merely place them under a single command. To eliminate total dependence on the United States and unrealistic desires for total national autonomy an integrated European Defense Community is necessary.

1734
Müller, Hans D., ed. [FORCE DE FRAPPE: EUROPE'S HOPE OR MISFORTUNE?] Die force de frappe: Europas Hoffnung oder Verhängnis? Olten, Walter-Verlag [1965] 124 p. UA700.M9

Contents.--Force de frappe as a problem of political structure, by Georg Picht.--MLF--no alternative: political questions concerning the Multilateral Nuclear Force, by Carl F. von Weizsäcker.--Friendship without illusions, by Alfred Grosser.--Europe without De Gaulle, by Paul Reynaud.--Documents.

Analyses of French nuclear strategy and policy and their military and political implications for NATO, Europe, and the German Federal Republic. Georg Picht stresses the irrationality of France's strategic doctrine and policy. Carl F. von Weizsäcker considers the contemplated Multilateral Nuclear Force an obstacle to European unification, strengthening the American-European alliance, and solving the German problem. Alfred Grosser assesses the difficulties in Franco-German cooperation and the prospects for improved relations between both countries. Paul Reynaud contends Europe does not need to follow De Gaulle's path, but should instead work for bringing about European federation and consolidating the Atlantic partnership. The 57-page section "Documents" contains texts for the following: President De Gaulle's press conference of July 23, 1964; French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville's declaration of November 3, 1964 before the French National Assembly; De Gaulle's speech of November 22, 1964, in Strasbourg; "Thoughts on the West's Strategy," a lecture delivered by Gen. Charles Ailleret, Chief of the French General Staff, to NATO's Defense College; "French Nuclear Power--an End or a Means?" an article in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, December 9, 1964, by Dr. Fred Luchsinger; Gen. Pierre M. Gallois' letter of December 8, 1964, to Georg Picht and the latter's reply.

1735
[NASA'S OFFERS TO EUROPE] Nasa-Angebote für Europa. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Apr. 15, 1966: 247. U3.W38, v. 10

Reports on the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) offer to train West European scientists and potential astronauts to participate in U.S. space programs. Through thus gained experience, NASA underlines, the participants would later be able to serve their countries in weather forecasting, decontamination of air, communication, navigation of space ships, etc. The article states that in connection with this offer NASA rejects any idea of making the American carrier and payload rockets available to European allies, because it fears use of such vehicles for nuclear tests.

1736
NATO SEEKS A NEW DEFENSE LINE. Business week, no. 1919, June 11, 1966: 40-41.
HC431.B47, 1966

France is determined to quit the alliance. What NATO will resemble when France leaves is hard to say, but the remaining nations have decided to stick

together. They voted to shift NATO's military headquarters from Paris to the environs of Brussels. The United States and the 13 remaining allies think that NATO must be kept strong as insurance against possible Soviet threats. De Gaulle, on the other hand, believes that the Soviets have given up any intentions of trying to get their way in Europe by military force and insists that NATO--or at least its joint military structure--is a relic of the cold war that hampers peaceful arrangements between Western Europe and Russia. Apparently De Gaulle hopes that, once he arranges a detente with Russia and the U.S. influence is eliminated, France will emerge as a major power in Europe. But it is not likely that De Gaulle will lure any other NATO member out of the Organization. For, in addition to its importance as a deterrent to the Soviets, NATO is regarded as a polite means of restraining West Germany from becoming independent militarily. The decision of the 14 governments to keep NATO together was not hard to reach. The difficulty will be to work out the consequences of their decision. To give NATO a new impulse, the U.S. emphasis now will likely be on NATO initiatives for an East-West settlement in Europe, although because of the Vietnamese War U.S. officials doubt that Moscow will be receptive at the present time.

1737
Noirot, Paul. [WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO AND FRANCE'S WORLD ROLE] Le retrait de l'OTAN et le rôle mondial de la France. Démocratie nouvelle, no. 4, Apr. 1966: 2-7.
D839.D45, 1966

As so extensively remarked upon, the world situation has altered since conclusion of the NATO treaty. Especially relevant to De Gaulle's decision to withdraw is the Soviet-U.S. parity which has practically nullified the value of alliance for lesser powers. As Henry Kissinger has stated: "A country gains little in allying itself and risks little by staying neutral . . . . We are living in a curious era in which neutrals benefit the most from the protection of allies and allies aspire to the same freedom of action as neutrals." At the same time French officials deem NATO's protection superfluous they resent the limitations it places on economic and political action. One can cite U.S. pressures on NATO members to aid its cause in Vietnam, the state of emergency called for U.S. troops in France during the Cuban crisis without France's knowledge, and the U.S. air intervention in the Congo from French bases as instances of U.S. actions compromising French political freedom. Moreover, the United States exerts great pressure on its allies to buy American made military equipment. De Gaulle scarcely dreams of a reversal of alliances; in fact, he is thinking of closer European cooperation and, with Great Britain's support, the refusal of nuclear arms to Germany. Advances to the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union are being renewed in the interest of levying pressure on Germany. De Gaulle's policies ("poker bluffs") are dangerous, but so is Atlanticism. The French Left opposition must wake up to the realization that there exists more than these two alternatives.

1738
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Paris, Nato-Otan [1964] 205 p.
JX1393.N63

Provides "a comprehensive list of books and periodicals dealing with NATO." The present volume is the English edition of the bibliography, originally published in French in 1962.

1739
Orvik, Nils. NATO: THE ROLE OF THE SMALL MEMBERS. International journal, v. 21, spring 1966: 173-185. D839.I5, v. 21

How important is NATO to its smaller members; conversely, how useful are they to NATO? The original motivations for these nations to become alliance members were the Soviet threat, military and economic aid made available by the stronger members, political advantages in being formally allied with an anti-Communist bloc, and the failure of neutralism during World War II. None of these motives remains as compelling as it was in 1949, yet the alliance is still a comfortable arrangement for the members. At its inception NATO's greatest need was territory, which the small members helped in supplying. Territory remains somewhat important, but primarily psychologically, in the era of the ICBM. Integration of the smaller nations' forces into the NATO structure, the political support they can supply, and their potential roles as mediators in such areas as arms control agreements are further advantages said to stem from the membership of the smaller nations. Since neutrals could play any of these roles successfully the small members must demonstrate their worth to the alliance. Extended consultation is not the answer, for the interests of the North Atlantic nations are not really congruent. The issue of nuclear control has pointed up this ambivalence. It may well be that the alliance will have to be divided up into two membership classes, the "A" members leading the alliance, and the "B" members maintaining conventional defense. Finding themselves suddenly and formally subordinate, however, the B-group would probably drift away from NATO altogether. An alternative arrangement would be to split NATO into regional groups with much more closely allied interests. To maintain credibility of defense the United States would belong to each regional group and might even "serve as the major co-ordinator for the regional programmes." A devolution of NATO along these or any other still-useful lines is much less to be feared than its becoming "an empty shell with an impressive list of distinguished members."

1740
Philip, André. COUNSEL FROM AN ALLY: REFLECTIONS ON CHANGES WITHIN THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY. Columbia, University of Missouri Press [c1966] 79 p. (The John Findley Green Foundation lectures, 1965) DC412.P45

A series of three lectures, entitled "The New France," "The New Europe," and "Change and Challenge." The first deals with technical, economic, social, and political transformations now taking place within France; the second with European unification and the problems of economic relations between Europe and the world; and third with problems of defense and foreign policy in Europe and France. The author feels that the disarray that characterizes Atlantic defense and foreign policy can be overcome only by the establishment of a true partnership between the United States and Europe. He suggests that the United States prod European unity by promising to hold close consultation with the head of the European community on every problem and not to use atom bombs without European consent.

1741
Raven, Wolfram von, ed. [ARMY AGAINST WAR: VALUE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BUNDESWEHR] Armee gegen den Krieg; Wert und Wirkung der Bundeswehr. Stuttgart-Degerloch, Seewald Verlag [1966] 328 p. UA710.R34

Contents. --Pankow gave offense, by Konrad Adenauer. --Alliance of two continents, by Franz Josef Strauss. --The Bundeswehr of tomorrow, by Kai Uwe von Hassel. --Détente and disarmament, by Wilhelm Grewe. --Opposition and defense contribution, by Fritz Erler. --What is the Bundeswehr lacking? by Helmut Schmidt. --Tradition and progress, by Fritz Rudolf Schultz. --Can NATO remain strong? by Dirk U. Stikker. --Concept of deterrence, by Lauris Norstad. --Détente is the goal, by Patrick Gordon Walker. --Perimeter and hinterland, by André Beaufre. --The Federal Republic of Germany, by Adolf Heusinger. --Defense of Central Europe, by Hans Speidel. --Army in the nuclear age, by Ulrich de Maizière. --Aircrafts or rockets? by Josef Kammhuber. --Sea flank, by Friedrich O. Ruge. --Soldier in an open society, by Wolf Graf von Baudissin. --Public opinion and the Bundeswehr, by Gerd Schmückle.

Assessments of Atlantic, West European, and West German security problems. Special consideration is given to the present role and significance of the German armed forces from the political, military, technological, sociological, and historical perspectives.

1742
Sixsmith, E. K. G. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE. Army quarterly and defence journal, v. 92, Apr. 1966: 5-9. U1.A85, v. 92

Britain's voice is greater in world affairs than the strength of her armed forces justifies. Without economic strength Britain could not retain this status. While costs of maintaining present force levels at home and abroad are mounting, the defense budget will be reduced approximately 100 million pounds. This means cuts must be made somewhere. Britain's security is tied to the security of Europe. Defense Minister Healy at the Atlantic Council meeting indicated NATO could meet its defense requirements with the present force structure, particularly since the Soviet menace to Western Europe has almost disappeared. It is not correct to shift all attention to the Chinese menace, however, for European problems still exist. Although there is dissatisfaction in Germany with present boundaries, the general feeling holds that "no solution of the Berlin question short of a united Germany seems satisfactory, and there seems no halfway between the present situation . . . and the still distant permanent settlement." The German problem is the prime obstacle toward reaching any satisfactory disarmament agreement, since the fear of German aggression is used by the Soviets in justifying their refusal to consider any solution short of the impractical dream of complete disarmament. At present the balance of terror among the great powers helps stabilize international affairs. The threat of other nations acquiring nuclear weapons, many of whom harbor localized enmities toward each other and bear little responsibility in international life, stresses the need for a step that would bring these nations to forego their desires to develop weapons of mass destruction. "The chief obstacle to such an agreement between Russia and the West is the Soviet's fear of our intentions of giving Germany control of nuclear weapons and the Soviet fear of any form of inspection." While the immediate aim is to maintain the integrity of NATO, Britain must continue to seek a détente and real progress toward preventing nuclear proliferation. Although France will remain a difficult ally, she gives no indication of wishing to destroy the alliance system or to alter basically the other ways in which the European nations are moving toward mutual cooperation among themselves. The fact that Britain will continue to have a Territorial Army for Home Defense will enable her to meet any changes in the world strategic situation and give her a disciplined force in the event she must withstand the effects of nuclear disaster.

1743
Stifani, Giuseppe. [. . . WHERE IS THE COORDINATION?] . . . Wo bleibt die Abstimmung? Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Apr. 15, 1966: 191-192. U3.W38, v. 10

The British decision to buy F-111s from America has introduced a new element of uncertainty into the prospects of international cooperation in the military aircraft field. In practice it means that it will be impossible to get any European programme for an advanced weapons system going before 1970. For countries like Italy, who lack the financial resources to initiate such programmes, the result may well be that they too will be obliged to buy their advanced aircraft from the United States, if no European models are available to meet their needs. (Abstract supplied)

1744
Strausz-Hupé, Robert. THE WORLD WITHOUT NATO. Orbis, v. 10, spring 1966: 79-90. D839.O68, v. 10

Weighs the pros and cons of preserving NATO and deduces that a world without it would be dangerous for all states now belonging to the alliance, since Europe would be indefensible. The withdrawal of American power from Europe would create a vacuum which on the one hand could not be filled by bilateral alliances between individual European states and America, but on the other hand would irresistably attract the intervention of the great and proximate power of the U.S.S.R. "It is possible to design all kinds of hypotheses for the state of a world without NATO. Among these, one seems most likely and ominous: The United States would be more isolated from the world than had been envisaged by the hardiest isolationists of the pre-World War II era." More optimistically the author notes that there always has been a world order; it is likely that there will be one in a NATO-less future.

1745
Trautmann, Gerhard. [WOULD FRANCE DEFEND US? GALLOIS SAYS: PERHAPS, LIPKOWSKI BELIEVES: YES] Würde Frankreich uns verteidigen? Gallois sagt: Vielleicht, Lipkowski glaubt: Ja [interview] Christ und Welt, v. 19, Mar. 11, 1966: 3, 10. BR4.C37, v. 19

Gallois: The German Federal Republic can choose among three courses of action to protect its national security. One course would be to acquire nuclear-power status. This would enhance the nation's political independence and security, were it not for the fact that its "geographic and political situation, alone among European countries, is still unsettled." Under these circumstances nuclear status would only strengthen the suspicion among Germany's neighbors that it intends to use atomic weapons for blackmail and offensive purposes rather than defensive ones. Another course would be continued reliance on the presence of American forces in Germany and possibly on America's supplying the most sophisticated weaponry, in which case the German nation would have to reconcile itself to second-rate technological progress. The present NATO strategy (flexible or gradual response) reflects primarily the security interests of the United States and leaves West Europe exposed to the risk of the enemy's cutting a deep incision into its territory. The third course would be a joint French-German defense

community and combined effort toward establishment of first a European confederation and second a Union of European states. In case Bonn chooses to play its European card to the full (which does not need to be an anti-American policy), the road would be open for the creation of a common defense system. The Federal Republic's security interests are far closer to those of France than of the United States, and French nuclear strategy provides for automatic counterstrike against aggression. A bloc made up of France and the Federal Republic would enhance both nations' bargaining power vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc and thus would speed up solution of the German reunification problem. German fears of French hegemony are groundless, because in any entente with Germany France would be the weaker partner in population, economy, and political stability. Lipkowski: French foreign policy assumes that German reunification can be achieved only through an East-West détente, which in turn requires open renunciation by the German Federal Republic of nuclear arms and full recognition of the Oder-Neisse boundary. The so-called "German threat constitutes the only card Russia can still play out to maintain the cohesiveness of the Soviet bloc." A common diplomatic effort by France and the Federal Republic toward creation of a European striking force would complement the American military protection and foreign policy by bringing the common French and German interests to the fore. Since both nations share the same strategic zone an attack on the German Federal Republic would be tantamount to an attack on France. The French force de frappe, "capable of destroying instantly about 30 percent of all Russian cities," represents quite an effective deterrent against aggression.

1746
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations. THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: BASIC ISSUES. A study. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 14 p.
UA646.3.U44

Contents. --The problem. --The Soviet threat. --The French challenge. --The consultative process. --A practical footing.

Reviews the problems facing NATO and the difficulties of achieving a European settlement. Greater European involvement in strategic and political planning within the alliance is urged. "Here is where organizational imaginativeness is needed, rather than a managerial pseudo-science which formally locates power in bodies to which no member government will in fact delegate real authority." At the same time, the importance of NATO to Atlantic security and development is emphasized.

1747
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations. THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: TREATY AND RELATED AGREEMENTS. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 57 p.
JX1393.N67U5166

At head of title: 89th Congress, 2d session. Committee print.

A collection of documents relating to the Atlantic alliance. The North Atlantic Treaty, the Brussels Treaty, the Convention on the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the Treaty Between the French Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany on French-German Cooperation are reprinted herein, as are supplementary documents and communications associated with these agreements.

1748
Valette, Claude. [A MISTAKEN PROBLEM: NATO-WARSAW PACT SYMMETRY] Un faux problème: la symétrie O.T.A.N. -pacte de Varsovie. Revue politique et parlementaire, v. 68, May 1966: 8-17.
H3.R4, v. 68

Those who theorize that the dissolution of NATO would invite the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact are mistaken. Historically the Communist-bloc military alliance was created chiefly as a response to West German rearmament (after conclusion of the 1954 Paris Accords) and not as a counterweight to NATO itself. Certainly there are similarities in the texts of the Eastern and Western treaties, but these mean little in comparison with differences in spirit and goals. Even were NATO and the Warsaw Pact counterpart organizations, the destruction of the first would not suffice to undermine the political value of the second. Through its military presence (and references to the German danger) the Soviet Union reinforces its hold on Eastern Europe in the face of the de-Stalinization-desatellization process. The specter of two fronts that haunts the Soviet Union would be less fearsome if NATO were considerably weakened; the U.S.S.R. would be able to resume such traditional Russian foreign policy tactics as the pendulum movement of efforts back and forth from East to West. To be sure nuclear logic still forces prudence on Soviet leaders, but the stakes of the conflict remain the same no matter what happens to NATO.

1749
Van Buylaere, Albert. [A TEMPTING COLLABORATION, BUT . . .] Eine verlockende Zusammenarbeit, aber . . . Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Apr. 15, 1966: 191.
U3.W38, v. 10

The head of Sud-Aviation's helicopter division recently gave a group of foreign journalists an outline of his company's long-term plans in the rotary-wing field and described his ideas for a wide-based European cooperative programme under which Sud-Aviation's partners would play their full part in the development of future models. Such a proposition would normally have been highly attractive to Europe's aircraft industries, had it not been for France's decision to withdraw from NATO and revert to the dangerous practice of bilateral military agreements. In the circumstances, countries such as Benelux may well ask if participation in this programme would not leave their armed forces too dependent on French production, with the possible result that, should they become involved in a conflict of which Paris did not approve, the problem of spares could become acute. Brussels has not forgotten France's attitude when American aircraft stationed in France were used to ferry Belgian paratroops to Stanleyville . . . to rescue Europeans from massacre. (Abstract supplied)

1750
Verberie. [THE ALLIANCE AND SHARED NUCLEAR RESPONSIBILITIES] L'Alliance et le partage des responsabilités nucléaires. Revue militaire générale, no. 4, Apr. 1966: 461-470.
U2.R48, 1966

Includes summaries in English and German.

Alliance nuclear sharing is a problem to be dealt with more in the political than the military context of deterrence. It is not as important for bringing maximum violence to bear (a defense problem), which is

moreover equivalent to the assurance of reciprocal destruction. Deterrence is (1) a peacetime strategy to avoid war and (2) an escalation strategy designed to demonstrate to the enemy the will not to surrender while still avoiding massive nuclear exchanges. "No political stake can justify a war ending in the annihilation of the two camps." This being the case, under balance-of-terror conditions it seems that the U.S. nuclear threat is an inadequate deterrent. To increase deterrence General Beaufre has suggested destabilization at the nuclear level, or creation of multiple independent nuclear centers. Such a move would certainly make a potential aggressor more prudent but would not necessarily increase the security of the small nuclear powers. Instead of acting as a catalyst for the forces of the super-ally, the launching of a nuclear arsenal by a small third country might bring the United States and the Soviet Union, "on the edge of the precipice, to a compromise solution which would leave the small nuclear power with its ashes." Moreover independent nuclear forces tend to weaken an alliance, and weaknesses can be exploited. Deterrence is maximum when the allies form a solid bloc. By studying the escalation process the Western alliance can find a solution to its nuclear problems, a solution that reconciles the existence of several nuclear centers with the need for concerted action. Such a solution would be based on the right of European nuclear centers to decide on early-stage escalation measures (e.g., the use of nuclear weapons in Central Europe). In thus escalating conflict Europe would be demonstrating its will to resist and also forcing U.S. involvement. At the same time U.S., French, and British nuclear forces could be coordinated. The United States would retain responsibility for the decision to escalate up to nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. By coordinating strategic policies while increasing the decisionmaking power of those countries most vitally affected by a crisis in Europe the deterrent power of NATO can be increased and peace made surer.

1751
Wiss-Verdier, A. [CONFRONTED WITH THE NATO CRISIS] Face à la crise de l'OTAN. Documents, v. 21, Mar./Apr. 1966: 6-14. DDI.D65, v. 21

Germany must realistically weigh the factors involved in the NATO crisis that came to light with France's announced withdrawal and must find a solution with both of its major allies (the United States and France) that assures German security. On April 6, 1966, the Bonn government outlined its position in five points: Germany thinks an integrated defense structure necessary, even in peacetime; NATO members must study in common the repercussions of recent French actions on the military situation and on the alliance's defense capacity; French troops in Germany are a necessary element of NATO's defense; an accord must be reached with France on the new status of these troops; and the goal of all efforts is maintaining the effectiveness of NATO. In the Frankfurter Rundschau (no. 86, 1966) Erich Hauser remarked that De Gaulle should be praised for showing the West German public how diplomatically weak Bonn is despite its economic strength and how fragile is its costly and vaunted Bundeswehr in the face of certain strategic modifications. The Bundeswehr and the Luftwaffe would be ineffectual without use of the French hinterland. Wolfram von Raven, in his introduction to Armee gegen den Krieg (Stuttgart-Degerloch, Seewald Verlag, 1966), describes the German Army's role in German and European defense as a function of the nation's immense strategic value, the threat emanating from the East, new weapons technology, and high population density. Germany would not survive a military confrontation; therefore the only protection it has is in indirect defense (politically based deterrence strategy). For this purpose a strong Bundeswehr was constituted, an army that represents a sort of "political currency whose market value must be sufficient to allow our country to assure its security. Here resides its true, indeed its only and unique significance." Germany cannot alienate France. If the latter withdraws its troops the Bundeswehr would have to be increased, which would provoke outcries from both Germany's allies and enemies. Nor can it afford to lose U.S. promises of protection.

4. Related Policies and Problems

1752
Alsop, Stewart. HIS BUSINESS IS WAR. Saturday evening post, v. 239, May 21, 1966: 29-33, 94, 97-98, 101. AP2.S2, v. 239

Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara has predicated his action upon three goals: "(A) You must have a sure second-strike capability, to deter a massive attack. (B) You need sufficient control so that both sides have the capability of stopping short of an all-out nuclear exchange. (C) Nuclear superiority has a limited application--all you deter is mutual suicide. You do not deter lesser military threats. Thus a military structure wholly based on nuclear superiority is a bankrupt military structure." He has taken three general courses of action to achieve the aforementioned goals. The first is based on his belief that the old division of defense functions into Army, Navy, and Air Force, and restriction of their respective responsibilities to the ground, sea, and air are outmoded. In the past 5 years Mr. McNamara has brought these services closer together and forced each to integrate itself into the overall defense picture. The second is his elimination of the standard arbitrary way of measuring time that characterized past defense activities. The concept of cost-effectiveness has replaced the simple expedient of annually giving a certain percent of the defense dollar to the Air Force, so much to the Navy, and the rest to the Army. Cost-effectiveness provides a yardstick toward allocating the defense dollar where it is most needed. Finally, McNamara has improved the mobility of defense forces to meet varying battle contingencies; he has modified the former idea of relying solely upon a nuclear deterrent and increased military manpower and conventional equipment to meet a limited war situation. Critics point out that all this is fine, but that three weak points exist: (1) Secretary McNamara does not have insight into behavior of human beings; this quality cannot be quantified and rationalized into a force structure; and he does not understand "what war is really like." War is an emotional and irrational act, and facts and figures do not reflect this fact. (2) He has been wrong in prognosticating the length and depth of America's Vietnam involvement, and has failed to comprehend the emotional involvement of the Vietcong, which makes them refuse to negotiate in spite of their present disadvantage. (3) Too much power over military decisions has been delegated to one individual, the Secretary of Defense. Further Secretary McNamara has developed a monitoring system that precludes adequate discussion of options, which are never debated out in public. This is a democracy, and critics do not like one man, civilian or military to be able to keep the essential issues from the public. In spite of these objections to his actions, the Secretary of Defense must be considered a very rational person

and one of the most dedicated of public servants in American history.

1753
Ambler, John S. THE FRENCH ARMY IN POLITICS, 1945-1962. [Columbus] Ohio State University Press [1966] 427 p. UA700.A65
Bibliography: 377-406.

A study of French Army political interventions between 1945 and 1962, spotlighting the problem of civilian control. The study focuses on military threats to the political regime rather than the broader subject of military influence on policy. The author concludes that praetorianism in this period was, from one viewpoint, the result of a historical conjuncture and, from another viewpoint, a source of valuable information for "cross-national theories of civil-military relations." Decolonization, the trauma of World War II, drawn out and highly political wars in Indochina and Algeria, an unsympathetic domestic public opinion, and a power vacuum in the government until 1958 proved explosive. From the viewpoint of a theory of civil-military relations several points are instructive. (1) That civilian control is closely related to the strength of the popular consensus supporting civilian political institutions is borne out. (2) If political authority is weak a cohesive military establishment is likely to think of itself as "an island of health, unity, and courage in a sea of corruption, conflict, and decay" and try to save the nation from its government. (3) Given certain qualifications French experience supports the theory that in a democracy military professionalism is the best guarantee of civilian control. However in recent years "it has become increasingly clear that professionalism alone is inadequate to assure civilian control, especially when the army is in the service of a liberal democracy: since professional military values may clash with dominant civilian values, the officer must also have a positive commitment to civil supremacy." In political guerrilla wars the soldier must be committed to civilian war goals (which are changeable), but not so committed as to interfere with domestic policies. The face of the French Army is changing with the creation of the officer-technician. But the transformation is slow. Circumstances are conceivable in which the military could again threaten civilian control, especially because public attachment to a constitutional framework is lacking in the country.

1754
BANKRUPTCY OF CULT OF ARMS. In U.S. Consulate, Hongkong. Survey of China mainland press, no. 3659, Mar. 17, 1966: 35-37. DS777.55.U52, 1966
Excerpts from an article in Jen min jih pao (Peking) as reported by New China News Agency, Mar. 14, 1966.
Chi Kor

Contends that modern revisionists have attempted to still the revolutionary spirit of peoples by threatening them with the effects of nuclear warfare. "To put the matter plainly, they have merely changed the motto of the old-time revisionists, 'there can be no revolution after the invention of breech-loading rifles' into 'there can be no revolution after the appearance of nuclear weapons.'" Examples are adduced of how reliance on modern armaments by Hitler, Chiang Kai-shek, and U.S. forces in Korea could not prevent their ultimate defeat.

1755
Bhatia, Harish. RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES. In United Service Institution of India. Journal, v. 95, Oct./Dec. 1965: 207-222.
U1.U5, v. 95

Argues the necessity of integrating the armed forces of India and examines expected attempts to refute the necessity of such a move. Ways in which the reorganization can be worked so as to prevent disruption of efficiency as well as the obstacles to be overcome before the new can replace the old organization are viewed from the standpoint of integrating all three services. Proposed in addition is "some integration of allied organizations like the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Production Department."

1756
Black, Hawley L. THE CANADIAN RESERVE FORCE. National guardsman, v. 20, Mar. 1966: 18-23.
UA42.N24, v. 20

Contains a brief history of the Canadian Militiaman and surveys the current controversy surrounding Defense Minister Paul Hellyer's announced intention to reform, eliminate, or consolidate various units. A look at present defense policy and the extent of the reforms leads the author to conclude that "strong traditions of community, family and national pride make reforms 'hard to swallow.' The Militia will, however, adapt and continue to perform its proper functions, as it always has."

1757
Bowman, Richard C. ANALYSIS IN WAR PLANNING. Air University review, v. 17, Mar./Apr. 1966: 40-48.
TL633.A66, v. 17

Points out that military analysis in the atomic age will fail if it merely counts manpower and weapons. This is part of the "over-kill syndrome." In its stead older types of evaluation and courses of action must be utilized as the analysis of alternative weapons and force structures is continually challenged and improved. The greatest danger arises when systems analysis itself becomes the decisionmaker rather than a fact-gathering tool that facilitates decisionmaking. The civilian as well as the military analyst must realize he is not omnipotent, because "in the nuclear age the need for both quantitative analysis and comprehensive military judgment is much greater than ever before."

1758
Brown, George W. GENERALS AND THE PUBLIC: RECENT POLICYMAKING IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS. [Lawrence] Governmental Research Center, University of Kansas, 1964. 83 p. (Governmental research series, no. 29)
JK558.B7
University of Kansas publications.

Contents. --Setting. --The tradition of civilian control of the military. --The propriety of military participation in public cold war education. --Military expertise on the cold war and communism. --Military perceptions of the cold war and communism. --Military cold war programs in action. --Toward understanding the policy decision of 1962.

Describes in case-study fashion "the ways in which various civilian and military leaders perceive the role of military personnel in the contemporary American setting" and analyzes "in the light of these perceptions the policy of civilian control which has resulted." Brown is primarily concerned with the role military personnel may "properly be expected or permitted to play in educating the public on the nature of the cold war and the menace of communism," a subject taken up by Senate hearings in 1962. Reassessing the 1962

policy decision regarding civilian control, Brown concludes it represented "an ambivalent answer to the question of whether the traditional requirements of civilian control can be effectively maintained as the role, influence, and power of the military continues to expand."

1759
Brownlow, Cecil. U.S., EUROPE VIES FOR LATIN FIGHTER ORDER. Aviation week & space technology, v. 84, May 30, 1966: 26-27.
TL501.A8, v. 84

"Air forces of six major South American countries are on the verge of second-round tactical jet aircraft buys as their post-World War 2 fleets of hand-me-down U.S. equipment phase into obsolescence and beyond. Major question is whether the aircraft will be American or European." The Office of International Security Affairs (ISA) of the U.S. Dept. of Defense has told the countries involved that their programs for aircraft acquisition must be "kept within the bounds of their individual economic and social requirements." U.S. policy toward the South American nations is founded upon a desire to avoid an expensive arms race, to place emphasis on social and economic (not military) development, and to encourage standardization that will lead to "common spares pools and overhaul facilities as additional means of cutting costs." Deputy Assistant Secretary for ISA William E. Lang has stated that two basic types of aircraft--a simple counterinsurgency plane and a good medium transport --can satisfy air requirements for the Latin countries. Unwillingness to abide by the ISA standards may lead some of these countries to make "at least token European buys."

1760
Burck, Gilbert. THE TOUGHEST MANAGEMENT JOB IN THE WORLD. Fortune, v. 74, July 1966: 73-78, 139-140, 142-144. HF5001.F1, v. 74

The vast bureaucracy of the U.S.S.R. is deep in a great reorganization of the economy. Tardily heeding Lenin's admonition to learn from capitalism, Soviet leaders are more and more giving local managers the autonomy that will drive them to work more efficiently. They are rediscovering some economic facts of life--that a realistic price system allocates resources much better than the best of central planning committees, and that profitability is a more efficient gauge of performance than fulfillment of quantitative quotas. And they are making growing use of such once-disparaged devices for economic planning as electronic computers. Some U.S. experts call the changes in progress the second Soviet economic revolution. The first one ignored consumer needs but industrialized the nation and was attended by rapid growth. The second is attempting through decentralized control to make the economy more responsive to the needs of the people. This spring 300,000 workers were already operating under the new system. By early next year the figure is supposed to rise to ten million, or a third of the Soviet industrial labor force.

1761
CAN THE EPIDEMIC OF COUPS BE STOPPED? [editorial] Toward freedom, v. 15, Mar. 1966: 3-4.
P&GP RR

The recent spate of military coups in Africa highlights the problems of armies in unstable countries and of foreign arms shipments. Armies provide little security in Africa. On the contrary, by diverting funds from economic development they may undermine it. To use armies for keeping internal order is undemocratic and destabilizing to the degree that peaceful means of change are forgotten or blocked (as they were in Nkrumah's Ghana). "Unfortunately many independent countries of Africa have accepted without question . . . that a national army is a natural and logical part of internal government, ostensibly to be used only against major rebellion, but in practice to overawe and if necessary to coerce even peaceful opposition." Civilian control over the military is a problem confronting all free African states and should therefore be examined by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Meanwhile the support of coups from abroad must be stopped by OAU and U.N. controls on arms transfers and private money transactions between military officers and foreign concerns. Measures must be taken to "halt the slide of African politics toward the gunbarrel philosophy which Mao shares with his adversaries of the right . . . before Africa goes any further toward the point of no return in the role of booty to be won in World War III."

1762
Carver, George A. THE FACELESS VIET CONG. Foreign affairs, v. 44, Apr. 1966: 347-372.
D410.F6, v. 44

Describes the history, organization, functions, and zeal of the Vietcong in the context of communism in South and North Vietnam and the political struggles taking place in South Vietnam.

1763
[DOLLAR AND DEATH. editorial] Dollar i smert', Sovetzkii voin, no. 12, 1966: 46-47. illus.
U4.S645, 1966

Money and death in the capitalist world have always existed in wedded union. Today in the United States the unity of the dollar and the assassin's bloody sword is flagrantly displayed in the innocents who are sacrificed throughout Vietnam, Laos, the Congo, and the Dominican Republic to enrich American millionaires. In no other armed conflict, according to the boast of Business Week, has such close contact existed between American industry and the combat forces. But ahead of them looms only one thing--disaster. They have already paid with thousands of their hirelings' lives. In addition over one thousand aircraft have been knocked down by the army of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and hundreds of bombers, fighters, and helicopters have been destroyed by the troops of the National Liberation Front army. All possible aid to Vietnam's just struggle against the interventionists is extended by the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries with conviction that the righteous action of the Vietnamese people will triumph.

1764
Fedorov, L. [NIGERIA BEFORE THE COUP AND AFTER] Nigeriia do perevorota i posle. Aziia i Afrika segodnia, v. 9, June 1966: 48-50.
DS1.S7, v. 9

Offers a detailed analysis of the socio-economic causes that led up to the military coup in Nigeria. Serious economic difficulties, steadily deteriorating conditions of the working people, corruption and negligence on the part of high-ranking bureaucrats, and unending bickerings between political parties resulted in popular discontent and the overthrow of the Balewa government. (Abstract supplied)

230-967 O - 66 - 5

1765
Friedman, Leonard R. SOVIET MILITARY AND POLITICAL ELITE. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Military review, v. 46, Apr. 1966: 68-73. Z6723.U35, v. 46

Thumbnail sketches of the men who run the Soviet "Praetorian Guard"--the Far Eastern (Siberian) Army. These generals are oriented toward both military and political thinking. Their control of the Siberian Army, which in large part has controlled "the Soviet destinies in Asia, and then in Europe," gives them enormous influence in Soviet affairs.

1766
Gellman, Benet D. PLANNING FOR A NATIONAL NUCLEAR EMERGENCY: THE ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT AND FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS. Virginia law review, v. 52, Apr. 1966: 435-462. LL

The fearsome prospect of a nuclear war has prompted the United States to undertake comprehensive programs for the national defense. Nuclear planning has focused almost entirely, however, on the military aspects of national preparedness. The author cautions the federal and state governments also to plan adequately for the preservation of government, and of our federal system, in the wake of an attack. He urges that the primary responsibility for our defense resides in the federal government, and that new studies should be undertaken to identify the respective roles and the inter-relationship of the federal and state governments in such a situation. The author concludes that post-attack governmental plans can and should be devised which are consistent with the United States Constitution and with the federal system. (Abstract supplied.)

1767
Gerwin, Robert. [ATOMIC ENERGY IN GERMANY: A REPORT ON THE PRESENT STATE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR RESEARCH AND NUCLEAR TECHNIQUE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY] Atomenergie in Deutschland; ein Bericht über Stand und Entwicklung der Kernforschung und Kerntechnik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Hrsg. in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Bundesministerium für Wissenschaftliche Forschung. [Düsseldorf] Econ-Verlag, 1964. 169 p. tables. QC788.G4

Contents. --The unique German situation. --25 years of nuclear fission in Germany. --Who determines German nuclear policy? The organizational framework. --Research centers and their projects: a review of state activity. --Development of reactors and their limitations: a review of industrial activity. --How will it proceed? Retrospect and prospect. --The law of December 1959 on the peaceful use of nuclear energy and safeguards against its dangers (atomic law). --The atomic program of the Federal Republic of Germany 1963-67. --The German Bundestag Commission for Atomic Energy and Water Economy. --Tables, etc.

Outlines West German nuclear research and engineering activities, which are confined by law to peaceful purposes. Nonuse of a defense budget in this area constituted a disadvantage at the start of a number of projects. It proved beneficial, however, at later stages of development, inasmuch as the German nuclear scientists and engineers were not bound by military secrecy and by often narrow military objectives. They were also saved from inner conflicts over their work. In conclusion the book lists the members of the German Bundestag Commission on Atomic Energy and Water Economy and the members of the [West] German Atomic Forum. It gives organization charts for the [West] German Atomic Commission and the German Federal Ministry for Scientific Research, including its atomic energy departments and related departments dealing with international cooperation in nuclear energy.

1768
Hassel, Kai-Uwe von. [WHEREFORE GERMAN ARMS' AID TO AFRICAN STATES?] Warum deutsche Ausrüstungshilfe für afrikanische Staaten? Afrika heute, no. 7, Apr. 1, 1966: 93-94. P&GP RR

German military aid to African states is offered as a means to economic development. In general African states have no defense problems, but they require military power for maintaining domestic stability. Development aid and military aid complement each other when the latter does not include offensive weapons. The West, Germany included, cannot deny this aid to Africa. However it must be given in a spirit of development and respect for sovereignty.

1769
Hitch, Charles J. DECISION-MAKING FOR DEFENSE. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1965. 83 p. (H. Rowan Gaither lectures in systems science) UA23.H52

Describes "the evolution of the defense management problem over the years." "Two of the major management innovations made since 1961, "the "programming" system and the operations research techniques recently instituted in defense decisionmaking, are explained.

1770
Itskov, Igor' M. [GUNRUNNERS IN EVENING DRESS] Kontrabandisty vo frakakh. Moskva, Znanie, 1964. 94 p. HD9743.U6I8

In the autumn of 1963 the magazine Time informed the world of the rearmament of American gangsters. In two luxurious stores in the city of Atlanta robbers and murderers can order modern weapons. Who is rearming these gangsters? Who supplies the rifles and machine guns for Portugese colonialists? Whence come the military goods that make their way to the addresses of Latin American dictators? From what arsenal do American extremists and bandits in other countries receive their weapons? Besides the "official" suppliers of the instruments of death, a gigantic black market in weapons operates in the "free world"; one of the most brilliant representatives of the merchants of death is Samuel Cummings, the founder and president of an American company that is now organized on an international scale--"Interarmco." (Translation of supplied summary)

1771
Janowitz, Morris. SOCIOLOGY AND THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. In collaboration with Roger Little. Rev. ed. New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1965. 136 p. UA23.J3, 1965
Bibliography: p. 131-136.

Contents. --The military establishment as a social system. --Hierarchy and authority. --Assimilation of military roles. --Primary groups and military effectiveness. --Techniques of organizational control. --The soldier and international relations.

Analyzes military organization in terms of sociological variables. Primary groups within the military and the effects of the military on national society are

examined, as well as the effects of society as a whole on its military subsystem.

1772
Korzun, L. [CIVIL DEFENSE IN THE NATO COUNTRIES] Grazhdanskaia oborona v stranakh NATO. Voennye znaniia, v. 42, May 1966: 28-29.
U4.V874, v. 42

Studies the scope and tendencies of civil defense efforts in the United States and the countries of Western Europe. The author asserts that the "ruling classes of imperialist states" use civil defense programs and pronouncements as a means of arousing anti-Soviet feeling among their citizenry. Western civil defense efforts are also employed as a means of increasing military pressure upon the Socialist nations and as a source of great profit for the monopolists. The U.S. civil defense program, however, has encountered great difficulties and has foundered on many scientific and technical points.

1773
Lamarche, Réginald, and Aimé Vaes. NUCLEAR ENERGY IN BELGIUM. Euratom, v. 5, June 1966: 36-43. illus. P&GP RR

The resources, programs, research, and facilities of the Belgian nuclear energy effort. Illustrations of types of reactors and nuclear power plants are included. Belgian cooperation in nuclear research and development with other members of the European community and other nations is briefly discussed.

1774
Noel-Baker, Philip. SCIENCE AND DISARMAMENT. Impact of science on society, v. 15, no. 4, 1965: 211-246. Q1.I4, v. 15

Armaments have been revolutionized since World War II; thus disarmament can be achieved only through the participation of scientists in negotiations. Today more than half of America's scientists are engaged in military research; Great Britain employs fully 20 percent of its scientists on weaponry; and undoubtedly many other nations allocate their scientific resources similarly. A scientist participates in military research for various motives, not least among which is simple national loyalty. He can, of course, like the conscientious objector, refuse to take part in warmaking, but few scientists feel that this provides the solution, and many feel that peace can best be preserved by weaponry. If he does respond to his government's invitation to participate in military research he is under the orders of those who make political decisions. Yet the scientist in military research has at his command so much knowledge of modern weapons that he is actually a part of the decisionmaking process. He is therefore obliged to warn the world of the dangers inherent in his weapons of disarmament. Along with responsibility for armaments, scientists must also share in the blame for "the use--or misuse--of language to obscure the realities of the present arms race and of nuclear war." Firstly they have caused confusion by using old strategic terms to describe nuclear concepts. Secondly they have invented a chilling new jargon. The terms "kiloton" and "megaton" obscure the actual destructive power of nuclear weapons. Even professionals tend to "think of kilotons as tons." The international scientific community has not totally ignored its responsibility. In America scientists from all over the world helped develop the atomic bomb, then proceeded to lobby firmly against its use. In 1955 Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell took their stand against nuclear war. From their manifesto (signed by other famous scientists as well) grew the Pugwash Movement, a responsible and dedicated effort by scientists on behalf of world peace. However, they must do more. "Operation Vox Populi: The Challenge of the Peoples to Militarism and Death" must be launched. Eleven issues, including future weapons development, the danger of unintended war, the short-term effects of disarmament and the like, should be studied and elucidated publicly by an international committee of highly reputed scientists. A manifesto summarizing their opinions on these issues should then be prepared, first to be endorsed en masse by scientists, and then to form the basis for a world petition in favor of general disarmament. With proper administration, public relations, and finance, many mechanical problems could be surmounted.

1775
Raymond, Jack. THE DEATH MERCHANTS. Diplomat, v. 17, May 1966: 24-25, 58-61.
AP2.D575, v. 17

Recent furor over an alleged arms-peddling mission to the Middle East by President Johnson's brother-in-law, though no more than gossip, sheds light on a practice that has had "sensational" impact upon the underdeveloped world: the gift or sale of obsolescent weapons by the major powers to the smaller nations. Such a transaction is often covert and involves both governments and private individuals. In the Middle East, for example, an arms race is being conducted on a handsome scale that can only represent "the stockpiling for a future Arab-Israel war." And the United States is seriously involved in this race. One of the better known private arms merchants, Samuel Cummings of Interarmco, runs a business easily worth $10 million. But most arms trade is government sponsored, with the United States the leading dealer. The American program is based on the idea of helping friendly nations build up their military forces, but is conducted with enough salesmanship to make any private concern proud. The Soviet Union and other bloc members have also been heavily involved in the arms traffic. West Europe has recently entered the show. All past international attempts to control the traffic in arms have failed; however today the stakes are higher and success is long overdue.

1776
Rembser, J. [ATOMIC BUDGETS IN THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC] Atomhaushalte in den USA, Grossbritannien, Frankreich und der Bundesrepublik. Atomwirtschaft--Atomtechnik, v. 11, Mar. 1966: 114-118. diagrs.
TK9001.A97, v. 11

The annual reports of the national atomic authorities of the USA (USAEC), Great Britain (UKAEA) and France (CEA) have enabled a detailed review to be compiled of the expenditures of these countries on the advancement of nuclear research and technology and a comparison to be made with the corresponding expenditures in the German Federal Republic. The comparison reveals that, in the long view, comprehensive measures for advancement are still necessary in the Federal Republic in order to attain the state of knowledge and experience in the other large industrial nations in the field of the peaceful use of atomic energy. In the USA other authorities than the USAEC also finance the peaceful and the military use of atomic energy. While the USAEC is spending about DM 10 billions during 1966 the other agencies--leaving out of account the expenditure of the Navy Department--will

be spending additional DM 22 billions. The review reveals that the main constructional activity in respect of nuclear installations in the USA took place between 1951 and 1955. Investment stayed at about the same level until 1962 and since then has steadily fallen. The operating costs of the USAEC rose until 1958 with an annual growth rate of about 25%; this growth rate subsequently weakened and in 1965 fell strongly for the first time. In Great Britain net expenditure reached its peak in 1958 and from 1959 has steadily decreased. In France expenditure on the peaceful use of atomic energy has increased from 1955, that on the military use has increased to a considerable extent since 1960. In 1964 the ratio of military to peaceful expenditure reached the value of 2:1 with the expenditure on peaceful applications running at about DM 1,5 billions. In the German Federal Republic national support for the peaceful use of atomic energy is also still in a build-up phase. Saturation, such as was observed in Great Britain in 1958 or in the USA about 1960, is here still far away. The mean annual growth rate in the Federal Republic during the last seven years has remained at about 22%. (Abstract supplied)

1777
Ruban, M. ON PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAINING OF SUBMARINERS. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Soviet military translations, no. 236, Mar. 29, 1966. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 34,781) p. 15-24.
P&GP RR

"CSO: 1850-D."
"Translation of an article . . . in the Russian-language journal Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil (Communist of the Armed Forces), No 1, Moscow, January 1966, pp 49-54."

Deals with the psychological training and preparedness of the Soviet submariner, particularly his psychological reactions to nuclear warfare combat conditions. Captain Ruban argues that fear of nuclear weapons can be overcome if the submariner is given a clear appreciation of the effects of nuclear weapons and radiation and is subjected to lectures on nuclear physics and nuclear armaments.

1778
Rzheshevskii, O. [PENTAGON INTENSIFIES IDEOLOGICAL CULTIVATION OF TROOPS] Pentagon usilivaet ideologicheskuiu obrabotku voisk. Voennyi vestnik, v. 46, June 1966: 113-116.
U4.V87, v. 46

Every American intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state is supported by its own propaganda campaign. The Vietnamese War has heightened propaganda activities in the Pentagon. Series of brochures are disseminated among military personnel to prepare them politically and morally for aggressive actions in Vietnam. Anti-Communist propaganda, playing upon fears of the "Soviet threat," seeks to convince servicemen that their enemy abroad is the Soviet Union and at home American Communists or their sympathizers. Militaristic publications assure their readers that the United States can destroy the U.S.S.R. and other nations of the Socialist system in one blow, that Washington enjoys great nuclear superiority over Moscow, and the like. Thus the will to support the arms race is maintained. A university in Washington, D. C. has assumed the task of preparing for the Pentagon a series of brochures on world revolution, in which the objectives of the national liberation movement are falsified and the doctrine of the "big stick" (so dear to U.S. ruling classes throughout history) is again set forth. In this manner U.S. militarists hope to mislead simple folk and military personnel. But sentiment at home will eventually determine the attitudes of U.S. troops in Southeast Asia. In time the wave of protest launched against U.S. aggression by the workers and students of the United States, the condemnation of the Vietnamese War pronounced by Negro leaders, and the antiwar feelings expressed by youth of military draft age will leave their mark upon the psyche of U.S. troops in Vietnam. Antiwar feeling is sure to increase among draftees and reservists, "from whom it is more difficult to hide the true, antipopular objectives of the war being prosecuted in Vietnam by the imperialists."

1779
Schiller, Herbert I. COMMUNICATIONS FOR THE STATUS QUO. Focus Midwest, v. 4, nos. 9/10, 1966: 12-14.
P&GP RR

Communication is undeniably important to American foreign policy; it should be the major concern of the State Department. Yet through its weakness State has allowed the military to monopolize the better part of America's highly sophisticated new communications technology. Communications satellites offer exciting new opportunities; in the United States it is the military that has been in the forefront of developing them. America's proposals at a 70-nation intergovernmental conference that allocated frequencies for space communications were formulated within the Defense Department. Among others they included the setting aside of a narrow band of frequencies, 50 megacycles in all, for the exclusive use of space communication. These frequencies are of military value alone, and have without fanfare brought the arms race into space. Their use, moreover, rests on the assumption that commercial communications satellite facilities, utilizing the nonexclusive remainder of the 2,800 megacycles allocated to these systems, will prove profitable only in the northern latitudes of the world. The poor half, the southern latitudes, will be left to the concern of the Defense Department's National Communications System. Thus the "scheduled division of labor in the United States communications program" appears to be "profit-taking from the industrially-advanced Northern and Western portions of the world and patrolling of the destitute Southern and Eastern sectors." Is it the intention of the "haves" to militarily enforce the status quo among the "have-nots"? Although worldwide communications networks, whose costs to the advanced nations are relatively small, could be used to help erase illiteracy and to "enlarge the mutual comprehension of peoples." American space efforts appear to be directed toward the alternate course of "incomplete, undirected, and irresponsible use, with the risk of an increase in international hatred and suspicion as a consequence."

1780
Schwartz, Leonard E. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE FURTHERANCE OF PEACE RESEARCH. American behavioral scientist, v. 9, Mar. 1966: 24-28.
H1.A472, v. 9

Research into the causes of war, "peace research," represents a new dimension in social science, combining the best of the behavioral sciences. Its output will provide a vital guide for policymakers. Yet at present both Government and scholars are lagging, perhaps because of mutual misunderstanding, in promoting social science under Government auspices. The suspension of Project Camelot, "one of the biggest social science research projects in modern times," whose "primary mission was to determine the potential

for social revolution" within a country, merely aggravated this malaise. The suspension was nonetheless an unfortunate one, for an action-oriented project of this nature provides both theory and a "laboratory" for testing it. On the other hand the multitude of questions raised by the Camelot affair may turn out to be a blessing in disguise. University-Government-private foundation dialogues should attempt to determine the scope and methods of research into conflict. At present little conflict-oriented Government behavioral research is being conducted. The National Institutes of Health, one of the largest supporters of behavioral studies, does little work in the field of conflict resolution. The Defense Department's programs are expectedly military, while the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in conjunction with the Atomic Energy Commission and DOD, places heavy emphasis on inspection and verification. Foreign area research in the Government has taken up only a little slack. ACDA, DOD, and NIH should enter into a dynamic collaborative promotion of efforts to determine social science alternatives to physical destruction.

1781
Shieh, Francis Shi-hao. PEKING'S IMAGE OF RAND AND PENTAGON. Springfield, Va., Distributed at the Clearinghouse, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1964. 17ℓ. U394.S3S5

Contents. --Introduction. --Pentagon's accomplice--American military research organization 'RAND Corporation,' by Yan Hua. --Pentagon's research organization RAND Corporation. --The inside story of America's RAND Corporation, by Hsiao Feng.

A translation of three Chinese Communist articles on the subject of the Rand Corp. Yan Hua calls Rand a super-military research institution, a tool of the Pentagon that proves U.S. intentions to prepare "for new aggressive war by means of long and deep thinking." Hsiao Feng criticizes Rand's powerful influence in the United States and concludes: "It can be seen that following the development of military science and following the intensive processing of America's expansion of armament work and war readiness, 'scientific research' has become the nation's policy controlled by 'death' businessmen competing to grab military contracts, and grabbing the results of day-to-day important research. Looking at the important emphasis paid by the U.S. federal government to The Rand Corporation and similar organizations' activities, certainly the U.S. military extremism has left no stone unturned to reach such an extreme situation."

1782
Star, Jack. HOW FAIR IS THE DRAFT? Look, v. 30, Apr. 19, 1966: 25-27. AP2.L79, v. 30

Many Americans cannot pass the physical and mental requirements for induction into military service. Of those who pass, many will never be called to serve. "The nation's 4,000 plus Selective Service boards hold the key to a man's draft status." Inequities inherent in the methods used to determine the draft availability of one man over another are apparent since approximately two-thirds of the high school graduates end up in the service, while two-fifths of the college graduates and nearly one-half of the high school dropouts never wear a uniform. With the present need for additional manpower various groups and some Members of Congress are investigating current draft inefficiencies and unfairness. Various plans have been proposed in the past and rejected for one reason or another, but to date no agreement is possible on what to do about reforming the current system and how to reconcile a wide variety of opinions about who is available to serve in the military.

1783
Steele, William S. MANAGEMENT FOR DEFENSE. Air University review, v. 17, Mar./Apr. 1966: 16-27. TL633.A66, v. 17

Reviews the history of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the nature of the faculty, and its courses and methodology. The Industrial College is designed to prepare the career military man and civilian government executive for high-level managerial posts in the Defense Department and other civilian agencies.

1784
Sterne, Theodore E. WAR GAMES. Army, v. 16, Mar. 1966: 40-46; Apr.: 64-68; May: 72-77. Ul.A893, v. 16

A thorough exposition of the nature and purpose of war games. The history, characteristics, scope, suitability, validity, interpretation, control, and methodology of wars games are set forth. The final article of the series describes the normal sequence of events in the game.

1785
[STRATEGIC CONTRABAND IS ONE ASPECT OF THE ARMED PEACE] par le groupe XXX. La contrebande stratégique est un des aspects de la paix armée. Planète, no. 29, July/Aug. 1966: 86-92. P&GP RR

The Western powers' adversaries in Vietnam, Algeria, the Congo, and Egypt have been surprisingly well endowed with equipment originating in Western countries. That this has been the case since the Korean War reveals a new aspect of the modern cold (sometimes hot) war, namely contraband. Illegal traffic in strategic goods is extremely widespread and includes such items as whole factories, electronic equipment, certain metals used in advanced production processes, chemicals, and even human specialists. The most serious threat posed by contraband is nuclear dissemination. Communist China's atomic explosions could only have been achieved through imports of enriched uranium and plutonium from the West. Many nations, most importantly Egypt, acquire radioactive wastes and stockpile them. Once they have built long-range rockets they can fill them with radioactive poisons--a powerful weapon at a bargain price. No action has been taken to halt this strategic contraband which, in the madness of stockpiling, constitutes a quasi-official commerce considered indispensable by all.

1786
Strepetov, Vasilii I. [A SINISTER WEB] Zloveshchaia pautina. [Leningrad] Lenizdat, 1965. 198 p. UB275.S76

Contents. --The many faces of falsehood. --The forces and resources of "psychological warfare." --One goal, any means. --The saboteur and executioner as articles of export. --The domestic front of "psychological warfare."

This book relates the forms and methods of ideological subversion as carried on by imperialism and describes the operation of bourgeois propaganda as supported by anti-Communist centers, anti-Soviet

organizations, and the activities of foreign intelligence organs. While criticizing the bourgeois ideology and revealing the anti-Communist nature of imperialist propaganda, the author also shows how bourgeois ideology and morals penetrate into Soviet life. The book teaches the Soviet people to be vigilant and to arm themselves in the struggle against the bourgeois ideology. (Translation of supplied summary)

1787
Swomley, John M. THE MILITARY'S GROWING POWERS SINCE VIETNAM. Fellowship, v. 32, Mar. 1966: 7-9.
JX1901. F45, v. 32

Asserts that military power in America is rapidly growing and pervading civilian authority, and supports this with illustrations drawn from the Vietnam conflict. Swomley fears that "the military is now in a position to escalate us right into nuclear World War III." He cites mistaken military forecasts, the closeness of General Maxwell Taylor to the President, and military censorship, misinformation, and propaganda as having figured importantly in decisions to step up the pace of war in Vietnam. In Swomley's view "the military influence in our society is so penetrating that it extends not only into the White House but in the labor movement, the industrial complex and nearly everywhere else."

1788
Wolk, Herman S. THE NEW AMERICAN MILITARY. Air Force and space digest, v. 49, Apr. 1966: 86-88.
UG633. A65, v. 49

"Vietnam has become the proving ground of a remarkable transformation in the American military." During the Second World War, when the United States had to marshal its overwhelming strength, the U.S. military assumed a position of dominance in political power and influence. Since 1945 the nuclear revolution and complexities of limited warfare in the nuclear age have demoted the military in policymaking, strategy formulation, and weapons selection. The U.S. defense establishment has become more integrated and centralized, perhaps at the cost of some dynamism and imagination. The military assumed a largely managerial role, while "politics became the core of nuclear strategy." In situations as difficult as that now facing the United States in Vietnam a successful effort "requires the firm support of the great majority of Americans." Yet there are those, such as Senator Fulbright, who have remained unaware of the transformation effected upon the American military since 1945 and accuse the military of becoming increasingly self-determining and free of civilian control. Refusing to admit the continuing validity of Clausewitz's dictum these critics reject "the necessary marriage of force and diplomacy." The assumption that military power is intrinsically evil lies at the base of the charges made by Walter Lippmann and Hans Morgenthau that the United States practices globalism to become the policeman of the world. The U.S. military establishment has demonstrated it has the capability "to fathom today's sophisticated political philosophies" while supplying the military strength essential for the execution of political policy. If current needs demand that the military leader be a statesman, they also require the statesman to appreciate and understand military concepts and strategy. "This reciprocal balance is no longer a luxury, but is in fact a necessity."

D. CONSEQUENCES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES AND WAR

1. General Analyses

1789
Beck, J. N., and P. K. Kuroda. RADIOSTRONTIUM FALLOUT FROM THE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION OF OCTOBER 16, 1964. Journal of geophysical research, v. 71, May 15, 1966: 2451-2456.
QC811. J6, v. 71

The radiostrontium data obtained at Fayetteville, Arkansas, show that a considerable fraction of the debris from the October 16, 1964, nuclear explosion has entered the stratosphere. It is estimated that the stratospheric Sr^{90} inventory has increased by 0.38% and the tropospheric Sr^{90} inventory by 4.0% as a result of the Chinese nuclear explosion. The mean residence time of Sr^{90} in the troposphere was calculated to be 30 days, according to the two-compartment model of the atmosphere. (Authors' abstract)

1790
Bomke, Hans A., and others. THE NATURE OF WORLDWIDE GEOMAGNETIC DISTURBANCES GENERATED BY THE STARFISH EXPLOSION OF JULY 9, 1962. Journal of geophysical research, v. 71, June 1, 1966: 2777-2789. QC811. J6, v. 71

A new approach was used to study the worldwide effects recorded by standard magnetometers a few minutes after the Starfish detonation. The magnitudes of the total disturbance were plotted on a world map and, by the use of standard contouring techniques, global lines of equal signal strength were obtained. In this system of isopleths, an outstanding feature is a pair of clearly defined maximums located near the geomagnetic meridian of the source and centered at geomagnetic latitudes of about 45° North and South, whereas there is a relatively low value near the shot location. Another innovation was the introduction of a coordinate system based upon the geomagnetic field direction at each station; one axis (called a) is along the dipole field line and the other two orthogonal axes lie in the plane (called p) perpendicular to the dipole field. The close resemblance between the isopleths of the p component and those of the total disturbance (at 3 min postshot) indicates that the major portion of the signal was in the p plane at that time. The a pattern, while more complicated than the p, clearly exhibits certain symmetries that are described and tentatively identified. To account for the two p maximums a possible mechanism was advanced, namely, that the pattern is the result of coupling of energy from the isotropic, modified Alfvén mode into transverse, pure Alfvén waves in regions where favorable coupling conditions exist. (Authors' abstract)

1791
Dorn, D. W. NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES--A NEW LABORATORY. Discovery, v. 27, Mar. 1966: 26-29.
AP4. D6, v. 27

The properties of nuclear explosions are unique; they thus provide an exciting new experimental tool for several branches of science. Charting the seismic wave produced by the intense explosion, for instance, has helped the geophysicist discover additional properties of the earth, through study of both earthquake effects in areas where no earthquakes occur and the electrons produced by the explosion. The plasmas--gases at such high temperatures that many of the electrons have been stripped off the atoms--associated with nuclear explosions provide clues to similar plasmas that compose the stars. Another highly fruitful field of study has been that of the neutrons produced by fission and fusion. Great intensity and

short duration characterize the light generated by a nuclear explosion; through this means man may be able, by detonating a nuclear source far out in space, to test the theory of relativity to a higher degree of accuracy than ever before. Even the field of polymers --including many plastics--can make valuable use of the intense gamma rays emitted by nuclear explosions. In short this new tool can enable the scientist to "test theories about systems as large as the universe or as small as the nucleus."

1792
Etzioni, Amitai. MORE 'HUMANE' WARFARE IN VIETNAM? War/peace report, v. 6, May 1966: 5-6.
P&GP RR

Toxic chemicals employed by the United States in Vietnam range from tear gas to "considerably more vicious gases." Tear gas was used as early as March 1965; even before that American helicopters reportedly sprayed an "immobilizing" gas over Mekong Delta areas. This latter gas, it is said, occasionally leaves "people permanently 'disarranged,' which is fine talk for driving them insane." Nerve gases and hallucinogens may be next. Chemical warfare's defenders claim the gases to be nonlethal and thus more humane than bullets. Yet even the "spiced-up" tear gas now being used can certainly kill an undernourished Vietnamese child. Moreover gas cannot be aimed merely at military personnel. But the most frightening aspect of all is the possibility of weakening the moral and psychological taboos that now militate against the employment of chemical and biological agents. The use of gas in Vietnam has been unauthorized but unpunished. The American public and Congress were never informed about its introduction into the war. Pressure to use chemical agents probably comes both from the chemical industry, which obviously stands to profit by their extended use, and the military, some of whom are using Vietnam as a battlefield laboratory and some of whom find gas a convenient answer to the frustrations of a guerrilla war. The introduction of chemical warfare into Vietnam highlights three basic issues: the relationship between short-range military considerations and long-term policy problems, the authorization of such new and morally controversial weapons--whether by soldiers alone or by Congress and the American public, and the question of whether chemical warfare is humane.

1793
Faenov, Ia. I., and I. S. Krasil'nikov. [THE EFFECT OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS ON RADIOCOMMUNICATIONS AND RADAR] Vliianie iadernykh vzryvov na radiosviaz' i rabotu RLS. Vestnik protivovozdushnoi oborony, no. 1, Jan. 1966: 88-90.
Slav Rm

Acquaints the Soviet reader with data published in the Western press on the series of nuclear explosions carried out by the United States and Britain in 1958-63 to study the effects of nuclear blasts on radiocommunications and radar.

1794
Gilbert, Marc. [THE LIGHT OF A THOUSAND SUNS] La lumière de mille soleils. Nouvel observateur, no. 80, May 25, 1966: 12-13.
AP20.O2, 1966

The South Pacific has had the dubious honor of witnessing the A-bomb's adolescence. The United States has ceased its experiments there and now the French are beginning with a fabulous testing infrastructure. The Pacific Test Center (CEP) spreads over 1500 kilometers and houses installations that have cost over 500 billion old francs. The rear base, Tahiti, has new port facilities and an impressive airport, a building boom, and record prices. The targets, Mururoa and Fongataufa, lie 1200 kilometers southeast of Tahiti. Once deserted, they now boast complicated equipment. Six hundred kilometers north-northeast is Hoa, the advance base, the nerve center of the CEP. A full 10,000 Frenchmen are involved in the Pacific nuclear tests, including 150 meteorologists and a great part of the modern armed forces. The test series is France's greatest military maneuver since World War II. From it General de Gaulle expects a considerable increase in prestige. It is small wonder that the government doesn't pay much heed to Latin American, Japanese, Australian, or New Zealand protests or to the anti-bomb demonstrations of foreign students. The political effects of French success count more than the loss of some good will. "The mushroom that is going to rise above Mururoa will be, above all, an advertisement of the French force de frappe, evidence that the Gaullist government has decided to take its nuclear program all the way."

1795
Kovalenko, V. SAFEGUARDING FOOD PRODUCTS AND WATER FROM AGENTS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. Washington, U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1965. 19 p. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 32,686) P&GP RR
"CSO: 1873-D."
"A translation of a Russian-language pamphlet . . . entitled Zashchita pishchevykh produktov i vody ot sredstv massovogo porazheniya (Safeguarding Food Products and Water from Agents of Mass Destruction), Moscow, 1964, pp 1-30."

Treats the means by which food and water may be contaminated by biological, chemical, and radioactive agents; the methods by which comestibles and potables may be protected from such contamination; the precautions to be taken when handling food and water from contaminated areas; and the techniques by which decontamination may be effected.

1796
Mayer, Jean, and Victor W. Sidel. CROP DESTRUCTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM. Christian century, v. 83, June 29, 1966: 829-832. BRl.C45, v. 83

Surveys the practical and ethical implications of the destruction by the United States, through actions such as the use of herbicides and defoliating agents, of rice crops and grain stores in South Vietnam. "Our point is not that innocent bystanders will be hurt . . . but that only bystanders will be hurt. The primary U.S. aim--to disable the Vietcong--will not be achieved and our proclaimed secondary aim--to win over the civilian population--is made a hollow mockery."

1797
NUCLEAR EARTHQUAKE, by D. W. Freedom, the anarchist weekly, v. 27, May 21, 1966: 1, 4.
HX821. F825, v. 27

The world's press has failed to take note of "another example of nuclear madness" in the linkage between underground nuclear tests and the occurrence of earthquakes and tremors. American officials have admitted the correlation between U.S. underground testing in Nevada and tremors in Denver; recent earth movements in California have also been related to this testing. Nothing less than a major earthquake will stir

the United States to reconsideration of its test program. Perhaps a lesson could be learned from the fatal quake at Tashkent caused, "there seems to be little doubt," by a Soviet test series 500 miles away. While the earth is being unsettled by Soviet and U.S. experiments China is polluting the atmosphere with "dirty" bombs and neglecting its own welfare for revenge. "It seems obvious to any anarchist that the most urgent thing needed today is disarmament. It seems equally obvious that, with the kind of madmen loose at the top of governments today, international disarmament is an impossibility." British anarchists will concentrate, through any means, on preventing the use of these weapons from British soil.

1798
Palumbo, R. F., A. H. Seymour, and A. D. Welander. RADIONUCLIDES IN FOODS FROM THE CENTRAL PACIFIC, 1962. Nature (London) v. 209, Mar. 19, 1966: 1190-1192. Q1. N2, v. 209

The results of a survey designed to determine the radionuclide contribution of a series of nuclear tests conducted at Christmas Island in 1962 to foods in the central Pacific region. The analyses "demonstrated that radioactive fall-out into the central Pacific from the atmospheric detonation of nuclear devices during the Dominic series was barely detectable; it was many thousandfold less than the local fall-out from surface and underwater detonations of nuclear devices at Bikini and Eniwetok observed during earlier surveys."

1799
U.S. Defense Electric Power Administration. CIVIL DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY. [Washington] 1966. 88, 22A p. UA929.95.E4U5

Explains for the electric power industry the nature and implications of modern warfare and the requisite steps for safeguarding the industry in the event of war.

1800
Vietnam (Democratic Republic, 1946-) State Committee of Science and Technology. STATEMENT BY THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM STATE COMMITTEE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ON THE USE OF TOXIC CHEMICALS AND POISON GAS BY THE AGGRESSIVE U.S. IMPERIALISTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM [n.p., 1965] 6 p. UG447.V5

As the United States loses the war in Vietnam its tactics become more and more inhuman and barbarian. The aggressors destroy crops, animals, and people with toxic chemicals and poison gases. The South Vietnamese, including a large proportion of female and young civilians, suffer from "colic, vomiting, continuous diarrhoea, convulsion, fever, suffocation, hard-breathing, hemoptysis, bloody evacuations, continuous diarrhoea of the bowels, deformation of the mouth, furuncles, shock fits, unconsciousness, dizziness, loss of eyesight." Thousands have died. Poison gases were introduced in 1964 and their use is ever widening. The imperialists have invented clever ways to "ensure that their toxic chemicals and war gases cause the greatest number of casualties and the heaviest damage to crops and vegetation." Use of these weapons is deplorable and a crime against humanity; their effect is to increase the determination of the Vietnamese peoples to repel the aggressor. The government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam calls on all scientists and peoples to condemn the United States "for its usurpation and misuse of scientific achievements in its dirty war of aggression against our country, sowing death and destruction there, and besmearing the honour of the United States."

1801
Walterscheid, Ed. TRANSURANIUM ELEMENTS THROUGH NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES. Nuclear news, v. 9, July 1966: 16-18. QC770.N75, v. 9

Reveals a new method for producing heavy, transuranium isotopes through the use of underground nuclear explosions. A recent nuclear test called "Cyclamen" may have created the heaviest substance ever isolated. Moreover Cyclamen produced in "a fraction of a second what the best reactor irradiation would require a year to do."

1802
Zherbin, E. A., and others. THE DESTRUCTIVE EFFECT OF AN UNDERWATER NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Soviet military translations, no. 249, May 2, 1966. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 35,277) p. 11-18. P&GP RR
CSO: 1850-S
Translated from the Russian-language journal Voenno-meditsinskii zhurnal, no. 2, 1966, p. 68-72. RC970.V55

Describes the phenomena produced by underwater nuclear explosions including effects of the blast wave, penetrating radiation, and radioactive contamination. The authors suggest that protective measures at sea and ashore and protective apparel against radiation injuries may occasion "a significant decrease in the influence of the destructive factors of an underwater nuclear explosion." A bibliography of Soviet works on nuclear detonations at sea is included.

2. Political

1803
Rety, John. LIBERTY, EQUALITY, & RADIOACTIVITY. Freedom, the anarchist weekly, v. 27, May 14, 1966: 1. HX821.F825, v. 27

A listing of worldwide reactions to proposed French atomic tests in the Pacific, reactions which include New Zealand's strong protests against the probably serious disruption of its milk industry, Latin American denunciations of the threat to its maritime resources, U.S. and Soviet disapproval, and popular demonstrations.

3. Military

1804
Getler, Michael. NIKE-X DEPLOYMENT FEUD HEIGHTENING. Missiles and rockets, v. 18, May 9, 1966: 12-13. UG630.M54, v. 18

"The central arguments in the ABM [antiballistic missile] debate have come to focus on two key points: what is the likelihood that the Soviets will react offensively to a U.S. ABM system?; and if they do not react, what is the potential for saving perhaps 50 million American lives in the event deterrence should fail--even though another 50 million may die?" Secretary Robert S. McNamara continues to stand against the deployment of an ABM defense system because he feels that the Soviet Union would respond with a boost in their offensive forces. Also he assumes the United States could offset Soviet ABM development at a cost between 10 and 20 percent of the Soviet system by improving U.S. offensive capabilities. McNamara's position is that ABM deployment must be

considered "within the total context of damage limitation--including a fallout shelter program, improved bomber defenses, and other measures." Army Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, challenges McNamara's arguments, stating that neither he himself nor anyone else could know "the level of damage which would destroy our Nation." Gen. Wheeler also feels that the United States is in a better position than the Soviet Union to afford the cost of an ABM defense system. Air Force Secretary Harold Brown offers some answers to the question of whether such an investment would be a waste of money.

1805
Russell, Bertrand Russell, 3d earl. A CENTURY OF GENERAL CIVIL WAR. Minority of one, v. 8, Apr. 1966: 19. AP2.M55985, v. 8

Predicts that continuation of the U.S. pursuit of world domination will lead to "a century of general civil war, in which each country would have a minority subservient to the United States, as the British Government is now, and a majority desiring independence and willing to seek it, even at the cost of bringing civilization to ruin."

1806
Stone, Jeremy J. ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILES AND ARMS CONTROL. In his Containing the arms race: some specific proposals. Cambridge, M.I.T. Press [1966] p. 21-74. JX1974.S8

Bilateral control of defenses has become matter for the arms controller. Expense and the possibility of technological breakthroughs in offensive missile penetration will reduce the likelihood of U.S. procurement of an antiballistic missile (ABM) system for perhaps a few years. But the Soviet Union, cognizant of its experiences in two world wars and of presently being surrounded by potential enemies, may judge any increase in defensive capacity worth considerable expense and uncertainty. Short-run prospects for restraint seem good now that (1) both superpowers understand the costliness of ABM systems, (2) the "perceived risk of war is at present low," and (3) the United States has proposed at Geneva a freeze on the development of strategic weapons. An agreement not to be the first to procure ABM's (which could be easily policed) could serve as a starting-point for a policy of restraint in arms acquisition. ABM procurement would breach an important threshold and accelerate the arms race; for example an efficient ABM system would prompt development of nonballistic, cruise-type missiles. "Once deployed, improvements in our missile defense capability would be sought to keep pace with our improving offensive capability, and vice versa; the buying of strategic weapons would be accelerated." ABM systems would also impede progress toward general disarmament. The already-knotty problem of balancing missile capabilities on both sides would be aggravated by the need to balance defensive capacities. If weapons in orbit were found to be able to penetrate ABM defenses this would jeopardize the U.S.-Soviet agreement not to orbit weapons of mass destruction. Both powers would be tempted to test the potential of an ABM system, thereby violating the test ban treaty or precluding its extension to underground testing. The U.S. Secretary of Defense could perhaps dissuade Soviet ABM procurement by revealing the probable cost of a Soviet ABM system and the cost of the U.S. offensive penetration system certain to follow it. "The comparison may be revealing--and it may be observed by important members of the Soviet bureaucracy who would otherwise not be shown such discouraging information." Soviet mistakes and waste in past procurement efforts could be documented for the same purpose. The United States could also threaten retaliatory action (building of a U.S. ABM system, production of nonballistic missiles) to deter Soviet procurement. To inhibit U.S. defensive programs Moscow might adopt similar methods.

1807
WHAT WE ARE LEARNING IN VIET NAM. Nation's business, v. 54, June 1966: 35-37, 50, 54, 56. illus. HF1.N4, v. 54

Reports the "battle-tested theories, research under the gun, jungle-bred ingenuity" and other "valuable lessons which will make our defenses stronger" gained from U.S. experience in the Vietnamese War. New equipment, better trained and more effective fighting men, justification or repudiation of military plans, and improved methods of defense management are cited as some of the values of the war to the defense establishment. Some of the new types of military equipment used for the first time in Southeast Asia are described.

4. Economic

1808
Beller, William S. FIRMS URGED TO DIVERSIFY WHILE DEFENSE SPENDING HIGH. Missiles and rockets, v. 18, May 9, 1966: 34, 36-37. UG630.M54, v. 18

The Denver Research Institute has reported on the problems defense industries may encounter when the demand for military products is reduced and they attempt to diversify. DRI's report (prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) emphasizes the role management should play in the diversification process. Now is the time, it asserts, for company officers to determine what commercial ventures would best utilize their firms. DRI researchers stress the role the Federal Government might play in easing the process. It could encourage diversification and even consider modifying the Armed Services Procurement Regulations "to make various diversification costs allowable expenses under defense contracts." Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Science and Technology J. Herbert Hollomon's response to these ideas was that defense industries are private concerns and their decisions to diversify are "purely private." He and a highly placed Defense Dept. official were not convinced defense spending will drop drastically in the foreseeable future. Many experts feel that once the Vietnam conflict is settled there will be a large spending cutback, unless greater emphasis is placed on development of new strategic or other major weapons systems (such as Nike-X). Getting into the commercial market involves either buying a company already in it or developing products and services internally (this is the more profitable course for management). The types of products or services include new uses for the company's existing products, "redesign or additional development" of products in being, and introduction of a new product to meet a specific market need. Dr. Hollomon pointed out that defense industries have an advantage over commercial companies in that their production is not tied to the status quo--they can "analyze the commercial market, prepare for it, and successfully sell into it" without fear of losing too much. He emphasized that defense companies have advantages such as highly specialized facilities, large numbers of skilled personnel, an ability to handle high risk ventures, and a

policy of placing performance standards over product standards, and suggested several different areas (transportation, education) in which defense companies might become involved.

1809
Bowen, William. THE VIETNAM WAR: A COST ACCOUNTING. Fortune, v. 73, Apr. 1966: 119-123, 254, 259. HF5001. F1, v. 73

Vietnam is a very expensive war. Costs of U.S. involvement are now piling up at the rate of about $13 billion a year, according to FORTUNE's estimates. If, as seems likely, the U.S. puts 400,000 men in Vietnam by the end of 1966, the war cost will then be running at the rate of at least $21 billion, or double the expenditure President Johnson's fiscal-1967 budget allows for. Right now buildup costs are far greater than published Defense Department figures might indicate. A great many military orders are being financed by funds that contractors borrow against future payments by the Treasury. Moreover, Secretary McNamara has been drawing heavily on existing inventories of men, planes, and arms, and these eventually must be brought back to normal levels. As deliveries roll in and the armed forces expand, expenditures will begin to catch up with the costs already incurred. All together, careful analysis suggests that costs of the Vietnam war already are, and will continue to be, far above those yet officially indicated. And they are likely to bring a new order of strain to the American economy. (Abstract supplied)

1810
Canada. Dept. of Defense Production. Industry Directory Section. CANADIAN DEFENCE PRODUCTS. Compiled by General Services Branch, Industry Directory Section of the Dept. of Defence Production. Ottawa, Dept. of Defence Production, 1964. 354 p. illus. UF535. C2A54

Collected data relevant to Canada's defense products and firms. This review has been prepared in order to facilitate procurement of such products and services from Canada by friendly and allied nations. Indexes of products, services, and firms are provided.

1811
ENGINEERS' CAREER DIRECTORY 1966. Space age news, v. 8, no. 12, c1965: 29-59. P&GP RR

A directory of aerospace firms that lists their location, annual net sales, distribution of sales, fields of interest, research, major products and projects, and personnel demands.

1812
Guenod. [BALANCESHEET AND PERSPECTIVES OF THE FRENCH AEROSPACE INDUSTRY] Bilan et perspectives de l'industrie aérospatiale française. Forces aériennes françaises, v. 20, June 1966: 700-713. UG635. F8F66, v. 20

The French aerospace industry looks relatively small as a part of the national manufacturing sector, employing 2 percent of the total manpower and accounting for 1.5 percent of its turnover. Nonetheless it has proved by its successes to be indispensable to nationwide technological progress and to the French military program. But the high costs of research and development compared with restricted markets and the time required to develop a product threaten to throw the industry into a decline. Defense needs are too low to provide sufficient stimulus. The most promising future for the aerospace industry lies in expansion of markets through developmental cooperation with other nations, particularly with Great Britain.

1813
Harris, T. George. VIETNAM'S ECONOMIC LESSON: PEACE CAN YIELD FATTER PROFITS THAN WAR. Look, v. 30, May 31, 1966: 44-46. illus. AP2. L79, v. 30

Dr. Pierre Rinfret, economic adviser to U.S. corporations, has asserted that a revolution in capitalism has spelled the end of the doctrine of wartime prosperity. The "New Economics," Dr. Rinfret feels, has produced the administrative skill necessary for the Government to regulate the economic growth rate. "War, once a shot in the arm to lagging business, now throws a shock into a smoothly functioning system set for peak long-term growth." War production is waste production; "peace is now the stable ground of prosperity." Capitalism has stolen Marx's thunder, conquering economic chaos through central planning. But the $8 billion that will probably have to be spent on the Vietnamese War will strain the economy, create inflation, cause the Government to adopt countermeasures, and foster uncertainty in business circles. The war effort may cause industry to create too much production capacity; the realization of peace will then force many of the newly built factories to close, leading to an "overcapacity recession." Happily President Johnson realizes that such adverse economic effects will have a great effect in election year 1968 and that "what is good for the country in this situation is just as good for LBJ." Certainly he has the strength and the knowledge to "turn the New Economics into a practical equivalent of war."

1814
Horowitz, Robert S. THE RAMPARTS WE WATCH. With Gene Famiglietti and John J. Ford. Derby, Conn., Monarch Books [1964] 190 p. (Monarch select books, 484) UA23. H564

Presents for the American taxpayer a "comprehensive study" of how his defense dollar is spent. The U.S. deterrent, civil defense, the Communist war capability, and the controversies generated by the defense establishment are outlined.

1815
Johnson, G. W., and G. H. Higgins. THE USE OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES IN ENGINEERING AND INDUSTRY. In British Nuclear Energy Society. Journal, v. 5, Jan. 1966: 60-71. TK9001. B7A182, v. 5

A single hydrogen bomb with a total volume no greater than a bulldozer can move more dirt in seconds than the bulldozer can in months. And at a 1/100th the cost. To harness this explosive power for peaceful applications has been the aim of the Plowshare Program, established in 1957 under the directorship of G. W. Johnson. Because of early interest by the Panama Canal Company in the possible excavation of a sea level canal, the development programme has been concerned with (a) reducing radioactivity in fallout to a minimum, and (b) developing cratering technology. Concurrently, numerous studies of underground mining applications were carried out and the general understanding of underground nuclear explosions was expanded. The Paper describes the present state of knowledge of nuclear explosions in various environments--for both deeply buried, contained explosions, and for less deeply emplaced charges which result in craters. (Abstract supplied)

1816
MCNAMARA SCALES DOWN HIS BUYING. Business week, no. 1924, July 16, 1966: 34.
HC431. B87, 1966

Implies that, while Defense Secretary McNamara feels the end of the Vietnam War is not in sight--"we do not look for a short war"--its logistics will be planned and measured to limit economic impact and avert huge military surpluses at its conclusion. McNamara is reported to believe that by the end of 1966 the projected total output of air munitions can be cut by as much as 30 percent and possibly also aircraft, helicopters, and ground ordnance. Although existing air ordnance contracts will not be cancelled, planned additions to these contracts will not materialize and expansion of operating production lines will not take place.

1817
Musgrave, Richard. GUNS AND . . . BUTTER OR OLEO? Challenge, v. 14, May/June 1966: 33-34, 41.
HC101. N533, v. 14

Considers projected Federal expenditures and receipts in fiscal year 1967 on the basis of the administrative budget, the cash budget, and national income accounts. "Assuming that the war will not be expanded, Vietnam hardly constitutes a fiscal emergency which justifies the restraint imposed in the new programs. With private consumption expenditures expected to rise by $25 billion from 1965 to 1966, it is clear that, for the people as a whole, the issue of guns or butter does, in fact, not arise. In view of this, there is little reason why the limited cost of the war should be reflected largely in a holding down of Great Society programs. A much better solution, in my view, would have been an increase in income tax rates to finance much-needed social programs. As it now stands, the needy groups will bear the brunt of the burden of the war in Southeast Asia."

1818
Pechel, Peter. [THE GLOOM OF GODS FOR THE AMERICAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY] Götterdämmerung der amerikanischen Rüstungsindustrie. Aussenpolitik, v. 17, June 1966: 325-330.
D839. A885, v. 17

Strategic rearmament of the United States is now, during the American military struggle for Southeast Asia, reaching its saturation point. U.S. military operations in that region depend, however, on arms produced by the second-rank segment of the defense industry, while strategic rearmament relies on the top segment of the industry. In view of the degree of saturation any further increase of the existing U.S. overkill capacity would be sheer folly. Consequently a huge industrial complex together with the nation's approximately 200,000 elite technologists are now facing the end of governmental purchase orders and commissions. Dr. Peter Pechel, hitherto a Washington correspondent of German radio and TV corporations and henceforth editor-in-chief of the Free Berlin broadcasting station, discusses the situation and how the industries involved could diversify to continue to utilize their production capacities after losing their governmental contracts. (Translation of supplied abstract, modified)

1819
[PROMOTION OF AVIATION FAILING] Förderung der Luftfahrt tut not! Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Apr. 15, 1966: 209-212. U3. W38, v. 10

Contends that the German Federal Republic's policy with regard to procurement of new weapons (especially in the aerospace field) adversely affects the nation's technological progress by its excessive reliance on the American supplier instead of the German, whose technological know-how and ability in many cases surpasses the American's (e.g., in the field of antitank rocketry). The author refers to a recent meeting of the Christian Social Union's Study Group on Defense Policy, which expressed similar sentiments. He quotes long passages from a speech by the Union's Chairman, Franz Joseph Strauss, pointing out the adverse effects of such policy on the German Federal Republic's industrial development.

1820
Rafian, Rachik. MILITARISM AND NATIONAL ECONOMY. Soviet military review, no. 6 (18), June 1966: 55-58. P&GP RR

Military spending and production are economic waste, barren of industrial or personal economic benefits. "Militarism channels into destruction what could have been made to serve human progress: it destroys the fruits of labor of millions of people." Such production can stimulate the economy of industrialized imperialist nations only to the point where militarized industry has become integral to that economy and military expenditures are stabilized; then no further economic impetus is possible. "Whenever the overall volume of production expands thanks to military spending--this is expansion on an unhealthy basis." Inflation and gold outflow in the United States illustrate this principle. Underdeveloped nations participating in military blocs suffer even greater ills from militarization. In Turkey, for instance, the one-third of the national budget needed to maintain the army as an ally of U.S. imperialism does nothing to improve that country's position as the poorest in Europe. But military orders are such a great source of profit to the monopolists that any proposal to reduce military spending receives no hearing. "Business and war march hand in hand." The American journal Newsweek recently reported that U.S. firms that followed the troops into South Vietnam are netting 20 to 30 percent returns on their investments. Only general and complete disarmament can secure for mankind the resources it needs to eliminate privation, illiteracy, and disease. "A curtailment of military spending might create favourable conditions for increasing the scope of economic aid from the industrially advanced countries to the developing countries." The world standard of living could thus be improved "in a historically short period."

1821
Rosen, Sumner N. DISARMAMENT AND THE ECONOMY. War/peace report, v. 6, Mar. 1966: 12-14.
P&GP RR

Consideration of the economic impact of arms limitation and reduced defense spending seems fallacious during this period of Vietnamese War demands. Even more so is the conviction that the United States is enjoying one of its great economic booms with reduced unemployment, etc. "The unpleasant truth is that the prosperity we are enjoying is as artificial and unstable as is the military crisis in Vietnam, that this crisis is an important reason for the prosperity, and that, if the crisis is reduced, the bloom will quickly fade from the economic situation." The likelihood of settlement of the Vietnamese War in the near future (a possibility that cannot be ruled out) should be enough incentive to the Federal Government to begin readying for the effect this will have on the economy. The Report of the Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament [abstracted as item 1468 in vol. 2, no. 3

of this bibliography] which should provide guidelines for handling defense cutbacks, does not fill the need. Two years in the making, the Report projects a depressing outlook. It is "against serious federal planning, against any new instruments for meeting the impact of arms cutbacks, against any substantial, continuing concern for these problems." The Ackley Committee was hindered in its findings by the lack of both industry and geography-oriented "impact" studies on DOD and AEC spending. Without these bases for analysis, the conclusions drawn by the Committee are "timid and hedging" in character. The effect of military spending on the economy is minimized, whereas adjustments "in the pattern of expenditures that will be required to maintain reasonably high levels of demand and employment" are emphasized. The generally accepted alternative to reduced military spending by the Government--increased nonmilitary spending--is viewed as unlikely and "undesirable." In sum the main failure of the Report is that it does not view the impact of arms cutbacks on the economic structure as a "unique" or significant problem that will require special means for adjustment.

1822
Tomiche, Fernand J. [THE WAR IN VIETNAM AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY] La guerre au Vietnam et l'économie américaine. Projet, no. 6, June 1966: 674-682. HN37.C3A46, 1966

President Johnson and his advisers are gambling on economic expansion without inflation. The basis of their optimism is found in the January 1966 Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisors and in the heretofore successful working of wage/price guideposts. The Report cites an abundant labor supply, the absence of bottlenecks, and growing industrial capacity as phenomena permitting noninflationary growth. Yet these astute observers overestimate or underestimate certain crucial factors, foremost among them being the costs and effects of the Vietnam War. Defense spending will be greater than anticipated and its stimulus felt throughout the economy. Moreover, the war effort requires the most efficient sector of the work force to serve in the armed forces, which cannot but limit productivity gains. Increased military spending is also having the effect of rapidly moving stocks and thus contributing to the overheating of the economy. The stimulating effect of the entire budget has been underestimated and the decisionmakers are counting too much on voluntary labor and management restraint, which is unlikely with full employment and high demand. In sum the capacity of the U.S. economy has been overrated by the Government. "In spite of enormous resources the United States cannot simultaneously carry on a policy of world prestige, a war in Vietnam, and create the American 'great society' without running short of breath."

1823
WAR COSTS BLUNT DRIVE ON PAYMENTS DEFICIT. Business week, no. 1916, May 21, 1966: 50. HC431.B87, 1966

The Vietnamese War has caused the U.S. dollar drain to attain a $2.3 billion annual rate during the first quarter of 1966. Although Treasury Secretary Henry Fowler has declined to specify the dollar cost of the war thus far, estimates have placed it as high as $1 billion. Defense buildups have increased U.S. domestic demand, thus necessitating more imports. "The effect of Vietnam on the balance of trade is not easy to measure, since it involves the broader question of how fast the economy would be expanding without the added fillip of defense buildup." But Secretary Fowler has cited the "exuberance" generated by the effort in Southeast Asia as clearly substantial and deleterious to the U.S. trade balance.

1824
Weidenbaum, Murray L. THE DEFENSE BUSINESS: A FAR CRY FROM ADAM SMITH. Challenge, v. 14, May/June 1966: 35-37, 44. HC101.N533, v. 14

The Government-oriented private corporation, which differs considerably from the "mixed" public and private sectors of the economy such as those engaged in the generation and distribution of power, intermingles public and private authority in the same business organization. Corporations of this type exist primarily in the aerospace industry, where a Stanford Research Institute survey covering the period 1957-61 found that more than 50 percent of plant and equipment was provided by the Defense Department and "leased" to companies. The Government also finances, via progress payments, most of the inventories of major contractors. To some extent Government-oriented private corporations assume or at least administer Government functions, while the Government performs innovational and entrepreneurial tasks. The contention has been made that the practice of some Government agencies, notably the Department of Defense, in giving patents to private contractors on the results of publicly financed research and development suggests the mercantile system operating in England prior to the establishment of what is now called free enterprise. How the relationship between Government and firms in the military-space market might be altered is conjectural. Up to now attempts to diversify the operations of military producers have been various, numerous, and generally ineffective. A strong case exists for reexamining the prospective net gains to the Nation of other arrangements for meeting Government requirements, perhaps by corporations run along more traditional lines. On the other hand the areas of the economy in which public and private sectors intertwine are limited largely to technological activities, particularly those involving missiles, atomic energy, and space exploration.

1825
Wittmann, Walter. [MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH] Militärausgaben und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, v. 122, Jan. 1966: 109-129. graphs. H5.Z4, v. 122

A systematic presentation of the question of whether military expenditures, on balance, retard or enhance economic growth. The author first examines the endogenous impact of military outlays on the growth of the national product--the influence of such outlays on labor, real capital, and technological progress as determining factors of that growth. He proceeds by inquiring into war as an exogenous factor of economic development--a factor which does not directly affect labor, real capital, and technological progress in their capacity of determining the growth of the national product. While discussing various aspects of each of those problems the author outlines, and sometimes subjects to critical analysis, the views of the following authors: A. Wagner, A. Lösch, J.A. Schumpeter, B.G. Hickman, L.H. Dupriez, N.D. Kondrat'ev, K. Littmann, G.H. Hildebrand, N.V. Breckner, J.H. Adler, R.E. Nelson, G. Haberler, W.A. Jöhr, G. Demaria, A. Smith, A.T. Peacock, J. Wiseman, Th. Pütz, G. Schmolders, H. Timm, M.S. Kendrick, S. Fabricant, U. Hicks, and others.

5. Ethical and Social

1826
Finn, James, ed. PEACE, THE CHURCHES, AND THE BOMB [New York] Council on Religion and International Affairs [1965] 103 p.
JX1974.7.F5

Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--Preface, by James Finn.--The blessed vision of peace: chimera or blueprint? by John J. Wright.--Questions for Vatican II, by Theodore R. Weber.--Would you press the button? by Walter Stein.--After nineteen years, let us begin, by William V. O'Brien.--The Council must speak, by Justus G. Lawler.--More unsolicited advice to Vatican Council II, by Paul Ramsey.--"To deter or not to deter . . . is not the only question," by Theodore R. Weber.--The limits of nuclear war: is a just deterrence strategy possible? by Walter Stein.--Moral issues and nuclear pacifism, by Justus G. Lawler.--Relevant knowledge and moral issues, by William V. O'Brien.--Appendix: Article 25 of Schema XIII.

Comments on the problems raised in Article 25 of Schema XIII in which the third session of Vatican Council II stated its view on "making lasting peace," proscribed nuclear warfare, and denounced the armaments race. Paul Ramsey's article is an analysis of the four original articles by Messrs. Weber, Stein, O'Brien, and Lawler; the last four contributions are responses by these same authors to Dr. Ramsey's critique. James Finn cautions: "The reader who looks for a consensus on the grave and troubling issues involved in this discussion will search here in vain. . . There are differing judgments made on (1) the nature of the nuclear deterrent . . . (2) the proper criteria for the evaluation of nuclear arms, i.e., the relative importance of technological, military, political and moral criteria, (3) the relevance and value of the traditional just-war theory, (4) the relation of nuclear weapons to our present nation-state system, (5) the relation which obtains between the enlightened religious conscience and obedience to government authority, (6) the responsibility of the Church to speak to the faithful and to the world on the morality of the nuclear deterrent, (7) the entire question of the Christian vocation in political life."

1827
Gessert, Robert A. WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION. II. WHAT ARE THE CONSIDERATIONS THAT WILL GUIDE WISE U.S. POLICY? Worldview, v. 9, Mar. 1966: 4-8. P&GP RR

Wars of liberation are instruments of Communist policy. In such wars military operations are a last resort; U.S. response must make use of economic and political development and military aid. Military means of countering such wars are not prohibited on ethical grounds. In fact a system of ethics that did not attempt to guide violence (since it rejected it absolutely) would be a useless, irrelevant system. But policy must be guided by wisdom as well as ethics. Policy is guided by rational political purposes, military strategy and tactics, and the scarcity of resources, as well as such values and mores as are part of religious ethics. In the case of Vietnam, for example, American national interest requires that its commitment to the de facto government of South Vietnam be honored; it further requires that the line be held in Vietnam to deter future wars of liberation, which are an admitted chosen instrument of Communist policy. Military necessity has dictated the bombings of strategic North Vietnamese targets. "Tragically collateral" civilians have been killed, true, but the military purpose of the choice of targets seems clear. Area bombing in the South is also sometimes required, but should be utilized with restraint. Counterterror and torture are seldom justifiable. The domestic resources of the United States have been taxed but little, yet a great disparity exists between the costs to the small proportion of Americans in the field and to those at home. Since the human costs of this type of warfare are great, assistance designed to prevent its preconditions are attractive. The failure of prevention, however, should not rule out defense assistance. Termination of a war of liberation is difficult to determine. Although American intentions are limited--to end the aggression rather than punish the aggressor--any reasonable termination on terms acceptable to the West will present a complicated potpourri of military, political, economic, and international factors.

1828
Hartigan, Richard S. SAINT AUGUSTINE ON WAR AND KILLING: THE PROBLEM OF THE INNOCENT. Journal of the history of ideas, v. 27, Apr./June 1966: 195-204. Bl.J75, v. 27

Writers concerned with the theory of the "just war" must sooner or later return to the pronouncements of St. Augustine, one of the great authorities on the Christian doctrine of war. Although St. Augustine's authority is usually interpreted to support the contention that innocent and noncombatant civilians should not be submitted to the indiscriminate slaughter of nuclear war, examination of his writings reveals that "he exhibited an unexpected degree of harshness and seeming indifference to the fate of the innocent." Augustine did state that the Christian individual is not justified in killing an assailant in self-defense; here his pacifism is unequivocal. But in contrast to his pacifist predecessors in the Church (Origen, Lactantius, Tertullian) Augustine argues that war is justified when it is undertaken by a people to "restore a violated moral order" and to "avenge in the name of justice a violation of God's sacred order." The Christian, who ought not kill even to save his own life, thus is permitted to do so for the sake of the common good. But Augustine's theory contains an inherent inconsistency. What of the enemy soldiers, who are merely doing their duty, or the innocents in the enemy populace, who have remained volitionally uncommitted to the unjust course taken by their rulers? Are these, too, to be killed? Augustine argues that in most cases "the extremely intimate relationship which exists between individual and social morality means that an unjust nation will not be characterized by the presence of a just citizenry." Nor is death, even of the innocent, the evil to be most avoided in war; to extirpate vice and evil motivation God sometimes allows "the innocent to be scourged with the guilty." The soldier prosecuting a just war sins only when he slays out of personal passion or vengeance or when continued slaughter is no longer essential to assure victory. Augustine's ethics manifests incongruity in that he posits "the requirements of a charity so strong that in one sphere an evil man may not be slain and in the other an innocent man may be. It is an incongruity which remains to plague Christian ethics today."

1829
Hörmann, Karl. [PEACE AND MODERN WAR IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHURCH] Friede und moderner Krieg im Urteil der Kirche. [Wien] Wiener Dom-Verlag, 1964. 112 p. BT736.2.H58

Bibliographical references included in "Anmerkungen" (p. 76-109).

Outlines the Roman Catholic Church's traditional teachings on war and peace and describes the ethical dilemma posed by the choice between nonviolence and violence and by the question of just wars (wars allowed by the Church under certain conditions). In modern times papal pronouncements and encyclicals on peace, especially those by Pius XII and John XXIII, focus on problems of legal organization of peace. They underline the necessary moral bases for the international order and the need for man's orientation toward peace. Prof. Hörmann discusses the views and interpretations of Catholic moral theologians on preventive war and resort to violence in self-defense. The author feels that of all possible motives against war's ever again being staged, the moral and ethical ones are the strongest in that they, more than anything else, can compel man to express his inborn aggressive instincts in a more peaceful form.

1830
Lelyveld, Arthur J. PEACE: JEWISH IMPERATIVES. Congress bi-weekly, v. 33, Mar. 21, 1966: 8-10.
DS101.C655, v. 33

Jewish ethics present many ambiguities in relation to war. It has been demonstrated that "Jewish sources can provide us with texts and quotations to support every conceivable position on war and peace." For example the distinction between optional and obligatory wars was made in a far simpler world and thus has only limited applications today. Nonetheless Judaism offers valid guidelines for decisions concerning violence. Jewish tradition, despite its view of the Lord as a "man of war," was always acutely uncomfortable with total violence and military prowess. Exultation in violence became "un-Jewish." The imperatives of the Jewish tradition deny the taking of life unless to protect life or "that human dignity which the Divine Presence in life makes supremely precious." Everything else, including the American stance in Vietnam, is "chamas"--cruel violence. The use of nuclear weapons is the "ultimate sacrilege," for it represents complete contempt for human life. Obliteration bombing and its threat have caused a discontinuity in the concepts of war and peace, yet man continues to deny his danger by thinking of war in outmoded terms. The modern Jew, as part of the larger world, must act in terms of fairness, truth, the freedom to dissent, and the continuing search for peace.

1831
Quade, Quentin. WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION: WHAT ARE THE LIMITS OF A JUST POLICY? Worldview, v. 9, Feb. 1966: 4-7.
P&GP RR

No American policy concerning wars of national liberation is wrong a priori; yet this does not condone any and all actions. Policy alternatives can only be evaluated as to greater good or lesser evil, and no choice is clear. Where revolutionary movements in emerging nations possess dominant Communist elements clearly linked to other countries already controlled by communism, such movements, on the basis of what Communist regimes have shown themselves to be, are "abominable." Situations of this nature have been given the name "Wars of National Liberation." Their success must be prevented, both through curtailing insurgency, terrorism, and external intervention and through establishing a viable polity by improvement of economic and social conditions. The tenets of Christianity do not conflict with the readiness to war against such Communist insurgency, for a lesser evil will be used to prevent a greater one. Communism cannot be rolled back, but it can be stopped and, in time, shaped in the mold of moderation. In doing this the use of force must discriminate between combatants and noncombatants. Force may be used only to the extent necessary to achieve its objective and must be escalated gradually. Signs of the success of this policy must be carefully awaited along with changes in the objective order that might invalidate the position previously adopted, such as a lessening of the Communist influence in the revolutionary movement.

1832
Zahn, Gordon C. THE CRIME OF SILENCE. Commonweal, v. 84, June 17, 1966: 354-356.
AP2.C6897, v. 84

The U.S. Government "is making murderers of us all." American Catholics are faced with a situation analogous to that experienced by German Catholics during the Hitler era; silence on the crimes committed in the Vietnamese War makes one an accomplice in mass-murder, just as silence in the face of Hitler's misdeeds implicated the Church in the mass-murder of six million Jews. Awareness of some of the atrocities perpetrated in Vietnam by U.S. forces or allies "for whose actions we must take full responsibility" has not elicited moral protest from American Christians; on the contrary, a recent national poll indicated that over 60 percent of the Catholics sampled favored the use of "whatever added force is necessary to win" in Vietnam. Nuclear bombing or extermination of all Vietcong sympathizers might well find favor with these elements. Justification for such acts may be provided by views such as the recent recommendation by a Catholic specialist in international affairs that "we revise our traditional moral teaching on war to permit the intentional killing of innocents!" An even greater scandal is the reluctance of American bishops to express themselves on moral issues of the Vietnamese War. "When murder and torture become an everyday item in the newspapers and when they are done in fulfillment of a national policy or even only 'excused' in the light of that policy, silence is worse than a scandal. It becomes a crime." When entire villages are destroyed merely because of the suspicion that they may harbor Vietcong "the principle of the double effect or any of the other loopholes we so conveniently read into the traditional 'just war' morality" can no longer soothe the Christian conscience. "The blood of innocents is already upon our hands. The longer we tolerate these things in silence, the greater will be the blot upon our national honor and the burden of sin upon our individual souls."

6. Biological

1833
Bond, Victor P., Theodor M. Fliedner, and John O. Archambeau. MAMMALIAN RADIATION LETHALITY: A DISTURBANCE IN CELLULAR KINETICS. New York, Academic Press, 1965. 340 p. illus. (American Institute of Biological Sciences. Monograph series on radiation biology)
QH652.B58

Includes bibliographies.

Provides a highly detailed description of mammalian response to whole-body irradiation with emphasis on man. Chapter 6 deals specifically with human radiation injury.

1834
Bontemps, Jacques. [MAN CONFRONTED BY NUCLEAR POLLUTION] L'homme face à la pollution nucléaire. Sciences et avenir, no. 231, May 1966: 302-307. Q2.S475, 1966

In order to live in the nuclear civilization we must know its dangers and learn how to avoid them. Study programs on the effects of radiation and on the paths travelled by various radionuclides are urgently needed. Different radioactive materials produce different physical effects. Radiation comes from natural sources (the amount of which varies from region to region) and from two major artificial sources, nuclear explosions and industrial nuclear waste products. Test fallout has so far had considerable effect on humanity and will do more damage, but we are far from approaching a critical level. Industrial wastes are fairly well controlled by national and international standards. Although much has been discovered about the spread of radioactive elements through water, air, and soil and about their entry into the food cycle, it is important for man to know more.

1835
PROCESS MAY REDUCE RADIATION EFFECTS. In American Medical Association. Journal, v. 196, May 2, 1966: 35. R15.A48, v. 196

The enzyme urease (or antibodies produced by rabbits inoculated with it) appears to partially immunize mice against some of the lethal effects of gamma radiation. Dr.'s Willard J. Visek and Hung Chen Dang of Cornell University report that in "nine repeated experiments with 657 animals they found that 800 roentgens of cobalt gamma radiation killed 80% of untreated mice and only 30% of treated mice. At 900 r, all the controls were killed while 20% of the treated mice survived." Ammonia, the production of which in the intestinal tract is implicated as an important toxin in radiation death, can be almost completely cut off by the immunization process initiated by the introduction of urease or antibodies into the system. Urease inoculations may in the future protect populations against the radiation dangers of atomic warfare. Unlike other radiation protection agents urease may be given weeks or even months before exposure.

1836
Püllmann, Alfred. [NO FEAR OF THE DEADLY DOSE? A GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF PROTECTION AGAINST RADIATION] Keine Angst vor der tödlichen Dosis? Ein deutscher Beitrag zum Problem des Strahlenschutzes. Christ und Welt, v. 19, Apr. 8, 1966: 22. illus. BR4.C37, v. 19

Explains the theory of Dr. Ernst H. Krokowski (lecturer at the Free University, Berlin) on protecting living organisms from radiation. The author emphasizes that radiologist Krokowski's pioneering work will help to immunize man against the deadly effects of radiation in the environment of outer space as well as on earth. The article points out that Soviet scientists are conducting their radiological research in a direction similar to Dr. Krokowski's.

1837
Seigel, Daniel G. FREQUENCY OF LIVE BIRTHS AMONG SURVIVORS OF HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI ATOMIC BOMBINGS. Radiation research, v. 28, June 1966: 278-288. QC770.R3, v. 28

Koseki data through 1961 were checked for the live birth experience of approximately 24,000 persons in Nagasaki and Hiroshima, and comparisons were made among groups at various distances from the atomic bomb in 1945. Although the investigation was motivated by an interest in the relationship between radiation and fertility, no information is available on comparative birth control practices in these study populations, and hence no inferences are made concerning any stage of reproduction prior to the live birth itself. Among those with married status in 1945, the percentage with no births from 1945 to 1961 was the same in each distance group. This was also true for the subgroups with no births previous to 1945. Among those with first marriage from 1946 to 1950, the percentage with no births up to 1961 did not show any extraordinary variation by distance from the bomb. The ratio of live births to person-years of marriage during 1946 to 1961 was unrelated to comparison group. (Author's summary, modified)

1838
Sotobayashi, Takeshi, and Seitaro Koyama. STRONTIUM-90 FALLOUT FROM SURFACE AND UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS. Science, v. 152, May 20, 1966: 1059-1060. Q1.S35, v. 152

Deposition of strontium-90 per unit area per unit fission energy from surface blast of the first Chinese atomic bomb was several times heavier than that from an earlier atmospheric test series. The venting of a Russian large-scale underground test also significantly increased deposition of strontium-90 at Niigata, Japan. (Author's abstract)

III. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

A. INTERNATIONAL LAW

1. Pacific Settlement

2. Adjudication

1839
Acheson, Dean. THE LAWYER'S PATH TO PEACE. Virginia quarterly review, v. 42, summer 1966: 337-348. AP2.V76, v. 42

Suggests that world peace will not be best achieved through world law, that by reliance on it in certain situations "peace is far more likely to be seriously breached." This is not to say that law is not beneficial; its efficacy is limited, however. Thus, "in the search for ways to maintain our values and pursue them in an orderly way, we must look beyond the resources of law and use all the arts and methods which the wit of man has devised and can devise." Today it is necessary to negotiate with strength as well as from strength.

1840
Bindschedler-Robert, Denise. [INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NEUTRALITY FROM THE SOVIET VIEWPOINT] Völkerrecht und Neutralität in sowjetischer Sicht. Österreichische Zeitschrift für Aussenpolitik, v. 5, no. 3, 1965: 144-163. DB47.O43, v. 5

Studies the status of international law, particularly neutrality, in the theoretical framework of Soviet Marxism-Leninism. The Soviet doctrine of international law follows from the nation's view of itself as a particular and higher political entity; the Soviet Union judges the merits of international norms individually. The yardstick used is the law's conformity with the Soviets' sense of history. Thus international law stands on shaky legs. The legality of neutrality is admitted for today, but perhaps not tomorrow.

1841
Detter, Ingrid. LAW MAKING BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. Stockholm, P.A. Norstedt [1965] 353 p. JX1995.D38
Bibliography: p. 330-345.

Studies the international lawmaking activities of international organizations, seeking "to establish what acts of international organizations contribute to the formation of international law," and to analyze what methods are used to bind member states. The author concludes that international organizations can contribute to the making of international law through their various unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral acts. The internal law of organizations is a source of international law.

1842
Goldberg, Arthur J. THE RULE OF LAW IN AN UNRULY WORLD. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 54, June 13, 1966: 936-944. JX232.A33, v. 54

"Adlai Stevenson Memorial Lecture at the School of International Affairs, Columbia University, New York, N. Y., on May 18 [1966] (U.S./U.N. press release 4860/Corr. 1)."

Focuses on the functions of international law, the U.N. peace and security system, dangers that threaten the United Nations, and the future of world law.

1843
Lucchini, Laurent. [COMPARATIVE NATIONAL PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: THE PRINCIPLE OF NONINTERVENTION] Pratique comparée des états en matière internationale: le principe de non-intervention. Journal du droit international, v. 93, Apr./June 1966: 451-464. JX6002.J5, v. 93

Studies the present status of the principle of nonintervention in domestic matters as stated in Article 2 (para. 7) of the U.N. Charter with reference to the behavior and declarations of governments. Lucchini analyzes the Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence in regard to the nonintervention principle. The practices and opinions of France, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Algeria are discussed in general terms; U.S., Soviet, British, and various African attitudes are treated in the Rhodesian case study. In the wake of reactions to the Rhodesian affair the principle of noninterference has partially given way to "the general tendency to politicize international problems."

1844
Mahnke, Hans H. [A GENUINE STATE OF PEACE: INTERNATIONAL LAW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF INTEGRATION] Echte Friedensordnung. Das Völkerrecht als Integrationsinstrument. Europäische Begegnung, v. 6, Feb. 1966: 88-92. P&GP RR

Since the world's peace depends on the existence of an international order supported by a workable system of international law, its character clearly depends on the quality of that law. Inimical to the latter are both fetishism and abuse; actually no international law can be a panacea for all the basic political conflicts of an age. Yet the tendency to overestimate the content and the force of existing international law seems to be growing in the German Federal Republic. Nowhere is this more evident than in one group of West Germans' current practice of invoking that law for the sake of the restoration of Germany's lost eastern territories, and in another group's attempt to convince the German people to reconcile themselves permanently to that loss. The very fact that both groups base their different arguments on the same legal principle--the so-called right of self-determination--proves how ambiguous is its legal meaning. In view of the existing cultural and ideological diversity in the world it would be an outright impossibility to formulate an unequivocal, universally binding norm on that right. No less damaging to the consolidation of a sound system of international law has been the Soviet bloc's practice of exploiting international law, principally for purposes of political expediency. The same could be said of the abuses and violations of that law by the Third Reich. All these actions have weakened the working of the system of international law to the extent that in the past 20 years the development of international common law and the scope of international jurisdiction have

markedly declined. Even the United Nations, pledged to abide by the rules of international law, has habitually displayed a high degree of indifference to them. The chasm between Western and Soviet bloc interpretation of some basic institutions of international law is often too great to be accommodated. Also, Asian and African countries, as a rule, are unwilling to accept many institutions of international law (e.g., neutrality, sovereignty, legality) in their established Western traditional meaning. But, despite such divergence of legal modes, certain rules of international law exist to secure a bare minimum of international order. That order, not supported by coercion from any central authority, is based on the principle of reciprocity in much the same way as were the penal and the civil laws of past ages, when the state's authority was weak or missing and when sanction of the law was solely a matter of private initiative. Current international law is less a product of juridical logic than of common sense, whose task it is to set the standards for and limit the free play of political action in international affairs. Due to the modern development of communications media a more sophisticated system of international law will eventually emerge, universal in character and application.

1845
Parks, Larry G. THE LAW OF--AND UNDER--THE SEA. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 92, Feb. 1966: 54-59.
Vl.U8, v. 92

Weighs the need for evolving doctrines that will allow for the orderly and peaceful uses of the resources of the sea by all nations. The great interest nations have begun to take in exploring the seas as a possible way to increase their economic well-being will increasingly underline the need for legal conventions that can prevent conflicts between rivals and facilitate peaceful competition. Parks concludes:" The process of accommodation must await future developments. Unless and until a clear line of conflict is drawn, it is premature to attempt to lay out binding rules by international agreement. Out of the resolution of conflicts will come the orderly development of the international law of the sea through process of custom, tradition, and agreement."

1846
Rosenne, Shabtai. SOME DIPLOMATIC PROBLEMS OF CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF TREATIES. University of Washington law review, v. 41, Apr. 1966: 261-281. LL

Reflects on some of the less evident, although critical, problems related to the codification of Law of Treaties, which was begun in 1962 by the International Law Commission. The author, a Commission member, relates the scope and history of the project, the form the restatement of treaty law has taken, and the political attitudes of states participating in the work. The climate of these negotiations and problems of adjusting conflicting state interests are described. Results are to be reported to the 21st Session of the U.N. General Assembly.

1847
Seidl-Hohenveldern, Ignaz. [LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY] Kriegs- und Neutralitätsrecht. In his Völkerrecht. Köln, Heymann, 1965. p. 285-308.
JX3491.S54.V6

Includes bibliographies.

Outlines the present state of international laws on war and neutrality, and appraises their adequacy in, or their relevancy to, conditions of the nuclear age. For instance Art. 51 of the U.N. Charter (prohibiting certain preventive actions against expected attack) has been completely outdated, the author argues, by developments in the Cuban crisis in 1962. Prof. Seidl-Hohenveldern feels that on the whole existing international laws on war and neutrality are not as obsolete as some authors would believe. Outlined in comprehensive form are the following subjects: the right to war, the rules of war (including those pertaining to the question of legality of nuclear weapons), the concept of active and passive combatants, private ownership in occupied territory, administration of occupied territory, termination of war by peace treaty and by "debellatio" (viz defeat of the enemy and annexation of his territory without any peace treaty whatsoever), armistice, punishment of war criminals, neutrality and collective security, and others.

1848
A SYMPOSIUM ON THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND): FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES. New York University law review, v. 41, Mar. 1966: 2-147. LL

Contents.--Foreign relations law of the United States: A preface by Adrian S. Fisher.--The restatement of the foreign relations law of the United States: bases and conflicts of jurisdiction, by Stanley D. Metzger.--Jurisdictional immunities of foreign states, by Richard C. Pugh and Joseph McLaughlin.--The immunities of representatives of foreign states, by Albert H. Garretson.--Recognition and the restatement, by Leonard C. Meeker.--The law of international agreements in the restatement, by Oliver J. Lissitzyn.--State responsibility for injuries to aliens, by Cornelius F. Murphy.

Covers the following sections from the American Law Institute's Restatement: pt. 1, Jurisdiction: Bases and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, Immunities from Jurisdiction; pt. 2, Recognition; pt. 3, International Agreements; pt. 4, Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens. The term "Foreign Relations Law" was coined to include "(1) those rules which we in the United States conceived to be established by international law and (2) those parts of the domestic law of the United States (including but not limited to its constitutional law) which give effect to rules of international law or otherwise involve matters of significant concern to foreign relations."

B. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

1849
Comay, Joan. THE UN IN ACTION. Foreword by Adlai E. Stevenson. New York, Macmillan [1965] 150 p. illus., maps, ports. JX1977.C5556

Stresses the peacekeeping and welfare activities of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. U.N. operations in Kashmir, Palestine, Korea, the Congo, Yemen, and Cyprus are described, and some of the practical and political problems of U.N. peacekeeping are discussed. In the second half of the book the work of such agencies as the International Labor Organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency, UNESCO, and the World Health Organization is detailed.

1850
Coyle, David C. THE UNITED NATIONS AND HOW IT WORKS. New ed., with an introd. by Hernane

230-967 O - 66 - 6

Tavares de Sá. New York, Columbia University Press, 1966 [©1965] 256 p.
JX1977.C65, 1966

A revised and updated edition of this basic exposition of the structure and mechanisms of the United Nations.

1851
Daftary, A. Matine. [THE UNITED NATIONS AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR PEACE AND DISARMAMENT] Les Nations Unies comme instrument de coopération internationale pour la paix et le désarmement. Revue de droit international, de sciences diplomatiques et politiques, v. 44, Apr./June 1966: 123-126.
JX3. R37, v. 44

United Nations responsibility for peacekeeping and the promotion of international cooperation was the subject of three reports delivered to the Interparliamentary Conference in Ottawa in September 1965. Mr. Daddario of the United States, Mr. Kriegel representing Czechoslovakia and the Socialist countries, and Mr. Meshra presenting the nonalined countries' viewpoint came up with contradictory theses on regional pacts, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the relative roles of the Security Council and the General Assembly, and many other issues. It is the great powers who will make or break the United Nations, and rather than isolating specific divergencies they would do better to treat all problems as an inseparable whole (perhaps at a summit conference). If the atmosphere of confidence and cooperation that preceded the drafting of the U.N. Charter cannot be restored then the Charter itself must be revised or adapted to today's world order. Universal membership is essential. Also a reliable organization for world peace will not be achieved without (1) a law forbidding recourse to force and weapons unless approved by a world authority, (2) an international court of justice to apply this law, and (3) an international police force to enforce it.

1852
Eide, Asbjørn. PEACE-KEEPING AND ENFORCEMENT BY REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: ITS PLACE IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM. Journal of peace research, no. 2, 1966: 125-145.
AS9.J6, 1966

The problems concerning regional freedom of action in relation to the United Nations, in particular to the U.N. Charter Art. 53, have been analyzed. The cases where these questions have been discussed in the United Nations, and the legal claims advanced in justification of such freedom of action, have been stated. A substantial part of the paper has been devoted to drawing up a perspective in which the legal interpretation and application of Art. 53 should be seen. It has been argued that the more intense the action contemplated, the more necessary is a wide political support for its initiation, which can only be guaranteed by voting requirements. The compromise embedded in the Charter concerning regional action, and the attitudes to this during the drafting stages, have been examined; and the different attitudes and assumptions concerning regional organizations today have been tested by a 'tour d'horizont', examining present and potential organizations in this field. The perspective thus drawn up has been used to analyse the different claims for freedom for regional action from prior authorization from United Nations organs under Art. 53. The conclusions are that whenever the action contemplates coercion, military or non-military, or even when it is a 'peacekeeping' operation, prior authorization should be considered necessary. But, in cases of non-military coercion and 'peacekeeping', these being less intense than military coercion, such authorization may be given by the General Assembly as well as from the Security Council, whereas military coercion outside the scope of self-defense can be authorized only by the Security Council. (Summary supplied)

1853
Jacob, Philip E., and Alexine L. Atherton. THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: THE MAKING OF WORLD ORDER. Homewood, Ill., Dorsey Press, 1965. 723 p. (The Dorsey series in political science) JX1954.J22

Contents. --The struggle for peace and security. --Promoting economic welfare. --Strengthening the human potential.

Examines international organization through concentrating on "major international problems of a character requiring the concerted efforts of international organizations in their solution." Part 1 treats the collective security concept, structures for maintaining international security, regional security, disarmament, arms control, and the peaceful settlement of international disputes through the mediation of the United Nations.

1854
Malicky, Neal. TO KEEP THE PEACE: A CHURCHMAN'S PROPOSALS FOR A STRONGER UNITED NATIONS. Illus. by William Schuhle. [Washington, General Board of Christian Social Concerns of the Methodist Church, Division of Peace and World Order, 1965?] 64 p. illus. JX1963.M242
Bibliographical references included in "Notes," p. 59-61.

Treats problems of the United Nations such as the veto, peacekeeping, financing, and economic development aid, and specific concerns such as the arms race, human rights, and U.N. membership, with a view to establishing peace, order, freedom, and justice in the world. The author lists some actions interested Christians can take for promoting the quest for peace, including prayer, exertion of pressure on the Government, and conciliatory behavior.

1855
Ross, Alf. THE UNITED NATIONS: PEACE AND PROGRESS. [Totowa, N.J.] Bedminster Press, 1966. 443 p. JX1977.R594

Views the United Nations "as a political phenomenon." The author takes the position that the world body has not fulfilled the expectations surrounding its creation and attempts to understand why. Analyzing the United Nations realistically leads to the "conviction that the widespread belief that peace among nations can be won, as people say, by setting law in the place of might and violence, is an illusion due to lack of understanding of the conditions under which law grows in the national community, and the fundamental differences between the national and the international communities." In a 30-page section devoted to the subject Ross expresses great pessimism on the prospects for disarmament being enhanced by the United Nations, pessimism grounded in both historical precedent and his own analysis of the world organization. The General Assembly, as he sees it, is "the worst possible forum for negotiations toward" disarmament. Such negotiation should take place only behind closed doors and directly between the immediately interested parties. All in all "the prospects for political initiatives and

leadership on the part of the United Nations are not . . . very bright--unless the major powers can agree to restore to the Security Council the functions assigned to it under the Charter."

1856
Wild, Patricia B. THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND THE ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN BORDER CONFLICT: A STUDY OF NEW MACHINERY FOR PEACEKEEPING AND FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AMONG AFRICAN STATES. International organization, v. 20, winter 1966: 18-36.
JX1901.I55, v. 20

This case study of the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) treatment of the Algerian-Moroccan border dispute hopefully illuminates "the useful functions of the Organization of African Unity as well as those of other regional organizations based on cooperation for the maintenance of regional peace and security." Undefined colonial boundaries, Moroccan irredentism, the discovery of important mineral resources in the disputed area, and ideological differences between the two countries formed the complicated background of the open warfare of October 1963 between Morocco and Algeria. A meeting convened between the disputants, Modibo Keita (Mali), and Haile Selassie (Ethiopia) at Bamako on October 29 created a ceasefire and demilitarization committee and asked the OAU Council of Ministers to establish a committee of arbitration. Agreement to use the facilities of the OAU, rather than the United Nations or some other organ, was a turning point. The Council of Ministers set up a committee of seven to seek a solution to the dispute. The work of the Bamako Committee and the OAU Special Committee instituted a cooling-off period and thereby effected a reconciliation between the two countries, although no legal border settlement has yet emerged. African peacekeeping procedures--the supervisory ceasefire committee and the mediatory role of the Special Committee--"may have exerted pressure on the disputants to conform to the OAU injunction regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes." Probably only bilateral negotiations will permit a final settlement, and OAU efforts for the future may limit themselves to mediation and conciliation rather than arbitration. In its equitable treatment of both arguments (allaying Moroccan fears of a pro-Algerian bias) the OAU perhaps encouraged submission of future disputes to its procedures. The exclusion of the great powers from this conflict was mainly due to the voluntary distance kept by these powers, and it "remains to be seen whether or not the OAU could deal effectively, and to the exclusion of the United Nations, with a dispute involving the major powers." Hopefully the success demonstrated by the OAU in this case will lead to utilization of its peacekeeping machinery in future conflicts.

C. INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY FORCES

1857
Boyd, Andrew. PEACE-KEEPING IN DANGER. Disarmament, no. 10, June 1966: 11-15.
JX1918.P7D5, 1966

"All real progress towards disarmament depends on progress in peace-keeping." Despite recent indications that peacekeeping is making no progress, several considerations suggest extension and improvement of such efforts in the future. The principle that provision for peacekeeping is essential to disarmament plans has become widely accepted. Afro-Asian fears that peacekeeping forces will be perverted by imperialist nations to serve other purposes have now somewhat diminished. The U.N. Charter is no longer regarded a "sacred text"; it has assumed a flexibility that permits the implementation of practical peacekeeping arrangements. After 17 years of international efforts toward peacekeeping many lessons have been learned, offering the hope that past mistakes will not be repeated. Perhaps the greatest service peacekeeping renders in modern times is that of preventing local disturbances from escalating into major conflict. If the charge be true that U.N. intervention always freezes the status quo and hinders permanent solutions to regional problems, the alternative of escalation to violence is hardly preferable. Past experiences promise to lead to improvements in the military techniques and working methods of future peacekeeping actions. Equipment and training will also be enhanced. Although a permanent U.N. military planning staff remains a distant hope, the willingness of several countries to earmark military units for permanent U.N. service will permit more rapid and flexible response to dangerous situations. The current U.N. crisis--which threatens to force the withdrawal of the U.N. contingents in Cyprus and on the Israeli-Egyptian border--is caused by the reluctance of nations to pay their share of U.N. peacekeeping costs. Perhaps those states that are not major powers but are financially secure could bear the expenses of U.N. peacekeeping, thereby depriving the major powers of some of the control of U.N. policy that their financial assistance certainly buys. "Something like this is, I believe, the only practical way now open to us to ensure that the existing UN capacity for peace-keeping work can be maintained and gradually enlarged."

1858
Boyd, James M. CYPRUS: EPISODE IN PEACEKEEPING. International organization, v. 20, winter 1966: 1-17.
JX1901.I55, v. 20

U.N. intervention in the essentially communal dispute in Cyprus was in response to the threat external support for each side would have posed to international peace and security. On March 4, 1964, a unanimous Security Council resolution authorized the Secretary General to create a 3-month peacekeeping force subject to Cypriot approval and voluntary financing. An early status of forces agreement for UNFICYP, which by June 8 numbered 6,411 men, was negotiated with Cyprus. The force was to prevent a recurrence of fighting, contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order, and aid a return to normal, pre-December 1963 conditions. In operation for over a year UNFICYP has indeed quelled the fighting and restored a tenuous order, to the extent that much civilian economic activity has resumed. However, the arms race on the island has not been impeded, neither side has significantly relaxed its position, and "normal conditions" certainly do not obtain. The force performed admirably in the face of some serious hindrances: (1) the delay required to bring it into operation that was due to the lack of standby arrangements; (2) short-term authorizations (UNFICYP's mandate has required 5 renewals from the Security Council), unconducive to long term planning; and (3) uncertain financing procedures. However "peacekeeping" implies more than just military interposition to restore calm to a situation. "Hand-in-hand with this effort is the need to create the conditions for a basic settlement. This is the area in which related political, economic, and social measures must be taken to assist in the creation of these fundamental conditions. Accompanying these complementary measures must be

a determined effort to resolve the basic political problem. This is the role for good offices, negotiation, and mediation."

1859
Citrin, Jack. UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES: A CASE STUDY IN ORGANIZATIONAL TASK EXPANSION. Denver, University of Denver [c1965] 85 p. (Social Science Foundation and Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver. Monograph series in world affairs, v. 3, no. 1)
JX1977.C54

Views U.N. intervention in Lebanon, the Congo, West Irian, and Cyprus as examples of organizational task expansion. Questions that are put to the data involve the common characteristics of the four crises, the internal and external conditions that permitted U.N. "task expansion in the sphere of military security to take place," and the "relationship between this particular example of organizational task expansion and the larger process of international integration."

1860
Cox, Arthur M. WHAT DOES "U.N. PEACEKEEPING" MEAN? Saturday review, v. 49, May 14, 1966: 19-22.
Z1219.S25, v. 49

The primary security role for the United Nations consists of peacekeeping in the "Third World." Even though the middle powers are willing to assume international policing responsibility, the United Nations is unlikely to take such action in the future unless the superpowers at least acquiesce in it. Actually both the Soviet Union and the United States recognize that U.N. peacekeeping operations carried out under the cloak of collective responsibility do not require that the vital interests of either state be committed. With the Vietnam War and the Dominican crisis in mind Washington has increasingly become aware of the desirability of acting within a framework of collective security arrangements. Some American policymakers have expressed hope that the United States could rely on regional organizations rather than on the world organization for peacekeeping arrangements. Yet the United Nations provides the best available source of impartial peacekeepers, despite all its imperfection and ambiguity in this area of activity. The latest Canadian White Paper on Defense gives the highest priority to national support of U.N. peacekeeping. Similar stances have been taken by the Scandinavian governments and several of the other middle powers. These are trends that the United States should nourish in all possible ways, particularly in its defense planning and the financial assistance it renders to the United Nations. Washington should also encourage Britain's new peacekeeping program and entertain the possibility of including Communist units--from Poland and Hungary, for example--in U.N. peacekeeping efforts.

1861
Goldberg, Arthur J. PEACE AND JUSTICE AMONG NATIONS: THE AGENDA OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 54, May 23, 1966: 798-802.
JX232.A33, v. 54

"Address made before the Economic Club of Detroit, Mich., on May 2, 1966 (U.S./U.N. press release 4845 dated Apr. 30)."

Touches upon some of the world's current and chronic trouble spots, such as Kashmir, Rhodesia, and Vietnam, and cites the potential and actual role of the United Nations in keeping the peace in these areas.

1862
Krivchikova, Emiliia S. [THE U.N. ARMED FORCES; PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW] Vooruzhennye sily OON; mezhdunarodnopravovye voprosy. Moskva, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1965. 190 p.
JX1981.P7K7

Contents.--The concept of international U.N. armed forces and their significance.--The creation and employment of the U.N. armed forces: an exclusive provision of the Security Council.--The organization, control, and command of U.N. international armed forces.

The Charter of the United Nations does not provide for the creation of a permanent international army. The U.N. armed forces are armed forces of the member states of the United Nations that are provided at the order of the Security Council under circumstances stipulated by the Charter. This monograph by E. S. Krivchikova, Candidate of Juridical Sciences, is devoted to unmasking the plans of Western powers to create, within the limits of the United Nations, armed forces on a permanent basis for meddling in the internal affairs of other states. The book analyzes in detail the United Nations creation and use of armed forces in each instance--in Egypt, in the Congo, and in Cyprus. (Translation of supplied summary)

1863
Lumsden, Malvern. RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING FORCES: A SCANNING OF INSTITUTIONS. Journal of peace research, no. 2, 1966: 194-196.
AS9.J6, 1966

Indicates the amount and type of social science research being conducted in the area of peacekeeping forces.

1864
Nicholas, H. G. IS FORCE NECESSARY? 3. THE PEACE-KEEPING EXPERIENCE OF THE LEAGUE AND THE UNITED NATIONS. NATO letter, v. 14, May 1966: 3-12. illus.
D845.2.A44, v. 14

Examines some of the differences in authority vested in the League of Nations and the United Nations in dealing with armed aggression against one of their members. The failure of the League is outlined, and the United Nations peacekeeping authority is viewed in the light of intervention in various areas of the world under the U.N. flag. Nicholas concludes that "unless there is a better relationship between East and West and a greater willingness by the unaligned to accept a corporate responsibility than were apparent at the last Assembly, then the outlook for developing a U.N. rôle in this field is dark. Before fresh peacekeeping tasks are found for the U.N. . . . it is first necessary that members should accept the obligations that already confront them, of liquidating the Organization's existing burden of debt and of continuing its existing responsibilities in respect of the operation to which it is still committed, UNEF, in an area still very far from pacified."

1865
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: MEETINGS OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE. UN monthly chronicle, v. 3, June 1966: 15-17.
JX1977.A1U564, v. 3

Summarizes statements of Sweden and Canada made before a meeting of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. The representatives discuss the procedures and financial arrangements the United Nations should follow to increase its capability and authority to maintain peace and security in the world.

1866
Young, Oran R. TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING [Princeton, N.J.] Center of International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 1966. 45 p. (Princeton University. Center of International Studies. Research monograph no. 22)
JX1977.Y65

Contents.--The Hammarskjöld approach: peacekeeping despite the cold war.--The reemergence of the great powers: some Charter concepts revisited.--The United Nations and superpower crises.

Attempts to assess peacekeeping trends rather than specific peacekeeping plans or arrangements. Mr. Young analyzes peacekeeping with a view toward a more "diffuse and complex" approach, for "the present situation generates a horizontal spread of relevant peacekeeping arrangements as opposed to a sequence in which one dominant approach follows another." Such a development is taking place at the United Nations, which may be able to act as a useful third party in future superpower crises.

D. OTHER PROCESSES, PLANS, AND PROPOSALS

1867
Barnes, Gerald. HOW TO PROMOTE ENDURING PEACE. World federalist, Apr./May 1966: 7-9.
JX1901.W825, 1966

Peace, like happiness, is a byproduct of the good life--it is to be approached indirectly. Such an assumption, while only half true, reveals something about the contemporary world. In this argument, the principal roadblocks to both the good life and to peace are ignorance, irresponsibility, unequal opportunity, population pressure, and international anarchy. Their interrelationship leads the world in a vicious spiral upward to war. Yet for each vicious circle "there is a potential benign circle." Increased education, for example, leads to increased tolerance, more birth control, and a higher sense of responsibility. A "World University" might aid in the growth of mutual understanding and a sense of international community. Increased world trade, brought about by lower tariff restrictions, would not only heighten international communication but also raise the world living standard. Limited world government would provide the solution to the problem of international anarchy. Two first steps would be taken away from anarchy by extension of the test ban and conclusion of a no-first-strike agreement. Achievement of the good society would bring peace and democracy to the world. Those who favor the direct approach to peace, on the other hand, consider international unrest to be the cause rather than the effect of many social ills. Lack of trust among nations, even if unfounded (and solid evidence shows that it is not), is a psychological fact of life. Government was established to promote peace among individuals who hate and mistrust one another. Would it be possible to establish a world government by peaceful persuasion alone in time to prevent world war III? And if not, would it be moral to establish it by force? The direct approach has many merits. Still the world must be "vigilant against those self-styled 'realists,' dedicated to the direct, external approach; those 'tough thinkers' who, in a crisis, always insist that the end justifies the means."

1868
Berlia, Georges. [A COURSE ON THE GREAT CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PROBLEMS] Cours de grands problèmes politiques contemporains. Rédigé d'après les notes et avec l'autorisation de Georges Berlia. Licence 4e année, 1964/1965. Paris, Cours de droit [1965] 676 p. JX1308.B47, 1965

Partial Contents.--Problems of peacekeeping--1919-1964.--pt. 1. Collective security attempts.--Recourse to war in the classical era.--Maintenance of peace between 1919 and 1939.--Maintenance of peace after 1945.--pt. 2. British and French security policies (1919-1945).--The 1919 settlement and the various powers.--The Anglo-French search for security from 1920 to 1939.--English and French security policies from 1945 to 1965.

Studies the problem of maintaining peace as this problem has manifested itself since 1919, "first in its international aspects and then in some of its aspects pertaining to states' internal affairs." Among the subjects treated in a historical context are East-West relations, blocs and alliances, the cold war, the United Nations, coexistence, neutralism, disarmament, the new states, government power and security requirements, and French and British foreign and defense policies.

1869
[THE CHURCH AND THE BOMB] L'Église et la bombe. Christianisme social, v. 74, Mar./Apr. 1966: 265-268.
HN30.C53, v. 74

After a special session on the problems raised by nuclear weapons the 13th Regional Synod of the Reformed Church of France adopted the agenda and resolution printed here. The synod pledges itself not to participate in "the worship of power and premeditation of mass murder which are implied in the strategy of nuclear war" and refuses approval to any national policy of nuclear armament. In the light of the facts that danger grows at the rate these weapons proliferate, that accidents become more possible, and that the arguments presented in favor of the force de frappe (especially deterrence and national independence) are contestable, the synod asks the Committee for Nuclear Affairs of the French Protestant Federation to authorize a minister (1) to study the problem from every angle; (2) to establish permanent contacts with political and Catholic authorities and with all lay and religious movements concerned with this question; (3) to keep the Church informed of his work; and (4) to promote a lucid, spiritual, and free political attitude. The French Protestant Churches received, in March 1965, a letter from the working committee of the Christian Peace Conference supporting their antigovernment nuclear policies and asking for intensified opposition.

1870
Dresner, Samuel H. GOD, MAN AND ATOMIC WAR. New York, Living Books [1966] 227 p.
BR115.A85D7

Endeavors to "understand the implications" of modern man's greatest problem, survival, which is manifested in the fact that "cosmology has been superseded by eschatology." The author insists that totally destructive atomic war is a real possibility because today's decadent "morality" cannot deter it and all other supposed barriers to it (fear, military defense, shelters, diplomacy, or divine intervention) are either insufficient or illusory. Yet insanely "we buy and sell, tear down and build, marry and have children, campaign and govern, even teach and preach --as if nothing had changed." This possibility of annihilation unparalleled in history demands a radical

solution which is an inner revolution, spiritual perfection. "Even a nuclear ban and world government will not suffice, because the danger is so great and so easily obtainable. Intermediate means, while as necessary now as in the past, are no longer sufficient, for unless an inner change is brought about no outer change can survive." Man and the world cannot continue alone. They need the will and presence of God to inspire patience, responsibility, greatness, purpose, sacrifice, and world law; these not only will insure survival but justify it. Dresner denies he is offering a simple magical formula for the world's dire needs. "I am only making one claim--that the material world is dependent, in the last analysis, upon the spiritual world, that ultimate realities have become immediate realities, and that our world may be annihilated unless we awake."

1871
Garretson, Robert C. THE RUBLE-DOLLAR ROAD TO PEACE. Nation, v. 202, May 16, 1966: 576-581.
AP2.N2, v. 202

Soviet and U.S. goals are nearly identical: "first, to achieve economic security with comfortable living standards for all their people and, second, to expand their trade with the rest of the world and thus increase their economic and political influence and, at the same time, assist many backward parts of the world to move toward peaceful economic security." Communist ideology is no asset in achieving these goals. Capitalist workers are generally better off than their Communist counterparts, and underdeveloped nations see little in the record of Communist China to inspire imitation. Throughout the next 35 years both the Soviet Union and the United States should be able to grow, perhaps attain full economic production, without impeding the development of the other. "The growth rates of both economies will not be determined by their political philosophies, whether Communist or capitalist, but by their ability to realize their economic potentials." But political philosophy will be altered by economic growth, with economic trends increasing the likelihood of avoiding nuclear war and economic techniques promising to make the two superpowers nearly identical. By 1999 Soviet and U.S. living conditions should manifest unprecedented affluence, with poverty and want all but eradicated. Improved data processing and communication facilities may make it possible to determine at any given moment the exact consumer needs of an economy, thereby perfecting planning and removing the risks of free enterprise. "By 1999, with poverty abolished, employment assured, and comfortable living standards taken for granted in both economies, it is likely that pressures for peace will be more than adequate to overwhelm any war schemes that may be invented by men seeking power at any price or that may be generated out of reckless adherence to worn-out political theories."

1872
Golden, Charles F. EAST AND WEST: PEACE. Concern, v. 8, July 15, 1966: 11, 14.
P&GP RR

A firsthand report by a prominent American clergyman of the Oct. 1965 meeting of the Christian Peace Conference's Advisory Committee. The author asserts that, despite "the operational and procedural problems of the Christian Peace Conference, with the added tendency to reflect the political views of the Eastern governments at the expense of Western views," the Conference's broadest convocation, the All Christian Peace Assembly, is in a better position to contribute to world peace than the World Council of Churches.

1873
Hörmann, Karl. PEACE AND MODERN WAR IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHURCH. Translated by Sister Mary Caroline Hemesath. Westminster, Md., Newman Press, 1966. 162 p.
BT736.2.H613

Contents.--pt. 1. The present-day teaching of the Church concerning peace.--Legal organizations of peace.--Establishment of peace organizations.--Training for peace-mindedness.--pt. 2. The traditional Catholic teaching concerning peace.--Moral evaluation of violence.--Lawfulness of a just war.--Conditions of a just war.--pt. 3. The modern war in the judgment of moral theology.--Rejection of a war of aggression.--Right of military defense.--Modern war of prevention.

Details the Catholic Church's teachings on peace and modern war, a great part of which originates from Pope Pius XII. A solution to the complex problem of modern war will probably never be found but it is the purpose of this book "to continue the discussions in that direction which should be the most cherished goal for everyone: in the direction of peace." Albert Schweitzer in 1954 stressed that only the rejection of war on ethical principles will achieve peace. Hörmann maintains that it is the efforts of the Church on behalf of peace that "make the ethical reasons become effective."

1874
Jones, Lew. THE ANTIWAR MOVEMENT AROUND THE WORLD. Young socialist, v. 9, May/July 1966: 16-21.
P&GP RR

Gathers together information from the reports of "revolutionary socialists who have been active in building anti-Vietnam-war activities" in many countries--information on the size, methods, and outlocks of Vietnam protest movements in Australia, Japan, Belgium, Italy, France, Latin America, Switzerland, and Canada. The antiwar movement is said to have been important in crystallizing world opinion against U.S. aggression in Vietnam and raising "the broader questions of the nature of capitalism and the need to oppose it."

1875
Kotov, Mikhail. [WAR PROPAGANDA IS OUTSIDE THE LAW!] Propagandu voiny--vne zakona! Kul'tura i zhizn', v. 10, no. 4, 1966: 30.
AP50.K8, v. 10

In 1950 the World Congress of Peace Defenders, meeting in Warsaw, called upon all states to suppress all war propaganda. In 1951 the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union unanimously adopted a law for the defense of peace and outlawed war propaganda in any form. Since then no Soviet citizen has been guilty of violating this law, while the entire Soviet people has seriously supported peaceful coexistence throughout the world. In the United States and West Germany, however, war propaganda is considered legal, and journalistic appeals for thermonuclear war are not uncommon. Who has not seen in Western journals maps with arrows indicating possible atomic strikes against Soviet cities and industrial centers? The effect of war propaganda even upon sensible elements of society cannot be overestimated. War cannot begin without psychological preparation; nor can lasting peace be maintained unless the atmosphere is cleansed of hatred. In time peace will become a normal and immutable feature of human existence; but until aggressive elements on earth are forced to renounce

their reckless plans, war propaganda and any incitement to aggression must be made illegal in all lands.

1876
Lasley, John W. THE WAR SYSTEM AND YOU [2d ed.] Chapel Hill, N. C., Institute for International Studies [1965] 262 p. JX1952. L5185, 1965
Bibliographical footnotes.

Solicits individual action for peace and order. Lasley argues that arms races always lead to war and that deterrence, whether based on gases, germs, or nuclear weapons, is a policy of suicide rather than security. He suggests that the Nation could rechannel the vigor and patriotism with which it now supports its war machine into the quest for peace. U.S. defense expenditures and the military-industrial complex are described and compared with the resources needed to overcome world sickness, hunger, and poverty. The argument is made that militarism and patriotism should not be equated. Rather patriotism and national sovereignty are better served by the search for a peaceful world order. Law is the instrument of peace and freedom at all levels of social life, including the international. "We must stop measuring our national sovereignty in megakills and begin to recover the personal freedoms and economic control of our national resources which we have sacrificed to the war system." The author discusses military conscription, and wonders if this does not violate the "involuntary servitude" prohibition of the 13th Amendment. A rundown of the views of the world's major religions concerning the unity of man and war is given. "Virtually all societies . . . have the equivalent of the Ten Commandments to check the savagery in man and make it possible for him to develop his culture and civilization. The conspicuous exception is at the world level of man's society." The author feels that the one alternative to an awful world war III is institution of a democratic world government with real and enforceable judicial, legislative, and executive powers. To this end he suggests several reforms of the United Nations and the International Court of Justice. One chapter catalogs recent crimes against human rights and freedom and asserts that these are the concern of all men. Lasley holds that the individual is the key to the achievement of peace: "It is not a question of 'Can I?' be effective in the movement for world order and peace, but rather 'Will I?'" Wanting peace we cannot continue to "tolerate and nurture our military machines of mass murder, threaten to destroy other nations and their people, fail to seek with all our energies equity, liberty, security and peace for all mankind within a framework of world law and government." Included in the appendix are a text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a summary of the Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 50 activities for promoting peace, a list of major peace organizations, and a list of peace publications.

1877
Laulicht, Jerome, and Norman Z. Alcock. THE SUPPORT OF PEACE RESEARCH. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 10, June 1966: 198-208.
JX1901. J6, v. 10

Indicates what groups will tend to contribute money to peace research and to what degree. A survey of contributors to the Canadian Peace Research Institute showed the major potential sources to be government, private foundations, and, among the general public, political leaders, business executives, and labor leaders.

1878
Lawler, Justus G. NUCLEAR WAR: THE ETHIC, THE RHETORIC, THE REALITY; A CATHOLIC ASSESSMENT. Westminster, Md., Newman Press, 1965. 189 p. UF767. L35
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents. --A call to conscience. --Morality and nuclear policy. --The Johannine strategy. --Utopians vs. crackpot realists. --Nuclear newspeak. --Moralistic newspeak. --The Cuban blockade and its aftermath. --To the Bishops in council.

A "humanistic" approach to the problem of nuclear war. The author criticizes theories of controlled nuclear war as false and immoral, and he decries nuclear newspeak ("the dulling and distortion of official language that fogs all moral issues concerned with war and peace"). Catholic concern with the cold war, he feels, has been misdirected "to reflecting the xenophobia of the right wing, to rationalizing the deterrent, to strengthening old-world nationalisms, to giving honorary degrees to sabre-rattling generals, to exalting the role of J. Edgar Hoover, to identifying Christianity with anti-Communism, or to simple abdication of the entire problem into the hands of political leaders." The public wants disarmament, but this sentiment has yet to be well articulated. Catholicism as a universal religion could aid the course of articulation by fostering dialogue between East and West and by taking a stand on nuclear warfare and international justice.

1879
Lyttle, Bradford. YOU COME WITH NAKED HANDS: THE STORY OF THE SAN FRANCISCO TO MOSCOW MARCH FOR PEACE. Raymond, N.H., Greenleaf Books [1966] 246 p. illus., facsims., plan, ports. JX1953. L88

Chronicles the march sponsored by the Committee for Nonviolent Action (CNVA). Motivated in part by American challenges that CNVA demonstrators would not carry their pacifist messages "to the Russians," the marchers walked 2300 miles from San Francisco to Moscow to urge all nations to disarm unilaterally and promote peace and brotherhood rather than war and hatred.

1880
Millard, Everett L. FREEDOM IN A FEDERAL WORLD: HOW WE CAN LEARN TO LIVE IN PEACE AND LIBERTY BY MEANS OF WORLD LAW. Rev. 3d ed., including draft revision of the United Nations Charter. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana Publications, 1964. 254 p. JX1954. M49, 1964

Summarizes and reports "an 11-year discussion among students of world affairs possessing many varied backgrounds of belief and experience." Discussants are participants in the "Conference Upon Research and Education in world government" (CURE), which includes political scientists, educators, churchmen, jurists, businessmen, and writers. CURE has studied possible improvements to make the United Nations an effective world governing body, suggested preparatory steps toward disarmament, and put forth a draft of revisions for the U.N. Charter.

1881
Miller, William R. MAKING AND KEEPING PEACE. Reconciliation quarterly, no. 132, 1st quarter 1966: 632-636. JX1901. C5, 1966

Peace can be regarded as something to be preserved, with the avoidance of war as the goal. Or it can be seen as a form of freedom--"freedom from war

and freedom for a broad range of affirmative activities that make for social justice and equilibrium." Though peacekeepers should not be denigrated, their approach represents the former concept of peace, minimal and unsatisfying. The true vision of creative peace must grow and evolve from a pragmatic view, one based on a dynamic dialectic between ultimate goals and approaches to actual problems, and between the approaches and the problems themselves. The proper existential attitude to be taken toward international affairs calls for experimentation that proceeds not by testing an ideal solution in the cauldron of experience but by cutting particular solutions from the cloth of man's ideals and letting the problems themselves supply the measurements. Thus can the intentions of peacekeepers and peacemakers coincide. Thus will the peacemaker concern himself with building a good society in every sense of the term. He will also appreciate the peacekeeper's problems, and before demanding the abandonment of coercive means for the prevention of overt conflict he will devise and demonstrate pragmatic means that can accomplish this end more peacefully. The peacemaker will strive for careful reduction of the means of force and violence to minimum levels of usefulness. He will embrace needed, yet imperfect, institutions such as the United Nations as a way to transcend sovereignty and reach a higher ground from which sovereignty itself can be seen objectively "and helped to become more responsible, harmonizing historical necessities with the common goals of humanity."

1882
Mitrany, David. A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM. Chicago, Quadrangle books, 1966. 221 p. JX1954.M53 1966

Contents.--A working peace system.--The problem of equality in historical perspective.--An advance in democratic representation.--Problems in international administration.--The functional approach to world organization.--Functional federalism.--The prospect of European integration: federal or functional.

Advocates "the voluntary cooperation of a number of nations with common interests for the purpose of creating supra-national institutions after the model of the specialized agencies of the United Nations and of the European Communities." This "functional approach" to the problem of divisive nationalism would direct popular allegiances to supranational institutions and render national states superfluous.

1883
Mohanty, Guru Prasad. ONE WORLD: WHY, HOW AND WHEN. [Calcutta, Cosmos Printers & Publishers, 1965] 183 p. B5134.M605

Proposes that man develop through his powers of intuition, an inner "awareness" that evolution and life have real meaning. "Once we have this vision other differences and conflicts racial, national, communal etc. will recede. . . . The concept of one Government, total disarmament and lasting peace and prosperity could be effective if we decide to follow a common means in achieving them by exploiting the tremendous radiating powers of mind." Mohanty writes on the universe and man's role in it; the origins of life and evolution; the atom and its effects on man's understanding; radioactive pollution; the science of Yoga; and "one world" as the way to achieve progress rather than destruction. "Through dharma one can gain material welfare and realise his desires as well; why then is not dharma resorted to?"

1884
Nicol, Davidson. TOWARD A WORLD ORDER: AN AFRICAN VIEWPOINT. Daedalus, v. 95, spring 1966: 674-693. Q11.B7, v. 95

Ranges over various topics from barriers against the achievement of world order (language, nationalist or racist historiography, the learning of homogeneous values in a heterogeneous world) to the formation of modern African nations. The author stresses the contributions independent African states can make to world order, through their own unification and peacekeeping efforts and through an eclectic and nonalined approach to international affairs.

1885
Porsholt, Lars. ON METHODS OF CONFLICT PREVENTION. Journal of peace research, no. 2, 1966: 178-193. AS9.J6, 1966

In this article, 'conflict' is defined as a situation where actors are pursuing incompatible goals. It is assumed that the actors are acting if and only if they deem the value of the goal, weighed by the probability of attaining it, to be greater than the value of the means used, i.e. the value lost through the struggle. In terms of the variables of a conflict model, conditions of power balance are formulated, i.e. of a situation where both parties are determined to defend themselves if attacked, and neither attacks. A distinction is drawn between the political burden of military aggression, and the physical cost of warfare; similarly, it is distinguished between valuation of the goal from the point of view of expansion and from that of security. On the basis of these distinctions, the concepts of non-expansive attitude and of aggressiveness by fear are defined and their influence on the conditions of power balance is discuss d. It is shown that in a situation where none of the actors is expansive and both perceive the other party's attitude as non-expansive, peace is independent of military methods of conflict prevention, and thus the concept of power balance cannot be applied. Non-military methods of conflict prevention are defined as measures aiming at influencing the actor's attitude in the direction of non-expansiveness. Finally, it is attempted to formulate a survery of non-military conflict prevention measures, based in part on how these measures influence the actor's expectations concerning warfare and international cooperation, and in part on which of the value variables determining the actor's attitude they affect. (Summary supplied)

1886
PUGWASH XV. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 22, Apr. 1966: 42-47. TK9145.A84, v. 22

Activities of the 15th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, held at Addis Ababa, Dec. 29, 1965-Jan. 3, 1966. Five working groups dealt with education in developing countries, the organization of science in developing countries, the scientific approach in aid to developing countries, specific problems of developing countries, and security problems of developing countries. Among the issues examined by the last group were nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, the Vietnam conflict, economic burdens of defense expenditures, and the role of the United Nations. A list of participants and observers at the Conference is included.

1887
Pyronnet, Joseph. [NONVIOLENT ACTION: A NEW FORCE DE FRAPPE] L'action non-violente: une nouvelle force de frappe. [Paris, Éditions Témoignage

chrêtien, 1965] 170 p. (Bibliothèque de l'homme d'action) HM278. P9
Bibliography: p. [167]-170.

Partial contents. --Confronting Hitler: the resistance of Norwegian professors. --The nuclear problem seen by the British. --Two years of nonviolent action in France (April 1960-May 1962). --Psychological action and active nonviolence. --The Sino-Indian conflict or the nation of nonviolence.

Defends nonviolence as an effective mode of popular action and calls upon men to protest the use of force in an age where destructive achievements of technology make this their duty.

1888
RESOLUTION ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE STRUGGLE TO REINFORCE WORLD PEACE. Review of international affairs, v. 17, June 20, 1966: 27-28. D839. R4, v. 17

Text of a resolution adopted by the 6th Congress of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia, held in Belgrade June 7-11, 1966. The Congress calls for an end to the arms race, "renunciation of the use of force, gradual disarmament--both nuclear and classic and including the immediate dismantling of all military bases located on foreign territory, and the organized efforts of the entire international community to create conditions for economic cooperation such as would make it possible for all peoples to enjoy freely the fruits of their labor and the advantages of general human progress." U.S. actions in Vietnam and "the stubborn refusal of colonialism to relinquish its remaining strongholds" are particularly condemned.

1889
Roberts, William H. 'NON-VIOLENCE' AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY. World affairs, v. 128, Jan./Mar. 1966: 224-232. JX1901. W7, v. 128

Since 1917 Communist strategy has been predicated upon the belief that Communist goals can be achieved without warfare. Recent Soviet pronouncements on the dogma of peaceful coexistence have not denied the essential end of that dogma--propagation of world revolution and attainment of a Communist denouement on a global scale. To achieve this purpose Communist strategists understand that countermeasures mounted against communism by non-Communist states must be rendered innocuous by antigovernment opposition within those states. "Nonviolent" peace protests work toward the same end. "The principal tactical goal of 'nonviolent' protests in the field of foreign policy-making is . . . the paralysis or quasi-paralysis of the nation's social leadership. On the other hand, the strategic purpose of 'non-violent' protests is an attempt to deprive the government of the moral support of the major social groups which it needs in executing any more important political move in the field of foreign policy." Because true majorities of the chief social groups are unlikely to withhold support from the government unstructured mass actions--the peace organizations--were established "to bring their collective pressure to bear on the leadership of the legitimate social groups to which citizens belong qua faith, race, occupation, or profession." Advocates of "nonviolence" understand that any official reprisal against their influence on the conduct of foreign policy will place them in an "underdog" role and attract to their support a larger number of ideologically disinterested sympathizers, who will "share with the advocates of 'non-violent protest a feeling of resentment against those who had to employ means of compulsion." These sympathizers will have become part of what is known in Communist terminology as "the masses." Americans must ask themselves whether peace is desirable if it must lead, as Communist doctrine asserts, to the loss of a value system they treasure. "To demonstrate for peace qua absence of war and to profess neutrality regarding the value systems involved is, therefore, not only impolitic since it offers aid to the opponent. It is also, and at best, a morally very doubtful exercise of our freedom since it tends to undermine the very value system on which this freedom is based."

1890
Sharp, Gene, and others. THE INVASION THAT WAS: A SYMPOSIUM-IN-PRINT ON THE MEANING OF THE GRINDSTONE ISLAND EXPERIMENT IN CIVILIAN NATIONAL DEFENSE. Fellowship, v. 32, May 1966: 13-15, 27. JX1901. F45, v. 32

Impressions of a 1965 experiment in nonviolent resistance. During the "Grindstone Experiment" an invasion of Grindstone Island was simulated while defenders attempted to resist nonviolently. The participants, students at the Grindstone Island Summer Institute sponsored by the Canadian Friends Service Committee, were for the most part veterans of the nonviolent and pacifist movement. Yet at the end of the 31 hours of the experiment 13 of the defenders had "died" and most of the group "had been faced with the failure of many of their deepest-held attitudes and actions." The experiment was reported in Theodore Olson and Gordon Christiansen's book Thirty-One Hours (Grindstone Press, New London, Conn.). Gene Sharp, Charles C. Walker, Roy Kepler, and Charles Bloomstein--all experts in the fields of nonviolence and civilian defense--comment here on Thirty-One Hours and its meaning for the concepts of nonviolent defense.

1891
Sohn, Louis B. CHINA, THE U.N., AND THE U.S. War/peace report, v. 6, Apr. 1966: 10-11. P&GP RR

The two major problems Communist China poses for U.S. foreign policy involve recognition and the United Nations. Solution of these problems has been precluded by the refusal of one side in the cold war to approve any measure likely to be regarded as a possible gain by the other. Perhaps a package solution, so complicated that "even an expert would not be able to read the scorecard" and incorporating so many elements that neither side could claim a clear victory and all contestants would realize advantages, may solve the China-United Nations dilemma. As a basis for discussion the following elements are suggested for the package: "The Chinese seat at the United Nations should be declared vacant, with neither of the two successors being entitled to occupy it." At the same time all divided countries (the two Chinas, the two Koreas, the two Vietnams, and the two Germanies) should be admitted to the United Nations, with the stipulation that the governments of East Germany, South Vietnam, North Korea, and Formosa would within 5 years be required to hold plebiscites, under U.N. supervision, to determine whether their citizens wished to unite with the other halves of these nations. The two sides in the cold war may be inclined to gamble on the results of these plebiscites. The People's Republic of China, West Germany, India and Japan would be given permanent Security Council seats, thereby providing more adequate Asian representation. Permanent members

of the Security Council would retain the veto only with respect to binding Council decisions, while the Security Council could "make recommendations by a vote concurred in by a majority of the permanent members and a majority of the non-permanent members of the Council." The importance of nonbinding decisions from the newly universal General Assembly may prompt Security Council members to surrender veto power in this area, thus preventing veto-power proliferation because of enlarged membership. While the package plan may seem more difficult to achieve than each of its components, "in practice this longer route might lead to the goal of a more peaceful world much faster than an attempt to solve each problem on its merits, in isolation from all the others."

1892
Swan, Herbert L. POSITIVE ~~NEGATIVE~~ PEACEFARE: THE NEGLECTED ART OF WAGING PEACE. New York, Vantage Press [1966] 149 p.
JX1952. S96

Outlines a positive, constructive approach to peace. The author locates the cause of war in nations' anarchic behavior and the hope for peace in the peace-loving nature of all peoples. "The truth to perceive is that we the peoples have always kept the peace, that it is our nations that keep on losing it." Despite the continuous expansion of states' war apparatus, war, because it means mass destruction, is obsolete. Nations can adjust to one another by establishing Departments of Peace whose long-term policies must be "growth through integration." One-sided foreign policies that "condition, cause, begin, and end war" must be harmonized and synthesized. An initial goal is the creation of an East-West modus vivendi, which can be attained by demonstrating and proclaiming the need for and possibility of interdependence and coexistence. The divisions in a Department of Peace might appear as follows: Education for Peace, Publicity for Peace, Speaker's Bureau for Peace, Cultural Projects to Spread National and Racial Tolerance, Clearing House for Individual Ideas and Group Movements on Peace, Regional Peace, World Peace, Foreign Policy. The technique to be used consists of compromise and making the necessary allowances for differences between nations. Disarmament is a future possibility but not useful in the absence of positive peacefare: "disarmament conferences collapse and disarmament pacts are broken because our statesmen always treat the symptom, armaments, never the disease, anarchy."

1893
Will, Herman. AN INTER-RELIGIOUS EXCHANGE ON PEACE. War/peace report, v. 6, Apr. 1966: 16-17.
P&GP RR

The first National Inter-Religious Conference on Peace met March 15-17, 1966, in Washington, with its 300 delegates and 6 co-chairmen drawn from the Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Jewish, Unitarian-Universalist, Episcopal, and Methodist religions. Workshops dealt with the changing Communist world, China and Asia, and the morality and limits of intervention. Proposals included communications and exchange programs with Communist China, ceasefire and a United Nations-administered settlement in Vietnam, a halt to the bombing in Vietnam, and rejection of the notion that the United States enjoys the right to intervene wherever danger of Communist revolution is present. "It appears likely that this unofficial group under the six co-chairmen will continue to move in new directions toward an international conference."

1894
WORLD PEACE COUNCIL SESSION, GENEVA, JUNE 13-16, 1966. New times, no. 28, July 13, 1966: 37-48.
D839. N483, 1966

Contents.--Appeal to all concerned about the future of humanity.--Appeal to all the peoples of the world to intensify activity in support of the Vietnamese people's just struggle against the U.S. war of aggression.--Memorandum on European security.--The struggle for national independence is an integral part of the struggle for peace (general resolution).--Resolution on organizational and structural problems.--Resolution on Cuba.--Letter to the members of the 18-Nation Committee.

Resolutions, appeals, and memoranda of the World Peace Council session at Geneva, June 13-16, 1966. The letter to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament calls for new initiatives toward general and complete disarmament and the implementation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, a nonproliferation treaty, and other limited measures.

IV. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. GENERAL STUDIES

1895
Bauer, Eddy. IS FORCE NECESSARY? 1. THE EVOLUTION OF ARMIES THROUGHOUT THE AGES. NATO letter, v. 14, Mar. 1966: 8-20. illus.
D845.2.A44, v. 14

Presents the historical development of regular armed forces since the era of the Roman Empire with a brief assessment of the influence of social and political structure upon the composition of armies throughout the period. The effect of nuclear weapons upon laws of military science and combat deployment receives some attention.

1896
Clemens, Walter C., comp. SOVIET DISARMAMENT POLICY, 1917-1963: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOVIET AND WESTERN SOURCES. [Stanford, Calif.] Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, 1965. 151 p. (Hoover Institution bibliographical series, 22)
Z2517.R4C4

Lists and annotates "the most important primary and secondary materials on Soviet disarmament policy which have appeared in Russia, Europe, and North America from 1917 to 1963." Most of the materials are from Soviet sources, partly because Western material is highly abundant and partly because Western articles may be easily located through the bibliographies and periodicals listed by the author and through the standard indexes. The materials have been organized in the categories of chronological (pre- and post-World War II), orientation (Communist, Western, and League of Nations or United Nations materials), and documents or secondary works.

1897
Denton, F. H. SOME REGULARITIES IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT, 1820-1949. Background, v. 9, Feb. 1966: 283-296. D839.B4, v. 9

Reports a statistical analysis designed to "detect and summarize regularities in the perceived 'causes' of large scale conflict between social groups (war) from 1820 to 1949." The study utilized data from Lewis Richardson's Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (Pittsburgh, 1960) with the caveat that Richardson's sources are primarily European and thus undoubtedly reflect some cultural bias. Among certain regularities noted were the following: a periodicity in international conflict, an economic-colonial war grouping "as expected from Marxist theory" but "relatively rare today," a second "colonial" war grouping stemming from the European-Moslem cultural animosity, and several disparate categories of conflict within the concept of "civil war."

1898
Dudley, C. E. S. INSURRECTION: FROM THE JACOBINS TO MAO TSE-TUNG. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 111, May 1966: 163-168. U1.R8, v. 111

A brief history of violent insurrectionary movements and ideas from the period of the French Revolution through the thought of Mao's Chinese revolutionary movement. The ideas of Jean Jacques Rousseau, Robespierre, "Gracchus" Babeuf, Louis Auguste Blanqui, Karl Marx, Freidrich Engels, V. I. Lenin, Mao Tse-Tung, and their disciples are sketched, showing how concepts of insurrection have altered in their 120-odd year span.

1899
Fuller, Jon W. THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE. Orbis, v. 10, spring 1966: 247-273.
D839.O68, v. 10

Studies the attitude toward chemical and biological weapons expressed at various international conferences since 1868 and examines U.S. and Soviet attitudes toward their use in modern warfare. The author finds that the effective propaganda launched against gas warfare during the First World War has been largely responsible for the universal condemnation of chemical and biological agents. He also notes the contention that such agents will, because of their benign and temporary effects in certain instances, become the weapons of the future. International law may yet be able to outlaw toxic chemical and biological weapons while allowing the use of certain nonlethal agents which might be particularly useful in arming an international police force. "In making a future decision about using chemical or biological weapons, the statesman or the general will have to balance the opprobrium attached to their use with the probable advantages to be derived. If it is thought that such weapons will be decisive, they will almost certainly be used."

1900
Greene, Wade. DISARMAMENT: THE CHALLENGE OF CIVILIZATION. New York, Coward-McCann [1966] 119 p. JX1974.G73

A layman's guide to disarmament during the 20th century for children and adults. Greene views disarmament efforts following the First and Second World Wars and during John F. Kennedy's administration, and sketches present day attempts to lessen the risk of war and achieve arms control. "The challenge to the men who try to negotiate disarmament is to find common grounds that don't threaten national interests and feelings."

1901
Quester, George H. DETERRENCE BEFORE HIROSHIMA: THE AIRPOWER BACKGROUND OF MODERN STRATEGY. New York, Wiley [1966] 196 p.
U162.6.Q4

Hypothesizes that "the major strategic complications imposed by bomber aircraft . . . arose early in the twentieth century with the introduction of aircraft systems that first led governments to assume the bomb-delivery capabilities that only now exist." As evidence the author analyzes concepts and applications of airpower from 1899 to 1945. Trends that have been uncovered include a "connection of sympathy" between decisionmakers and civilian populations; lessening of the value attached to cities as war goes on and a

nation's soldiers are sacrificed; reduction of fear of civilian casualties as the danger of defeat or invasion grows; limited effectiveness of palliatives such as physically or mentally preparing urban populations for bombing attacks; destabilizing effects of offensively superior aerial weapons; and the failure of deterrence to prevent limited wars and their escalation into general war. The advent of nuclear weapons has changed the nature of air deterrence but little. Serious dangers of miscalculation still exist, and restraint on the part of states is essential to the maintenance of peace.

1902
Schilling, Kurt. [METHODS AND FORMS OF WORLD DOMINATION] Wege und Formen der Weltherrschaft. Der Staat, v. 5, no. 2, 1966: 163-187.
LL

In ancient times each great civilization produced an empire ensuring its peoples peace and security, but its expansion was limited by the technical means through which the central authority could control peripheral realms. This was also the case with the "Holy Roman Empire" whose Diet of Worms in 1231 foreshadowed the development of modern sovereign states in Europe by granting territorial independence to German principalities. But the technological and industrial progress that began in the 16th century finally made realization of a universal empire feasible. The first two powers to aspire for this role, Great Britain and France, did so from the 18th century onward. Britain sought domination outside Europe by control of commercial routes. Its rapid, Calvinist-motivated industrialization gave it political power to control its colonial territories with a minimum of military force. Great Britain's superior strength and its preoccupation with the continental balance of power overwhelmed Napoleon's ambitious efforts to achieve world dominion. The ensuing balance of power (restored by the Congress of Vienna with Britain its strongest protector) lasted practically unshaken until World War I. In the meantime, however, enormous increases of territory by Russia and the United States signalled the end of British aspirations. World dominion by America today would not require U.S. territorial expansion. Indicative of this are the successful realization by the United States of the Monroe Doctrine and achievement of the celebrated "American way of life" (based on John Locke's social philosophy intertwined with traces of secularized Puritanism.) Given American capital and technical means, virtually nothing limits the potential of private American interests to overpower the economies of many nations. Domination of this kind needs peace. "Yet for exactly the reason that it is domination, such a peace is for the long run intolerable." The second contender for world dominion, Russia, remained until 1917 a feudal and agricultural society, perfectly suited to foreign economic exploitation. Lenin's genius offered Russia its best and perhaps only chance of elevating itself to this role. The Communist system for world domination rests on national Communist parties' laying claim to and "defending" each nation. As terror and violence are inevitably associated with the system, it is unacceptable as a universal empire. The most recent entrant to the power struggle is China, but that nation's revolt against Western colonialism is longstanding (e.g., the Opium War, 1840-42). Communist rule made China a free and sovereign nation; it also negated, for the first time in 3,500 years, the whole Chinese tradition. Disregarding all other factors, China's geographical and human size makes it both contender for world domination and opponent of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Any balance of power needs one controlling power. Therefore neither a bipolar nor a multipolar world is possible for the long run.

1903
Slukhai, Ivan A. [ROCKETS AND TRADITIONS] Rakety i traditsii. Moskva, Voen. izd-vo, 1965. 223 p. illus.
TL781.8R9S55

A history of rocket and missile research and development in Russia and the U.S.S.R. from the 19th century. The author emphasizes the peaceful intentions of Soviet rocket development and states that the Soviet rocket program was diverted to military ends because of the constant threat to the Soviet state from the imperialist powers that had encircled it.

B. THE BACKGROUND UP TO WORLD WAR I

1904
Chapin, Seymour L. A CASE OF ARMS CONTROL IN THE FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT. Journal of the history of ideas, v. 27, Apr./June 1966: 285-295.
Bl.J75, v. 27

In 1790 Brun de Condamine persuaded the French Académie des Sciences to evaluate his conception of a weapon that would destroy enemy warships by inflaming their sails. A spokesman for the Academy, Gabriel Bory, doubted the inventor's contention that use of the device would save lives. Pointing out that in 1759 Louis XV had "buried in oblivion" a proposal to develop and employ Greek fire, Bory concluded that "the Academy, 'faithful to its principles and those of humanity,' could not undertake the experiments proposed by Brun de Condamine without an express order of the Government to do so." Since the government did not order the tests, Montesquieu apparently was right about his own era when he wrote in the Persian Letters: "You claim to fear that someone may invent a method of destruction more cruel than those in use. No, if such a fatal invention were discovered, it would soon be prohibited by the law of nations and supressed by unanimous consent." Although such French efforts as the attempt to equal and surpass England's ability to determine longitude at sea were motivated partly by military considerations, they were "demonstrations of man's increasing constructiveness through his use of reason; they were not destructive of that very humanity." Why, then, did the Reign of Terror approve the development of an incendiary bullet? For one thing France's military situation in 1793-94 approached desperation. Perhaps of greater significance was the emergence of the concept of total war. Finally, the suppression of the Academy--"an anachronistic symbol of the Old Regime"--meant "the loss both of a society which had considered itself not only the arbiter of projects but the defender, if not the shaper, of enlightened principles, and of one in which the militarist had been combined with the scientist."

1905
Jiří z Poděbrad, King of Bohemia, 1420-1471. THE UNIVERSAL PEACE ORGANIZATION OF KING GEORGE OF BOHEMIA: A FIFTEENTH CENTURY PLAN FOR WORLD PEACE, 1462/1464. Prague, Pub. House of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 1964. 120 p. illus.
JX1942.J513
Bibliographical footnotes.

In honor of its 500th anniversary an historical analysis of the peace project of King George of Poděbrady by Václav Vaněček, its reproduction in Latin, and translations into English, Russian, French, and Spanish of the project, which was formulated "to rid mankind of the scourge of war and to safeguard a lasting

Peace throughout the World." According to V. Vaněček the King's Treaty on the Establishment of Peace Throughout Christendom was a "forerunner of all that represents the fundamentals" of the United Nations. He proposed "peaceful coexistence" with the Turks; but if Islam persisted in aggression the Christian world would initiate a joint defense against it. The never-accepted treaty required that disputes between its signatories be settled peacefully, envisaged the creation of a universal law, and provided for the organization of the international community within a universal peace body which would include an assembly of delegates, a council of rulers, an international court of justice, and an administrative apparatus. The treaty explicitly stated that state sovereignty and equality would not be affected by these arrangements.

C. THE INTERWAR PERIOD AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

1906
Carroll, Berenice A. GERMANY DISARMED AND REARMING, 1925-1935. Journal of peace research, no. 2, 1966: 114-124. AS9.J6, 1966

An 'armament-disarmament scale' of eight steps is proposed at the outset against which to evaluate Germany's armament level in the period under consideration. The level permitted by the Treaty of Versailles falls at step 4 on this scale. Through examination of German military records, in particular the secret mobilization plans of the Reichswehr, we show that the actual level of German armaments, while greatly exceeding permitted amounts, did not rise above step 5 (defensive forces) through the year 1934 nor even through the year 1935, when Hitler openly repudiated the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. Since the scale proposed depends in part upon the level of economic commitment to armaments, a table comparing military expenditures and gross national product in Germany, the United States and England, 1929-1945, is appended (compiled from the sources cited, including some unpublished German records). We conclude that, while Germany's violations of the military provisions of the Treaty of Versailles were flagrant and substantial, her military forces were kept within the bounds of what was, for those years, a defensive establishment. This remained true for six to eight years after the departure from Germany of the Interallied Military Control Commission (early 1927). From this experience of disarmament we draw a number of suggestions relevant to problems of disarmament today. (Summary supplied)

D. THE POST-WORLD WAR II PERIOD AND THE UNITED NATIONS

1907
Aleksandrov, A. [THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. STRATEGIC AVIATION AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR] Razvitie strategicheskoi aviatsii SShA posle vtoroi mirovoi voiny. Voenno-istoricheskoi zhurnal, v. 8, Apr. 1966: 43-53. illus. DK50.A3, v. 8

Surveys the development of U.S. strategic aircraft since 1945. Improvements in range, speed, bomb load capacity, and defense systems throughout this period are reported.

1908
Brown, Neville. THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE SUPER-POWERS: THE AMERICANS WON. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 111, May 1966: 144-147. U1.R8, v. 111

Analyzes some of the devices and weapons which allowed the U.S. to gain temporary military superiority over the U.S.S.R. in light of the overall strategic doctrine of the two superpowers. While the United States was developing offensive capabilities revolving around an intercontinental bomber and missile force, the Soviets were concentrating their energies toward a small intercontinental capability and a larger medium-range capability directed primarily at NATO. In comparing Soviet and American weapons, Brown cites characteristics which might have forced the Soviets to gamble and deploy medium and intermediate range missiles in Cuba. This act "should be seen less as a bold adventure by a state that felt invincible than as a desperate endeavour to redress or to appear to redress, a growing strategic imbalance . . . . Between 1962 and 1966 the strategic situation has been gradually transformed from one of acute Soviet inferiority to one of virtual stalemate."

1909
Hacker, Jens. [BERLIN'S LEGAL STATUS: CHANGES IN SOVIET INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW] Die Rechtslage Berlins; die Wandlungen in der sowjetischen Rechtsauffassung. Hrsg. vom Bundesministerium für Gesamtdeutsche Fragen. Bonn [1964] 44 p. JX4084.B38.H25

Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--Berlin's status under international law.--Four Powers' regulation.--Lines of communication with Berlin.--Interpretation of law by the Soviets.--Berlin's status according to constitutional law.

Considers Berlin's status in relation to the Four Powers, to the German Federal Republic, and to the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany. The following are discussed at length: the London Protocol of September 1944, the London Agreement of November 1944, joint regulations and measures introduced in 1945 by the Four Powers with regard to Germany and Berlin, the Western allies' and West Germany's rights to lines of communication with Berlin, the 1948 change in the official Soviet position on the city's status, the Soviet Union's proposal of 1958 for transforming West Berlin into a "Free City" and its renouncement of the Four Powers' regulation of 1945, and Berlin's relation under law to the German Federal Republic and East Berlin's to the Soviet zone of Germany. Hacker concludes that according to international law the whole Berlin area is subject to the Four Powers' authority. According to the constitutional law of the German Federal Republic the city constitutes an integral part of the republic. However the application of this principle encounters difficulties due to certain reservations "by the allies."

1910
Laloy, Jean. [THE DIVISION OF THE WORLD] La division du monde. Preuves, v. 16, May 1966: 3-9. AP20.P74, v. 16

What were the origins of the postwar division of the world into two great blocs? Knowing this it becomes possible to devise strategies for healing the split. Two types of explanation are popular. One claims that international relations are based on power and that bipolarity resulted from the disappearance of all but two power centers. "Several autonomous powers equilibrate themselves better than two great poles whose interests necessarily conflict." The other explanation is that the Socialist ideology of the Soviet Union necessitated division, and that this division will endure until a single world political system is established. Neither of these theories isolates the core of the problem.

After the war the Soviet Union and the United States had no conflicting "national interests" and were not opposed by traditional rivalries. As states they "seemed destined to live in peace." Nor did the existence of two great military forces create, of itself, a fatal rivalry. "Conflict of interests, weapons, and imperialisms created certain conditions of the schism, but not the schism itself." The conflict which developed in 1945 was of a different, more absolute and brutal, nature. Ideologies too were reconcilable in the postwar period had not other events and feelings intervened. Power considerations, global geopolitical rivalries, social structures (collectivism, free enterprise), and ideologies (socialism, individualism) contained no inevitable dynamism leading to deep division between the United States and the Soviet Union. At fault were "wills," the perceptions that decisionmakers had of themselves and their roles. A disparity in political goals set the character of postwar relations. The Soviet Union sought to transform a world; the United States, preferring isolation, acted on a world scale to maintain stability based, in principle, on the tolerance of diversity. Neither adversary understood the motives of the other and thus judged the other's actions as worse than they were. "Many believed that division led to war and saw no salvation except in even greater power. Thus occurred the era of confrontation without issue." Because the Soviet-U.S. crisis does not stem from inevitable circumstances or collective passions, but from a political choice, it is subject to modification via intellectual and moral transformations. The first step is to remove intentions of total victory and the second is to change erroneous policies.

1911
Smith, Alice Kimball. A PERIL AND A HOPE: THE SCIENTISTS' MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1945-1947. Chicago, University of Chicago Press [1965] 591 p. Q127.U6S6

Details the entry of scientists into American political life through their concern with the implications of the atomic bomb. Political activities of the so-called "scientists' movement" during and after World War II are discussed in the context of the relation of scientists to public affairs in general.

1912
Smith, T. L. TWENTY YEARS OF GUIDED WEAPONS. In Royal Aeronautical Society. Journal, v. 70, May 1966: 585-591. TL501.R7, v. 70

Covers the World War II development of British guided missiles, the postwar period during which industry joined government in missile work, and the development of air-to-air and surface-to-air weapons.

1913
Stucky, Harley J. AUGUST 6, 1945--THE IMPACT OF ATOMIC ENERGY. New York, American Press [1964] 144 p. UF767.S86

A brief analysis of the development and use of the atomic bomb. Its impact on America and the world is analyzed, and alternative methods of controlling this awesome force are presented. In the author's opinion the only feasible method is international control of atomic weaponry.

V. GENERAL ANALYSES AND BASIC APPROACHES

A. GENERAL ANALYSES

1914
Barnet, Richard J., and Richard A. Falk, eds. SECURITY IN DISARMAMENT. Princeton, N.J., Published for Princeton Center of International Studies [by] Princeton University Press, 1965. 441 p.
JX1974. B27

"Many of the chapters . . . grew out of working papers prepared for the Woods Hole Summer Study of 1962."

Bibliography: p. 429-430.

Investigates "the technical and political feasibility of choosing arms control and disarmament as a national security strategy." The futility of continuing the arms race and the achievement of arms control agreements have generated a climate, the editors feel, of increased interest in disarmament. Various issues evolving from the search for disarmament are becoming more and more a part of public debate. Three problem areas are singled out in this collection of essays. The first includes problems of getting started toward disarmament and arms control with an emphasis on the issue of inspection. The second area encompasses "the fear of national governments that they will be 'locked in' to a disarmament agreement that will jeopardize their interests." Sanctions and enforcement are major issues dealt with here. Particular problems resulting from drastic disarmament measures constitute the third area. "Without a theory of how international society might function in a warless world, it is difficult to determine whether particular measures of arms control or disarmament are leading in a desired direction."

1915
Deutsch, Karl W. INTEGRATION AND ARMS CONTROL IN THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT: A SUMMARY REPORT. American political science review, v. 60, June 1966: 354-365.
JA1. A6, v. 60

Based upon a study undertaken at Yale University and in Western Europe in 1963-65 and supported in part by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Nationality, not class, occupation, religion, or any of the other determinants that cut across national boundaries, exerts the greatest influence upon political attitudes in present-day Europe. Editorials in elite newspapers and public opinion polls evince a decline of interest in general political and legal designs for a united Europe. "There is striking consensus in France and Germany on the desirability of arms control and disarmament on a more than local or regional scale, and including further direct agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union." Both French and German elites express fear of nuclear proliferation and support continued disarmament discussions. Over half the French respondents to sampling feel that the force de frappe will be either abandoned or turned into a European institution after De Gaulle's death. Ninety-five percent of the West Germans sampled declared a West German nuclear force not worth its cost. The West German elite express "no strong positive desire" to attain multilateral sharing of nuclear weapons. "The proportions of the various responses to these and related questions confirm an impression from our interviews: there is no substantial German pressure for an MLF [multilateral nuclear force] but rather a willingness to go along with such a scheme, if Germany's ally, the United States, should insist on it." Certain conclusions seem warranted: There is no evidence that the next few years will witness "any autonomously developing changes in the French or West German political system." Supranational political issues will be subordinated to national issues in these nations. During times of crisis European nations will strengthen their ties with the United States, not with each other. "In terms of European unification, we may expect after 1975 a possible resumption of the advances of the 1950s, but not much earlier." The states of Europe favor increased arms control measures, a nonproliferation pact, and extension of the nuclear test ban treaty. "They favor all these policies, however, only provided that they can keep the American alliance and the American nuclear shield." Hence, the United States enjoys an unusual opportunity to exercise leadership in the European area; fulfillment of this opportunity must be "weighed carefully in the balance against the attractions of any policy of predominant or unlimited United States commitments on the continent of Asia."

1916
DISARMAMENT AT THE TWENTIETH U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. External affairs, v. 18, Jan. 1966: 21-24.
JX351. A3, v. 18

Reports General Assembly discussions and actions concerning nonproliferation, the proposed World Disarmament Conference, an extension of the test ban, nuclear-free zones, and general and complete disarmament.

1917
Djerdja, Josip. BREAKING A VICIOUS CIRCLE. Review of international affairs, v. 17, Apr. 5, 1966: 3-5.
D839. R4, v. 17

As the nuclear powers continue to haggle over the differences in their positions on a possible nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the number of countries willing or able to produce a nuclear weapon continues to grow, thereby decreasing the possibility of achieving control over nuclear armaments. The positions of the major powers at Geneva have never changed. The talks on extension of the Moscow test ban treaty to underground nuclear testing also remain deadlocked on the question of inspection, with the United States rejecting the Soviet assertion that modern advances in science and technology have produced instruments of observation capable of substituting for on-site inspection. "If one bears in mind the accuracy with which the outside world follows and locates the underground tests in the U.S.S.R., and if it is known how efficient numerous space 'observers' are, then this, together with all the other available instruments, would probably speak more in favour of the Soviet than the American thesis."

There can be no illusions that implementation of these limited measures would lead to great material changes in national armaments. "However, they would have a moral and political effect which would exercise a beneficial influence in other spheres and would, above all, considerably facilitate preparations for a general disarmament conference, to be convened in the near future." The greatest obstacle to the initiation of the disarmament process is the reluctance of the major powers to sacrifice political objectives through termination of the arms race. Just as the developing nations are forced to remain under the heavy burden of their colonial past because of the political shortsightedness of the major powers, so all of mankind is forced to live in a state of armed peace and constant fear of war because of a similar shortsightedness. Elaboration of new disarmament policies and adoption of new practices in trade and economic development thus are the most urgent prerequisites for real progress.

1918
Ewald, Robert F. ONE OF MANY POSSIBLE GAMES. Background, v. 9, Feb. 1966: 275-282.
D839. B4, v. 9

Describes the playing of a game whose model was limited world government and general disarmament. Based on the Clark-Sohn model developed in World Peace Through World Law (1960), the simulation was used in a course for graduate students in education. According to Ewald the simulation proved highly useful in explaining the model.

1919
Lall, Arthur S. TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND DISARMAMENT: SOME GENERAL PROPOSITIONS. Disarmament, no. 9, Mar. 1966: 6-10.
JX1918. P7D5, 1966

Violent territorial disputes--prevalent today--may disturb the cold war détente and stalemate disarmament negotiations; flout international law, especially the U.N. Charter; and engender cynicism about the international peacekeeping and security apparatus. But violence may fortuitously contribute to disarmament, even if it is "the most dangerous and destructive approach," by making the great powers aware of the necessity to seek peace and security through nonmilitary measures that may include disarmament. Mutual tensions do not affect the great powers' willingness to negotiate on means for arresting nuclear weapons development in other countries. But nonnuclear nations generally look askance at such proposals, which expect sacrifices from them without alleviating the dangers that confront them and without requiring great-power disarmament moves. Territorial disputes do inhibit readiness to negotiate disarmament issues for the counties directly involved. Especially inimical to disarmament measures in conflict areas is the apparent eagerness of a great power to involve itself on one side of a dispute. Because interest in a territorial dispute is most often not localized or confined to the actual disputants, "the armament complexes and upward armament spirals which develop in the atmosphere of territorial disputes can be most surely reduced or down-turned in the context of agreed steps of global disarmament and arms control rather than by measures aimed at local disarmament." Germany, Indonesia, Pakistan, and India will not agree to arms control measures unless these are part of a general agreement. But the great powers will probably not negotiate disarmament issues that affect them directly while they are engaged in a military conflict. So it seems that meaningful disarmament is possible only after U.S., Soviet, and Chinese involvement in Vietnam is ended.

1920
McGuire, Martin C. SECRECY AND THE ARMS RACE; A THEORY OF THE ACCUMULATION OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND HOW SECRECY AFFECTS IT. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1965. 249 p. (Harvard economic studies, v. 125)
UA10. M33

Contents.--Introduction.--Prerequisites for a theory of the arms race.--The choice of armaments: an economic decision.--Secrecy and the economic model.--The arms race: an interaction process.--Secrecy and interaction in the arms race.--Information exchange and arms control.--Appendix A. A simulation model: uncertainty in deterrence and attack.--Appendix B. Uncertainty in Richardsonian models.

Proposes to "present a theory of the arms race" and "to investigate the role that information--or its inverse, secrecy--plays in the arms race, and, in particular, to explore the question of how much secrecy is worth." The model used is primarily an economic one and is confined to the race between the major adversaries to build strategic weapons and delivery systems. Questions studied include what factors generate armaments races, how information is used--or misused, and what effects these have on negotiations for arms control.

1921
Mahnke, Dieter. [RESEARCH PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY (ACDA)] Das Forschungsprogramm der "United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency" (ACDA). Europa-Archiv, v. 21, June 10, 1966: 421-424. D839. E86, v. 21

Outlines the tasks, organization, and research activities of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The author reports briefly on long-term research projects, and more extensively on those conducted in 1965, which, among other matters dealt with the following questions: nonproliferation of nuclear arms and their delivery systems, regional arms races, verification of arms control, economic effects of defense cutbacks, arms control and limited wars, and the international political climate. The author concludes that the influence exerted on U.S. arms control and disarmament policy by the agency and other American research teams (governmental and private) that deal with similar problems "should not be underestimated."

1922
Moch, Jules. DISARMAMENT IN 1966: HOPES AND FACTS. Disarmament, no. 10, June 1966: 7-10.
JX1918. P7D5, 1966

Argues the importance of partial measures during periods (such as the present) when progress toward general and complete disarmament is unfeasible. General and complete disarmament is said to be postponed by the failure to achieve national reunifications (Germany, Vietnam, Korea, China) and regional security, conditions that particularly militate against the peaceful atmosphere essential to disarmament successes. Mr. Moch lists those limited measures that he feels will "constitute a slight halt on the road towards world catastrophe" and engender a "Geneva spirit" conducive to progress in disarmament.

1923
Noel-Baker, Philip. [ARE THERE MURDERERS AMONG THE SCIENTISTS?] Les assassins sont-ils parmi les savants? Nouvel observateur, no. 82, June 8, 1966: 2-5. AP20.02, 1966

The power of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and man's defenselessness before them are frightening. "A war conducted with modern weapons threatens really to provoke the end of the world." Do the scientists who develop these weapons have an extraordinary responsibility? Nine points are relevant: (1) All taxpayers are responsible for national defense policies. (2) Some, but not all, scientists can be conscientious objectors and refuse to participate in military projects. (3) A scientist who does defense research is obligated to help develop weapons that are as powerful as the enemy's. (4) That he is merely a general's or a politician's functionary is an argument used to justify the scientist's deadly work. (5) But, since the scientist understands the nature of his weapons better than does the military or political leader he is actually more responsible. (6) His duty is to warn the politician, the general, and the world's public of the dangers of the arms race. (7) Positively, the scientist must lend his efforts to solving the technical problems of a disarmament treaty and must actively campaign for a disarmament policy. (8) The same obligations are incumbent on military men and politicians, who, however, will not make a significant move until public opinion demands it. (9) Therefore it is without government aid that the scientist must act, alone, in a "supreme effort to ward off the mortal dangers which threaten humanity." Already many of the world's most notable scientists have raised their voices against modern arms races, most significantly at the 14 Pugwash conferences. In the Vienna declaration (1958) they declared the elimination of all war, even limited, to be an urgent task for mankind, and in the London declaration (1962) they called on all scientists to work toward total disarmament. But government officials are not worried and average citizens are apathetic. The remedy is a radical information and education program on the incomprehensible and never surpassed dangers of today's arms race, a movement that could be called: "Operation Vox Populi: the people say no to militarism and death." Scientists' influence on the course of history would be decisive if they could induce the world to understand the need for disarmament.

1924
SOVIET PRESS MATERIALS ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, no. 3. Washington, Joint Publications Research Service, 1966. 89 p. (Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 35,985)
P&GP RR

"CSO: R-7000-D."

Contents. --U.S., Soviet draft treaties debated at Geneva. --U.S. intransigence halts A-arms ban progress. --U.S. seeks arms control, not disarmament. --U.S.S.R. reasserts readiness to sign A-arms pact. --Johnson, Rusk not sincere on disarmament, by Leonid Kuralov. --U.S. increases pressure in France-NATO rift, by V. Matveev--U.S. delaying tactics in France noted by Izvestiia, by S. Zykov. --Maneuvers of Atlantic crusaders, by B. Kotov. --French NATO policy supported, by V. Golubkin. --Western reaction to present French NATO policy, by A. Leont'ev and V. Popov. --Messmer in Bonn for French NATO status talks. --Ball urges European unity to counter France. --Satisfaction of Bonn demands. --NATO group discusses Bonn sharing of A-arms. --Fallacy of Teller proposal. --Myth of "Soviet menace," by V. Maevskii. --Using maneuver and pressure, by S. Alekseev. --CENTO meeting confirms pact's aggressor role. --Influence of NATO crisis, by V. Kondrashov. --Red Star comment on CENTO meeting. --Ankara CENTO session, by I. Ugol'kov. --Nevada radioactivity violates test-ban treaty, by Kim Gerasimov. --U.S. wants to continue underground A-tests, by G. Ratiani. --Krasnaia Zvezda condemns U.S. underground nuclear tests, by V. Pustov. --Bonn hushes Seebohm to hide its revanchism. --Washington opposes talks on German unity, by Valentin Zakharov. --West Germany exploits NATO rift, by V. Mikhailov. --Franco-German negotiations continued, by E. Pral'nikov. --Northern Europe in search of peace, by Iu. Iakhontov and D. Ershov. --U.S.-Bonn alliance threat, by S. Beglov. --Bonn opposes Gromyko-proposed European talks. --Forging a nuclear axis, by O. Vasil'ev. --CPSU dispelled myth of national liberation front isolation, by D. Kraminov. --U.S. seeks to "internationalize" Vietnam War, by V. Kudriavtsev. --Commentators discuss shaky U.S. pact system. --U.S. bloc policy "bankrupt," by D. Volskii. --Appeal for war propaganda control, by N. Tikhonov. --International council of peace notes NATO threat to peace. --Widen struggle for peace. --U.S.A.--stronghold of reaction, by N. Iakovlev. --Breakthrough achieved at Dubna in research on transuranic chemical elements.

Brief articles from the Soviet press and news commentaries from Soviet radio programs on aspects of arms control, disarmament, peace, national and international security, and related subjects.

1925
SOVIET PRESS MATERIALS ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, no. 4, Washington, U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1966. 147 p. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 36,418)
P&GP RR

"CSO: R-7000-D."

Contents. --Spiridonov cites Supreme Soviet's peace work. --Bonn white paper distorts U.S.S.R. policy aims, by A. Avtokin. --Bonn peace note seen as propaganda shell, by Kim Beliaev. --Failure of current Geneva talks blamed on United States, by V. Menshikov and G. Dragunskii. --Aim of West German "white book" labeled propagandist self-justification, by E. Grigor'ev. --British reply to Soviet note concerning training of West German military units on British soil, by Vladimir Volodin. --Aim of Erhard visit to Britain, by G. Trofimenko. --Report on possible Erhard concessions to London, by V. Mikhailov. --Benefits of the Warsaw Pact, by M. Podkliuchnikov. --11th anniversary of Warsaw Pact organization hailed. --Suppression of Vietnam Buddhists ordered by Washington, by A. Leont'ev and V. Popov. --Denmark in political controversy over NATO issue, by G. Deinichenko. --Bonn replies to French memorandum on NATO. --French press reaction, by Iurii Lopatin. --New regulations for flights of NATO military aircraft over French territory. --Military spending cause of U.K. budget crisis, by Evgenii Makarov. --New plans for German access to nuclear arms. --Comments on results of April conference of NATO nuclear planning group, by V. Larin. --West German troops train on British soil, by Iu. Zhuravlev. --East-West dialogue opens prospects for peace, by Lev Nikitin. --Soviet reply to West German note of 25 March 1966, by V. Kolomei. --Warsaw treaty organization seen as reliable shield for peace, by N. Novikov. --Stockholm Socialist international congress a failure, by G. Deinichenko. --U.S. blocks disarmament progress at Geneva, by Ivan Khartsev. --Geneva disarmament talks recess, no gain made. --

230-967 O - 68 - 7

U.S. balks at discussing disarmament issue, by Georgii Dragunov. --U.S. blamed for failure of Geneva 18-Nation Disarmament Committee session, by Semen Vladimirov. --Britain scored for allowing West German troops to train with nuclear weapons on her territory, by Evgenii Makarov. --McNamara--Von Hassel talks further Bonn aims. --Joint West German-U.S. production of tanks, by Anatolii Vladimirov. --Large revanchist gathering in Bonn, by A. Tiupaev. --Bonn policy demands all-European cooperation, by Mikhail Vasil'ev. --Washington aids Bonn militaristic ambitions, by Valentin Zakharov. --Sincerity of Bonn 25 March peace note attacked, by Iurii Borisov. --Soviet note condemns West German revanchism. --Peaceful coexistence remains goal of U.S.S.R. --Dubna Nuclear Institute marks 10th anniversary. --Britain helping to build up West German military machine, by Iu. Zhuravlev. --Talks of 18-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva suspended. --Eisenhower nuclear arms sale proposal branded as surrender to German militarism, by S. Vishnevskii. --Nuclear arms ban proposals outlined by 23rd Party Congress, by M. L'vov. --West German "peace note" branded a revanchist manifesto, by V. Khvostov. --NATO relocation in Benelux area questioned, by Iu. Glukhov. --Growing regimentation in West Germany, by V. Mikhailov. --U.S. hypocritical stand on disarmament criticized, by V. Larin. --Journalists meet in London, by D. Kraminov. --International scientific cooperation based on equality, by M. M. Lebedenko and P. A. Tokareva. --The Bonn government and French troops, by Iurii Zhukov. --New Japanese disarmament authority set up, by E. Rusakov. --New nuclear electric power station in the GDR, by S. Tosunian. --Nonproliferation treaty stalled at Geneva, by V. Matveev. --The "peaceful" offensive by Bonn and NATO, by A. Efremov. --The missile appetite of Bonn, by V. Mikhailov.

Brief articles from the Soviet press and news commentaries from Soviet radio programs on aspects of arms control, disarmament, peace, national and international security, and related subjects.

1926
Steele. WHY I LEFT CND. Socialist standard, v. 62, Apr. 1966: 53-55. HX3.S76, v. 62

"Had I thought more analytically from the outset and gone straight to the question 'What causes war?' instead of wasting time over silly red herrings like disarmament treaties, neutral initiatives, UNO etc., I should have never supported CND [Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament]." The disarmament goals of CND are an insufficient approach to peace. Nuclear weapons are simply one kind of weapon--and perhaps not even the most terrible. Most importantly, CND does not deal with war's real cause, which is capitalism.

1927
Stone, Jeremy J. CONTAINING THE ARMS RACE: SOME SPECIFIC PROPOSALS. Cambridge, M.I.T. Press [1966] 252 p. illus. JX1974.S8

Contents. --Antiballistic missiles and arms control [abstracted elsewhere this issue]--Bomber disarmament: underlying considerations, 1964. --Bomber disarmament: prospects, early 1965. --Missile disarmament. --A negotiator's pause in strategic weapon procurement. --Devising further arms control proposals. --Postscript. --Bibliographical notes. --Index.

Surveys the major porblems of arms control and disarmament that involve Soviet and U.S. strategic forces. The author examines attempts by the two superpowers to secure defense systems against bombers, missiles, and submarine-launched missiles, and suggests policy proposals in keeping with the problems (political, military, strategic, and technical in nature) of limiting these weapons. Stone argues for a "policy of restraint" in the procurement of new weapons systems as the basis for containing and decelerating the arms race.

1928
Waterkamp, Rainer. [CHANGES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOVIET DISARMAMENT STRATEGY 1954-65] Wandlungen von Theorie und Praxis der sowjetischen Abrüstungsstrategie 1954-1965. Moderne Welt, v. 7, no. 1, 1966: 71-105. D839.M58, v. 7

Traces the constantly changing interaction of political, strategic, ideological, and legal factors that over the past 11 years have influenced Soviet disarmament strategy. The author brings together more than 200 primary and secondary sources. He concludes that Soviet disarmament strategy, traditionally a subject of dogmatic ideological considerations, has in recent years become to a large degree divorced from them, due mostly to the fact that technological considerations necessarily have played a greater role in Soviet decisions. Hence the attitude of Soviet political leaders to disarmament problems has become gradually less dogmatic. This process has been belated, however, and hampered by the Moscow-Peking ideological feud and the political power struggle. Still it is more advanced than one might assume from the Soviet stand so far at disarmament negotiations.

1929
Wharton, John F. THE CAUSES OF PEACE: SOME CAUTIONARY NOTES FOR THE PEACE MOVEMENT. Saturday review, v. 49, July 2, 1966: 12-14, 40. Z1219.S25, v. 49

Thinkers best able to assess modern concepts and their probable future significance "believe that the major peace movements are ineffective and incapable of ever stemming the tide of war because the thinking that underlies them is old-fashioned, confused, delusionary, and out-of-step with the findings of modern behavioral science." Official disarmament programs are delusionary in that they assume wars can be ended through the destruction of armaments. Wars can be fought with sticks and stones if man so desires; and unless all machinery is destroyed along with heavy armaments modern weapons can be produced rapidly even under conditions of disarmament. Other peace programs ignore the necessity of a legislature and a police for making and enforcing the law, or "ignore the rise of movements such as the Nazis, which, when running in high gear, can be stopped only by force." Even the brilliant program advanced by Clark and Sohn in their World Peace Through World Law offers an arrangement that would "freeze the status quo" and alienate those important groups that value the achievement of other goals (racial equality, preservation of democracy) above world peace. "Any movement which makes world peace its paramount goal will never achieve world peace unless and until the dominating leadership groups of mankind come to prefer world peace to any other goal." Millions of people can live together in society without experiencing civil war because of institutions that offer peaceful means for effecting or opposing change as an alternative to violence and because of provisions intended to

restrain violators of the moral and ethical standards of that society. "Peace is a by-product of a society that offers satisfactory (NOT Utopian nor perfect) means of resolving peacefully the tensions arising from demands for, and resistance to, change, and which can also define satisfactorily (NOT perfectly) right and wrong and keep control over the wrongdoers." If communality can be extended to the entire world, peace will appear. The movement to stop war must give way to a more affirmative movement--one that creates conditions for peace. The evolutionary process that has led man from crude cave drawings to the achievements of modern culture may yield new ideas that "may produce institutions as inconceivable to us as the Catholic Church would have been to Julius Caesar or the Soviet Union to Napoleon Bonaparte. They may be--they can be--the institutions of a world communality, which brings world peace in its wake."

B. APPROACHES AND PROPOSALS

1. Comprehensive Measures and Proposals

1930
Coulibaly, Sory. URGENT NEED FOR A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. Review of international affairs, v. 17, Apr. 20, 1966: 7.
D839.R4, v. 17

One of a series of articles by government officials on the U.N. resolution to convene a World Disarmament Conference.

The Government of Mali recognizes that underground nuclear testing, by improving thermonuclear weapons, poses as great a threat to mankind as testing in the atmosphere or under water; a complete ban on testing and destruction of all stocks of nuclear weapons is imperative. Nonnuclear powers must exert a more dynamic and incessant pressure upon the nuclear powers. Mali supports the Moscow test ban treaty and notes with regret that the treaty is losing its efficacy and statements in the world press are forecasting attempts to question the validity of the treaty itself. "In view of all this, the Government of Mali reaffirms its conviction that everything possible should be done to hold a World Disarmament Conference which would wholly cover, under the most favourable conditions, the problems of general and complete disarmament."

1931
Rich, Alexander, and John R. Platt. HOW TO KEEP THE PEACE IN A DISARMED WORLD. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 22, Apr. 1966: 14-19.
TK9145.A84, v. 22

"Our continued failure to discuss fully the organization of a disarmed world may itself be a considerable impediment to the progress of disarmament negotiations." An analogy to the problem of world organization under conditions of disarmament can be found in the drafting of the U.S. Constitution. Through the contributions of not more than half a dozen men and in a period of months the U.S. system of government was formulated. Authors of The Federalist Papers then sought to quell opposition to the new Constitution by explaining that its feedback mechanisms (checks and balances) would avert dangers and stabilize and maintain the new system against attempts to pervert it. "Thus, the guiding principles of the Federalists were, first, to make a hardheaded system; second, to make a system with feedbacks adequate for averting or correcting anticipated dangers; and third, to make a system with a minimum of powers so that it would have the maximum probability of being accepted." The same prerequisites must be met by a peacekeeping organization in a disarmed world. Were disarmament achieved, representation in the peacekeeping organization could be bicameral, with one house granting each state one vote, while the other house could be organized on the basis of population and economic production. Short tenure in one house would "allow for a rapid response to changes in public opinion," while longer tenure in the other would provide continuity and stability. Executive authority, as the Federalists reasoned, might be better administered by a single executive officer. Armed forces subject to the central authority must be secure from corruption or manipulation, while nuclear weapons (if they be retained) should be widely dispersed and based on the territory of major powers as "a kind of fail-safe mechanism." The system must not depend for its revenue upon states, but upon more stable mechanisms (tariffs on international trade, and the like). If a small group of Soviet and American experts could come together for 6 months, as Leo Szilard has suggested, to study peacekeeping problems and their solutions, they might equal the achievements of the Federalists and exert "a beneficial influence on the progress of disarmament discussions today."

1932
Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research. THE PEACEKEEPING PROPOSALS OF THE U.S. OUTLINE OF BASIC PROVISIONS OF A TREATY OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL WORLD: A STUDY, BY A PANEL OF RESEARCH ASSOCIATES OF THE WASHINGTON CENTER OF FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCE, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY. Washington, 1964. 129 p.
JX1974.W28

Partial contents.--Disarmament, peacekeeping and the national interest, by Arnold Wolfers.--Military power in a disarming and disarmed world, by Robert E. Osgood.--Non-military instruments of policy in a disarming and disarmed world, by Paul Y. Hammond.--Peaceful settlement and peaceful change, by Laurence W. Martin.--Legal restraints on coercion, by Robert W. Tucker.--A United Nations peace force I: character and mission, by Charles Burton Marshall.--A United Nations peace force II: control and accountability, by Livingston T. Merchant.

Concentrates on the international peacekeeping aspects of the U.S. plan for general and complete disarmament (GCD). Wolfers' essay deals with possible American responses to the Soviet and "other inimical challenges." Osgood considers the role of military power in the world envisioned by the draft treaty and posits some of the potentially destabilizing conditions. In Hammond's essay nonmilitary aspects of power that would be utilized in a disarmed world are treated, while Martin discusses the extent to which peaceful settlement of disputes would be the order of the day under GCD. Tucker stresses the importance of international law in the U.S. draft. An envisioned U.N. peace force --its character, mission, control, and accountability-- is the topic of the final two essays by Marshall and Merchant. Biographical notes on the authors, a summary of the Outline, and the complete text of the peacekeeping provisions are included.

2. Noncomprehensive Measures and Proposals

a. REGIONAL

1933
CONTROLLING THE MIDDLE EAST ARMS RACE. Disarmament, no. 10, June 1966: 1-6.
JX1918.P7D5, 1966

"Abridged version of a paper the Institute for Strategic Studies (London) prepared for its 7th Annual Conference in 1965."

Except for Europe the Middle East is the only region wherein the "Western" alliances and the Warsaw Pact nations share a common border. The explosive situation in this area, exacerbated by the great quantities of sophisticated arms supplied by both the East and the West, can lead to major warfare in the event of an Arab-Israeli clash. "The arms holdings of these countries have already reached such a level that effective intervention in these circumstances would entail the application of very considerable military resources, even by great power standards." If nuclear weapons are introduced into the situation, the dangers to world security increase greatly. A plan to control the Middle Eastern arms race should be composed of four elements: (1) A great power agreement, ratified by the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Britain (and possibly Czechoslovakia, West Germany, and others) would guarantee an absolute freeze upon the supply of offensive and defensive weapons to the Middle East. Any request for armaments would have to be justified to the satisfaction of all signatories. (2) The great powers would agree not to disseminate nuclear weapons or the knowledge needed to produce them. (3) A credible declaration not to produce or acquire nuclear arms would be made by the Middle Eastern nations. The great powers would have to "agree to bring whatever pressure was needed to secure such undertakings from Middle Eastern countries." (4) Both great power blocs would grant guarantees against aggression in the Middle East. Because the guarantee should "carry an assurance of swift and certain great power intervention, demanding the least possible prior consultation and agreement," it may be preferable to have the United States and the U.S.S.R. serve as sole guarantors. On-site verification of these arrangements would be almost impossible to achieve; the embargo on conventional arms should therefore be regarded as self-enforcing. The Arab States and Israel would probably agree to verification of their nonnuclear activities by an impartial international organization, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. Imperfect as this plan is, its simplicity and straightforwardness may best suit it to the Middle Eastern situation, where "the choice is between half a loaf, at the best, and no bread at all."

b. OUTER SPACE

1934

Rehm, Georg W. [ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE] Rüstungskontrolle im Weltraum. Bonn, Siegler [1965] 129 p. (Dokumentationen der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Bd. 3.)
JX1974.7.R43

Bibliographical footnotes.
Documentation: p. 65-129.

Partial contents.--Space and arms control.--The breakthrough in thermonuclear ballistic weapons and its importance for the approach to space problems.--Treatment of space problems in disarmament negotiations between East and West.--Treatment of space problems by the U.N. Committee on Space.

Detailed account of the U.N. negotiations, debates, and resolutions over the period 1957-64 on arms control in space, and description of the East's and the West's positions during different stages of the negotiations. Rehm also reviews the 1963 Moscow agreement barring nuclear tests in space, and the resolution by the U.N. General Assembly of the same year proscribing the orbitting of nuclear weapons in space.

c. OTHER MEASURES AND PROPOSALS

1935

DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. External affairs, v. 17, Nov. 1965: 474-481. JX351.A3, v. 17

Sums up the work of the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference during the period July 27-Sept. 16, 1965. A test-ban extension, the identification of seismic events, new techniques in detection, nonproliferation, and general and complete disarmament were major agenda items. This session of the Conference, though short, was considered quite fruitful.

1936

Foster, William C. ARMS CONTROL--A SERIOUS BUSINESS. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 55, July 11, 1966: 50-55.
JX232.A33, v. 55

"Address made before the Belgo-American Association at Brussels, Belgium, on June 20," 1966.

Reviews some of the problems of arms control--disputes over inspection, extension of the test ban to underground testing, identification of underground tests, and the potential impact of disarmament on the American economy.

1937

Gasteyger, Curt. THE EIGHTEEN NATION DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. Disarmament, no. 10, June 1966: 16-20. JX1918.P7D5, 1966

Reviews activities of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament during its session of Jan. 27-May 10, 1966. Attempts to achieve a nuclear nonproliferation treaty, a declaration of nuclear nonacquisition, and a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty are surveyed. Amendments to articles I, II, and IV of the U.S. draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons are reproduced.

1938

Jack, Homer A. DISARMAMENT IN THE 20TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY. Disarmament, no. 9, Mar. 1966: 14-18. JX1918.P7D5, 1966

Summarizes the issues and reports the activities of the disarmament debate in the U.N. 20th General Assembly. Matters discussed included prospects for the proposed World Disarmament Conference, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, a comprehensive test-ban treaty, denuclearization of Africa, and the report of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament on progress toward general and complete disarmament. The author feels that the discussions "reflected more promise than progress" and observes that events in Southeast Asia or Central Europe may determine disarmament negotiations more than the discussions.

1939

Jaquet, Gérard. [EUROPEAN AND ATLANTIC PERSPECTIVES AFTER EIGHT YEARS OF DE GAULLE'S REGIME] Perspectives européennes et atlantiques après huit ans de régime gaulliste. Revue socialiste, n.s. no. 193, May 1966: 401-411.
HX5.R38, 1966

De Gaulle's nationalist, anti-integrationist policies in Europe and the Atlantic community have managed to alienate France from the majority of its allies. The Socialist Party originally supported the establishment of NATO as a temporary measure to secure peace against Stalinist expansionism. Military pacts cannot

survive in a peaceful world, but have we reached the stage of irreversible détente where East-West war is unthinkable? Unfortunately not. Uncertainties persist, and as long as this is so "we cannot be completely reassured about the future behavior of the major world powers." For example, both a Sino-Soviet break and a Sino-Soviet reconciliation would have unforeseeable repercussions. NATO remains a necessary instrument; by withdrawing France simply renounces the influence it can exercise over the Organization. The French Left must travel a different foreign policy road that accepts the Atlantic alliance while not allowing France to be dominated by the United States, that strives for European integration, and that seeks East-West relaxation. In this last quest partial measures (the extension of the test ban treaty, an effective nonproliferation treaty, a denuclearized Central Europe, a NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression treaty, or recognition of the Oder-Neisse boundary) would reduce tensions and create a better atmosphere for fundamental European and global settlements.

1940
Lang, Daniel. LETTER FROM GENEVA. New Yorker, v. 42, June 25, 1966: 108-110, 113-116.
AP2.N6763, v. 42

Much of the time delegates to the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference are "uncertain whether they are serving as propagandists for their foreign Ministries or as prophets of the millennium." In any event the nonnuclear members of the Conference appear to be willing to trade their option to join the nuclear club for a comprehensive test ban. The chief obstacle to a test ban agreement is, as usual, American insistence on and Russian objection to on-site inspection. The neutrals have in effect said to both the Soviet Union and the United States: "Allow the formal ban to apply simply to tests of a seismologically detectable magnitude, and have a general moratorium on smaller tests." Unfortunately seismology is far from ready to definitely identify nuclear blasts. Moreover underground tests are now being extensively employed by both Washington and Moscow to refine guidance systems and antimissile defense. Even the peaceful Plowshare program is a stumblingblock to a comprehensive test ban. While the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission is reluctant to give up the program, in the eyes of other nations "a nuclear explosive is a nuclear explosive." Russia, for its part, has an almost pathological fear of on-site inspection, bred perhaps from centuries of existence behind insecure natural boundaries. Opposition to a nonproliferation treaty stems principally from the West German problem. Moscow fears that any NATO nuclear-sharing plan will be just a thinly disguised means of proliferating weapons in Europe. All told the Conference has made relatively little progress. Although many fear that participants will continue to hem and haw until it is too late to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, the Conference is unlikely to end. As one delegate has put it, "Can you imagine how the world would seem without such a conference? It gives value to everything we have today--even to things that we may not like very much."

1941
Luard, David Evan, ed. FIRST STEPS TO DISARMAMENT; A NEW APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF ARMS REDUCTIONS. New York, Basic Books [1965] 277 p. JX1974. L78

Contents. --The background of the negotiations to date, by Evan Luard. --Western preconditions for disarmament and arms control, by Sir John Slessor. --Soviet preconditions for disarmament and arms control, by Malcolm Mackintosh. --Observation posts, by Philip Windsor. --Air inspection, by Walter Levison. --Inspected zones, by Michael Howard. --A ban on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, by Morton H. Halperin. --Military liaison missions, by W. F. K. Thompson. --Agreements for selective arms reductions, by Neville Brown. --The role of peace-keeping forces in disarmament, by E. L. M. Burns. --The role of communication in arms control, by Thomas C. Schelling. --The problem of verification, by Wayland Young. --Conclusions. --Index.

Analysis which assumes generally that there is greater prospect in the immediate future for limited arms control measures than for a "single apocalyptic agreement on 'general and complete disarmament.'" An introductory look at past disarmament negotiations and the Western and Soviet attitudes about and preconditions for arms control supports this thesis. Philip Windsor comments on the political implications of an agreement establishing observation posts. The value of such an agreement, he finds, rests in its contribution to the assessment of military capabilities--to the establishment of "norms of military activity"--thus easing the military tensions and insecurity of Western and Eastern Europe. Brig. Thompson points out the special advantages of military liaison missions such as are presently used by West Germany. Michael Levison reviews the state of satellite and aerial inspection and determines that, if attained, an air inspection agreement would be successful. Inspected zones, says Michael Howard, will come with nations' "growing confidence" that they will suffer no risks from such zones. Morton Halperin asserts it would be in the interest of the United States and the Western bloc to sign a formal nonproliferation treaty, especially if coupled with similar measures such as a no-first-use agreement and a production cutoff. Resultant awareness by other countries of U.S. commitment to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons would encourage their own interest in halting diffusion. Neville Brown describes the dangers concomitant with different selective arms reduction measures concluding that cutbacks in offensive weapons buildups would contribute to limited disarmament. Peacekeeping measures acceptable to the international community are perhaps further away from agreement than the other measures discussed in this volume, according to Lt. Gen. Burns. Thomas Schelling distinguishes the "dialogue" over arms control from the more formal "hot-line" type of communications, describing the former as "the continuous process by which the Soviet Union and the United States interpret each other's intentions, and convey their own, about the arms race." He finds this formula especially relevant to nuclear weapons, military exploitation of space, ballistic missile defense, strategic conceptions, etc. Wayland Young views the problem of verification as a major obstacle. The editor, Evan Luard, concludes that an accumulation of limited measures is probably the most fruitful way to achieve comprehensive disarmament.

VI. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND RELATED MEASURES

A. NEGOTIATION OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES

1942
Lall, Arthur S. ON THE AGENDA OF MANKIND: DISARMAMENT. Columbia University forum, v. 9, spring 1966: 32-37. AS30.C59, v. 9

In the early 1960's three contexts made disarmament negotiations possible: (1) The superpowers admitted that they were about equally matched and neither appeared likely to upset the balance in the short run. (2) The two sides came close to a nuclear conflict and were disposed to brake the arms race. (3) They evidenced a common realization that their welfare would be enhanced by at least some degree of arms control and disarmament. At present, when the "unbalance" of terror has undermined mutuality of interest in arms control and disarmament, the deadlock in Geneva rests on whether nuclear sharing is nuclear proliferation. Because nations negotiate from fear as well as from strength, a sounder approach to disarmament talks would be to consider the international concern caused by potential nuclear sharing within the alliances. To allay such fear and construct a firm base for disarmament negotiations the following are requisite: (1) A freeze on the number and characteristics of nuclear weapons in Central Europe; (2) Reaffirmation of Germany's commitment not to manufacture nuclear weapons on its territory, fortified by a new pledge not to join with another state in the manufacture of these weapons outside Germany; (3) Frank disclosure of the precise limits on any minimal nuclear sharing that is proposed; (4) Categorical assurance that nuclear sharing will not be extended beyond NATO and the Warsaw Pact; (5) Admission of mainland China to the disarmament dialogue and the United Nations; (6) Discussion among the superpowers, India, Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan, and the United Arab Republic of other measures that might bolster a nonproliferation treaty, especially in Asia; and (7) A commitment by the superpowers in any nonproliferation treaty that they will limit, reduce, and eventually eliminate their stocks of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, starting no later than 3 years after the signing of the treaty.

1943
Thiam, Doudou. IRREPLACEABLE ROSTRUM FOR SMALL POWERS. Review of international affairs, v. 17, May 5, 1966: 7-8. D839.R4, v. 17

One of a series of articles by government officials on the U.N. resolution to convene a World Disarmament Conference.

The Government of Senegal regards meetings of the nuclear powers as the best means of achieving peace and disarmament. "Nevertheless, the world disarmament conference will offer to small powers an irreplaceable rostrum, especially to the non-aligned countries of the third world, from which they will be able to express universal consciousness and to exercise a wholesome pressure on the holders of atomic weapons." Satisfactory compromises will be reached at the conference if the great powers are willing to cooperate and to suspend the "dialogue between the deaf" now taking place at Geneva. No nuclear power should be barred from the conference, lest its success be limited in the manner of the Moscow test ban treaty. Although general, complete, and controlled disarmament remains the main problem facing the world, the conference will be salutary if it achieves a universal renunciation of nuclear weapons production and a nonproliferation pledge.

B. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

1. Escalation

1944
Brodie, Bernard. ESCALATION AND THE NUCLEAR OPTION. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1965. 88 p. ([Rand Corporation. Research] memorandum, RM-4544-PR) Q180.AIR36, no. 4544

The use of tactical nuclear weapons can best be studied from the viewpoint of their ability to deter escalation. Except if dealing with a madman, appropriate military and diplomatic manipulations cannot conceivably fail to deter the war no one wants. Only if Soviet perceptions indicated an opportunity to get away with a favorable change in the status quo without incurring Western retaliation would Russia initiate a military action. With this fact in mind Europeans are forever emphasizing the choice between nonwar and destruction and are alarmed by the U.S. strategy of expanding options, which tends to render the nuclear threat ambiguous. In order to influence the enemy's choice regarding escalation, one's strategy must (1) keep the initial military situation from deterioration, (2) contain it below unnecessary levels of violence, and (3) show determination to operate on any level the enemy would consider. This last condition is relevant to the tactical use of nuclear weapons. One school of thought, indeed the school that has largely determined U.S. limited-war policies, strongly considers these weapons the critical factor "in tripping off uncontrolled escalation." The most probable, although still improbable, type of war in Europe will have small beginnings, say a dispute over Berlin access routes. Escalation caused by "rigid mechanisms of military response" or psychological factors (prestige considerations, hate, rage) is controllable. It is inane to say that nothing is worse than defeat in limited war. But suppose neither side is willing to yield. Fighting intensifies and it becomes obvious that the Soviet Union has become willing to risk limited war over Berlin; NATO can hardly assume that it is more willing to accept conventional than nuclear defeat. "The best way for us to avert not only defeat but unnecessary escalation is to demonstrate that our readiness to take risks is not less than theirs" by using nuclear weapons more "abruptly" than they had bargained for. At any rate NATO cannot continue to postulate Soviet aggressiveness without counting on Soviet readiness to employ nuclears. In the Far East Korea set a precedent in U.S. and Chinese expectations for the nonuse of nuclear weapons. Public opinion has perhaps made the psychological neutralization of the atom inevitable, but the United States should not further weaken the political and military impact of the tactical use of

nuclear weapons with its present anti-nuclear-weapons policies.

2. **Miscalculation and Accidental War**

3. **Surprise Attack**

4. **Proliferation**

1945
BOMBS AWAY [editorial] Nature (London) v. 210, June 18, 1966: 1193-1194.
Ql. N2, v. 210

For much of the 3 years that have passed since the conclusion of the partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty technical means to ensure against the spread of nuclear weapons have been sought, to little avail. Technical solutions have not been found because the problem is essentially political. Although nations have been acquiring nuclear weapons at the approximate rate of one every 5 years, "for every nation which manufactures nuclear weapons, there is at least one other which has deliberately decided not to do so," generally on the basis of political constraints. That the stumbling-blocks to effective nonproliferation arrangements are political can be illustrated by the drawbacks to nuclear-free-zone proposals for regions such as Central Europe or Latin America. These proposals have tended to apply either to areas in which nuclear arms are unlikely to be acquired, or to crucial tension areas in which "a simple declaration of intent would be unconvincing if it were not accompanied by full-blooded inspection." Extension of the test ban to cover underground detonations and nondissemination agreements present other problems that can only be solved politically. The best contribution the technician can make, then, is probably in the realm of controlling the application of fissile materials. The International Atomic Energy Agency stands a good chance of working out an effective system of international supervision and may even be able to encourage an international agreement to cut off the manufacture of military nuclear explosives.

1946
Brunner, Dominique. [IS NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION INEVITABLE?] La prolifération nucléaire est-elle inévitable? Revue militaire suisse, v. 111, June 1966: 292-298. U2. R5, v. 111

For 10 years the prospect that middle powers with sometimes-unstable governments might control nuclear weapons has haunted U.S. analysts. Limitation of the nuclear club, according to Raymond Aron, forms one of the three fundamental theses of U.S. strategic theory. With the exception of France European public opinion and governments concur in the U.S. goal, but more out of "the repugnance inspired by nuclear weapons as the symbol of frightful destruction than as a function of an objective analysis of the diverse aspects of nuclear proliferation." In order to comprehend intelligently the ramifications of the question Europeans should read Leonard Beaton's Must the bomb spread? (Penguin Books, 1966). Although he opposes it, Mr. Beaton does not assume that nuclear weapons proliferation would increase the likelihood of nuclear war or eventually trigger a Soviet-U.S. nuclear conflict. Of all the arguments used against nuclear proliferation the most valid is its bandwagon effect--one country's acquisition of an independent nuclear force might impel countries that previously had scarcely considered such a course to nuclear weapons production. The effect is clear in the case of India and China, and may easily hold true for Japan and China. India, Japan, and Israel may seek entrance into the nuclear club within the next decade; if they do the decade following 1975 "may well see the birth of German, Swedish, Swiss, and Italian nuclear forces." The nuclear programs of the former three nations would stem as much from security considerations as from a desire to increase their world prestige. Perhaps India would even receive American aid for a nuclear program, given the U.S. habit of "not refusing a certain support to its friends wanting to acquire a striking force after the nuclear program has reached the point of no return."

1947
CHINA NEARS AN H-BOMB TEST. Business week, no. 1915, May 14, 1966: 39.
HC431. B87, 1966

Communist China's most recent nuclear test in Singkiang Province is preliminary to the development of an H-bomb. "Once again U.S. defense officials appear to have seriously underestimated the technical competence of a potential adversary." Whereas the U.S. nuclear development program required 7 years to advance from its first fission experiment to a thermonuclear reaction, China may make the transition in less than 2 years. Chinese success seems to have stemmed from the ability of the gaseous diffusion plant at Lop Nor to separate fissionable U-235 from the plentiful U-238; if so, the availability of U-235 will allow China to trigger megaton-yield devices in a relatively short time.

1948
Emel'ianov, V. S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. New times, no. 29, July 20, 1966: 4-6. D839. N483, 1966

As nuclear weapons increase in might and proliferate throughout the world, a tendency to minimize the consequences of nuclear warfare has become evident. At the same time no progress has been made toward realization of a nuclear nonproliferation treaty and a ban on underground nuclear testing--limited measures that are not ends in themselves but important steps toward general and complete disarmament. The obvious loophole in the U.S. draft treaty on nonproliferation nourishes the hopes of West German rulers that their revanchist policies can be realized with the help of nuclear arms. West Germany has already begun "preparing for the manufacture not only of nuclear weapons but also of their delivery vehicles, of rockets." Despite the worldwide movement to outlaw all nuclear testing, thereby strengthening international security, the United States continues to argue that underground nuclear tests cannot be distinguished from earthquakes and insists upon on-site inspection. "The proposal of Sweden on the establishment of a 'club' for detecting nuclear explosions merits attention in this respect. Such a 'detection club' which will have as its purpose the exchange of materials on a voluntary basis, would promote confidence." History is now at a turning point; either new members will join the nuclear club and escalate the danger of nuclear conflict, or a new era of civilization will begin, financed by the resources once devoted to the production of armaments. "The Soviet people favour the second alternative."

1949
Finney, John. EXPERIMENTAL MORATORIUM ON UNDERGROUND TESTS? New republic, v. 155, July 16, 1966: 10-11. AP2. N624, v. 155

The recent International Assembly on Nuclear Weapons held at Scarborough, Ontario, brought together disarmament specialists for a 3-day brainstorming session on the problems of nuclear proliferation. "It was probably the most important private disarmament meeting to take place in recent years, for gathered . . . were what could accurately be described as the opinion and policy-makers of disarmament in the world, except Communist China." This transplanted Geneva Conference heard a proposal for an experimental suspension of underground tests for a limited period of time during which, if one nation suspected another of conducting a clandestine underground atomic test, it could ask the suspect country to submit data to the contrary and invite inspection by a foreign team. The hope is that experience with such a plan would incline the nuclear powers to enter into a "permanent ban on underground tests, on the same basis of verification by challenge or invitation." The proposal advanced by an American delegate and received favorably by the Soviet delegates, was entered in the final report of the conference. It was the bright spot of the meeting, since delegates left the sessions without much hope for curbing proliferation. The widespread belief that "proliferation would be politically, militarily and morally bad" was challenged by three potential members of the nuclear club, Australia, Japan, and India. The three contended that nuclear proliferation might be desirable in Asia to counterbalance the growing menace of nuclear-armed China. Some nations are pleading for information from the nuclear powers on the huge cost of such an undertaking in order to relieve pressure at home to "go nuclear." Much disatisfaction was evidenced with the inability of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to agree on a nonproliferation treaty. The United State's "bland assumption that the way to stop proliferation was through a nonproliferation treaty, and once a treaty was agreed upon by the super-powers, all the non-nuclear states would sign," no longer appears to be justified. The nonnuclear states now want the nuclear powers to slow down their own production of fissionable materials to ease the arms race or stop their underground testing. After 3 years the Geneva talks need some new ideas. The Johnson administration appears to appreciate the political benefits of a test ban extension, but this poses risks of the Soviets conducting clandestine underground tests and perhaps gaining technical advantage thereby.

1950
Fromm, Erich. IS GERMANY ON THE MARCH AGAIN? War/peace report, v. 6, Mar. 1966: 3-4.
P&GP RR

Reports are coming from the direction of West Germany that indicate it is on the march again. Bonn's interest in obtaining nuclear weapons is underlined by what seem to be preparations for a time when it will have them. Franz Joseph Strauss has been quoted as referring to the "new Fuehrer" when talking about the promise of German nuclear weapons. A parallel can be drawn between the Federal Republic's position regarding nuclear weapons and Hitler's denouncement of the Treaty of Versailles' dictate against rearmament of Germany. Former Chancellor Adenauer has criticized the United States for negotiating with the Soviet Union on nonproliferation and disarmament treaties. West Germany's position on the 1954 agreement not to produce nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons is qualified by the principle of the "clausula rebus sic stantibus . . . . a contract is valid only as long as the premises existing at the time of the signing continue to exist." In addition Bonn contends that the treaty does not preclude the purchase of nuclear arms from foreign countries. New civil defense laws have been enacted that "seem to anticipate the day when the Germans will crawl out of bomb shelters, unscathed in a nuclear war fought between East and West." In addition changes taking place in the German Army are bringing the more "traditionalist" character of the German soldier to the forefront. West Germany's long-term goals include the return of the territories of East Prussia and Silesia, which were lost to Poland, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia; and reunification of the Germanies, which issue Bonn "shrewdly uses to divide the U.S. and the U.S.S.R." Germany has become the most powerful economic power in Europe and is interested in "economic hegemony over a unified Western Europe." Important to the accomplishment of West German aims is maintenance of its friendship with the United States.

1951
GENEVA. Atlantic, v. 217, May 1966: 31-33, 34.
AP2.A8, v. 217

Recounts the problems and prospects of securing a nuclear nonproliferation treaty at recent sessions of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

1952
INDIA AND THE ATOM BOMB [editorial] Indian recorder & digest, v. 12, May 1966: 1, 24.
DS401.1284, v. 12

Whether India should build an atomic force is usually discussed in the context of the Chinese threat. The only substantive objection that can be raised is that the costs of this force could exceed its deterrent effectiveness. It is up to the government to provide cost estimates, which may well prove that money poses no real hurdle. Indeed, there seems to be no alternative to going nuclear: professions of nonalinement and nonviolence will not defend India; and to count on Western aid in case of emergency or to believe that Peking would never launch atomic attack on India is mere wishful thinking. Nuclear defense may well prove more economical in the long term than conventional defenses.

1953
Kintner, William R. A REAPPRAISAL OF THE PROPOSED NONPROLIFERATION TREATY. Orbis, v. 10, spring 1966: 138-151.
D839.068, v. 10

The catastrophic consequences usually said to be inescapable in the event that the nuclear powers fail to secure some sort of nuclear nonproliferation treaty may well be exaggerated. How such a treaty will prevent new nations from acquiring nuclear capabilities is still indemonstrable; the only certain effect of such a pact will be the weakening or destruction of NATO. Prospects for achieving an Atlantic alliance based upon the interdependence of a United Europe and the United States would be diminished, for the treaty would preclude establishment of an independent European nuclear deterrent. Exasperated in their attempts to acquire a voice in alliance nuclear planning, the West Germans may once again forge a Rapallo-type treaty with the East. A nondissemination pact would also force the United States to increase its commitments to defend other nations against Communist nuclear attack and would prevent the United States from offering antimissile defense systems (which require nuclear warheads) to nations open to Soviet or Chinese missile threats. On the other hand evasion of nonproliferation sanctions would be a simple matter,

and many nations (e.g., India) have probably stockpiled enough plutonium product of their nuclear power reactors to be able to develop a nuclear weapon without outside help. "The avowed purpose of the nonproliferation treaty is to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons. The pursuit of this goal does not require a treaty. Nor would a treaty make it attainable. By signing this treaty, the Soviet Union would merely agree to do what she is doing now, namely, keep her weapons to herself." Unilateral actions (such as refusing economic aid to nations that refuse to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect their nuclear reactors for military production) may more effectively hinder the spread of nuclear weapons. A nonproliferation treaty is unnecessary and largely unenforceable, increases U.S. security obligations, "provides the Soviet Union with a tool capable of wrecking NATO," and "opens the doors to nuclear power politics on a global scale."

1954
Kramish, Arnold. THE GREAT CHINESE BOMB PUZZLE--AND A SOLUTION. Fortune, v. 73, June 1966: 157-158, 246, 248, 250. illus.
HF5001. F1, v. 73

The third explosion of a nuclear device in China last month raised anew the question of how the Chinese achieved nuclear-weapon capability so fast. Particularly puzzling was how they managed to produce uranium 235, which fallout analysis shows they employed even in their earliest 1964 test. Free-world intelligence some years ago became aware of a gaseous-diffusion plant for U 235 at Lanchow, but it seemed inadequate to produce substantial quantities in the concentration needed for weapons. Arnold Kramish, a Rand Corp. nuclear physicist, speculates in this article that the Lanchow plant was operated in conjunction with another plant capable of enriching U 235 by electromagnetic separation, a process the U.S. declassified in 1955. It seems likely that the Chinese learned electromagnetic techniques from U.S. blueprints. But how did they get the gaseous-diffusion plant? Kramish reasons that the Russians helped them to build it as part of an "atoms for peace" facility. (Abstract supplied)

1955
Lall, Betty (Goetz) NUCLEAR WEAPONS: CAN THEIR SPREAD BE HALTED? [New York] Council on Religion and International Affairs [1965] 45 p.

Contents. --The framework. --Obstacles to preventing proliferation. --Policies and measures to impede proliferation.

The "spread" or "proliferation" of nuclear weapons means "an increase in the number of countries producing nuclear weapons; the spread of nuclear weapons by means of one country giving, selling, or lending nuclear weapons, or certain kinds of nuclear weapons material information to another country not heretofore possessing nuclear weapons; and the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of nations, in areas, or environments, in which nuclear weapons had previously been absent." Some of the obstacles to nonproliferation arrangements arise from a "lack of consensus" among those concerned on the dangers of nuclear war. The intransigence of France and Communist China are additional impediments to achieving agreement. Limited measures that might contribute to halting the spread of nuclear weapons include: a ban on nuclear testing; an agreement not to share nuclear weapons or information with nonnuclear countries; nuclear-free zones; IAEA safeguards on nuclear energy plants; a ban on weapons in space; political guarantees; positive incentives; trade restrictions; a cutoff of fissionable materials production; regulations on delivery vehicles; and a no-first-use pledge. Upon review it seems likely that the problems of proliferation could be handled by some or all of the these measures. Concentration on partial measures, however, should not foreclose interest in general and complete disarmament and international peacekeeping machinery, both of which are acknowledged goals of the governments concerned with impeding the arms race. "While it would be dangerous in the extreme to think all questions can be settled by only Moscow and Washington acting, nevertheless, very little in the way of non-proliferation or any related objectives can be accomplished if these two countries prove unable to reach agreement on measures to keep world peace."

1956
Moch, Jules. [NONDISSEMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND EUROPEAN SECURITY] Non-dissémination des armes nucléaires et sécurité européenne. Revue socialiste, n. s. no. 192, Apr. 1966: 289-312. HX5. R38, 1966

Both nuclear weapons proliferation and dissemination are imminent threats. Proliferation, or an increase in the number of producers, may be slowed by the costly and formidable prerequisites of nuclear production--industrial, scientific, financial, and territorial (space for testing). The easier path to nuclear weapons acquisition is via dissemination, which requires political persuasion in place of economic and scientific strength. Dissemination is brought about by giving nuclear weapons to another state, sharing highly pertinent information with it, or bestowing on it the right of codecision over strategic preparations and weapons use. The danger of proliferation will never be abolished unless through internationally controlled general and complete disarmament coupled with adequate means of enforcement. However retardation measures can be undertaken. First is a total test ban agreement that would hinder any nonnuclear signatory subsequently considering nuclear weapons development. A second measure for braking the proliferation trend would consist of international rules barring scientists from participation in another nation's nuclear weapons program. To prevent rapid proliferation three political (rather than technical) steps may be meaningful. The first should be a general nondissemination agreement among nuclear powers (applicable also within alliances). The second would be a nonacquisition treaty among the other powers, and the third would be internationally concluded agreements on denuclearized zones such as the Antarctic agreement. Today's attention must be focused on limited and immediately realizable disarmament as being both attainable and preparatory to more general agreements. The immediate task is limitation of the nuclear club to five, not because proliferation will lead to general war, but because it threatens limited wars that can kill millions of men.

1957
NUCLEAR DEADLINE. Economist, v. 219, May 21, 1966: 800-801. HG11. E2, v. 219

Nuclear proliferation seems to be "running well ahead of the passionate protest." India, Japan, and the United Arab Republic have all declared that if defense requirements necessitated it they could and would go nuclear. Israel and Pakistan would undoubtedly follow their regional antagonists into the club.

Some observers feel that the third Chinese nuclear explosion has sounded the death knell for hopes of achieving a nonproliferation agreement. This is an oversimplification. A treaty can still be signed, although it is only one of the measures necessary to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. Several of the near-nuclear states have expressed the requirement that the "vertical" proliferation taking place within the nuclear club be halted. The Chinese tests are only one of the many portents that "there is very little time left before any halt at all will be impossible." The Soviet Union is under pressure from the Warsaw Pact nations to share nuclear decisionmaking. The pressure is much like that within NATO, which the Russians fear will draw West Germany into the nuclear club. Yet the Eastern zone seems to be embarking on its own nuclear program. Adoption of even the American draft treaty will stop Bonn from acquiring an independent nuclear striking arm; rejection of all treaties will insure there is no guarantee. Furthermore, despite any American statements to the contrary, hope for a mixed-manned NATO nuclear force acceptable to all members of the alliance is dying out. The Russians will soon be unable to use their fear of a German finger on the nuclear trigger to block a nonproliferation treaty. If they continue to base their opposition on this fear they will confirm that "they simply dare not stand up to China's charges . . . that they are conspiring with America to achieve a joint world hegemony through a non-proliferation treaty." The last deadline is close at hand.

1958

Palfrey, John G. U.S. APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS. Nuclear energy, Apr. 1966: 107-111. TK9001.N73, 1966

Salutes U.S. nuclear industry for its preoccupation with both prevention of nuclear proliferation and international safeguards against military applications of nuclear technology intended for peaceful purposes. Commissioner Palfrey discusses steps the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission has taken to regulate export of nuclear reactors. He explores the possibilities of Soviet-U.S. cooperation to prevent proliferation. The partial nuclear test ban treaty, Palfrey believes, was partly responsible for improved U.S.-Soviet relations; he denies that "progress in relations generally between two rival countries" is prerequisite to the implementation of arms control measures.

1959

UNDERGROUND CHALLENGE. Economist, v. 218, Mar. 19, 1966: 1111-1112. HG11.E2, v. 218

When the Geneva discussions on a nonproliferation treaty resume changes made in the Soviet and American drafts will narrow, but not close, the gap between the two positions. Yet even if the United States were to totally eliminate any provision for nuclear sharing, the Soviet Union still might not consider the American proposal free from loopholes. A March 12, 1966, Soviet broadcast made it perfectly clear that even consultative arrangements with West Germany would be quite unsatisfactory. Even so, the mood at Geneva is "one of persistence rather than resignation." A ban on underground nuclear tests, considered by many to be one of the cornerstones of nonproliferation, is being considered carefully. Verification, of course, continues to be the major stumbling-block. A new concept delineated by Mrs. Alva Myrdal, Swedish representative to the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference, may prove the means of breaking this deadlock. Under the theory of "inspection by challenge" a state suspected of illegal testing would have, if innocent, a strong interest in clearing itself. In order to do this it would presumably invite on-site inspection or offer clarifying evidence. If a state were suspected of violating the agreement and did not invite inspection, it could be challenged to do so. An unheeded challenge, particularly if occurring more than once, might offer strong grounds for abrogating the treaty after serious international consideration. Reaction to the Swedish proposal has been varied. Although highly praised in some quarters (particularly among the British and Canadian delegations) American reaction has been lukewarm. The Soviets, still unalterably opposed to any international inspection, have responded negatively. The Conference will therefore not officially discuss Mrs. Myrdal's doctrine; but the delegations will undoubtedly consider it privately, and it will be heard of again.

1960

U.S. PRESENTS AMENDMENTS TO DRAFT TREATY ON NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN 18-NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 54, Apr. 25, 1966: 675-680.
JX232.A33, v. 54

Includes a statement made by U.S. Representative Adrian S. Fisher before the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament on March 22, 1966 and the text of amendments to the U.S. draft nonproliferation treaty.

1961

Vasil'ev, O. CLUMSY STUNT. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 18, July 13, 1966: 28-29.
D839.C87, v. 18
Complete text from Izvestiia, June 23, 1966, p. 4.
Slav Rm

U.S. news agencies have recently claimed that the Soviet delegation to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament has stipulated U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam as a condition for agreement on the problem of a nuclear nonproliferation treaty. State Dept. spokesman McCloskey and disarmament negotiator William Foster have repeated this accusation of Soviet conditions at Geneva. This "undignified fuss" is but one more attempt to camouflage the reluctance of U.S. ruling classes to attain real progress at Geneva or to surrender their plan to grant West German revanchists nuclear weapons. "Yes, we have been and are for the withdrawal of the aggressive troops of the U.S.A. from Vietnam. But this question has not formed and must not form an obstacle to achieving an agreement on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Such an agreement can be concluded immediately, if this is sincerely desired by the Western powers, especially the U.S.A."

1962

Whitaker, D. R. THE USE OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES IN DEFENCE PLANNING. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 111, May 1966: 156-158. U1.R8, v. 111

Investigates some of the uses of nuclear explosion as an engineering tool. The small expense involved allows the technique to be used by rich and poor nations alike to develop their resources, e.g., through mining, building waterways and roads, and creating large water-storage facilities in normally arid areas. Use of such explosions specifically for defense purposes could be valuable in an undeveloped country where the absence of roads, harbors, water supplies, etc. are a major military obstacle. At present a political hurdle

like the test ban treaty prohibits all nuclear explosions above ground as well as the release of radioactive debris from underground explosions outside the territorial limits of the state conducting the explosion. With technological improvements the amount of radiation released by a cratering explosion could be reduced and could be improved to prevent testing of nuclear devices under the guise of a peaceful use of atomic energy. Many technical experts would like to amend the treaty to allow for peaceful uses, although "this would be a matter of political judgment on the extent to which such a clause might prejudice the long sought prevention of proliferation."

1963
Willrich, Mason. GUARANTEES TO NON-NUCLEAR NATIONS. Foreign affairs, v. 44, July 1966: 683-692.
D410. F6, v. 44

In their campaign against proliferation the nuclear nations have mentioned possible security guarantees to nations pledging nonacquisition, but the nature and content of the guarantees have nowhere been specified. What interests the nation considering its own nuclear forces are the conditions under which a guarantee would be activated. Certainly the primary demand would be deterrent power. Yet according to the lessons to be learned from alliances nuclear guarantees are not easily separated from conventional defense. "To work as a non-proliferation inducement a guarantee of security formally confined to cases of 'nuclear attack' may well need to entail a further, implicit commitment," one that nuclear powers may be unwilling to make specific in advance. Stronger than a unilateral guarantee would be a joint one backed by both the Soviet Union and the United States. A joint guarantee or one effected through the United Nations might win the approval of nations jealous of their nonalined status. Special attention is due the effects an offer of a nuclear guarantee would have on India, Israel, and Sweden. India demands much in exchange for a renunciation pledge: a guarantee of security from nuclear attack through the United Nations, a nondissemination agreement among the nuclear powers (including Communist China), a comprehensive test ban, a freeze on nuclear weapons production, and substantial disarmament. A "paper guarantee" will not suffice to deter India from the course it wills. Israel would likely accept a U.S. security guarantee, but the United States would extend this to include the whole Middle East. The solution would be creation of an atom-free zone backed by East and West; the consequences of this action in terms of stability justify the effort required to achieve it. In Sweden's case a U.N. nuclear guarantee might be accepted but would not act as a significant deterrent to acquisition. All in all nuclear guarantees are neither powerful inducements nor deterrents to nuclear weapons acqusition. Those capable of it will base their nuclear decisions on considerations of prestige, national security, and cost; security guarantees (at least those now talked about) will have at most a marginal bearing.

5. Communication

6. Command and Control of Weapons

1964
COLLECTIVE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS? AN INFORMAL DISCUSSION. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 4, spring 1966: 66-72.
D839. A85, v. 4

A round-table discussion of the collective use of nuclear weapons by the Atlantic alliance. Julian Critchley of Great Britain, Pieter Dankert of the Netherlands, Ernst Eichengrun of West Germany, Harry Keaton of the United States, and Alain Terrenoire of France--all "NATO Young Political Leaders"--touch upon such aspects of the problem as the proposed three-member directorate, European unity, escalation, the requisite decisionmaking process, and the possiblities of nuclear world war.

1965
THE NERVE CENTER OF UNITED STATES NUCLEAR STRATEGY. NATO letter, v. 14, May 1966: 19-20.
D845. 2. A44, v. 14

The Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, established by the U.S. Secretary of Defense in 1960 and located at Offutt AFB, headquarters of the Strategic Air Command, supplies the President with plans designed to meet any situation that might lead to aggression. A NATO working agreement allows officers from European nations to be assigned to Offutt as a laison group. The target division prepares "a single list of national strategic targets," while the operational planning division assigns targets to weapons systems. In the event of war the President of the United States will decide upon the appropriate measures to be taken. The fact that all strategic weapons systems are assigned to the staff allows for only one communal operational plan while avoiding conflict between various commands and services.

1966
Norstad, Lauris. A PROBLEM OF THE ALLIANCE. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 4, spring 1966: 57-65.
D839. A85, v. 4

General Norstad submits a constructive proposal to solve NATO's nuclear problem. The three producing nations: U.S., U.K. and France, should agree to "put into the common nuclear pot, under the NATO compact" weapons "to be available in the common interest, unimpaired by a last-minute restriction by one or another of the nuclear powers." Command and control over such weapons could be exercised by an executive group composed of the U.S., U.K., France and the Federal Republic of Germany. (Abstract supplied)

C. VIOLATIONS OF AGREEMENTS AND RESPONSES

1. Violations, Inspection, and Verification

1967
Bullard, Sir Edward. THE DETECTION OF UNDERGROUND EXPLOSIONS. Scientific American, v. 215, July 1966: 19-29. illus.
Tl. S5, v. 215

Details the present state of the art in the detection of nuclear explosions. The author concludes that underground nuclear explosions can be detected, located, and identified with sufficient certainty to permit the United States "to accept something like the Russian offer (since withdrawn) of 'two or three' inspections a year." While some improvements can still be made in equipment such as seismographic arrays, the political decisions can be made independently, for they "depend on a balance between the desirability of a test ban and the disadvantages of knowing that a few ambiguous events will occur in the U.S.S.R. each year, any of which could be an explosion but all or most of which are earthquakes."

1968
EURATOM GUARDS AGAINST MISUSE OF NUCLEAR FUEL: COMMUNITY CONTROLS ARE AUTOMATIC, DIRECT AND OBLIGATORY. European community, no. 93, June 1966: 14-15.
P&GP RR

Succinct account of the safeguards system by which the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) keeps track of all its members' nuclear activities and use of nuclear materials. "EURATOM led the way in putting nuclear safeguards into the hands of multinational authority. The EURATOM system has been fully operational and effective over the last seven years; and it is the most thorough system in existence."

1969
Evans, David M. MAN-MADE EARTHQUAKES IN DENVER. Geotimes, v. 10, May/June 1966: 11-17.
QE1. G56, v. 10

Finds that the recent series of earthquakes experienced in the area of Denver, Colorado, was triggered by contaminated waste-water injected into a disposal well by a unit of the U.S. Chemical Corps manufacturing products for chemical warfare and industry. The author suggests that the incident in Denver may indicate a method of controlling future earthquakes, that "it might be possible to relieve the stresses along some fault zones in urban areas by increasing the fluid pressures along the zone, using a series of injection wells. The accumulated stress might thus be released at will in a series of non-damaging earthquakes instead of eventually resulting in one large event that might cause a major disaster."

1970
Foster, William C. U.S. DISCUSSES PROPOSED SAFEGUARDS FOR CUTOFF AND TRANSFER OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESTRUCTION. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 54, June 6, 1966: 901-106.
JX232. A33, v. 54

Statement "made before the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva on Apr. 14 [1966] (U.S./U.N. press release 4836 dated Apr. 21)."

A discussion of that portion of the U.S. draft nonproliferation treaty that deals with safeguards applying to the nuclear-weapon states under the proposal "to halt the production of fissionable material for weapons use, to transfer a total of 100,000 kilograms of U-235 to peaceful uses under safeguards, and to destroy the thousands of nuclear weapons from which to obtain the material for such a transfer."

1971
Goldman, K. L., and others. SOLAR SIMULATION TESTING OF THE NUCLEAR TEST DETECTION SPACECRAFT. Journal of spacecraft and rockets, v. 3, May 1966: 658-666.
TL787. A62A2, v. 3

A test program for solar simulation of the nuclear test detection satellite was carried out in three steps: 1) full-scale engineering model development test, 2) 10-day full-scale operational qualification test of the prototype spacecraft, and 3) 7-day operational acceptance test of each flight spacecraft. The value of the composite test program was demonstrated through comparison and application of test data and, ultimately, through successful launch and performance in orbit of twin flight spacecraft. The model test provided accurate, early verification of spacecraft thermal control design and flight instrumentation performance. The data obviated more extensive spacecraft testing and were useful in evaluating solar simulation performance and the interaction with spacecraft configuration. The prototype test provided valuable data on spacecraft performance not otherwise obtainable except by flight testing. Limitation in spacecraft operation under solar simulation conditions could be determined, thereby allowing modifications to the flight spacecraft. Finally, solar simulation of the flight spacecraft provided excellent indication of performance in orbit and was useful in demonstrating reliability. (Authors' abstract)

1972
Lewis, H. W., and S. B. Treiman. SEISMIC SIGNALS FROM NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS IN OVERDRIVEN CAVITIES. Journal of geophysical research, v. 71, Apr. 15, 1966: 2029-2035.
QC811. J6, v. 71

A static treatment is given of the seismic signal from nuclear explosions in overdriven cavities, with particular attention to the role of the yield condition for the material of the cavity environment and to the role of incipient tension. When the elastic limits are exceeded, the seismic signal is larger than a purely elastic treatment would imply. This enhancement, however, grows relatively slowly with overdrive under certain circumstances. (Authors' abstract)

1973
Livingston, Robert G. AIRBORNE MAPPING EQUIPMENT QUALITY DEVELOPMENT. Photogrammetric engineering, v. 32, May 1966: 390-407.
TA593. A2P5, v. 32

The steady progress of quality in USAF development of the various elements of airborne map acquisition subsystems for the military mapping program during the period, 1950-1965, is described. A large portion of this progress involved actions incident to the improvement of the basic imaging sensor--the aerial mapping camera. In this category are lens distortions, magazine platen flatness, photographic resolution, shutter and diaphragm, image motion compensation, automatic exposure control, other geometric factors such as platen reseaus, data recording capability, camera calibration, camera window glass, and aerial camera stabilization. Improvements through the years include other elements of the airborne mapping subsystem, such as aerographic films, the distance measuring equipments, navigation-positioning equipment, airborne digital computers, the terrain profile recorder, and mapping radars. The AN/USQ-28 Mapping and Surveying Subsystem incorporates practically all of the progress in airborne mapping during the past sixteen years. A chart graphically contrasts the State of the Art in 1950 and that in 1965. (Abstract supplied)

1974
Lockhart, Luther B., Robert L. Patterson, and Allen W. Saunders. AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVITY IN ANTARCTICA. Journal of geophysical research, v. 71, Apr. 15, 1966: 1985-1991.
QC811. J6, v. 71

The radioactive aerosol content of the surface air in Antarctica has been measured continuously since 1956, first at Little America station and later at the South Pole station. On-site measurements were made daily of the radioactivity due to bomb-produced fission products and to naturally occuring radionuclides of the radon and thoron series. Later, composite samples covering 3-month periods were subjected to radiochemical analysis for such long-lived radionuclides as

Sr^{90}, Cs^{137}, Ce^{144}, PM^{147}, and Pb^{210}. The natural radioactivity was lower in Antarctica than has been observed at any other geographical location, as might be expected from the small area of exposed land surface in the vicinity. Fission-product concentrations, however, often exceeded those found in the southernmost part of South America and exhibited more well-defined seasonal variations, with maximums in the antarctic summer. (Authors' abstract)

1975
Mann, Wilfrid B., and S. B. Garfinkel. RADIOACTIVITY AND ITS MEASUREMENT. Princeton, N.J., Van Nostrand [1966] 168 p. (Van Nostrand momentum books, published for the Commission on College Physics, no. 10) QC795. M242

Chronicles the discovery and early development of readioactivity and describes the interactions of alpha and beta particles and of x and gamma rays "with matter and the consequent methods of detection of such radiations based upon the transfers of energy resulting from such interactions with matter." The "nucleonic instrumentation" developed for the detection and measurement of radioactivity is described in the final three chapters.

1976
Paltridge, G. W. STRATOSPHERIC SMALL-ION DENSITY MEASUREMENTS FROM A HIGH-ALTITUDE JET AIRCRAFT. Journal of geophysical research, v. 71, Apr. 15, 1966: 1945-1952. QC811. J6, v. 71

An airborne instrument suitable for measurement of the positive and negative small-ion density of the atmosphere above 9 km has been developed. It is a self-contained unit which can be attached externally to any subsonic aircraft. Access is required to the normal 28-volt dc supply and to one channel of a recorder. Various flights during 6 months in 1965 have shown that over this period there was a gradual decrease in the stratospheric dust concentration, as evidenced by the return to equality of the polar ion densities by July. A series of vertical profiles obtained during a single 24-hour period in July showed that any effect due to dust was confined to the troposphere and that, during this period at least, no significant time variation was apparent. Two long-distance flights confirmed the dependence of small-ion density on geomagnetic latitude for the two altitudes 10 and 13 km. (Author's abstract)

1977
Persson, G. FRACTIONATION PHENOMENA IN DEBRIS FROM THE CHINESE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION IN MAY 1965. Nature (London) v. 209, Mar. 19, 1966: 1193-1195. Q1. N2, v. 209

Reports a Swedish analysis of the fractionation phenomena associated with radioactive debris from China's May 1965 nuclear test.

1978
Thirlaway, Henry I. S. SEISMOLOGY AND FUNDAMENTAL GEOLOGY. Discovery, v. 27, May 1966: 43-48. AP4. D6, v. 27

Explains how the tremendous increase in seismic monitoring that has been brought about by the "political need to detect large underground explosions" has benefited fundamental geology. Because it is highly desirable not only to detect underground nuclear blasts but also to distinguish them from earthquakes the Western countries have set up sophisticated and standardized seismic arrays, which will continue to operate and deepen understanding of earthquakes for at least several years "whatever the outcome of political negotiations."

1979
Volchok, H. L. THE GLOBAL STRONTIUM 90 BUDGET. Journal of geophysical research, v. 71, Mar. 15, 1966: 1515-1518. QC811. J6, v. 71

Inventories of Sr^{90} in the earth's environment have been made for a series of dates between August 1961 and March 1965. On every date tested these inventories are found to be deficient when compared with the amount of Sr^{90} expected to be present, on the basis of nuclear weapons tests conducted in the atmosphere. The major portion of this deficiency is attributed to a 33% error in the inventory of Sr^{90} deposited on the earth's surface that is caused by assuming that the observed fallout on land is equivalent to that on the oceans, per unit area. It is suggested that water bodies collect fallout 1.5 times more efficiently than land. Applying this factor to the worldwide Sr^{90} deposition inventory results in good agreement between stratospheric depletion and worldwide deposition, in addition to accounting for the apparent budget deficiency. (Author's abstract)

1980
White, Peter T. THE CAMERA KEEPS WATCH ON THE WORLD. New York times magazine, Apr. 3, 1966: 26-27, 54, 56, 58, 60, 63-64, 66. illus. AP2. N6575, 1966

Explores broadly the techniques and uses of aerial photography and remote sensors of all kinds. Both military and civilian applications are explained in popular terms, with emphasis on the wide versatility and accuracy of photointerpretation.

1981
Young, Wayland H., ed. EXISTING MECHANISMS OF ARMS CONTROL. Oxford, New York, Pergamon Press [1966] 150 p. (The Commonwealth and international library) JX1974. Y6, 1966

Contents.--Introduction, by Wayland H. Young.--Western European Union, by Raymond Fletcher.--The United States bilateral safeguards system, by Glenn T. Seaborg.--The European Atomic Energy Community, by Jacques van Helmont.--The European Nuclear Energy Agency, by Einar Saeland.--The International Atomic Energy Agency, by John A. Hall.--Conclusion: atoms for peace and atoms for war, by Lewis C. Bohn.

Singles out for attention "the operation of existing mechanisms for the international control of warlike materials, principally fissile material." These papers, all of which originally appeared in the British quarterly Disarmament and Arms Control, describe cases where states have formally come together and set up systems and organizations for the control of fissile materials. In conclusion Lewis C. Bohn weighs the advantages and costs of spreading civil nuclear energy and expresses the view that it might be safer for the world if atomic power reactors were not widely disseminated.

2. Enforcement

a. BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

b. BY OTHER MEANS

D. CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES

1. General Analyses

1982

Massioukévitch, V. [AFRICA AND ASIA, DO THEY NEED GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT?] L'Asie et l'Afrique ont-elles besoin du désarmement général et complet? [Moscou, Agence de presse Novosti, 1964] 18 p. JX1974. M39

The Soviet Union, a peaceloving government, was compelled to enter the arms race to discourage U.S. aggressive imperialism. Yet everyone must analyze the terrible consequences of a modern war--a war made more likely by the arms race. Nuclear war would spread its evil into every corner of the world, "there would be no spectators, there would be belligerents and victims." How ridiculous are the Chinese who speak of reconstructing a Socialist world after the cataclysm. The goal is admirable but the means too extreme; the progressive classes would not be spared the ruin befalling the imperialists. "Communism was created for man, in the name of man. That is why . . . the Soviet government . . . strives to find the ways that imply a minimum of sacrifice." The new states of Africa and Asia would lose their economic, technical, commercial, and scientific ties with the industrial countries in the wake of a nuclear war; any development they had achieved would be reduced to zero. Thus their interest would be served by general and complete disarmament as outlined by the Soviet draft treaty before the United Nations. What would be the advantages? (1) The risks of widespread death and destruction of costly works would be eliminated. (2) Military blocs would disappear, therefore countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, and South Korea could redivert their resources to the more important work of economic development. (3) Many peaceful, neutral Asian-African nations could reduce the armies needed for defense against the imperialists and their puppets. (4) The funds now wasted in the arms race would be used to speed development. Perhaps in a single generation the underdeveloped nations could catch up with the developed countries. The Soviet propositions would not deprive national liberation movements of their strength; in fact they would be made stronger because the imperialist means of oppression would be removed. Some say that imperialism will never accept these disarmament proposals. But there is room for optimism. Popular pressures forced its acceptance of the partial test-ban treaty; in like manner a united front can impose its will to disarm on the "forces of war and aggression."

2. Military

3. Political

1983

Clemens, Walter C. THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN AND SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. Orbis, v. 10, spring 1966: 152-183. D839. O68, v. 10

Examines the effect of the nuclear test ban treaty upon Sino-Soviet relations. The treaty is cited as a major irritant to the Chinese Communists since 1956, when the possibility of such an agreement suggested to Peking that Moscow was turning away from their alliance to seek closer cooperation with the West and was considering a course of action that would injure Chinese security by placing moral or legal restraints on future Chinese nuclear tests. The signing of the test ban treaty was probably the immediate cause of the Sino-Soviet rift. Thereafter the test ban became the major issue "around which both parties tried to rally support and to 'expose' their ideological adversary's errors." In a deviation from past doctrine the Soviets, by their ratification of the treaty, served notice of their belief that the Socialist world could deal with "sober forces" in the West, thereby heightening the opposition between Chinese belligerence and the Soviet teaching of peaceful coexistence. "For all these reasons, material and symbolic, the test ban issue promises to remain an important factor in Sino-Soviet relations and in U.S. policy toward the two countries."

4. Economic

1984

Bolton, Roger E., ed. DEFENSE AND DISARMAMENT: THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall. [1966] 180 p. (Modern economic issues, a Spectrum book) HC110. D4B6

Defense spending: a burden or a prop? The editor of Defense and Disarmament finds that it is probably both, and in either case "defense production looms large in the national economy." In a collection of essays and excerpts dealing with the problems of massive defense spending, arms reduction, economic diversification and adjustment, Mr. Bolton concludes that disarmament will represent a boon to the economy, that "the burden can be reduced by transfering men and capital and technical skills into new uses," and that present reductions and adjustments due to more efficient defense spending will help pave the way toward coping with the large reductions that will come with disarmament.

1985

International Institute for Peace. THE ECONOMIC NECESSITY OF DISARMAMENT: REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PEACE. [Vienna, 196?] 69 p. HC79. D415

The proceedings of "a world-wide discussion between economists, scientists, trade unionists, businessmen and peace workers," held in Vienna, Dec. 12-14, 1964. Speakers from all over the world presented widely varying viewpoints on such diverse topics as nuclear-free zones, African unity, economic cooperation, and international trade. Participants agreed that no nation's economy is actually dependent on armaments; reconversion does not require drastic economic changes; the arms race threatens the balance and growth of the economy; and aid to developing countries, for which resources would be freed following disarmament, is a moral obligation.

1986

Ivanov, Konstantin, and Boris Batsanov. [DISARMAMENT AND WHAT IT WILL GIVE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES] Le désarmement et ce que cela donnera aux pays en voie de développement [Moscou] Éditions de l'Agence de presse Novosti [1965?] 134 p. HC65. I9

Contents. --Introduction. --At the Palace of Nations. --The other aspect of the question. --A new world problem. --Economic perspectives on Southeast Asia and the Middle East. --African economic perspectives. --The future of Latin America. --Some explanations. --Ideology, foreign policy, and disarmament. --Conclusion.

Describes and comments upon a plan for radically improving economic and cultural conditions in underdeveloped countries. The plan is contained in the

Soviet declaration (submitted to the 18th session of the U. N. General Assembly) on the peaceful use of the resources that would become available after disarmament. Dismantling of the capitalist war machine is the first, and Socialist economic development the second, aspect of peace in the world today. That world economic growth will rapidly increase under disarmament is, according to the authors, an unquestionable assumption.

1987
Weidenbaum, Murray L., and Ben Chieh-liu. EFFECT OF DISARMAMENT ON REGIONAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION. Journal of peace research, v. 3, no. 1, 1966: 89-92. P&GP RR

A reallocation of federal government defense expenditures to non-defense programs in 1963, other things being equal, would have reduced the differentials in regional income distribution in the United States. The areas of lowest average incomes such as the Southeast and the Southwest which have had large shares of government non-defense expenditures, would tend to benefit from such a reallocation of public sector resources. Conversely, the high income regions, such as the Far West and the Mideast, which have had large shares in government defense spending, would tend to receive reduced shares of total federal government disbursements. However, the income equalization effects of disarmament would be limited, with substantial geographic variations continuing to exist. (Authors' summary)

AUTHOR INDEX

[Numbers 1-433 refer to entries in vol. 2, no. 1; 434-937 to vol. 2, no. 2; 938-1468 to vol. 2, no. 3; and 1469-1987 to this issue.]

A

Abdullah, Mohammad, Sheikh, 1340
Aboltin, V. Ia., 1280, 1338
Abosch, Heinz, 1098
Acheson, Dean, 1839
Adams, C. A., 244
Adenauer, Konrad, 1741
Adler, Renata, 805
Africanus, pseud., 491
Ahearn, Thomas R., 738
Ahmad, Eqbal, 59
Ailleret, Charles, 1734
Akademiia nauk SSSR. Institut istorii, 967, 1374
Albinski, Henry S., 891
Albonetti, Achille, 192
Alcock, Norman Z., 806, 1877
Aldea, Dan, 749
Aleksandrov, A., 1907
Alekseev, S., 1924
Alexander, George, 1044
Alexandros, L., 1494, 1709
Allen, Richard V., 1002
Allon, Yigal, 1108
Alsop, Stewart, 601, 1752
Ambler, John S., 1753
The American behavioral scientist, 434
Amlund, Curtis A., 1430
Anand, R. P., 772
Anders, Allison, 426
Anderson, Evelyn, 941
Andreev, N., 120
Antipov, V. V., 589
Antoine, Pierre, 1341
Anureev, I. I., 83
Aranguren, José L., 1469
Archambeau, John O., 1833
Arkad'ev, G. P., 1338
Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association, 403
Army Times Publishing Company, Washington, D. C., 264
Arnhym, Albert A., 656
Aron, Raymond, 121, 941, 1470-1471, 1563
Aronowitz, Dennis S., 406
Arzinger, Rudolf, 673
Asprey, Robert B., 122
Atlantic Council of the United States, 674
Auberti, Michel, 362
Audrieth, Ludwig F., 999
Australia. Dept. of External Affairs, 1375
Avtokin, A., 1925
Axelbank, Albert, 602

B

BNTW, 1045
Baade, Fritz, 1464
Baar, James, 1046
Babaa, Khalid I., 514
Babakov, A., 1495
Babović, Bogdan, 371
Back, Kurt W., 6
Bader, W. B., 1710
Badurina, Berislav, 540, 886
Baldwin, Hanson W., 603, 1427
Ball, George W., 1711
Bane, Charles A., 1315
Baratta, Edmond J., 283
Barclay, C. N., 1125
Barnes, Gerald, 1867
Barnet, Richard J., 1914
Barnett, A. Doak, 1511
Barnett, Frank R., 117
Barrett, Raymond J., 305, 1562
Barringer, Richard E., 107
Bartenev, S., 528
Barthel, F., 1579
Baruchi, Enrique, 16
Bastid, Suzanne, 1325
Bateman, Don, 475
Batsanov, Boris, 1986
Baudissin, Wolf, Graf von, 1741
Bauer, Eddy, 1895
Baukloh, Friedhelm, 870
Baumann, Gerhard, 1190
Beal, George M., 1236, 1245
Beam, Jacob D., 341
Beaucoudray, M. Ganne de, 123
Beaufre, André, 192, 550, 605, 1099, 1100-1101, 1108, 1632, 1712-1713, 1741
Bebler, Ales, 435
Bechtoldt, Heinrich, 1191
Beck, J. N., 1789
Beebe, George A., 784
Beebe, Lucius, 1126
Beecher, William, 604, 1047
Beglov, S., 1924
Beiser, Edward N., 1237
Beliaev, Kim, 1925
Beller, William S., 807, 1192, 1808
Belot, Raymond de, 676, 1580
Bell, Coral, 17
Bennett, A. Leroy, 785
Bennett, Roy, 1326
Benoit, Emile, 1633
Benson, Ivor, 436
Berezhkov, V., 1127
Berg, Robert S., 1581
Berge, Pierre, 750
Berger, Peter, 1003
Bergman, Jules, 1582
Berlia, Georges, 1868
Berreby, Jean-Jacques, 938
Bertin, Leonard, 69, 404
Bertrand, Maurice, 1644
Bhatia, Harish, 1755
Bhowmick, S. C., 954
Bhutto, Zulfikar A., 1431
Bielau, Hermann, 1048
Bilik, B. H., 923
Bindschedler-Robert, Denise, 1840
Bingham, June, 1376
Birnbaum, Karl E., 383
Birrenbach, Kurt, 1193
Bishop, Peter V., 799
Black, Hawley L., 1756
Blackstock, Paul W., 70
Bloemer, Klaus, 18
Bloomfield, Lincoln P., 302, 893
Bloomstein, Charles, 1890
Blume, Isabelle, 808
Blumenson, Martin, 1496
Bobrow, Davis B., 843, 894, 977, 1428
Bodet, Jean, 1083
Böhm, Anton, 108
Boehm, Eric H., 437
Boehm, George A., 605
Bogdanov, Oleg V., 291, 342, 422, 1338
Boguslaw, Robert, 1463
Bohlen, Joe M., 1238, 1245
Bohn, Lewis C., 1981
Boissière, Claude, 1102
Bollinger, Klaus, 27
Bolton, Roger E., 1984
Bomke, Hans A., 1790
Bond, Brian, 51, 1108
Bond, Victor P., 1833
Bonham-Carter, Mark, 941
Bonnefous, Édouard, 260
Bonnet, Henri, 1714
Bontemps, Jacques, 1834
Boone, W. Fred, 1583
Borch, Herbert von, 590
Borchgrave, Arnaud de, 1645
Borisov, Iurii, 1925
Boulding, Kenneth E., 1
Bourne, Geoffrey Kemp Bourne, baron, 1663
Bouthoul, Gaston, 1472, 1563
Bowen, Vaughan T., 1305
Bowen, William, 1809
Bowman, Richard C., 1757
Boyd, Andrew, 1857
Boyd, James M., 1858
Brandwein, Robert, 751
Braucher, Charles L., 1239

Brauner, W., 265
Bregman, Alexander, 941
Brewin, Andrew, 607
Breyer, Siegfried, 552
Brill, James H., 1584
Bristol, James, 809
Broch, Tom, 1473
Brodie, Bernard, 1103, 1944
Brody, Richard A., 8
Broecker, Wallace S., 1306
Bromke, Adam, 677
Brosio, Manlio, 678
Brossier, Raymonde, 1342
Broussine, Georges, 1205
Brown, Sir Allen, 20
Brown, George W., 1758
Brown, Neville, 109, 1908, 1941
Brownlow, Cecil, 1049-1051, 1128, 1140, 1585, 1759
Brumberg, Abraham, 19
Brunner, Dominique, 1432, 1946
Brunner, E. D., 266
Brunst, V. V., 280
Brykin, Vladimir A., 1497
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 941, 1549
Buchan, Alastair, 20, 895, 1108
Buchanan, Keith, 1474
Büchenbacher, Christoph, 1521
Bulajic, Milan, 773
Bull, Hedley, 1475
Bullard, Sir Edward, 1967
Bundy, William P., 20, 1514
Burchett, Wilfred, 608
Burchill, Charles S., 1515
Burck, Gilbert, 267, 1760
Burgess, S. G., 285
Burhop, Eric H., 844
Burke, Arleigh, 1646
Burke, Stanley, 1205
Burlatskii, Fedor, 1433
Burnham, James, 311
Burns, Arthur L., 679
Burns, E. L. M., 1420, 1434, 1941
Bussey, Donald S., 591
Bussey, Gertrude C., 312
Butz, J. S., 71, 221, 553
Buzuev, Vladimir M., 1327
Byrnside, Ben C., 91

C

C., F., 1195
Cabanier, Georges, 72, 1647
Cabiac, Roger, 710, 1052
Cadett, Thomas, 1205
Cain, Leila S., 2
Caldwell, Turner F., 1053
Calvocoressi, Peter, 298
Campbell, Joel T., 2
Canada. Dept. of Defense Production. Industry Directory Section, 1810
Candlin, A. H. S., 1648
Canham, Erwin D., 124
Canstein, Raban, Freiherr von, 379
Cariappa, K. M., 1129
Carlton, David, 335
Carpenter, Norman R., 1313
Carpozi, George, 336
Carroll, Berenice A., 1906
Carter, Luther J., 1054, 1426
Carver, George A., 1762
Casamayor, 736
Case, Frank B., 680, 1130
Catholic Church in Germany. Bishops, 1004
Catholic Church in Poland. Bishops, 515, 1005
Cattell, David T., 32
Caucig, Franz von, 1196
Caulais, Jacques, 1498
Cavers, David F., 224
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1564
Centre d'informations scientifiques, économiques, et politiques, 33
Ceuzin, Paul, 554, 1056
Chalandon, Gabriel, 1282
Chalfont, Arthur Gwynne Jones, baron, 1024, 1108, 1381-1383, 1435
Champeaux, Ernest, 529
Chandrasekhar, Sripati, 465
Chang, Chi Ryang, 609
Chapin, Seymour L., 1904
Chapuis, Robert, 711
Chastenet, Jacques, 1563
Chaumont, Charles, 1325
Chauvel, Jean, 20
Chavichvily, Khariton, 978
Chen, Yi, 125, 476
Cherkasskii, V. Iu., 786
Cherkes, A. I., 73
Chesneaux, Jean, 1634
Chevallier, Raymond, 924
Chieh-liu, Ben, 1987
Chinn, Herman I., 999
Chiu, Hung-ta, 1316
Cho, M. Y., 477
Chopra, Maharaj K., 127, 592, 612
Chopra, Surendra, 954
Christ, Rolf F., 613, 1055
Christol, Carol Q., 867
Christopher, Stefan C., 812
Chubar'ian, A. O., 967
Chuev, Iurii V., 555
Chugasov, Andrei A., 74, 222
Chung, Ho, 1715
Chyong, Chung Tkhy, 614
Citrin, Jack, 1859
Clair-Louis, Jean, 968
Clark, Bronson P., 1501
Clark, Joseph S., 845, 1343, 1499
Clark, Robert A., 438
Claude, Inis L., 302
Clemens, Walter C., 1896, 1983
Cleveland, Harlan, 681, 979
Clubb, O. Edmund, 122, 1264, 1516
Cochrane, Sir Ralph, 1663
Cockrill, James T., 712
Coddington, Alan, 980
Coffey, Joseph I., 615, 1649
Cohen, Bernard C., 1517
Cohen, N. D., 52
Coignard, Marcel, 405
Columbia University. Arms Control Verification Study, 406
Comay, Joan, 1849
Combaux, Edmond, 1197
Commentator, pseud., 682, 856, 866
Conference of Heads of State or Government of Nonaligned Countries. 1st, Belgrad (1961), 316
Conference to Plan a Strategy for Peace, 1344-1345
Cooper, John C., 607, 867
Copp, DeWitt S., 128
Corbeau, Jean, 1083
Corbett, P. E., 1317
Cornides, Wilhelm, 941
Cosyns-Verhaegen, Roger, 1369
Cottrell, Alvin J., 139
Coudenhove-Kalergi, Richard von, 1551
Coughlin, William J., 931
Coulbois, Paul, 1283
Coulibaly, Sory, 1930
Coulmas, Peter, 439
Coulomb, Jean, 1587
Court Brown, W. M., 244
Couve de Murville, Maurice J., 1734
Couwenberg, S. W., 1477
Couzy, J. H., 1717
Cox, Arthur M., 1860
Coyle, David C., 1850
Crabb, Cecil V., 21
Craig, Gordon, 1108
Crampin, Stuart, 407
Crane, Brian, 129
Creekmore, C. J., 130
Critchley, Julian, 1964
Crook, Samuel L., 764

D

Dacier, Michel, 1198
Däniker, Gustav, 384
Daftary, A. Matine, 1851
Dahrendorf, Ralf, 226, 232
Dalma, Alfons, 131
D'Amato, Anthony, 365
Dankert, Pieter, 1964
Das, R. K., 954
David, Vaclav, 1384
Davies, John Paton, 1519
Davis, Robert H., 1463, 1478
D'Cruz, V., 34
Dean, Arthur H., 1385-1386
Dean, Fred M., 343
Defferre, Gaston, 1552
De Gaulle, Charles, 479, 1734
De Grazia, Alfred, 449
Deimer, Sefton, 897
Deinichenko, G., 1925
De Kadt, Emanuel J., 3
Delaye, Th.-J., 1265
Delcour, Roland, 480
Delmas, Claude, 1103
De Maizière, Ulrich, 1741
Dem'ianov, V. P., 83
Denton, F. H., 1897
Derevianko, P. M., 1131
Desai, Manilal J., 385
DeSaussure, Hamilton, 867
Desbarbieux, Roland, 182, 268, 617, 1132, 1199
Desjardins, Thierry, 1133
Detter, Ingrid, 1841
Deutsch, Karl W., 939, 1915
Devadanam, C., 954
Dinerstein, Herbert S., 4
Dirks, Walter, 516, 810
Diwakar, R. R., 1439
Djerdja, Josip, 737, 1917
Dmitriev, Bor, 836
Dodd, Stuart C., 812
Dönhoff, M., Gräfin, 183
Doernberg, Stefan, 1500
Donnelly, Desmond, 941
Dorlet, Louis, 1479
Dorn, D. W., 1791

230-967 O - 68 - 8

Dornberger, Walter, 106
Doty, L. L., 1719
Dougherty, James E., 1328, 1419
Douglas, James W., 1329
Douglas, William O., 774
Dragunov, Georgii, 1925
Dragunskii, G., 1925
Drambiants, G., 1488
Dresner, Samuel H., 1870
Droz, J.-P., 1565
Druzhkin, L. A., 83
Dubarle, Father, 1355
Duchacek, Ivo, 940
Dudley, C. E. S., 1898
Dufort, Robert H., 345
Dulac, Philippe, 618-619, 1134, 1650
Dulberger, Leon H., 1588, 1608
Dupoux, J. F., 227
Dupuy, René-Jean, 1325
Durdin, Peggy, 122
Durkee, William P., 1135
Duroselle, J. B., 1006
Du Tiret, G., 1301
Dutscher, Alan, 427
Dyer, A. J., 252

E

Ebert, Theodor, 813
Eccles, Henry E., 346
Eckhardt, William, 53
Eckstein, Alexander, 1553
Eden, Anthony, 1200
Eekelen, Willem F. van, 35
Efremov, Aleksandr E., 1572, 1925
Eggleston, Wilfrid, 1377
Egorov, Valerii N., 466
Ehrhardt, Carl A., 483
Eichelberger, Clark M., 837
Eichengrun, Ernst, 1964
Eide, Asbjørn, 1852
Eklund, Sigvard, 387
Elble, Rolf, 530, 1104
Eldridge, Lute, 1058
Eliot, George Fielding, 713, 1651
Emel'ianov, V., 347, 787, 1449, 1948
Emlen, Woodruff J., 1501
Encausse, H. Carrère de, 1520
Engels, Friedrich, 1532
Erasmus, pseud., 941
Eren, Nuri, 481
Erhard, Ludwig, 482
Ericsson, U., 415
Erikson, Erik H., 5
Erler, Fritz, 846, 1741
Ermath, Fritz, 1285
Ershov, D., 1924
Ershov, Iu., 1488
Erven, L., 1007
Eschenburg, Theodor, 1008
Esterling, Kel'd, 380
Estes, Howell M., 1589
Etinger, Iakov Ia., 467
Etzioni, Amitai, 1792
Europa-Haus-Schliersee, 1555
Europäische Arbeitsgemeinschaft, 1554
Evans, David M., 1969
Evans, F. T., 1318
Evanzia, W. J., 1591
Evgen'ev, I., 857
Ewald, Robert F., 1918
Eyraud, Michel, 132, 1201, 1720

F

Faenov, Ia. I., 1793
Falcke, Dietrich, 621
Falk, Richard A., 295, 775, 1522, 1914
Fall, Bernard, 1039, 1518
Famiglietti, Gene, 1814
Farine, Philippe, 1355
Farmer, James, 60
Fayolle, P., 1059
Fedorov, B., 75
Fedorov, L., 1764
Fedorov, Vladimir N., 838
Fehrenbach, T. R., 1330
Fenwick, Charles G., 292
Féral, Colonel, 1653
Ferry, W. H., 1564
Figueres, Leo, 1523
Fink, Daniel J., 1654
Finn, James, 1826
Finney, John, 1949
Fiore, Michael V., 1243
Firmage, Edwin B., 800
Fischerhof, H., 925
Fishel, Wesley R., 1429
Fisher, Adrian S., 1848
Fitzgerald, Mark J., 1364
Fix, Joseph E., 1655
Flamband, A., 1450
Flechtheim, Ossip K., 317, 468
Fleischmann, A. W., 1307
Fleming, D. F., 484, 969
Fletcher, Raymond, 1981
Fliedner, Theodor M., 1833
Florin, Peter, 1009
Fontaine, André, 518, 683, 941, 1010, 1378
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 244
Ford, John J., 1814
Forster, Thomas M., 622
Foster, William C., 348, 367, 386, 860, 871-872, 881, 898, 1420, 1936, 1970
Fourniau, Charles, 1138
Fraleigh, Arnold, 882
France. Commissariat à l'énergie atomique. Département des relations extérieures, 623
Franck, Thomas A., 293
Frank, Henning, 684
Frank, Lewis A., 899
Frankel, Charles, 814
Franks, H. G., 1060
Frederik, Hans, 469
Freed, Fred, 839
Frenzke, Dietrich, 486
Freund, Hugo, 815
Freund, Ludwig, 1527
Freymond, Jacques, 941
Frid, Norman, 380
Friedensrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1656
Friedman, Leonard R., 1765
Friedmann, Wolfgang, 776
Friends, Society of. American Friends Service Committee, 1501
Frisch, Alfred, 487
Frizell, Bernard, 1205
Froelich, J.-C., 1480
Frolova, L., 1488
Fromm, Erich, 1950
Frommann, Arndt, 1554
Frydenberg, Per, 801
Fucks, Wilhelm, 440
Fulbright, James William, 981
Fuller, Jon W., 1899
Furniss, Edgar S., 982
Futrell, Robert E., 337

G

Gadary, Y., 133
Galkin, A., 319
Galkin, M., 1673
Gallavardin, Jean, 1592
Gallois, Pierre M., 134, 1202, 1734
Galtung, Johan, 232, 816, 942, 1473, 1635
Galula, David, 20
Gandilhon, Jean, 1105
Ganovski, Sava, 441
García Amador, F. V., 296
Garder, Michel, 135, 1011
Garfinkel, S. B., 1975
Garg, B. L., 954
Garretson, Albert H., 1848
Garretson, Robert C., 1871
Garvey, Gerald, 714
Gasteyger, Curt, 941, 1389, 1420, 1937
Gauzit, J., 951
Gavin, James M., 1139, 1657
Gazier, Philipe, 1287
Geisenheyner, Stefan, 186
Gellman, Benet D., 1766
Gellner, John, 386
Geneste, Lt-Colonel, 1027
Georgia. University. Social Science Research Institute, 955
Georgiev, Elmir, 560
Gerard, Francis, 1325
Gerasimov, G., 1036, 1658
Gerasimov, Kim, 1924
Gerasimov, V., 561
Gergen, Kenneth J., 6
Gerhart, John K., 136
Germany (Democratic Republic, 1949-)
  Institut für Deutsche Militärgeschichte der Nationalen Volksarmee, 138
  Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, 368, 1436
  Staatsrat, 1408
Gerwin, Robert, 1767
Gessert, Robert A., 1827
Getler, Michael, 77-78, 562-563, 1061-1062, 1451, 1593-1594, 1659, 1804
Ghose, Surendra Mohan, 1439
Ghosh, Radha, 1203
Ghosh, T. C., 1660
Giess, Fritz E., 1204
Gilbert, Marc, 624, 1063, 1661, 1794
Gillett, Nicholas, 833
Gimpel, Herbert J., 564
Giovannitti, Len, 839
Gittings, John, 941
Gladkov, M., 1140
Glagolev, Igor' S., 349, 935
Glick, Edward B., 861, 1463
Glukhov, Iu., 1478
Gobbs, Norman, 1108
Goldberg, Arthur J., 290, 802, 881, 983, 1331, 1842, 1861

Golden, Charles F., 1872
Goldman, K. L., 1971
Goldstein, Walter, 389, 873, 900, 1662
Goldwyn, Robert M., 1086
Golikov, V., 519
Golubkin, V., 1924
Goode, Cecil E., 955
Goodman, Elliot R., 187
Goodman, Geoffrey, 1465
Goodrich, Leland M., 302
Goodwin, Geoffrey, 685
Goodwin, Richard N., 1518
Gorden, Morton, 847
Goriainov, Makar, 349
Gorove, Stephen, 409
Gosset, Pierre, 625
Gosset, Renée, 625
Government Data Publications, Washington, D. C., 1595
Grabowski, Z. A., 44
Graham, Robert A., 276
Granger, Clinton E., 488
Grant, Donald, 983
Great Britain. Central Office of Information. Reference Division, 984
Green, J. H., 901
Greene, Marc T., 626
Greene, Wade, 1900
Gresmann, Hans, 188
Gretton, Sir Peter, 593, 1106, 1663
Grewe, Wilhelm, 1741
Grézer, Jacques O., 1142
Griffith, Samuel B., 20, 122
Griffiths, Franklyn, 36, 902
Grigor'ev, E., 1722, 1925
Grosch, Daniel S., 1308
Gross, Johannes, 22, 189, 520
Gross, Leo, 302
Grosser, Alfred, 985, 1012, 1734
Gruening, Ernest, 1144
Grzybowsky, Kazimierz, 288
Gubarev, Vladimir S., 1244
Guelzo, Carl M., 890
Guenod, 1812
Guénolé, Jean, 686
Guéroult, Claude, 1205
Guest, Alex, 1596
Guetzkow, Harold, 955, 1502
Gundel, B. H., 1107
Gupta, V. P., 954
Gutteridge, William, 54

H

H., J., 1206
Haagerup, Niels J., 627
Haas, Michael, 943
Haase, Erich, 233
Hacker, Jens, 1503, 1909
Haekkerup, Per, 1390
Haffner, Sebastian, 1145
Hagemann, Max, 442
Haggerty, James J., 79, 566
Hahn, Walter F., 139
Hakim, George, 1391
Halkin, Hubert, 567
Hall, John A., 423, 1981
Halle, Louis J., 192, 941
Halle, Nils H., 1481
Hamm, Harry, 1528
Halperin, Morton H., 20, 848, 1941
Hammond, Kenneth R., 443
Hammond, Paul Y., 1853
Hamon, Léo, 320, 944
Hanning, Hugh, 306, 715
Hanrieder, Wolfram F., 7
Harbron, John D., 1664
Hargreaves, Reginald, 531
Harrigan, Anthony, 140, 1207, 1483
Harris, T. George, 1813
Harsanyi, John C., 1484
Hartigan, Richard S., 1828
Hassel, Kai Uwe von, 669, 1741, 1768
Hassialis, M. D., 232
Hayden, Thomas, 851
Hayes, Helen L., 91
Hazary, Narayan, 954
Heath, Sir Maurice, 1597
Heelas, Terence, 1146
Heer, David M., 739
Heiden, Horst, 1208
Heidt, Contrôleur Général, 1147
Heikal, Muhammad H., 892
Heilbrunn, Otto, 541
Heiman, Leo, 1064
Heininger, Horst, 594
Heller, Hermann, 1566
Helmont, Jacques van, 1981
Henle, Hans, 489
Henningsen, E. Juel, 244
Héraud, Guy, 945
Herberichs, Gérard, 1485
Heroy, William B., 926
Herzfeld, Charles M., 1065
Herzfeld, Norma K., 229
Heumann, Gert W., 1598
Heusinger, Adolf, 23, 669, 687, 1741
Hewetson, Sir Reginald, 629
Heymont, Irving, 1209
Hicks, B. B., 252
Hinterhoff, Eugene, 1148-1149, 1666
Hinton, Harold C., 986, 1437
Hirschfeld, Oswald, 630, 932, 1210, 1723
Hitch, Charles J., 1769
Hitchens, Harold L., 631
Hoagland, John H., 862
Hobsbawm, Eric, 381
Hocke, Gustav R., 1346
Höpker, Wolfgang, 632
Hörmann, Karl, 1829, 1873
Hoff, Hans, 232
Hoffman, Fred S., 141, 1667
Hoffmann, Stanley, 1486
Holifield, Chet, 688, 1066
Holland, James G., 190
Hollyhock, W. M., 80
Holmberg, William C., 1668
Holmes, John W., 20, 1724
Holsten, R. D., 765
Holsti, Ole R., 8
Holzheimer, Hermann, 490
Homer, Frank, 81
Honey, P. J., 20
Hooson, Emlyn, 689
Horikawa, Masakatsu, 281
Hornberger, Michael, 230, 568
Horowitz, Irving L., 849
Horowitz, Robert S., 1814
Hosmer, Craig, 350
Hounau, Général, 633
Howard, H. D., 1318
Howard, Michael, 192, 1669, 1941
Howard, Richard C., 1504
Howard, William E., 1046
Hromádka, Joseph, 321
Hrubiak, W., 1094
Hsiao, Fend, 1781
Hsin, Wen, 1013
Hsinhua News Agency, 817
Hsu, Hsi-hui, 1566
Huan, Claude, 1670
Hudson, G. F., 941
Hughes, Sarah T., 778
Hugo, Conrad von, 1152
Huizinga, J. H., 1014
Humpert, Franz J., 261
Hunt, E. L. Roy, 987
Huntley, James R., 1725
Hurewitz, J. C., 302
Hutchinson, Dorothy, 1501

I

Iakhonov, Iu., 1924
Iakovlev, N., 1924
Ibarrola, Jésus, 1302
Iklé, Fred C., 1454
Imhoff, Christoph von, 1015
India (Republic) Dept. of Atomic Energy, 1438
International Atomic Energy Agency, 244
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 231
International Conference for Solidarity with the People of Vietnam Against U.S. Imperialist Aggression and for the Defence of Peace, 1347
International Convocation on the Requirements of Peace, New York (1965), 322
International Institute for Peace, 1985
Isbell, Allen C., 1303
Isorni, Jacques, 818
Italy. Comitato nazionale per l'energia nucleare, 1154
Itskov, Igor' M., 1770
Iurev, N., 142
Ivanov, Konstantin, 1986
Ivanov, V., 1673
Izraël, Yu. A., 410

J

Jack, Homer A., 374-375, 1348, 1392, 1440, 1938
Jackson, Henry M., 493, 733
Jackson, Willis, 1600
Jacob, Philip E., 1853
Jacobs, Hayes B., 740
James, Victor, 1288
Janke, Erich, 390
Janowitz, Morris, 1771
Jaquet, Gérard, 1205, 1939
Jaspers, Karl, 1530
Jelenski, K. A., 941
Jen, Ku-ping, 636
Jen, Richard L., 194
Jena, B. B., 954
Jensen, Lloyd, 376, 1502
Jerome, Harold E., 270
Jiří z Poděbrad, King of Bohemia, (1420-1471), 1905
Joffrin, Yves, 1083
Johnson, G. W., 1815

Johnson, Harold S., 791
Johnson, Lyndon B., 290, 386, 779
Johnson, Max S., 195
Johnson, Philip L., 927
Jonas, Anne M., 1155
Jones, Lew, 1874
Joyce, James A., 1211
Judd, Walter H., 1526
Juyal, Shreesh, 788

K

Kageneck, August, Graf, 637
Kahin, George McT., 1501
Kahn, Rashid A., 1109
Kahng, Tae Jin, 789
Kaine, Henri, 1393
Kaiser, Karl, 470
Kalaydzhiev, Vl., 766
Kammhuber, Josef, 1741
Kantol, Norodom, 1394
Kaplan, Morton A., 941
Kaplan, Norman, 1601
Kar, Baidyanath, 297
Karefa-Smart, John, 302
Kasatkin, D., 1486
Kasliwal, N. C., 351, 904
Katz, Amrom H., 352, 638
Kauffmann, William W., 1103
Kavolis, Vytautas, 277
Kaysen, Carl, 905
Kean, David W., 936
Keane, Kevin, 254
Keaton, Harry, 1964
Keith, James F., 738
Kelen, Emery, 1379
Kempski, Jürgen von, 780
Kennan, George F., 639, 941
Kennedy, Robert F., 61
Kepler, Roy, 1890
Kertesz, Stephen D., 1212
Kertzscher, Gunter, 494
Kerven, Daniel, 989
Khaitsman, V. M., 967
Khartsev, Ivan, 1925
Khoman, Thanat, 1505
Khrushchev, Nikita S., 990
Khvostov, V., 1925
Kiger, Joseph C., 323
Kilpatrick, David D., 86
Kimche, Jon, 991
Kintner, William R., 117, 716, 1953
Kirk, Peter, 1726
Kissel, Hans, 1156
Kissinger, Henry A., 192, 1103, 1108, 1157
Klafkowski, Alfons, 781
Klass, Philip J., 82
Kliesing, Georg, 669
Klingberg, Frank L., 1567
Klonglan, Gerald E., 1245
Klineberg, Otto, 232
Knapp, Wilfred, 941
Knoll, Erwin, 1289
Knorr, Klaus, 691
Kolde, H. E., 928
Kolkowicz, Roman, 143
Kol'man, E., 1414
Kolodziej, Edward J., 717
Kolomei, V., 1925
Komarov, K., 325
Kondrashov, V., 1924
Kongress der Ostdeutschen Landesvertretungen. 1st, Bonn (1964), 326
Konstantinov, S., 377
Koriakin, Iu. I., 1290
Korionov, V. G., 1531
Korneev, L., 1488
Korolev, B., 495
Korolev, G. K., 1309
Korotynski, Henryk, 874
Korzun, L., 1772
Kosygin, Aleksei N., 1422
Kotov, B., 1924
Kotov, Mikhail, 1875
Kosyrev, E. A., 83
Kovalenko, V., 1795
Kovář, Jindřich, 975
Kovit, Bernard, 1608
Koyama, Seitaro, 1838
Kraminov, D., 1924-1925
Kramish, Arnold, 1954
Krasil'nikov, A. N., 967
Krasil'nikov, I. S., 1793
Krasil'nikov, S. N., 83
Krasil'shchikova, S. A., 1338
Krasota, P., 84
Kreisky, Bruno, 1395
Kremer, I. S., 967
Krippendorff, Ekkehart, 444
Krishna, Raj, 1441
Krishna Menon, V. K., 1439
Krivchikova, Emilia S., 1862
Kroker, Werner, 1532
Krone, Heinrich, 196, 1158
Krüger, Joachim, 875
Krusche, Heinz, 906
Kuby, Heinz, 863
Künzli, Arnold, 55
Küster, M., 570
Kulski, Wladyslaw W., 1556
Kunze, Heinrich, 752
Kuralov, Leonid, 1924
Kuroda, P. K., 768, 1789
Kuzin, Alexander M., 742
Kuzin, N., 1674
Kuzmack, Arnold M., 353
Kyle, Keith, 197
Kyle, W. B., 85
Kyprianou, Spyros, 1396
Kyria, Pierre, 532

L

Labedz, Leopold, 941
Lachs, Manfred, 1415, 1442
Lacoste, Raymond, 1213
Lacoste Lareymondie, Marc de, 1675
La Dany, L., 496
Laffay, Jean, 1506
Laffin, John, 1370
Lal, Mukut B., 1037
Lall, Anand. See Lall, Arthur S.
Lall, Arthur S., 302, 1919, 1942
Lall, Betty (Goetz), 753, 850, 907, 1349, 1466, 1955
Laloy, Jean, 1727, 1910
Lamarche, Réginald, 1773
Lamarsh, John R., 1068
Lambilliotte, Maurice, 497, 1350
Lamy, M., 1069
Lang, Daniel, 1940
Langhans, Kurt, 233
Langholm, Sivert, 946
Lanyi, George A., 947
Lapp, Ralph E., 718
La Pradelle, Paul de, 1325
Larin, V., 1925
Larionov, V., 1676
Larnaud, J., 1355
Larrabee, Eric, 533
Larsen, Larry J., 111
Larson, Arthur, 298
Lasley, John W., 1876
Laugier, Henri, 1325
Laulicht, Jerome, 37, 1877
Lavergne, Bernard, 498, 692, 970, 1636, 1728
Lawler, Justus G., 1826, 1878
Lay, S. Houston, 363
Leach, Edmund, 9
Lear, John, 411
Leary, Frank, 86, 1608
Leavitt, William, 571-572, 1070
Lebedenko, M. M., 1925
Lee, Robert M., 198
LeGroignec, Général, 144
Lehmann, Hans, 499, 1269
Leiss, Amelia C., 893
Leites, Nathan C., 640
Lelyveld, Arthur J., 1830
Leng, Russell J., 1332
Lengemann, Frederick W., 287
Lenin, Vladimir I., 1532
Lens, Sidney, 1677
Leonhard, Wolfgang, 422
Leont'ev, A., 1159, 1523, 1925
Leontief, Wassily, 937
Lepotier, Adolphe, 146, 595, 719, 1071, 1602
Lerche, Charles O., 1507
Lerner, Daniel, 847
Levi, Werner, 445, 819
Levine, Gene N., 234
Levison, Walter, 1941
Lewis, H. W., 1972
Leydon, John K., 91, 1603
Li, P'ing, 1678
Liao, Shih-wan, 147
Liddell Hart, B. H., 51, 112
Lieber, Robert J., 1729
Lieuwen, Edwin, 235
Lin, Piao, 148
Lindemann, Helmut, 534
Lippmann, Walter, 45, 199, 299
Lippy, Lester J., 1072
Lissitzyn, Oliver J., 1848
Lit, Theodore, 1526
Little, Roger, 1771
Liu, Hua-ch'iu, 1679
Livingston, Robert G., 1973
Lo, Jui-ching, 200
Lochet, Louis, 1355
Lockhart, Luther B., 1974
London. Institute for Strategic Studies, 113
Lopatin, Iurii, 1925
Loutit, J. F., 232
Low, Ian, 573
Lowe, George E., 1246
Lowenthal, Richard, 941
Luard, David Evan, 1941
Lubell, Harold, 1633
Lucchini, Laurent, 1843
Luce, Clare B., 300
Luchsinger, Fred, 391, 1016, 1110, 1730, 1734

Lukov, Grigorii D., 1247
Lumsden, Malvern, 1863
Lund, Nils, 642
Luns, J. M. A. H., 1397
Lusky, Louis, 294
Luu-guy-Ky, 887
Luvaas, Jay, 1108
Luxemburg, Rosa, 1532
L'vov, M., 908, 1925
Lyon, Peter, 941
Lyttle, Bradford, 1879

M

Maass, Friedrich, 643
MacArthur, D. M., 87
McCaffrey, Edmund, 354
McCain, John S., 1111
McClintock, Robert, 201
MacCloskey, Monro, 1732
McConnell, J. P., 88, 574, 720
Macdonald, Robert W., 301
McElheny, Victor, 693
McGillivray, Peter C., 721
McGinty, F. C., 1248
McGovern, George, 1518
McGrath, Joseph E., 955
McGuire, Martin C., 1920
McIntosh, David, 1724
McKay, Vernon, 948
Mackintosh, J. M., 1108
Mackintosh, Malcolm, 202-203, 1941
McLean, A. S., 285
Macmillan, Norman, 1680-1681
McNamara, Robert S., 1682
McVitty, Marion M., 1333
McWhinney, Edward, 471, 1319
McWilliams, Wilson C., 947
Madariaga, Salvador de, 1017
Maevskii, V., 1924
Maguire, Thomas, 149
Mahadevan, T. K., 1443
Mahler, E., 1604
Mahlman, J. D., 255
Mahnke, Dieter, 1921
Mahnke, Hans H., 236, 1844
Majonica, Ernst, 1214, 1521
Makarov, Evgenii, 1925
Makarov, L., 237
Malecki, Alexander, 992
Malewsky-Malevitch, S. de, 521
Malex, Ivan, 820
Malicky, Neal, 1854
Mallory, William R., 929
Mamaev, E., 1073
Manelis, B. L., 446
Mann, Wilfrid B., 1975
Manss, Robert W., 867
Maratov, M., 909
Marcel, Gabriel, 1563
Marey, Georges, 1279
Margolis, Howard, 876, 1249, 1423
Marquand, Carl B., 744
Marsault, Jacques, 10
Marshall, Charles B., 24, 1932
Martin, Andrew, 392
Martin, Francis, 1215
Martin, Laurence W., 1932
Martin, Paul, 369, 1334, 1388, 1398
Martin, Robert P., 694
Martin-Chauffier, Louis, 1563
Martinet, Gilles, 1160
Marushkin, B. I., 967
Marx, Karl, 1532
Marx, Wesley, 722
Masani, M. R., 150, 1439
Masannat, George S., 1533
Mason, John F., 89
Massioukévitch, V., 1982
Massmann, Karl-Friedrich, 1401
Masters, Roger D., 910
Mates, Leo, 949
Mathiot, Lt.-Colonel, 1683
Matloff, Maurice, 1108
Matveev, V., 1924-1925
Maurel, Christian, 1270, 1684
Maurèle, Commandant, 1271
Maxwell, Arthur E., 91
Mayer, Jean, 1796
Mead, Margaret, 327
Mecklin, John, 575
Meeker, Leonard C., 1848
Mehnert, Klaus, 20
Mehta, Swadesh, 803
Meier, Dorothy L., 447
Meissner, Boris, 46
Melchior de Molènes, Charles, 448, 1162, 1216
Melikian, Ovanes N., 467
Melman, Seymour, 412
Mendiaux, Edouard, 1534
Menshikov, V., 1444, 1925
Menter, Martin, 867
Meraviglia, Peter, 1521
Merchant, Livingston T., 1932
Merkulov, I. A., 558
Merle, Marcel, 1355
Merton, Walter, 1419
Metraux, Rhoda, 327
Metron, inc., New York. Universal Reference System, 449
Metzger, Louis, 151
Metzger, Stanley D., 1848
Meutter, Léon de, 950
Meyer-Landrut, Andreas, 1535
Mialet, Jean, 821
Michael, Franz, 62, 1526
Michalon, Father, 1355
Michelet, Guy, 1732
Middleton, Drew, 450
Mignonat, Jean-Alain, 1162
Mikhailenko, I., 1488
Mikhailov, M., 1272
Mikhailov, V., 1924-1925
Mikhailov, Y., 1406
Miksche, Ferdinand O., 451, 695, 971-972, 1217, 1733
Milcent, E., 1253
Milgram, Stanley, 1487
Millar, Thomas B., 645
Millard, Everett L., 1880
Miller, Barry, 576
Miller, D. M. O., 543
Miller, William R., 1881
Millis, Walter, 1564
Millman, H. C., 544
Mirskii, Z., 1074
Mirsky, Jonathan, 1501
Misra, Biswamohan, 954
Mitrany, David, 1882
Miyake, Y., 768
Moch, Jules, 922, 1325, 1467, 1922, 1956
Modell, John, 234
Modelski, George, 20
Modrzhinskaia, Elena D., 452
Möbus, Gerhard, 669
Moeller, Dade W., 283
Mohanty, Guru Prasad, 1883
Molodtsov, Stepan V., 370
Molter, Günther, 577
Monday Club, London. Foreign Affairs Study Group, 1256
Monitor, Hans-Jörg, 647
Montfort, Colonel-divisionnaire, 1165
Montmoreau, Alain, 696
Morgan, Joseph O., 1455
Morgenthau, Hans J., 453, 648
Morhagaer, 1541
Mornand, Jacques, 755
Morozov, G. I., 1338
Morozov, V. A., 432
Morton, Louis, 1424
Mosbaek, E. J., 756
Moscow. Institut mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii, 1320
Kafedra istorii mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii i vneshnei politiki SSSR, 1371
Moscow. Vsesoiuznyi iuridicheskii zaochnyi institut, 1321
Mosen, Wido, 596
Moss, Norman, 394
Moulton, Harland B., 1637
Moussa, Farag, 951
Müller, Hans D., 1734
Mueller, Siegfried, 1574
Muller, Steven, 522
Muroshova, L., 1488
Murphy, Charles J., 1166
Murphy, Cornelius F., 1848
Musgrave, Richard, 1817
Musgrove, Edgar F., 56
Muste, A. J., 1501

N

Naess, Arne, 822
Nallet, T., 1253
Narbonne, Roland de, 1088
Nathanson, Nathaniel L., 307
National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D. C., 1250
National Citizens' Commission on International Cooperation
Committee for Research on the Development of International Institutions, 1351
Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, 1425
Committee on Development of International Law, 1322
Committee on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, 1352
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 1339
Committee on Science and Technology, 1353
Committee on Space, 1416
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, 1459
National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. General Board, 823
Needler, Martin C., 974
Nehru, R. K., 395
Nekrich, A. M., 967
Nemoto, J., 768

Nerlich, Uwe, 697
Nesmelov, Oleg V., 472
Neumann, Robert G., 1521
Nevstrueva, M. A., 1273
New China News Agency, 1167
Nguen, Man' De, 614
Nicholas, H. G., 298, 1864
Nicholson, Howard, 757
Nicholson, Michael, 455
Nicol, Davidson, 1884
Nicolas, Marius-Paulin, 1028
Nifontov, Boris I., 723
Nikezić, Marko, 1399
Nikitin, Lev, 1925
Nikitin, M. D., 589
Nilsson, Torsten, 1400
Niu, Sien-chong, 152, 1686-1687
Nixon, Richard M., 523
Noel-Baker, Philip, 1149, 1774, 1923
Nogee, Joseph L., 883
Noirot, Paul, 1737
Norden, Albert, 25, 153, 1532
Norman, Lloyd, 1219
Norstad, Lauris, 1741, 1966
North, Robert C., 8
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 238, 1738
  Military Committee. Standing Group, 205
Nossal, Frederick, 1688
Novikov, N., 1925

O

O'Ballance, Edgar, 535
O'Brien, William V., 1826
O'Connor, Raymond G., 154
Odescalchi, Edmond P., 1112
Oehman, Cunnar, 724
Ohio State University Conference on Economics of Research and Development, Columbus (1962), 1076
Okumiya, Masatake, 651
Ollion, Général, 1113
O'Neal, Henry A., 91
O'Neill, Robert J., 976
Oplušťil, Václav, 975
Oppenheimer, Martin, 824
Oregon. State Board of Health, 745
Orlov, A. S., 1609
Orvik, Nils, 1739
Osborne, R. Travis, 1267
Osgood, Robert E., 1932
Ovsiannikov, A., 1673
Owen, Thomas B., 91

P

Padelford, Norman J., 302
Palfrey, John G., 396, 1380, 1958
Paltridge, G. W., 1976
Paltridge, Shane, 652
Palumbo, R. F., 1798
Panitzki, Werner, 649
Pant, T. N., 954
Papenbroock, Günter, 1610
Paret, Peter, 1108
Parks, Donald C., 283
Parks, Larry G., 1845
Partan, Daniel G., 289, 424
Pasquill, F., 244
Patchen, Martin, 11
Patterson, Robert L., 1974
Pavlenko, N., 653
Pavlichenko, Vladimir P., 1327
Pavlov, Bor, 836
Pax Christi. France, 1355
Pay, Rex, 1077
Pchelintsev, E. S., 1338
Pechel, Peter, 1818
Pechorkin, V., 382
Peckert, Joachim, 207
Pellissier, Edouard, 993
Pennell, Maynard L., 1292
Pentts, M., 1274
Peretti, A. de, 1355
Pergent, J., 1078-1079, 1220, 1689-1690
Perkins, Dwight H., 848
Perlo, Victor, 758, 1691
Perré, Jean, 1568
Perret, Louis, 1029
Perret-Gentil, J., 1080
Perrin, Jean-Paul, 1083
Perroux, Christian, 1521
Perry, Joseph B., 239
Persson, G., 1977
Petkovsek, Colonel, 94
Petros'iants, A. M., 1252
Petrov, D., 654
Petrov, M., 1169
Pfaff, William, 1542
Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., 208, 716
Philip, André, 456, 1325, 1740
Piatier, Henri, 725
Piccard, Paul J., 338
Picht, Georg, 1734
Piggott, Francis J. C., 414
Pile, Sir Frederick, 1108
Pilisuk, Marc, 851, 1114
Pinder, John, 941
Platonov, Konstantin K., 1247
Platt, John R., 1931
Plattner, C. M., 1081, 1170
Pliachenko, P., 655
Pimen, Metropolitan, 328
Pinkerton, R. N., 155
Plant, Sir Arnold, 232
Podhoretz, Norman, 1518
Podkliuchnikov, V., 1925
Poeggel, Walter, 500
Poirier, René, 1563
Poliakov, V. G., 967
Polianov, N., 877
Pomeroy, William J., 63, 1537
Popov, Iv., 766
Popov, V., 1924-1925
Porsholt, Lars, 1885
Portisch, Hugo, 1557
Possony, Stefan T., 726, 1171
Potapov, Ivan N., 1115
Powell, Elwin H., 597
Powell, Enoch, 1116
Powell, Ralph L., 156-157
Power, Thomas S., 656
Powers, Patrick W., 1294
Prague. Ústav pro mezinárodní politiku a ekonomii, 975
Pral'nikov, E., 1924
Prawitz, Jan, 415
Prentice, Virginia L., 1455
Preobrazhenskii, S., 825
Pretsch, J., 1460
Pringsheim, Klaus H., 698
Pritchard-Jones, Hugh, 1356
Prokop'ev, Nikofor P., 1030
Prybyla, Jan S., 47-48
Püllmann, Alfred, 1836
Pugh, Richard C., 1848
Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs. 14th, Venice (1965), 329
Purser, Brian L., 1254
Pursglove, S. David, 416
Pustov, V., 1924
Pyronnet, Joseph, 1897

Q

Quade, Quentin, 1831
Quaestor, pseud., 913
Quaroni, Pietro, 114
Quester, George H., 1638, 1901

R

R., G., 1020
Rabinowitch, Eugene, 501, 727, 1357
Rachkov, B., 1488
Radek, Karl, 1532
Radmann, Martin, 1021
Rafian, Rachik, 1820
Rajan, M. S., 473
Rakove, Milton L., 12
Ramming, Hans, 425
Ramsey, James A., 1022
Ramsey, Paul, 240, 1826
Raoul, François, 241
Rapacki, Adam, 1410
Rapoport, Anatol, 1489
Rasch, Harold, 835
Raser, John R., 580, 728
Ratcliffe, A. L., 953
Ratiani, G., 1924
Rauhut, Franz, 1304
Raven, Wolfram von, 158, 217, 1764
Raymond, Jack, 1775
Redko, Y., 64
Reed, Walter D., 867
Reese, Howard C., 1508
Rehm, Georg W., 1934
Reinicke, Adolf, 1569
Reiter, Elmar R., 255
Reithinger, Anton, 160
Reitz, James T., 209
Rembser, J., 1776
Renouvin, Pierre, 1563
Research Conference on Behavior in Organizations, University of Georgia (1962), 955
Reshetar, John S., 502
Resta, Paul E., 930
Rety, John, 1803
Reuss, Henry S., 298, 1540
Reutov, G. N., 356
Reynaud, Paul, 1734
Reynolds, Clark G., 1639
Reynolds, P. A., 994
Rewal, M. K., 914
Rhoads, Edward J. M., 162
Rhyne, Charles S., 782
Ricard, G., 1082
Rich, Alexander, 1931
Riché, Pierre, 334
Richet, Charles, 790
Richthofen, Bolko von, 976
Rickett, W. Allyn, 1501
Ricoeur, Paul, 1358

Riddleberger, Peter B., 1256
Rieck, Joan M., 1222
Riedmatten, Henri de, 1359
Riggert, Ernst, 1223
Rippon, Aubrey G., 163
Ritchey, Russell V., 242
Roberts, Adam, 826
Roberts, Eleanor, 365
Roberts, William H., 1889
Robertson, Terence, 700, 915
Robison, David, 701
Robles, Alphonso Garcia, 1411
Rocco, Gregory G., 1306
Roche, John P., 1518
Rodgers, Robert H., 115
Röling, Bert V. A., 330
Rogers, Robert, 1576
Roll, Christian, 1509
Rome, Beatrice K., 955
Rome, Sydney C., 955
Rondot, Pierre, 503
Roos, Hans, 26
Roschlau, Wolfgang, 702
Rosen, Sumner N., 1821
Rosenne, Shabtai, 1846
Rosenstein, Marvin, 283
Rosi, Eugene J., 243
Rosna, Walter, 598
Ross, Alf, 1855
Ross, Sherwood, 1360
Roszak, Theodore, 828
Rotblat, Joseph, 769
Roth, H. L., 923
Rothschild, J. H., 1613
Roucek, Joseph S., 1023, 1693
Rougeron, Camille, 581, 1083, 1614-1615
Rowe, David N., 1526
Royal Society for the Promotion of Health, 285
Ruban, M., 1777
Rubin, Alfred P., 867
Rudder, Earl, 852
Rueff, Jacques, 1563
Ruge, Friedrich O., 1741
Rummel, Rudolph J., 956
Rusakov, E., 1925
Rusanov, P. N., 83
Rusk, Dean, 783
Russell, Bertrand Russell, 3d earl, 1275, 1805
Russia (1923- U.S.S.R.) Gosudarstvennyi komitet po pechati, 357
Rybkin, E., 539
Rzheshevskii, O., 1778

S

Sachsse, Hans, 13
Saeki, Kiichi, 20
Saeland, Einar, 1981
Sagazan, Hubert de, 1081
Saha, Sisirranjan, 658
Šahović, Milan, 1461
Saiyidain, K. G., 232
Saksonov, P. P., 589
Salter, Ernest J., 1558
Sandoz, Gerard, 703
Sanguinetti, Alexandre, 1224
Santa Ana, Julio de, 1361
Sattarov, T., 1488
Saunders, Allen W., 1974
Saunders, David M., 95
Sauldie, Madan M., 504
Savitz, David, 1310
Sayles, D. C., 271
Scalapino, Robert A., 1117
Schaetzel, J. Robert, 1024, 1559
Schaffer, Bernard, 1118
Scheinman, Lawrence, 840
Schelling, Thomas C., 1402, 1941
Schenke, Wolf, 659, 865
Schifres, Alain, 165
Schiller, Herbert I., 1779
Schilling, Kurt, 1902
Schlafly, Phyllis, 166, 1175
Schliephake, Hanfried, 1616
Schmid, Karl, 38
Schmidt, Helmut, 210, 1225, 1741
Schmückle, Gerd, 1741
Schneider, Fernand-Th., 1226
Schneyder, Philippe, 39, 729
Schonwandt, Max, 505
Schorr, Daniel, 916
Schrecker, John, 40
Schreiner, Egon, 660
Schubart, Alexander, 167
Schütz, Wilhelm W., 506
Schuldt, Erwin, 1119, 1577
Schull, William J., 244
Schultz, Karl A., 1560
Schultz, Rudolf, 1741
Schulze Henne, Karl, 1257
Schuster, Edward J., 1032
Schwartz, David C., 730
Schwartz, Leonard E., 1780
Schwarz, Urs, 398, 1258
Schwarzenberger, Georg, 957
Schwarzkopf, Dietrich, 507
Schweitzer, Wolfgang, 525
Schwetje, Gerd, 1554
Scott, Andrew M., 958
Scott, Sir Robert, 20
Scott Russell, R., 244, 285
Seaborg, Glenn T., 1981
Searle, A. G., 232
Sedin, Lev, 661
Seidl-Hohenveldern, Ignaz, 1847
Seifert, Antolfin, 975
Seigel, Daniel G., 1837
Seltz, Anne-Marie, 1556
Semin, V., 237
Seminar on the Protection of the Public in the Event of Radiation Accidents, Geneva (1963), 244
Senghaas, Dieter, 1120
Sengupta, Rabi, 1640
Senter, Raymond D., 662
Servais, A., 1694
Seton-Watson, Hugh, 941
Seymour, A. H., 1798
Shang, Shan-tsui, 1085
Sharan, R. H., 954
Sharp, Gene, 1890
Shein, G. N., 1617
Sheinin, Iu. M., 967
Sheldon, Charles S., 1695
Shestov, V., 853
Shibaev, Nikolai F., 582
Shieh, Francis Shi-hao, 1781
Shigeharu, Matsumoto, 995
Shkunaev, V. G., 1338
Shmygov, Georgii F., 996
Shor, S. W. W., 96
Sidel, Victor W., 1086, 1796
Sikorskii, Vsevolod M., 959
Silvain, René, 1227
Simakov, E. V., 83
Simmons, Edwin H., 583
Simmons, Henry T., 584
Simonenko, D. L., 257
Simpson, S. D., 244
Singer, J. David, 1490
Singh, Baljit, 508, 791
Singh, Nagendra, 245
Singh, Sushil Chandra, 954
Sington, Anne, 211, 1228
Siniak, V. S., 83
Sixsmith, E. K. G., 1742
Skinner, B. F., 1491
Slater, Jerome, 457
Slessor, Sir John, 1941
Slim, Mongi, 1403
Slukhai, Ivan A., 1903
Small, Melvin, 1490
Smallwood, Richard D., 418
Smith, Alice K., 339, 1911
Smith, Dale O., 1641
Smith, Gerard C., 212
Smith, T. L., 1912
Smolik, Josef, 829
Snoy, Jean-Charles, 49
Sobakin, Vadim K., 458, 1335, 1338
Sohn, Louis B., 308, 358, 1891
Sokol, Anthony E., 1087
Sokolovskii, P., 213, 1363
Sokolovskii, Vasilii D., 663
Sokol'skii, V. N., 558
Sombart, Nicolaus, 830
Sommer, Theo, 58, 399, 664, 960, 1229
Sotobayashi, Takeshi, 1838
Soum, Jean-Claude, 1259
Souvarine, Boris, 168
Soward, S. H., 1541
Sparks, William J., 744
Speidel, Hans, 1741
Speier, Hans, 1230
Staar, Richard F., 170
Stabler, Elizabeth, 1697
Stalin, Iosif, 1532
Stambler, Irwin, 1090
Stanford, George S., 246
Staniukovich, K. P., 83
Star, Jack, 1782
Starbird, Alfred D., 403
Starushenko, G., 65
Steele, 1926
Steele, William S., 1783
Stein, Walter, 1826
Steiniger, Peter-Alfons, 509
Štěpanovský, Jiří, 975
Sterne, Theodore E., 1784
Stewart, C. G., 244
Steward, F. C., 765
Stifani, Giuseppe, 1743
Stikker, Dirk U., 1741
Stillman, Edmund O., 1542
Stone, Jeremy J., 359, 854, 905, 917, 1806, 1927
Stonier, Tom, 224, 1295
Stošić, Borko D., 792
Strauss, Franz Josef, 1231, 1741
Strausz-Hupé, Robert, 214, 1744
Strepetov, Vasilii I., 1786
Ströhm, Carl G., 41, 215, 510, 1025, 1121
Stubbe, Heinrich, 527

Stucky, Harley J., 1913
Styron, Mary-Alice, 841
Süss, Herbert, 27
Sugahara, Tsutomu, 281
Sugihara, Thomas T., 1305
Sugii, M., 765
Suits, Daniel B., 433
Surikov, B., 1091
Sushko, N. Ia., 1570
Sutcliffe, R. C., 1618
Swan, Herbert L., 1892
Swearengen, Thomas F., 1619
Switzerland. Bundesrat, 171
Swomley, John M., 1787
Symposium on Pacem in Terris by Pope John XXIII. University of Notre Dame (1965), 1364
Symposium on Personnel Dosimetry for Accidental High-Level Exposure to External and Internal Radiation, Vienna (1965), 770
Symposium on the Assessment of Radioactive Body Burdens in Man, Heidelberg (1964), 1311

T

Tai, Sung-an, 216
Tammelo, Ilmar, 459
Tank, Kurt, 98
Tarasenko, N., 460
Tarasova, V. A., 558
Tarr, David W., 666, 1699
Taylor, Charles, 42
Taylor, George E., 511, 1526
Taylor, T. B., 224
Teeple, John B., 862, 1447
Terrenoire, Alain, 1964
Tewary, I. N., 793
Thant, U, 304, 855
Thiam, Doudou, 28, 1943
Thirlaway, Henry I., 1978
Thomas, John R., 1700
Thomer, Egbert, 586, 667
Thompson, Kenneth W., 1365
Thompson, W. F. K., 1941
Tikhonov, I. I., 83
Tikhonov, N., 1924
Tillich, Paul, 1366
Tillion, Germaine, 1325
Timberlake, Clare H., 1404
Tims, Margaret, 312
Tinbergen, Jan, 831
Ting, Kuang-hua, 1543
Tiupaev, A., 1925
Tiushkevich, S. A., 1570
Tiwari, S. C., 794
Tiziou, Jacques, 1621
Tokareva, P. A., 1925
Tomiche, Fernand J., 1822
Tomšič, Ivan, 1314
Torcy, Camille, 705
Toscano, Mario, 1372
Tosunian, S., 1925
Trager, Frank N., 117, 706
Trautmann, Gerhard, 1745
Treiman, S. B., 1972
Trivedi, V. C., 20, 1420
Trofimenko, G., 1925
Trudeau, Arthur G., 428
Trukhanovskii, V. G., 1371
Tsimanovich, K., 498
Tsui, Chui-yen, 1177
Tucker, Robert W., 1932
Tütsch, Hans E., 29, 997
Tung, S. T., 1367
Twiss, Robert L., 587, 1092, 1178
Tyree, John A., 99

U

Ugol'kov, I., 1924
Uhlman, Ernst, 400
Uhlmann, E., 401
Ulbricht, Walter, 172, 492, 707
Ulegla, I., 1098
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. See Russia (1923- U.S.S.R.)
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Social Science Clearing House, 1336
United States
  Air Force. Office of Scientific Research, 955
  Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 879
  Atomic Energy Commission, 247, 258, 286, 1624
  Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament, 1468
  Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations
    Subcommittee on Department of Defense, 1180
    Subcommittee on Military Construction Appropriations, 173
  Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services, 1701
    Subcommittee for Special Investigations, 272, 732
  Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Military Operations Subcommittee, 1625
  Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 248
    Subcommittee on Research, Development, and Radiation, 1260
  Congress. Joint Economic Committee, 249
  Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 1626, 1702
  Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services, 1181
  Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, 733, 1261, 1746-1747
  Defense Electric Power Administration, 1799
  Dept. of Defense, 273
  Dept. of State
    Historical Studies Division, 858
    Office of Media Services, 998
  Dept. of the Air Force, 100
  Dept. of the Army, 1452
  Foreign Service Institute, 999
  Library of Congress. Aerospace Technology Division, 746, 1094
  National Science Foundation, 274
  Office of Civil Defense, 187, 748
  Public Health Service. Division of Radiological Health, 259
Usachev, I. G., 1374

V

V., V., 1368
Vaes, Aimé, 1773
Valaire, Guy, 761
Valette, Claude, 1748
Van Buylaere, Albert, 1749
Vance, Nelson C., 419
Van Cleave, William R., 708, 1642
Van den Berk, L. J. M., 1183
Van Dusen, Henry P., 1232
Van Dyke, Vernon, 1492
Vaněček, Václav, 1905
Van Riper, Paul P., 955
Varga, Eugen, 461
Varma, Shanti P., 1000
Vasil'ev, I. V., 1617
Vasil'ev, Mikhail, 1925
Vasil'ev, O., 1961
Vasin, N., 1488
Vaussard, Maurice, 832
Veale, F. J. P., 14
Verberie, 536, 1033, 1750
Verdross, Alfred, 1323
Vernant, Jacques, 15, 462, 919, 961, 1337, 1510
Verner, Admiral, 174
Verteidigungspolitischer Kongress der CDU, Kassel (1964), 669
Vietnam (Democratic Republic, 1946-)
  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1184
  State Committee of Science and Technology, 1800
Villevieille, A., 1083
Villon, Pierre, 1122
Vinacke, Harold M., 512
Vincendon, Pierre, 116
Viorst, Milton, 920
Virally, Michel, 1325
Vishnevskii, S., 1925
Vladimirov, Anatolii, 1925
Vladimirov, Semen A., 1412, 1925
Vogt, M., 1704
Volchok, H. L., 1306, 1979
Volodin, Vladimir, 1925
Volskii, D., 1127, 1924
Vo-nguyen-Giap, 1185
Vorob'ev, N. N., 962
Voznenko, V., 1517

W

Wagenlehner, Günther, 218
Wagner, Wolfgang, 340
Wakaizumi, Kei, 20
Walch, John W., 1273
Walker, Charles C., 1890
Walker, Patrick G., 30, 1741
Walker, Richard L., 117
Wallace, J. F., 1186
Waller, Pete, 101
Walsh, John, 759, 1262
Walterscheid, Ed, 1801
Walzer, Michael, 40
Ward, Chester C., 166, 1627
Warren, Roland L., 463
Washburn, Wilcomb E., 545
Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, 1932
Waskey, Donald R., 670
Waskow, Arthur I., 250, 332-333
Wassermann, Ursula, 1448

Waterkamp, Rainer, 538, 671, 1187, 1373, 1928
Watson, James A., 228
Watson, Mark S., 102
Watson, Norman E., 103
Watt, D. C., 1628
Weaver, Kenneth F., 176
Weber, Theodore R., 1826
Wegner, Rudi, 709
Weidenbaum, Murray L., 1296, 1824, 1987
Weik, Mary H., 1312
Weill-Tuckerman, Anne, 795
Weischedel, Wilhelm, 762
Weise, Kurt, 1297
Weizsäcker, Carl F. von, 599, 963, 1734
Welander, A. D., 1798
Werth, Alexander, 1545
Wesley, James P., 420
Wetmore, Warren C., 104
Wettern, Desmond, 1705
Weyde, Eugen, 546
Whaley, Barton, 107
Wharton, John F., 1929
Wheeler, Earle G., 177
Whitaker, D. R., 1962
White, Peter T., 1980
Wiek, Klaus D., 1554
Wiesner, Hans, 1233
Wiesner, Jerome B., 360
Wigner, Eugene, 224, 1263
Wilcox, Francis O., 302
Wild, Patricia B., 1856
Will, Herman, 1893
Willrich, Mason, 429, 1458, 1963
Wilson, Eugene E., 868
Wilson, George C., 1299, 1300, 1630
Wilson, Larman C., 1324
Wimmer, Paul, 547
Winbauer, Alois, 1035
Windass, Stanley, 278
Windle Taylor, E., 285
Windsor, Philip, 1941
Winterhager, Herbert P., 734
Wirsing, Giselher, 402
Wise, Raymond L., 804
Wiss-Verdier, A., 1556, 1751
Wit, Daniel, 474
Wittig, Peter, 796
Wittmann, Walter, 1825
Witze, Claude, 106, 934
Wohlstetter, Albert, 1103
Wolf, Charles, 20, 548
Wolf, John, 588
Wolfe, Thomas W., 178-179
Wolfenstein, E. Victor, 964
Wolfers, Arnold, 117, 1932
Wolk, Herman S., 1788
Wolter, Sigolf, 1554, 1561
Women Strike for Peace, Washington, D. C., 880
Woodburn, John H., 287
World Health Organization, 244
Wright, John J., 1826
Wright, Quincy, 797, 834, 889
Wulff, T., 180
Wyckoff, Don P., 310

Y

Yaffee, Michael L., 1097
Yalem, Ronald J., 798
Yan, Hua, 1920
Yank, Li, 1631
Yarmolinsky, Adam, 760
Yarrow, Clarence H., 1501
Young, Oran R., 1866
Young, Stephen M., 1187
Young, Wayland H., 361, 392, 1941, 1981
Younger, Kenneth G., 50
Yu, Hsueh-chih, 1278

Z

Zagoria, Donald S., 513
Zahn, Gordon C., 1832
Zakharov, Valentin, 1924-1925
Zartman, I. William, 117
Zenker, Karl-Adolf, 632
Zherbin, E. A., 1802
Zhigalov, I. I., 1001, 1547
Zhukov, G. P., 869, 1338
Zhukov, Iurii, 1925
Zhuravlev, Iu., 1925
Zilbert, E. R., 735
Zilliacus, Konni, 1123
Zimmerman, W., 941
Zinn, Howard, 965
Zinnes, Dina A., 1493
Zitzewitz, Horst von, 672, 1707
Zorin, Valerian A., 1338, 1413, 1548
Zverev, S. M., 421
Zvorikine, A., 232
Zygielbaum, Joseph L., 1708
Zykov, S., 1924
Zylstra, Donald L., 181

SUBJECT INDEX

[Numbers 1-433 refer to entries in vol. 2, no. 1; 434-937 to vol. 2, no. 2; 938-1468 to vol. 2, no. 3; and 1469-1987 to this issue.]

A

ABM. See Antimissile defense systems
ANF. See Atlantic nuclear force
ABEL, ELIE, 1691
ACCIDENTS, NUCLEAR. See Nuclear accidents
ACKLEY REPORT, economic effects of disarmament, 1821
ADLER, J. H., 1825
ADORNO, THEODOR W., 762
ADVANCED MANNED STRATEGIC AIRCRAFT (AMSA). See FB-111 under Aircraft; Bombers
AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY, 419, 924, 1455, 1973, 1980
AEROSPACE CORP., 272, 732
AEROSPACE INDUSTRY, 1243
  directories, 1811
  diversification, 1281
  effect of Vietnamese war, 1292
  European cooperation, 1045, 1222
  France, 220, 1282, 1812
  Government-industry relations, 732, 1824
  management, 1072
  Sweden, 268
AFRICA
  Algerian-Moroccan border dispute, 1856
  armed forces, 729, 1253, 1480, 1761
  Chinese Communist influence, 39, 126, 504, 993, 1534
  foreign military assistance, 1768
  foreign policy, 28
  nonalinement, 467
  nuclear-free zone, 859-860
  Organization of African Unity, 1431
  security system, 948
  Soviet strategy, 991
  United Nations, 302, 1497
  world order, 1884
AFTER TWENTY YEARS: ALTERNATIVES TO THE COLD WAR IN EUROPE [RICHARD BARNET AND MARCUS RASKIN], 522, 969
AGGRESSION, 459
  Chinese Communist view, 1515
  in obedience to authority, 1487
  primitive societies, 1473
  psychological aspects, 1491
  See also Conflict; Violence
AGREEMENTS. See Treaties, agreements, etc.
AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS, 123
  France, 94, 144, 600, 1132
  NORAD, 198, 607
  NATO, 182, 198
  protection of naval forces, 72
  "Sage Buic," 149
  STRIDA-II, 554, 1056
  Switzerland, 171
  U.S.S.R., 118
  United States, 136, 1182, 1683
  Vietnamese war, 1615
AIR WARFARE, Vietnamese war, 1061, 1119, 1159
AIRCRAFT, 1907
  advanced manned strategic aircraft, 1585
  COIN airplane, 104
  F-111, 1743
  FB-111, 1052, 1092, 1588
  France, 1082, 1732
  future role, 88, 575, 1671
  inertial navigation systems, 1058
  Latin America, 1759
  military transport, 1609
  research and development, 1055
  U.S. Air Force, 76
  variable-wing planes, 1606
  V/STOL, 577
  Vietnamese war, 1292, 1300
  West Germany, 98, 137, 1043, 1138, 1598, 1685
  See also Bombers
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
  France, 1606
  Great Britain, 1597, 1628, 1671
  nuclear-powered, 1054
  role in national liberation wars, 561
AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY
  Anglo-French cooperation, 1732
  Plowden Report, 1045, 1222
  West European cooperation, 1743, 1749
AIRPOWER
  airlift capability, 1589
  deterrence, 1901
  France, 1153
  future role, 88, 1569
  Great Britain, 1084, 1141, 1597
  NATO, 1721
  strategic and tactical uses, 1029, 1614
  United States, in Vietnam, 574, 601, 1070, 1119, 1615
  use in Southeast Asia, 592
  West Germany, 1043
  World War II, 337
ALINEMENT, 4, 1157
  and national interests, 1191
  See also Alliances; Treaties, agreements, etc.
ALL CHRISTIAN PEACE ASSEMBLY, 1872
ALLIANCE NUCLEAR FORCE, 522
  See also Atlantic nuclear force; Multilateral nuclear force
ALLIANCES, 1108, 1492
  behavioral analysis, 1490
  changing role, 1737
  East-West relations, 1835
  effect of nuclear weapons, 944
  French view, 1544
  future, 1401
  political basis, 1727
  See also Alinement; Treaties, agreements, etc.
ALPEROVITZ, GAR, 969
ALTERNATIVE TO PARTITION: FOR A BROADENING CONCEPTION OF AMERICA'S ROLE IN EUROPE [ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI], 522

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 1672
AN INQUIRY INTO ENOUGHNESS: OF BOMBS AND MEN AND STAYING ALIVE [DANIEL LANG], 1637
ANTARCTIC REGIONS, international cooperation, 858
ANTARCTIC TREATY, 858
ANTIAIRCRAFT DESTROYER (TYPE 82). See under Ships
ANTIGUERRILLA WARFARE, 1040
See also Guerrilla warfare
ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS
civil defense, 748
deployment, 668, 1062, 1176, 1586, 1667, 1804
against Communist China, 615
moratorium, 931, 1417, 1425
U.S. controversy, 1659
Vietnamese war, 1615
development, 359, 567, 569, 628, 879, 1067, 1569
Soviet view, 582
U.S. reaction to Chinese nuclear program, 610
effect on strategic parity, 591, 1107
lack of adequate systems, 230
Nike-Sprint, 668
Nike-X, 181, 569, 605, 758, 1044, 1067, 1128, 1582, 1630
radar development, 1594
reduction or elimination, 1424, 1806
U.S.S.R., 118, 139, 1176, 1629
U.S. policy, 605, 1065
ANTIPROLIFERATION TREATY (PROPOSED). See Proliferation of nuclear weapons--nonproliferation treaty (proposed)
ANTISATELLITE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, 550, 566, 662
ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE. See Submarine warfare
ARAB COUNTRIES, defense policies and programs, 301
ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE
arms traffic, 1775
military balance, 741
nuclear weapons development, 892
proposed settlement, 966
role of major powers, 1508
ARBITRATION, INTERNATIONAL, 790, 1323
ARCTIC REGIONS, strategic position, 116
ARMAMENT AND DISARMAMENT IN THE LATE STAGES OF CAPITALISM [FRITZ VILMAR], 1098
ARMAMENTS INDUSTRY. See Defense industry
ARMED FORCES
air transportation, 1616
armored infantry, 1064
Canada, 1688, 1841
Chiefs of Staff system, 245
Communist China, 1690
developing countries, 715, 1256
East Germany, 1233
foreign commitments, 1167, 1689
France, reduction, 637
Great Britain, 1663
historical development, 1895
India, 1660
inspection and verification. See Inspection and verification
interservice competition, 242
moral values, 1301
operational requirements, 565
professionalism, 1246
role in guerrilla warfare, 1031
U.S.S.R., 1131
West Germany, 1741
withdrawal from foreign bases, 382
See also Conventional forces; Peacekeeping and security forces; Peacekeeping and security forces (proposed); also under NATO; specific countries
ARMS AND ARMAMENTS
changing military requirements, 1055
ARMS AND ARMAMENTS--Continued
Chinese Communist view, 1566
comparative statistics, 113, 1098
conduct of war, 1571
costs, 254
economic aspects, 528
effects on the economic growth rate, 1464
France, 644
Government-industry relations, 1076
inspection and verification. See Inspection and verification
modern warfare, role in, 1087
political effects, 1569
production, 1293
Great Britain, 1623
West Germany, 1610
reduction or elimination, 1389, 1402, 1417, 1425, 1434, 1637, 1806, 1927, 1941
Central Europe, 362
Communist China, 848
developing countries, 893
effect on policymaking, 1463
effect on U.S. national security, 166, 426
Europe, 361
Great Britain, 1681
Latin America, 577
possibility of agreement, 343
role of nuclear powers, 392
regulation, 580, 1157
Soviet view, 342
Treaty of Versailles, 1906
Vietnamese war, 1816
research and development, 1052, 1062, 1092, 1608
Army Ballistic Research Laboratories, 68
cost-effectiveness programs, 1581
Eastern Europe, 209
eighteenth century, 1904
future requirements, 565
infantry rocket weapons, 1584
international stability, 353
limited war, 1049-1051, 1081, 1089, 1096
U.S.-U.S.S.R., 1029
vs. procurement, 594
Vietnamese war, 102, 1807
West Germany, 261
trade and dissemination, 104, 251, 1222
Czechoslovakia, to the UAR, 1494
developing countries, 1579
effect on disarmament, 1288
Latin America, 1759
Near East, 862, 1409, 1719, 1933
reorganization, 1240
Third World, 1255
U.S.S.R., 1171, 1709
United States, to Western Europe, 1743
See also Arms traffic
U.S.S.R., 83, 555, 1179, 1187
U.S. Air Force, 76
U.S. Army, 650
U.S. Marine Corps, 85
U.S. Navy, 81, 1073, 1607
Vietnamese war, 1074
West Germany, 621, 1124, 1656
See also Chemical and biological weapons; Conventional weapons; Military balance; Missiles; Nuclear weapons; Space weapons
ARMS, MONEY AND POLITICS [JULIUS DUSCHA], 1637
ARMS RACE, 854, 1774, 1876, 1957
ABM development, 359, 1065, 1630, 1806, 1927
causes, 344
costs, 254
dangers, 1923
developing countries, 1417

ARMS RACE--Continued
economic models, 1920
effect of:
Kashmir war, 1271
NATO, 1211
polycentrism, 1255
Vietnamese war, 755
effects, 594, 633, 737
Near East, 741, 892, 1409, 1445, 1719, 1775, 1933
regulation, 873, 1402, 1425
role of secrecy, 1920
Soviet-U.S. competition, 1637
Soviet-U.S. relations, 659
technological change, 353
tension, 846
vs. economic development, 1361, 1985
See also Space race
ARMS TRAFFIC, 1288
Africa, 1761
Interarmco, 1770, 1775
Israel, 966
Third World, 1775
U.S.S.R., to nonalined countries, 502
United States, 1143
See also Arms and armaments--trade and dissemination
ARON, RAYMOND, 1495, 1946
ASIA, 1344
bibliography, 1504
Chinese Communist expansion, 474, 490, 895, 968, 1126, 1130, 1177, 1510, 1518
Chinese Communist policy, 986, 989, 1557
Communist invasion routes, 112
defense policies and programs (proposed)
anti-Communist alliance (Nationalist China and South Vietnam)
Northeast Asian military alliance, 185, 1221
Western Pacific alliance, 1232
disarmament policy, 850
East-West strategies, 30, 45, 110
Indian policy, 465
instability in, 462
nonalinement, 467
nuclear deterrence, 20
role of Buddhist political power, 1509
United Nations, 302
U.S. policies, 20, 960, 1166, 1169, 1525
Western strategy, 130
See also Southeast Asia
ASOKA, 833
ASSOCIATION FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF WORLD LAW COLLOQUIUM (1965), 1325
ASSOCIATION OF LOS ALAMOS SCIENTISTS, 338
ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ATLANTIC COMMUNITY, 450, 1559, 1740
Europe's role, 1200
U.S. policy, 674
ATLANTIC NUCLEAR FORCE, 187, 701, 1190
See also Alliance nuclear force; Multilateral nuclear force
ATOMIC. See entries beginning with Nuclear
ATOMIC DIPLOMACY: HIROSHIMA AND POTSDAM [GAR ALPEROVITZ], 969
ATOMS FOR PEACE PROGRAM
Canada, 409
proliferation of nuclear weapons, 1446
See also Nuclear energy--peaceful uses
AUSTRALIA
Citizen Military Force, 1254
defense policies and programs, 645, 652, 1643, 1687
fear of Communist invasion, 165
national security policies, 20, 140
AUSTRALIA--Continued
nuclear policies and programs, 901
nuclear weapons acquisition, 891
strategic position, 679
AUSTRIA
armed forces, 1156
disarmament policies and proposals, 1395
military history, 1108

B

BALANCE OF POWER, 1902
changes in, 440, 963
Chinese Communist view, 1528
Europe, 470
German reunification, 599
nuclear weapons, 1381, 1383
role of nation-state, 1116
Southeast Asia, 648
U.S.-U.S.S.R., 991, 1908
BARBER, ARTHUR W., 1240
BARNET, RICHARD, 522, 969
BARTH, KARL, 1565
BASES. See Military bases
BEATON, LEONARD, 1946
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE, 1929
BELGIUM
defense policies and programs, 1694
NATO policy, 1718
nuclear research and development, 1773
BERLIN, legal status, 1909
BIBLIOGRAPHIES
arms control and disarmament, 1407
Asia, 1504
Chinese Communist nuclear policy, 1452
diplomacy, 951
international relations, 437, 449
international social science organizations, 1336
military roles in developing countries, 1256
NATO, 1738
nuclear weapons and the Atlantic alliance, 1452
social and behavioral sciences, 434
Soviet disarmament policy, 1896
Soviet nuclear explosions, underwater, 1802
strategy, 663
U.S.S.R., 357, 466
United Nations, 1374
war, 1118
BILATERAL SAFEGUARDS, 898, 1456, 1461
Canada, 409
U.S. system, 1981
See also Safeguards systems; also safeguards systems under International Atomic Energy Agency; Nuclear energy industry; Nuclear reactors; Proliferation of nuclear weapons--prevention
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. See Chemical and biological weapons
BIPOLARITY, 473, 599, 963, 1910
BLOCH, ERNST, 762
BLOCKADE, 115
BOMB SHELTERS, 721
See also Fallout shelters
BOMBERS, 90
East-West comparisons, 109
FB-111, 1052, 1092, 1588, 1667
Great Britain, 1084
reduction or elimination, 568, 606
role in deterrence, 1588
West Germany, 1723
See also Nuclear delivery vehicles
BOMBING, STRATEGIC. See Strategic bombing
BRECKNER, N. V., 1825
BRIGHT, JOHN, 833

BRODIE, BERNARD, 1103
BROWN, HAROLD, 1804
BROWN, NEVILLE, 1118
BRUSSELS TREATY ORGANIZATION, 1555
BRZEZINSKI, ZBIGNIEW, 522
BUCHAREST INSTITUTE OF ATOMIC PHYSICS, 749
BUDDHISM, role in Asia, 1509
BULGARIA, nuclear research and development, 560
BURMA, history, 1376
BURNS, EEDSON L. M., 915

C

CENTO. See Central Treaty Organization
CERN. See European Organization for Nuclear Research
CND. See Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
COIN AIRPLANE. See under Aircraft
CALDWELL, MALCOLM, 1123
CAMBODIA
  disarmament policies and proposals, 1394
  Vietnamese war, 608
CAMPAIGN FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, 1368, 1926
CANADA
  civil defense, 1137, 1186
  defense industry, 1810
  defense policies and programs, 129, 1688, 1756
  disarmament policies and proposals, 1398
  foreign policy, 37, 1541
    U. S. S. R., 471
  NORAD, 607
  NATO policy, 1724
  nuclear policies and programs, 1377
    bilateral safeguards systems, 409
  participation in negotiations, 915
  trade policies, Communist China, 634
  U. N. peacekeeping operations, 799
CANADIAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, 1890
CANADIAN PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 806, 1877
CAPITALISM, 1926
  arms and armaments, 1098
  cause of war, 1874
CARTER, W. HORSFALL, 1017
CATHOLIC CHURCH
  view of nuclear war, 1328-1329
  view of Vietnamese war, 1832
  views on war and peace, 1829, 1873
CENTRAL EUROPE
  arms control in, 362
  military balance, 1220
  nuclear-free zone, 142, 672, 865
  stability in, 1099
  tension reduction, 1408
CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION, economic role, 1196
CERESOLE, PIERRE, 833
CHALFONT, LORD, 1116
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, 87, 329, 355, 827, 1063, 1080, 1086
  biological effects, 279
  development, 95
    peaceful applications, 744
  humanization of war, 1047, 1792
  legal aspects, 1899
  psychological effects, 80
  strategic uses, 1614
  tear gas, 1619
  U. S. S. R., 73, 542, 1149
  U. S. policy, 70, 876, 1310, 1596, 1613, 1796
  Vietnamese war. See Vietnamese war--chemical and biological weapons
CHENG, CHU-YUAN, 1241
CHINA, COMMUNIST, 1476
  aggression against India, 1000
  Air Force, 152
  airpower, 1048
  armed forces, 1173
  Army, 162
  decisionmaking, 728, 977
  defense policies and programs, 62, 148, 1145, 1553
    civil defense, 1075
    criticism, 1123
    escalation, 1428
    future trends, 121
    nuclear weapons and missiles, 1566
    United States, 200
    Vietnamese war, 1427
    wars of national liberation, 511, 537, 1018, 1677
    world revolution, 145
    See also Strategy; War
  disarmament policies and proposals, 843, 848, 1418
  economic policies and programs, 634
  expansion in Africa, 39, 126, 504, 993, 1534
  expansion in Asia, 30, 165, 194, 474, 490, 523, 1166, 1207, 1518, 1557
  expansion in Thailand, 611
  foreign policy, 42, 125, 465, 476, 485, 513, 953, 1009, 1510, 1516
    aggression, 1515
    Asia, 989
    effect of Lin Piao, 1539
    Indo-Pakistan conflict, 1203
    Near East, 1533
    nonalined countries, 512
    Pakistan, 698
    Third World, 972
    U. S. S. R., territorial claims against, 486, 1023, 1557
    United Nations, 1512
    United States, 501, 981, 1269, 1678, 1682
    West German view, 496, 1528, 1558
    Western Europe, 510
  Franco-American relations, 1013
  international law, 1316
  "interzone theory," 1528
  Navy, 1130, 1692
    submarine fleet, 128
  nonparticipation in negotiations, 1337
  nuclear forces, 604
  nuclear policies and programs, 125, 1155, 1235, 1631, 1648
    Indian reaction, 395
    international implications, 489, 1177, 1655
    nuclear vs. conventional weapons, 157
    peaceful uses, 1278
    U. S. reaction, 610, 615, 735, 1057
    West German view, 671
  nuclear production capability, 1954
  nuclear test ban treaty, 1983
  nuclear weapons development, 670, 899, 1034, 1079, 1553, 1652, 1947
    bibliography, 1452
    East German view, 897
    nonproliferation treaty (proposed), 1957
    Soviet-U. S. efforts to prevent, 695
  nuclear weapons tests, 768, 1075, 1437, 1789, 1977
  People's Liberation Army, 1126
  people's militia, 127, 141, 147
  political-military objectives, 122, 1514
  propaganda offensive, 1543
  Rand Corp., 1781
  relations with Republic of China, 1367
  relations with Western countries, 960
  role in Southeast Asia, 949

CHINA, COMMUNIST--Continued
scientific research and development, 1241
U.N. membership, 1331, 1392, 1423, 1511, 1540, 1891
U.S. bombing of, 378
U.S. imperialism, 1715
U.S. policy, 969, 1176, 1526
view of United Nations, 1026
war potential, 20, 156, 159, 202, 491, 643, 968, 1150-1151, 1690
world role, 24, 497, 941, 986, 1383, 1464
world view, 1546
See also Sino-American relations; Sino-Indian relations; Sino-Soviet dispute
CHINA, REPUBLIC OF
defense policies and programs
Communist China, 1177
U.S. interests, 1367
U.N. role, 1540
war potential, 1152
CHRISTIAN PEACE CONFERENCE (1965), 811, 829
Advisory Committee (1965), 1872
Commission for the Study of International Problems, 364
Consultative Committee (1965), 1363
Theological Commission, 325
CHRISTIANITY
peace, 810, 818, 829, 832, 870, 1355, 1358, 1365, 1826, 1829, 1854, 1872-1873, 1878
Pius XII, 1485
Polish-German reconciliation, 515-516, 527, 1004-1005, 1016
view of nuclear war, 1328-1329, 1869
view of Vietnamese war, 823, 1832
view of war, 278, 1303, 1359, 1828
CHRISTIANSEN, GORDON, 1890
CITIZEN MILITARY FORCE, Australia, 1254
CIVIL DEFENSE, 109, 223-224, 230
Australia, 1254
Belgium, 1694
Canada, 1137, 1186
Communist China, 1075
criticism, 246, 724, 1772
East Germany, 233
effect on strategic parity, 591
electric power industry, 1799
France, 241
Great Britain, 1163
medical facilities, 1239, 1251
Norway, 672
policies and programs, 735, 1135-1136, 1262
post-attack governmental plans, 1766
Project Harbor Summary Report, 1249-1250, 1263
public reaction, 239, 1245
requirements, 748
shelter program, 721
sociological aspects, 1236, 1238
Sweden, 613
U.S.S.R., 222, 225
West Germany, 647, 1257, 1950
See also Bomb shelters; Fallout shelters; Survival
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS, 51, 242
Africa, 729, 1253, 1480, 1761
Austria, 1156
Communist China, 491, 1173, 1539
democratic societies, 260
developing countries, 1256
France, 618, 1753
Japan, 602
Latin America, 235
modern states, 245
role of:
decisionmakers, 1113
military, 1758
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS--Continued
role of--Continued
Robert S. McNamara, 1752
the President, 713
space communications, 1779
U.S.S.R., 170, 1187, 1285
United States, 717, 719, 1246, 1258, 1651, 1658, 1783, 1787-1788
use of prohibited weapons, 1792
Vietnamese war, 378
war games and gaming, 107
West Germany, 647, 1140
See also Scientific-military relations
CIVIL WAR, 1805
Communist views 214
international law, 776, 1522
CIVILIAN DEFENSE, nonviolence, 1890
CIVILIAN DEFENSE STUDY CONFERENCE (1964), 809
CLARK, GRENVILLE, 1929
CLAUSEWITZ, KARL VON, 1108, 1120, 1145
CLIMATE MODIFICATION. See Weather modification
COEXISTENCE. See Peaceful coexistence
COLD WAR, 1519, 1868
background, 1910
Catholic view, 1878
changing nature of, 444, 501, 795, 941, 1507
East-West relations, 597
education of public, 1758
French view, 1099
future, 19
influence of Christianity, 1365
role of nuclear weapons, 1378
role of strategic contraband, 1785
sabotage, 1573
Sino-Soviet-American relations, 960
space race, 1110
U.S. policy, 484, 493, 969
THE COLD WAR . . . AND AFTER [CHARLES O. LERCHE, JR.], 969
COLLATERAL MEASURES. See Limited measures
COLLECTIVE DEFENSE. See Security, international
COLLECTIVE SECURITY. See Security, international
COLONIALISM, 452, 1488
COMMAND AND CONTROL
civil-military relations, 713
NORAD defense center, 921
nuclear weapons, 1965
NATO. See NATO--control of nuclear weapons
role of electronics, 1604
COMMITTEE FOR NONVIOLENT ACTION, march to Moscow, 1879
COMMUNICATION, INTERNATIONAL, 1867
promotion of peace, 1355, 1361
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, vulnerability to nuclear explosions, 1793
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, MILITARY, 403
National Communications System, 1779
U.S.S.R., 82
vulnerability to nuclear explosions, 922, 1450
See also Space communications--military systems
COMMUNISM
aggressiveness, 521
and geostrategy, 595
Asia, 1505
Comintern, 1002
Communist China, 1009, 1560
developing countries, 40, 1464
education of public, 1758
evolutionary trends, 468
expansionism, 1574
Guatemala, 1576
insurgency, 535
nuclear war, 1982

COMMUNISM--Continued
peace movements, 1889
polycentrism, 1558
religious cold war, 1011
revisionism, 524
U.S. policy toward, 1518
wars of national liberation, 1827
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
conflict resolution, 288
disarmament policies and proposals, 214
international law, 1844
nationalism, 1025
polycentrism, 677, 953, 1470, 1506
seapower, 1664
Soviet relations with, 1529
view of nuclear weapons, 1638
See also Central Europe; Eastern Europe; Sino-Soviet dispute; Warsaw Treaty Organization
COMMUNIST PARTIES, France, 1523
COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION. 23RD CONGRESS, 1673
COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE. See Military service, compulsory
CONCILIATION, INTERNATIONAL, 1352
CONFERENCE OF EXPERTS (1958), 360
CONFERENCE ON LAW AND WORLD AFFAIRS (1964), 471
CONFERENCE TO PLAN A STRATEGY FOR PEACE, 1344-1345
CONFERENCE UPON RESEARCH AND EDUCATION IN WORLD GOVERNMENT (CURE), 1880
CONFERENCES
All Christian Peace Assembly, 1872
Association for the Development of World Law Colloquium (1965), 1325
Christian Peace Conference
Advisory Committee (1965), 1872
Commission for the Study of International Problems (1965), 364
Consultative Committee (1965), 1363
Working Committee (1965), 811
Civilian Defense Study Conference (1964), 809
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 23rd Congress, 1673
Conference of Experts (1958), 360
Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament. See Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament
Conference on Law and World Affairs (1964), 471
Conference to Plan a Strategy for Peace, 1344-1345
Consultation on a Multilateral Nuclear Force (1965), 213
Detroit Space Law Forum (1965), 868
Dublin Conference (1965), 1362
Information Conference on Contemporary Strategic Problems (1965), 192
International Assembly on Nuclear Weapons (1966), 1949
International Atomic Energy Agency. General Conference (1965), 903, 1460
International Conference for Solidarity with the People of Vietnam Against U.S. Imperialist Aggression and for the Defense of Peace (1964), 1347
International Conference for the Liquidation of Foreign Military Bases (1965), 817
International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (1964), 1252
International Convocation on the Requirements of Peace (1965), 322
International Peace Bureau Conference (1964), 809
International Women's Forum on Peace (1965), 827
Interparliamentary Conference (1965), 1851
National Inter-Religious Conference on Peace (1966), 1893
CONFERENCES--Continued
Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, 347, 820, 1327, 1357, 1774, 1886, 1923
Research Conference on Behavior in Organizations (1962), 955
Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia. 6th Congress, 1888
Symposium on Remote Sensing of Environment, 3d (1964), 1455
Warsaw Treaty Organization (1965), 172
Political Consultative Committee (1966), 1716
West German military colloquium (Dresden), 653
White House Conference on International Cooperation (1965), 628, 807, 931, 1349, 1423
Committee for Research on the Development of International Institutions, 1351
Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, 1343, 1417, 1421, 1425
Committee on Development of International Law, 1322
Committee on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, 1352
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 1339
Committee on Science and Technology, 1353
Committee on Space, 1416
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, 1459
World Conference on World Peace Through Law (1965), 290, 778, 782, 1315
World Congress for Peace, National Independence, and General Disarmament (1965), 314, 825
world disarmament conference, 371-372, 374, 737, 855-856, 881, 885, 1382, 1384, 1387, 1390-1400, 1403-1404, 1423, 1916, 1930, 1943
World Peace Council (1966), 1894
See also Negotiations
CONFLICT, 943
and geopolitics, 1112
behavioral analysis, 463, 956
biological analysis, 10
causes, 1897
changing nature of, 1571
Chinese Communist system, 977
cultural effects, 277
developing countries, 58, 949
effect of nuclear weapons, 536
escalation, 379, 886-887, 889, 1033
Chinese Communist view, 1428
deterrent effect, 1715
developing countries, 1447
Kashmir war, 175
nuclear weapons, 1568, 1944
possibility of, 953, 1027
role of military-industrial complex, 1787
Soviet view, 380, 382
Vietnamese war. See Vietnamese war--escalation
gaming, 1484
inevitability of, 57
legal principles, 797
limitation, 1471, 1489
role of airpower, 1901
U.N. role, 299
U.S. policy, 1653
nonlethal equivalents, 332
prevention, 370, 1885
protracted conflict, 513
relation to power, 3
resolution, 289, 315, 443, 596, 980
Asia, 20
Communist countries, 288
cultural relations, 814
institutions, 784, 942, 1264
interdisciplinary approach, 455
international law, 292, 538, 1314
loser's reaction, 946

CONFLICT--Continued
resolution--Continued
mediation. See Mediation
Near East, 301
Organization of African Unity, 1856
peace research movement, 824
political settlement, 1858
public opinion, 6
religious view, 1365
social science research, 1780
Soviet view, 1320-1321
U.N. role, 304, 369, 797, 1337, 1352
See also Arbitration, international
See also Aggression; Violence; War
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS, 1237
CONSULTATION ON A MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FORCE (1965), 213
CONTROL. See Command and control; Inspection and verification
CONVENTIONAL FORCES, 1087
France, 1697
Switzerland, 1704
CONVENTIONAL WAR
Europe, 109
future, 1569
probability of, 1116
use of missiles, 1615
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, 1096, 1230
CONVERSION. See economic conversion under Defense industry
COOPERATION, INTERNATIONAL, 831, 1349, 1364
Antarctic Regions, 858
arms and armaments, 594
nuclear research and development, 396
promotion of world peace, 830
science and technology, 329, 355, 1353
space, 302, 1318, 1416, 1587, 1735
U.N. role, 815
United States, 979, 998, 1499
U.S.-U.S.S.R., 1234
West European aircraft industry, 1743
West German armaments program, 1598
See also White House Conference on International Cooperation (1965)
COSMOS SATELLITES. See under Satellites
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, Annual Report (1966), 1822
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 1555
COUNTERCITY STRATEGY, 1027, 1640, 1901
Communist view, 1638
COUNTERFORCE STRATEGY, 1027, 1638, 1649
COUNTERINSURGENCY, 61, 548
civic action programs, 1668
role of seapower, 583
U.S. program, 64
Vietnamese war, 60, 1074, 1174
See also Antiguerrilla warfare; Guerrilla warfare; Insurgency
COUPS D'ETAT
Africa, 1480, 1761
Nigeria, 1764
CRISES, 947
control, 583, 1712
Cuba (1961), 1324
Cuba (1962), 1225, 1691
Dominican Republic (1965), 296
simulation, 1493
social science research, 8
CUBA
crisis (1961), 1324
crisis (1962), 1225, 1691
military buildup, 204
CUMMINGS, SAMUEL, Interarmco, 1770, 1775
CYPRUS
arms control measures, 1396
U.N. peacekeeping operations, 1858
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, disarmament policies and proposals, 1384

D

DAMAGE-LIMITING STRATEGY, 631, 1653, 1667
DANG, HUNG CHEN, 1835
DANUBE AREA, 1003
DECISIONMAKING, 11, 1757
moral and ethical aspects, 445
NATO, 675, 700, 1229
psychological aspects, 1478
role of military, 719
role of science and technology, 221
scientists, 1354
simulation, 728, 1493
social science research, 1
strategic analysis, 714, 1113
See also Nuclear decisionmaking
DEFENSE BUDGETS AND EXPENDITURES, 1178, 1291, 1814
appropriations hearings, 1701
Australia, 1643
Canada, 1688, 1724
capitalist countries, 1098
contributions to NATO, 752
diversion to social needs, 343, 1466, 1876
economic effects, 264, 430, 760, 936, 1280, 1467, 1813, 1817, 1820, 1825, 1984
effect on domestic welfare programs, 1289
effect on U.S. superiority, 1299
FY 1968 proposals, 1585
formulation and implementation, 1076
France, 637, 665, 750, 1147
future trends, 267, 1062
Great Britain, 1268, 1669, 1680
impact, 1296
NATO, 1218
reductions. See Defense cutbacks
U.S.S.R., 1285
Vietnamese war, 755, 757-758, 1180-1181, 1266, 1293, 1298, 1300, 1816, 1822-1823.
West Germany, 1286
world statistics, 1633
See also under specific countries
DEFENSE CONTRACTS, 732
future trends, 263
leading U.S. contractors, 754
reduction, 753
Vietnamese war, 1816
DEFENSE CUTBACKS, 1466
adjustment measures, 273, 751, 1468, 1808, 1818, 1821, 1936
Congressional concern, 606
economic effects, 756
Great Britain, 1268, 1742
regional impact, 937, 1987
See also Economic effects of disarmament
DEFENSE INDUSTRY
arms traffic participation, 1143
diversification, 1284, 1808, 1818, 1821, 1824, 1984
economic conversion, 753, 1465, 1468, 1887, 1985
effect of Vietnamese war, 1070, 1174, 1284
France, 710
production for limited war, 1049, 1051
West Germany, 261, 1610, 1819
See also Aerospace industry; Aircraft industry; Military-industrial complex; Nuclear energy industry
DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS, 1625, 1701, 1703, 1752

DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS--Continued
Australia, 1687
Austria, 1156
British White Paper (1966), 1663, 1666, 1705
criticism, 1175
economic effects, 265, 427, 1822
effect on:
disarmament negotiations, 376
domestic welfare programs, 1289, 1817
foreign policymaking, 1658
national security policies, 1157
formulation and implementation, 346, 657, 717, 719, 732, 734, 1258, 1651, 1769, 1965
France, 1697
domestic politics, 457
territorial defense, 618, 1031, 1172
future trends, 1062
Great Britain, 1125, 1671
Japan, 1686
modern states, 245
naval forces, 1115
public opinion, 219
reassessment, 1057
resource allocation, 52
role of military intelligence, 726
role of missile forces, 1090
strategic analysis, 714, 720
West Germany, 1210
See also Civilian defense; Mutual defense; Nonmilitary defense; Strategy; also under specific countries
DEFENSE PROCUREMENT
Canada, 1810
Great Britain, 1681, 1743
Plowden Report, 1222
West Germany, 1819
DEFENSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, 271, 1076
civilian applications, 1284
Communist China, 1048
cost-effectiveness, 719
design requirements, 580
East-West balance, 573
economic growth, 1825
European economic development, 1224
France, 1282, 1612
lasers, 1617
missiles, 77, 1090
research organizations, 722, 1351
U.S.S.R., 555
United States, 1781
U.S. Air Force, 266
U.S. Navy, 91
Vietnamese war, 1608
West Germany, 98
DE GAULLE, CHARLES, 29, 970, 982, 985, 1007, 1012, 1014, 1122, 1160, 1198, 1212, 1216, 1521, 1544-1545, 1552, 1730, 1736, 1939
DEITCHMAN, SEYMOUR J., 1118
DELIVERY VEHICLES. See Nuclear delivery vehicles
DEMARIA, G., 1825
DENMARK
defense policies and programs, 627, 1707
disarmament policies and proposals, 1390
NATO policy, 1223
DENUCLEARIZED ZONES. See Nuclear-free zones
DENVER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 1808
DESALINIZATION. See under Nuclear energy--peaceful uses
DESIGN FOR SURVIVAL [THOMAS S. POWER], 625
DETECTION STATIONS, 418, 1453
See also Observation posts
DETERRENCE, 109, 941, 1027, 1389, 1519, 1568, 1632, 1944
"assured destruction," 631
DETERRENCE--Continued
balance of terror, 530, 538, 1029
Catholic view, 1826
Communist China, 1553
conventional weapons, 1096
credibility, 124, 600, 675, 696, 699, 1033, 1205, 1569, 1729, 1750
French view, 1099, 1202, 1432
effect on disarmament negotiations, 376
French view, 144, 1675
futility of, 597
graduated deterrence, 1035
in Asia, 20
Indian capability, 1441
maximum deterrence, 625
middle powers, 1102
mutual deterrence, 531, 591, 1099, 1750, 1908
orbital bomb, 1592
Polaris role, 99, 580
psychological aspects, 1478
religious view, 1328-1329
role in GCD, 847, 852
role in indirect strategy, 1100
role of:
airpower, 592, 1901
foreign military bases, 666
navies, 1071
NADGE, 1060
NATO, 685, 1227, 1713, 1751
seapower, 1111, 1670
stable deterrence, 353, 1029
submarines, nuclear-powered, 1580
Swiss view, 1704
theories, 894, 1313, 1642
U.S.S.R., 1187
U.S. military power, 488
U.S. missile forces, 1090
U.S. view, 132, 136, 359, 656, 1653, 1667, 1699
Welsh view, "Earth's Nuclear Deterrent (END)," 1356
See also Strategy; Strategy, U.S.
DETROIT SPACE LAW FORUM (1965), 868
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
armed forces, 715, 1256
arms race, 1985
Chinese Communist influence, 159
defense policies and programs, 893, 1447
economic assistance, 451, 821, 996, 1294, 1360-1361
economic effects of disarmament, 432, 935, 1820, 1982, 1986
instability, 58, 953, 1764
military aid to, 1562
oil monopolies, 1488
Pugwash interests, 1886
role in international relations, 13, 1474
seapower, 1579
sources of conflict, 949
U.N. role, 435
U.S. "community of effort," 1682
U.S. policy toward, 40
world role, 1464
DIEFENBAKER, JOHN, 1688
DIPLOMACY, bibliography, 951
DISENGAGEMENT, Central Europe, 362
DISSEMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. See Proliferation of nuclear weapons
DIVERSIFICATION. See under Aerospace industry; Defense industry; Nuclear energy industry
DOCUMENTS
international law, 458
international relations, 1372
NATO, 1747
West Germany, 368
DOMINICAN CRISIS (1965), U.N. intervention, 296

230-967 O - 66 - 9

DONNELLY, DESMOND, 969
DRAFT. See Military service, compulsory
DUBLIN CONFERENCE (1965), 1362
DUBNA, JOINT INSTITUTE FOR NUCLEAR RESEARCH, 560, 1093
DUPRIEZ, L. H., 1825
DUSCHA, JULIUS, 1637
DUYNSTEE, ANTHONY E. M., 187

E

ENDC. See Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament
EURATOM. See European Atomic Energy Community
EARTHQUAKES, man-made, 1969
EAST-WEST RELATIONS, 495
  alliance interactions, 1635
  changes in, 953
  defense policies and programs, 1035
  détente, 117, 471, 680, 795, 1009, 1012, 1024, 1190, 1507, 1527, 1939
  developing countries, 435
  effect on nationalism, 439
  Europe, 517, 1007, 1121, 1410, 1413, 1549, 1728
  European security, 1713
  European settlement, 1022
  European unification, 522
  future, 440, 1506
  German problem, 1524
  international law, 1844
  nonproliferation treaty, 902
  peaceful coexistence, 687, 1527
  role of NATO, 1727, 1736
  Sino-Soviet dispute, 960
  space race, 1110
  Third World, 511, 972
  U.N. Security Council, 785
  Vietnamese war, 1117
  West German initiatives, 1538
  West German nuclear policies, 1145
  See also Soviet-U.S. relations
EASTERN EUROPE
  multipolarity, 1020, 1470
  relations with Germany, 1530
  Soviet policy, 1006, 1748
  West German relations with, 207, 525, 1214
ECONOMIC CONVERSION. See under Defense industry
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, Pierre Rinfret, 1813
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF DISARMAMENT, 427, 756, 936, 1325, 1464, 1466-1467, 1820, 1825, 1936, 1984-1985
  adjustment measures, 431, 751, 753
  capitalist countries, 432
  developing countries, 1982
  economic models, 433
  Government studies, 430, 1468, 1821
  Great Britain, 1465
  regional variations, 1987
  Soviet view, 1285, 1986
  world situation, 935
  See also Defense cutbacks
ECONOMIC POLICIES AND PROGRAMS, future requirements, 1294
ECONOMIC SYSTEM
  militarization of, 1280
  role in strategy formulation, 1653
EGYPT. See United Arab Republic
EIGHTEEN NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT, 435, 884, 953, 1388, 1935
  East German policies and proposals, 875
  lack of agreement, 373, 916, 1385
  nonalined countries, 883
  nonproliferation treaty discussions, 900, 912, 1419-1420, 1444, 1937, 1940, 1951, 1959, 1961
EIGHTEEN NATION COMMITTEE--Continued
  nonproliferation treaty discussions--Continued
    East-West disagreement, 398-399
    U.S. policies and proposals, 386, 920, 1960
    West German policies and proposals, 932
  relation to world disarmament conference, 1397
  Soviet policies and proposals, 853, 857, 1406, 1422
  U.S. policies and proposals, 366-367
EINSTEIN, ALBERT, 336, 1774
ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY, civil defense preparations, 1799
ELECTRONICS, role in warfare, 1604
ELITE GROUPS
  military, 235, 1765
  scientific-military disagreements, 339
  See also Scientific elite
ENGLAND. See Great Britain
ERHARD, LUDWIG, 1498
ESCALATION. See under Conflict; Vietnamese war
EUROPE, 1344-1345
  aerospace industry, 1045
  air defense systems, 1199
  aircraft industry, 1743
  arms control in, 361, 847, 850, 1389, 1410, 1417, 1538, 1915
  as a third world power, 1551
  conventional defense, 109, 705
  defense policies and programs, 1212, 1231, 1398, 1712, 1755
    European Defense Organization, 1498
    Franco-German cooperation, 1745
    Great Britain's role, 163
    U.S. role, 1730
    West German view, 620
  détente, 1548
  East-West settlement, 1208, 1746
    Soviet view, 1722
    West German disarmament, 197
  Eastern European view, 1716
  effect of German problem, 1500
  federation, 945
  Franco-German relations, 971, 1122
  French view, 1121
  future, 114
  Gaullism, 982, 1537, 1939
  Great Britain's role, 994
  independent nuclear forces, 1228, 1729
  joint air force, 1721
  joint nuclear force, 206, 217, 701, 1216, 1219, 1228, 1644, 1710, 1733
  military aid programs, 191
  military history, 1108
  NADGE air defense system, 182
  nuclear forces, 1200
  nuclear policies and programs, national, 1242
  peace parliament (proposed), 790
  Potsdam Agreement, 673
  scientific-technological development, 716
  space policies and programs, 1590
  subversion, 1574
  tension reduction, 877, 1226, 1413, 1728, 1741
  unification, 44, 456, 483, 518, 683, 690, 941, 1006, 1017, 1214, 1269, 1506, 1555, 1711, 1915
    criticism, 1521
    effect on German reunification, 1498, 1712
    effect on NATO, 685, 1194
    French nuclear policy, 1734
    French view, 640, 1014, 1552, 1737
    relation to defense problems, 193, 863, 1224, 1713
    role of West Germany, 1950
    U.S. role, 522, 1549, 1559, 1740
    West German view, 18
  West German integration, 1193

EUROPE--Continued
See also Atlantic community; Central Europe; East-West relations; Eastern Europe; European-U.S. relations; Western countries
EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY, 1076, 1555, 1981
safeguards system, 1957
EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, 1555
EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY, 1555
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, 49, 1555
French view, 483
EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION, 1555
EUROPEAN MONETARY AGREEMENT, 1555
EUROPEAN NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, 1981
EUROPEAN NUCLEAR FORCE. See Europe--joint nuclear force
EUROPEAN ORGANIZATION FOR NUCLEAR RESEARCH, 1274
EUROPEAN PAYMENTS UNION, 1555
EUROPEAN SPACE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION, 1587
EUROPEAN SPACE VEHICLE LAUNCHER DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION, 1587, 1590
EUROPEAN-U.S. RELATIONS
airpower, 1721
Atlantic partnership, 1559
cold war in Asia, 960
defense policies and programs, 210, 456, 678, 690, 701, 994, 1216, 1219, 1225, 1644, 1713, 1733, 1740
NATO, 1217
West German view, 23
effect of science and technology, 716
European security, 685, 691, 1103, 1224, 1410, 1632, 1711, 1744, 1746
French nuclear policy, 1734
French view, 29, 193, 970
joint space effort, 1192
NATO, 1145, 1737
nuclear research and development, 1076
problems and prospects, 192, 953, 1200, 1915
space cooperation, 1735
United States, 493, 522, 1549
Vietnamese war, 961
West Germany, 1193
See also Atlantic community; North Atlantic Treaty Organization
EXOTIC WARFARE
sabotage, 1573
weather modification, 1618
See also Unconventional warfare

F

F-111 AIRCRAFT. See under Aircraft
FB-111 AIRCRAFT. See under Aircraft; Bombers
FABRICANT, S., 1825
FALK, RICHARD A., 1324
FALLOUT. See Radioactive fallout
FALLOUT SHELTERS, 735, 1065, 1245, 1267
Canada, 1186
psychological effects, 228
public opinion, 234, 250
requirements, 748
survival simulation, 738
See also Bomb shelters
FAR EAST
achievement of peace, 1345
anti-Communist alliance (Nationalist China and South Vietnam), 185
British policies, 629
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, 1931
FINLAND, Navy, 1692
FIRE STORMS, 721
FISHER, ADRIAN S., 1960
FISSIONABLE MATERIALS
peaceful uses, 350, 876, 1945, 1970
See also Nuclear materials
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, 177, 1027, 1653
Europe, 1730
French view, 1729
military air transportation, 1609
NATO, 1227
role of U.S. Navy, 1617
Vietnamese war, 1036
FONTAINE, ANDRÉ, 1378
FORCE, USE OF, 1116, 1381
credibility, 124
pacific blockade, 115
prevention, 370
psychological aspects, 1487
relation to world order, 12
U.S. policy, 1522
FOREIGN POLICY, 974
and strategy, 1113
effect of science and technology, 999
formulation and implementation, 24, 1517, 1519
public opinion, 37, 319, 1481
role of military power, 1657
techniques, 940
U.S.S.R., 967, 1371
United States, 1542
See also under specific countries
FOUNDATIONS. See Organizations
FRANCE, 1740
aerospace industry, 1812
Air Force, 1132
aircraft industry, 1732
anti-Gaullism, 1552
Arab-Israeli dispute, 1508
armed forces, 711, 1279, 1753
Communist countries, 997
defense budget and expenditures, 665, 750, 1147
defense policies and programs, 94, 144, 220, 529, 600, 710, 1102, 1156, 1612, 1644, 1697
economic effects, 265
effect of politics, 711, 736
NATO, 1160
overseas intervention force, 1650
tactical nuclear warfare, 1133
territorial defense, 618, 1031, 1172
weapons development, 644, 1082
West German cooperation, 1745
West German view, 189
See also Strategy
demographic effects of World Wars, 1302
developing countries, 821
European unification, 483, 1006, 1014, 1549
foreign policy, 15, 498, 970, 982, 985, 1544
Communist China, 1510, 1631
Communist Party view, 1523
German reunification, 1745
public opinion, 1481
U.S.S.R., 188
United States, 1013
West Germany, 971
German reunification, 470
MRBM installations, 617
military history, 1108
missile development, 1059, 1078
missile sites, 1684
Navy, 146, 180, 1071, 1134, 1606, 1670, 1692
airpower, 1153
nuclear-powered submarines, 1647
NATO policy, 193, 195, 479, 699, 1198, 1212, 1216, 1229, 1231, 1544, 1714, 1718, 1728, 1730, 1736-1737
impact on European defense industries, 1749
nuclear forces, 619, 840, 1122, 1202, 1205, 1279, 1432, 1729

FRANCE--Continued
nuclear policies and programs, 624, 697, 1661, 1734, 1915
Atomic Energy Commission, 623
budget and expenditures, 1776
effect on European unification, 640
effect on NATO, 1227
"force nucléaire stratégique," 637, 1675
history, 840
Pacific Test Center (CEP), 1794
Protestant opposition, 1869
nuclear weapons tests, 133, 365, 740, 1265, 1803
relations with Communist China, 1437
relations with U.S.S.R., 1007, 1010, 1121, 1551
relations with West Germany, 1012
space policies and programs, 693, 1069, 1164, 1287, 1587, 1621
view of Europe, 691
withdrawal from NATO, 1636, 1714-1715, 1718, 1720, 1730, 1736, 1751
FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS, defense requirements, 1712
FRANCO-SOVIET RELATIONS
European security, 1413, 1548
space cooperation, 1590
THE FREE WORLD COLOSSUS: A CRITIQUE OF AMERICAN POLICY IN THE COLD WAR [DAVID HOROWITZ], 969
FREEZE ON WEAPONS PRODUCTION, 1402
FULBRIGHT, J. WILLIAM, 1788

G

GCD. See General and complete disarmament
GALLOIS, PIERRE, 1745
GAMING. See War games and gaming
GANDHI, MOHANDAS K., 5, 833, 964, 1443
GAZA STRIP, UAR policy, 1494
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT, 12, 1344, 1383, 1467, 1892
ABM development, 1806
Asia, 850
bibliography, 1407
British anarchist view, 1797
British trade unions, 1001
cold war effects, 846
deterrence, 852
economic effects. See Economic effects of disarmament
effect of MLF, 213
enforcement, 424, 1454, 1914
feasibility, 597, 798
German reunification, 880
Indian policies and proposals, 351, 1440-1441
legal aspects. See Legal aspects of disarmament
military view, 354, 428
nonalined countries, 883
peacekeeping and security forces, 1931-1932
political aspects. See Political aspects of disarmament
problems of achieving, 352, 852, 854, 1354, 1385-1386, 1402, 1900, 1917, 1919, 1922
proliferation of CBR weapons, 95
Soviet view, 342, 347
psychological aspects. See Psychological aspects of disarmament
public opinion survey, 1481
Pugwash conferences, 329, 355
religious view, 364, 810-811, 818, 870, 1328-1329
role in achieving peace, 680
rule of law, 774
scientific contributions, 1354, 1923
social aspects. See Social aspects of disarmament
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT--Continued
Soviet policies and proposals, 291, 356, 856-857, 967, 990, 1373, 1406, 1422, 1482, 1548, 1896, 1924-1925, 1928, 1948, 1982, 1986
Soviet-U.S. interest, 1942
technical aspects, 352
U.N. discussion, 1916
U.N. role, 837, 855, 1335, 1338, 1387, 1405, 1938
U.S. policies and proposals, 346, 366
world disarmament conference. See World disarmament conference
World Peace Council, 1894
Yugoslav view, 1888
See also Arms and armaments--reduction or elimination; Limited measures; Nuclear-free zones; Nuclear weapons--reduction or elimination; Regional disarmament; Unilateral disarmament
GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (1965), 903
GENEVA AGREEMENTS OF 1954, 1375
GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. See Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament
GEOPOLITICS, 1032, 1112
GEOSTRATEGY. See under Strategy
GERMAN PEACE TREATY. See under Treaties, agreements, etc. (proposed)
GERMANY
concept of nation, 1532
division, 236
East-West policies toward, 469
militarism, 1370, 1495, 1728
military history, 1108
Potsdam Agreement (1945), 781
rearmament (1925-1935), 1906
relations with Poland, 1004, 1016
reunification, 199, 326, 469-470, 487, 505, 941, 1121, 1498, 1506
Anglo-American view, 1524
British view, 197
East German view, 492, 500, 1408
effect on disarmament, 880, 1742
effect on European security, 685
European-U.S. relations, 522
Franco-Russian opposition, 188
French view, 683, 1224, 1712-1713, 1745
nonproliferation treaty, 1158
Polish view, 976
prerequisites, 22, 108, 160
prognosis, 963, 1496
Soviet-U.S. relations, 14
West German nuclear weapons acquisition, 697, 1413, 1710
West German view, 18, 43, 183, 499, 506-507, 598-599, 1008, 1530
GERMANY, EAST
armed forces, 646, 684
Army, 184, 622
concept of nation, 1532
defense policies and programs, 1233
See also Strategy
disarmament policies and proposals, 324, 368, 875, 1408
European security, 1500
foreign policy, 707
legal status, 1503
nationalism, 1025
nuclear policies and programs, 897, 1444
Potsdam Agreement (1945), 1021
relations with West Germany, 27, 492, 500, 988, 1536
reunification, 1008
Socialist Unity Party, 1536
U.N. membership, 509
view of West Germany, 1656
West German nuclear weapons acquisition, 906, 1436

GERMANY (FEDERAL REPUBLIC)
Air Force, 137, 559, 577, 649, 1721
air transportation policy, 1616
airpower, 1043
analysis of 1965 election, 43
Arab-Israeli dispute, 1508
armed forces, 138, 630, 667, 1124, 1741
arms and armaments, 1098, 1168
Army, 237
Berlin, 1909
Christian Social Union, Study Group on Defense Policy, 1819
civil defense, 1950
Civil Defense Corps, 1257, 1656
defense budget and expenditures, 1286
defense industry, 621, 1610, 1819
defense policies and programs, 647, 653, 669, 970, 1140, 1751
Communist countries, 138
East German criticism, 25, 27, 172, 174
nonproliferation treaty, 217, 932
research and development, 98
disarmament policies and proposals, 197, 846
East European solidarity, 1020
East-West relations, 1009
emergency powers, 167
European security, 1500
foreign policy, 183, 482
East European countries, 207, 494, 525, 850, 1214
Europe, 1121
European unification, 18
France, 189, 971
Franco-U.S. relations, 1229
Hallstein Doctrine, 505
priorities, 160
public opinion, 480
reunification, 487, 499, 506
Social Democratic Party, 38
U.S.S.R., 41, 46, 835, 1277
United States, 1193
French nuclear policy, 1734
Gaullism, 1521
imperialism, East German view, 988
militarism, Communist criticism, 153
military aid to Africa, 1768
nationalism, 660
naval airpower, 1598, 1685
Navy, 578
role in NATO, 632
NATO policy, 196, 210, 664, 697, 699, 704, 1193, 1225, 1229, 1231, 1718
nuclear forces, 137, 702
nuclear policies and programs, 620, 659, 664, 704, 897, 1140, 1210, 1767
budget and expenditures, 1776
nonproliferation treaty (proposed), 131, 390
NATO, 1158
See also Trettner Memorandum
nuclear weapons acquisition, 188, 598, 682, 692, 697, 703, 909, 913, 1021, 1122, 1138, 1190, 1208, 1217, 1419, 1433, 1436, 1444, 1448, 1495, 1710, 1723, 1745, 1915, 1948, 1950
criticism, 199
East German view, 707, 875, 906
effect on European security, 1413
effect on NATO, 1230
effect on reunification, 599, 1712
French view, 1737
nonproliferation treaty (proposed), 1957
Soviet view, 1548, 1722
Vietnamese war, 1201
world reaction, 397
Oder-Neisse Line, 1651
GERMANY (FEDERAL REPUBLIC)--Continued
rearmament, 142, 158, 261, 1021, 1206, 1728
relations with:
East Germany, 1536
Eastern Europe, 1524, 1538
France, 690, 1012
Poland, 26, 520, 527, 1015, 1554, 1556
religion and politics, 810
reunification, 1008, 1498
role in Franco-Soviet rapprochement, 1010
Sino-Soviet dispute, 1558
Social Democratic Party, 1536
war potential, 1656
GHANA, Navy, 1579
GIBRALTAR, military-strategic value, 1213
GOLDBERG, ARTHUR J., 983
GOMULKA PLAN, 362, 1410
GRADUATED DETERRENCE. See under Deterrence
GREAT BRITAIN
Air Force bomber command, 1084
aircraft procurement, 1743
Arab-Israeli dispute, 1508
armed forces, East of Suez, 1125
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 1368
defense budget and expenditures, 1465
defense policies and programs, 163, 1141, 1669, 1671, 1680, 1742
aircraft carriers, 1628
civil defense, 1163
criticism, 1356
East of Suez, 130, 1148, 1513
effect on European industry, 1732
Far East, 629
Indian Ocean, 1204
Labour Government, 1691
military bases, 1195
military commitments, 1268
naval, 1597, 1639
review, 1662
White Paper (1966), 1663, 1666, 1705
See also Strategy
disarmament policies and proposals, 335, 984, 1382
foreign policy, 50, 197, 994, 1123
German reunification, 470
military history, 1108
missile development, 1912
Navy, 593, 1106, 1623
NATO policy, 699, 1718
nuclear budget and expenditures, 1776
peace movement, 1547
Plowden Report (aircraft industry), 1045, 1222
United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, 1453
U.N. peacekeeping force (proposed), 306
GRINDSTONE EXPERIMENT. See under Nonviolence
GUARANTEES. See Nuclear guarantees
GUATEMALA, insurgency, 1576
GUERRILLA WARFARE, 543, 547-548, 1031, 1039, 1471
arms and armaments, 270, 1074, 1266
chemical and biological weapons, 1310
Chinese Communist program, 62, 513, 1126, 1577
civilian population's role, 545
Communist strategy, 535
Guatemala, 1576
history, 1369, 1898
Indonesia, 544
Latin America, 16
NATO, 541
North Vietnam, 1185, 1575
U.S. program, 64, 843, 1040
Vietnamese war, 381, 1038
See also Antiguerrilla warfare; Counterinsurgency; Insurgency

H

HABERLER, G., 1825
HALBERSTAM, DAVID, 1658
HALLSTEIN DOCTRINE, 160, 505
HAMMARSKJÖLD, DAG, 833, 1379
HARBOR, PROJECT, 1262
  Summary Report, 1249-1250, 1263
HEALEY, DENIS, 1669
HEIDEGGER, MARTIN, 762
HELLYER, PAUL, 1688
HICKMAN, B. G., 1825
HICKS, U., 1825
HILDEBRAND, G. H., 1825
HIROSHIMA
  nuclear bombing, 336, 775, 839
    effects on survivors, 256, 284
  radiation effects, 1837
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, 335, 341, 1906
HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR [ANDRÉ FONTAINE], 1378
HOLLOMON, J. HERBERT, 1808
HOROWITZ, DAVID, 969
HUA, HSIAO, 1173

I

INDIA
  Chinese Communist aggression, 490, 1000
  defense of, 20
  defense policies and programs, 612, 1129, 1755
    Communist China, 150
    reorganization, 1660
  disarmament policies and proposals, 351, 385
  foreign policy, 508, 1000
    Asia, 465, 895
    criticism, 35
    nonalinement, 526, 658
    nuclear guarantees, 1963
  nuclear policies and programs, 895, 905, 910, 1271, 1426, 1431, 1438-1441, 1952
    Communist China, 385, 395
    Kashmir war, 175, 914
    world reaction, 904
  nuclear weapons acquisition, 1946
  Pakistani-Chinese aggression, 1203
  unilateral disarmament, 1443
  U.N. peacekeeping and security forces, 803
  See also Indo-Pakistan conflict
INDIAN OCEAN
  British role, 1195, 1513
  military bases, 676, 1169
    United States-Great Britain, 1204
  strategy, 130, 1109
INDO-PAKISTAN CONFLICT, 462
  effect on Soviet-U.S. interests, 45, 1271
  Kashmir war, 175, 643, 698, 1037, 1340
  Pakistani-Chinese strategy, 1203
INDONESIA, 20
INDUSTRIAL CONVERSION. See economic conversion under Defense industry
INFORMAL PENETRATION, 958, 973
INFORMATION, arms race, 1920
INFORMATION CONFERENCE ON CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC PROBLEMS (1965), 192
INSPECTION AND VERIFICATION, 24, 360, 1914, 1936, 1941
  acceptance of, 350, 413
  airborne ion-density measurement, 1976
  inspection by challenge, 1948-1949, 1959
  legal aspects, 406
  military intelligence, 414
  nonproliferation treaty (proposed), 1420, 1870
  nuclear weapons tests, 404, 934, 1386, 1971

INSPECTION AND VERIFICATION--Continued
  peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 396, 409, 925, 1458, 1968
  problems, 352, 412
  satellite reconnaissance, 930
  small nations detection club, 415
  Soviet view, 347, 1423, 1940
  techniques, 426, 935
  underground nuclear testing, 69, 415, 1453, 1917, 1967
  Western European Union, 405
  See also Detection stations; Observation posts; Reconnaissance
INSURGENCY, 59, 61, 63, 543, 548, 1157, 1562
  Asia, 20
  civic action programs, 1668
  Communist strategy, 535
  Guatemala, 1576
  historical analysis, 1898
  North Vietnam, 1575
  Vietcong, 1762
  See also Antiguerrilla warfare; Counterinsurgency; Guerrilla warfare
INTELLIGENCE
  effect on deterrence, 726
  electronic devices, 416
  Project "Study Fair," 428
  role in peacetime, 924
  verification, 414
INTER-AMERICAN PEACE FORCE (PROPOSED), 310
INTERARMCO, 1770, 1775
INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE (ICBM). See under Missiles
INTERDEPENDENCE
  European-U.S. relations, 29
  India-United States, 150
INTERNAL WAR. See Civil war
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION. See Arbitration, international
INTERNATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1966), 1949
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL SCIENCE, 1336
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, 425, 1538
  fissionable materials regulation, 1945
  General Conference (1965), 1460
  safeguards system, 396, 411, 423, 925, 1386, 1420, 1450, 1456, 1458-1460, 1981
  Soviet criticism, 787
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL DEFENCE ORGANIZATION, 223
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR SOCIAL SCIENCES DOCUMENTATION, 1336
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION. See Communication, international
INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION. See Conciliation, international
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR SOLIDARITY WITH THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM AGAINST U.S. AGGRESSION AND FOR THE DEFENSE OF PEACE (1964), 1347
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR THE LIQUIDATION OF FOREIGN MILITARY BASES (1965), 817
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY (1964), 1252
INTERNATIONAL CONVOCATION ON THE REQUIREMENTS OF PEACE (1965), 322
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. See Cooperation, international
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, 1325
  international law, 772
  judicial selection, 293
  jurisdiction, 358

INTERNATIONAL LAW, 290, 292, 1315
application to space, 616
Berlin, 1909
blockade. See Blockade
changing nature of, 776, 1844
chemical and biological weapons, 1899
Chinese Communist view, 1316
codification of treaty law, 1846
conflict resolution, 358, 784, 1314
contributions of international organizations, 1841
control of nuclear energy, 1461
development, 1317
disarmament, 342, 424, 774, 845
documents, 458
East German statehood, 1503
15th century proposals, 1905
German reunification, 500
IAEA safeguards system, 1458
International Court of Justice, 772
intervention. See Intervention
multipolarity, 1430
nuclear weapons use, 775
Oder-Neisse Line, 1561
peaceful coexistence, 471, 1319
peaceful use of oceans, 1845
peacekeeping role, 797
Potsdam Agreement (1945), 781
problems and prospects, 1842
role in achieving peace, 777, 1839
sovereignty. See Sovereignty
Soviet view, 291, 1320-1321, 1840
territorial integrity, 370
treaties, legality of, 1323
United Nations, 302, 1325
U.S. involvement in Vietnam, 1672
U.S. policy, 1322, 1848
vs. sovereignty, 1515
war, 538, 780, 1486, 1563, 1847
wars of national liberation, 783
Yugoslav view, 773
See also Rule of law; Space law
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, 1336
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, 1323
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 1853
Pius XII, 1485
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Chinese Communist view, 848
European nuclear energy programs, 1242
15th century proposals, 1905
lawmaking, 1841
nongovernmental, 792
Paul VI, 832
INTERNATIONAL PEACE BUREAU CONFERENCE (1964), 809
INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH ASSOCIATION, 330
INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCE. See Peacekeeping and security forces (proposed)
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, 1336
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 21
African policy, 1884
anarchy, 1471, 1892
behavioral analysis, 940, 1490
criticism, 1475
changing nature of, 939, 941, 958, 1401, 1431
Chinese Communist view, 1512, 1546
civil war, 1805
cold-war peace, 950
Communist bloc polycentrism, 1470
crises, 947
culture, 436
developing countries, 13
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS--Continued
documents, 458
East-West détente, 471, 1507
effect of:
arms race, 737
economic growth, 1871
nonproliferation treaty, 873
French view, 1216
future, 1506
geopolitical aspects. See Geopolitics
historical approach, 957, 1372
history (1919-1965), 1868
human factor, 1358, 1366, 1634
in a disarmed world, 1335, 1481, 1914
moral and ethical aspects, 497, 1264
mutual interests, 445
nationalism, 1477
nonalined countries, 514
nuclear weapons, 12, 331, 453, 944, 1102, 1317, 1378, 1569
organizations, 323
political realism, 849
power politics, 1486
prognosis, 961, 963
role of:
intellectuals, 814
international nongovernmental organizations, 792
middle powers, 1541
military power, 12
science and technology, 727
simulation, 447, 1502
social science research, 1, 8, 320
Soviet threat, 847
Soviet view, 1482
spiritual revolution, 1870
systems analysis, 7
U.S.S.R., 1371
U.N. role, 785
U.S. "community of effort," 1682
U.S. role, 1542
violence, 1350
war, 1492
world domination, 1902
Yugoslav view, 1888
See also Alinement; Alliances; Peaceful coexistence; World order
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. See Security, international
INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE COUNCIL, 1336
INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, 1336
INTERNATIONAL SPACE AGENCY (PROPOSED), 868
INTERNATIONAL TENSION. See Tension
INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S FORUM ON PEACE (1965), 827
INTERPARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE (1965), 1851
INTERVENTION, 797
civil wars, 1501
Dominican crisis (1965), 296
international law, 1843
moral and ethical aspects, 240
religious view, 1893
role of navies, 1071
Soviet view, 1548
U.S. policy, 40, 626, 1040, 1324, 1522
"INTERZONE THEORY." See under China, Communist
IRAN, CENTO-RCD role, 1196
ISRAEL
Army, 1108
defense policies and programs, 1064, 1445
foreign policy, 966
Navy, 1494
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, 1409
nuclear guarantees, 1963

ISRAEL--Continued
nuclear policies and programs, 892
nuclear weapons acquisition, 1946
ITALY
arms control measures, 1420
defense policies and programs, 1161
nuclear policies and programs, 1154
U.S. missile deployment, 1691

J

JAPAN
armed forces, 151, 651
bilateral defense treaty (United States-Japan), 1166
defense policies and programs, 602, 654, 1686
foreign policy, 34, 477, 635, 995
national security policies, 20
nuclear weapons acquisition, 1946
rearmament, 636
See also Hiroshima; Nagasaki
JAPAN-SOUTH KOREA TREATY, 1221
JASPERS, KARL, 762
JÖHR, W. A., 1825
JOHN XXIII, 1328-1329, 1346, 1364
JOHNSON, LYNDON B., 380, 1531, 1549, 1813
JOMINI, ANTOINE H., 1108
JUDAISM, view of war, 1830

K

KAHN, HERMAN, 590, 1676
KASHMIR WAR. See under Indo-Pakistan conflict
KAUFMANN, WILLIAM W., 1103
KENDRICK, M. S., 1825
KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA S., 941, 990, 1437
KISSINGER, HENRY, 522, 1103, 1640, 1737
KONDRAT'EV, N. D., 1825
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF
Air Force, 609
role in Southeast Asia, 1215
KOREAN WAR, 1036
KROKOWSKI, ERNST, 1836

L

LANG, DANIEL, 1637
LANG, WILLIAM E., 1759
LAQUEUR, WALTER, 991
LARGE APERTURE SEISMIC ARRAY, 417
LASERS, 66, 403
intelligence, 416
military uses, 1617
space, 75
LATIN AMERICA
arms trade and dissemination, 1759
disarmament in, 861
Inter-American Peace Force (proposed), 310
militarism, 235
navies, 201
nuclear-free zone, 864, 1411
tension, 16, 1361
U.S. policies, 1324, 1531
LAW, RULE OF. See Rule of law
LAWYERS COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS VIETNAM, 1672
LEBANON, disarmament policies and proposals, 1391
LEGAL ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT, 406, 845
LENIN, VLADIMIR I., 519, 964
LERCHE, CHARLES O., JR., 969
LIDDELL HART, BASIL HENRY, 1108
LIMITED MEASURES, 12, 314, 360, 1343-1344, 1389, 1425, 1433, 1900, 1904, 1922
ABM moratorium, 931

LIMITED MEASURES--Continued
as a basis for GCD, 358, 1917, 1941
Chinese Communist view, 848
control of nuclear materials, 1981
Cypriot policies and proposals, 1396
Czechoslovak view, 1384
East German policies and proposals, 324, 368
effect of Soviet and U.S. strategies, 501
French Socialist view, 1939
Lebanese view, 1391
Near East, 1933
Polish policies and proposals, 362
problems of achieving, 1936
Pugwash Conferences, 329, 355
Soviet policies and proposals, 1406
U.N. Disarmament Commission, 375, 377
U.N. policies and proposals, 389
U.S. policies and proposals, 341, 348, 350, 367, 1404
vs. GCD, 1956
White House Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, 1421
White House Conference on International Cooperation (1965), 628, 807
See also Arms and armaments--reduction or elimination; Nuclear-free zones; Nuclear weapons--reduction or elimination
LIMITED WAR, 1027, 1471, 1572
airpower, 1029, 1614
armored infantry, 1064
arms and armaments, 1049-1051, 1081, 1089, 1096, 1608
navies, 1106
nuclear weapons, 540, 631, 1700
prevention, 1901
radar requirements, 1591
risk of, 1470
U.S. policy, 1649
See also Vietnamese war
LIMITED WAR AND AMERICAN DEFENSE POLICY [SEYMOUR J. DEITCHMAN], 1118
LIN, PIAO, 511, 513, 537, 1018-1019, 1173, 1539, 1677
LIPKOWSKI, JEAN DE, 1745
LIPPMANN, WALTER, 1788
LITTMANN, K., 1825
LITTON LN-3, inertial navigation system, 1058
LÖSCH, A., 1825
LONG LIVE THE VICTORY OF THE PEOPLE'S WAR [LIN PIAO], 511, 513, 537, 1018-1019

M

MLF. See Multilateral nuclear force
MCCONNELL, JOHN P., 1299
MCNAMARA, ROBERT S., 657, 719, 1057, 1299, 1585, 1703
ABM deployment, 1659, 1804
civil-military relations, 1752
defense budget and expenditures, 1701, 1816
European strategy, 1219
military-industrial complex, 1658
U.S. airpower, 1721
MAHAN, ALFRED T., 1639
MALI, disarmament policies and proposals, 1930
MANHATTAN PROJECT, 331
MANN, THOMAS, 1531
MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY, 408, 553, 557, 571, 587, 1062, 1175
legal aspects, 616
military implications, 807, 1091
MANNED ORBITING RESEARCH LABORATORY, 557
MAO, TSE-TUNG, 1145, 1577
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, 107
MASSIVE RETALIATION, 1640

MAVERICK MISSILE. See under Missiles
MAXIMUM DETERRENCE. See under Deterrence
MEDIATION
  Arab-Israeli dispute, 966, 1409
  Chinese Communist view, 977
MEDIUM RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE (MRBM). See under Missiles
MELEKESS SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR ATOMIC REACTORS, 1244
MELMAN, SEYMOUR, 969, 1658
MESSMER, PIERRE, 1684
MIDDLE EAST. See Near East
MIDDLE POWERS, 1102
MILITARISM
  Japan, 636
  Latin America, 235
  Soviet view, 1673
  West Germany, 1140, 1656, 1722
MILITARY AID
  Africa, 1768
  Communist countries, 1664
  developing countries, 1447
MILITARY BALANCE
  ABM deployment, 1586
  Arab-Israeli dispute, 1445
  Asia, 1441
  developing countries, 862
  East-West powers, 113, 454, 705, 1160, 1220
  Near East, 892, 1255
  technological change, 353
  United States-Communist China, 604, 1146
  U.S.-U.S.S.R., 90, 105, 552, 570, 579, 1033, 1128, 1299
  See also Nuclear parity
MILITARY BASES
  Asia, 1169
  economic effects of base closures, 273
  elimination of foreign bases, 382, 817, 1393, 1888
  Great Britain, 1148, 1213, 1681
  Indian Ocean, 676, 1195, 1204
  Near East, 938
  U.S.S.R., 1149
  United States, 666, 1689
  U.S. Air Force, 119
MILITARY BUDGETS AND EXPENDITURES. See Defense budgets and expenditures
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, 173
MILITARY ELITE. See Elite groups
MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, sociological analysis, 1771
MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, 851, 1072, 1280, 1818, 1876
  arms trade and dissemination, 1288
  Communist China, 1048
  criticism, 269, 1763
  effect on defense spending, 1637
  effect on world order, 1430
  foreign policymaking, 1658
  France, 710
  influence on policymaking, 1787
  role of Government, 1699
  West Germany, 261
MILITARY MIND, 51
MILITARY PARITY. See Military balance; Nuclear parity
MILITARY PHILOSOPHY, 346
MILITARY PROCUREMENT. See Defense procurement
MILITARY PROFESSION, 1246, 1771
  changing role, 1301, 1788
  characteristics, 51
  competitive nature of, 242
  criticism, 260
  France, 1753
  U.S.S.R., 1131
MILITARY PSYCHOLOGY, 1247
MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. See Defense research and development
MILITARY SERVICE, COMPULSORY, 1565, 1782
  Australia, 1643
  France, 711
  India, 1660
  moral aspects, 1237
MILITARY STRATEGY. See Strategy
MILITARY STRATEGY [VASILII D. SOKOLOVSKII], 1179
MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, 1571
THE MISSILE CRISIS [ELIE ABEL], 1691
MISSILES
  advanced ballistic reentry systems (ABRES) program 1622
  air-to-ground, 1615
  antiballistic missiles, 181, 567, 615, 1065, 1586, 1806, 1927
    Communist China, 1566
  detection devices, 408
  development, 1083
  East German acquisition, 646, 684
  France, 1059, 1078, 1132, 1164, 1684
  Great Britain, 1912
  ground support operations, 1625
  intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), 1090
  ICBM bases, 1072
  lunar-based, 1142
  Maverick (AGM-65A), 562
  medium range ballistic missile (MRBM), 617
  MRBM installations, Europe, 1227
  Minuteman III, 1622
  modern warfare, 1087
  Nike-Zeus, 1067, 1582
  NATO, in West Germany, 211
  orbital, 1142, 1592, 1627
  Polaris, 99, 564, 580, 1073, 1629
  research and development, 78, 1078, 1097
    U.S.S.R., 558, 1903
  role in conventional war, 576
  short range attack missile (SRAM), 1588
  Soviet MRBM deployment, 1710
  Soviet-U.S. comparisons, 109, 1908
  Sprint, 605, 1044, 1067, 1176, 1582
  submarine-launched, 1602
  tactical use, 1061
  types, 67, 549, 1046, 1078, 1578, 1620
  U.S.S.R., 71, 97, 118, 139, 563, 570, 1094
  United States, in Vietnam, 77
  U.S.-NATO training program, 1605
  vs. bombers, 606, 1270, 1588
  vulnerability to nuclear explosions, 1042
  warheads. See Nuclear warheads
  West Germany, 1605
  See also Antimissile defense systems; Nuclear delivery vehicles; Rockets
MONNET, JEAN, 1006
MOON, strategic uses, 1105
MORALITY, 445, 1828, 1832
MORGENTHAU, HANS, 1788
MOSCOW TREATY. See Nuclear test ban treaty
MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FORCE, 696, 708, 878, 909, 1190, 1205, 1209, 1386, 1448
  criticism, 213, 1022
  French view, 1010
  proliferation of nuclear weapons. See under Proliferation of nuclear weapons
  Soviet view, 142, 898, 908, 1010
  West Germany, 23, 598, 1208, 1734
  See also Alliance nuclear force; Atlantic nuclear force
MULTINATIONAL NUCLEAR FORCE. See Atlantic nuclear force

MULTIPOLARITY, 599, 748, 941, 963, 1401, 1506
deterrence credibility, 124
effect on the arms race, 1255
international obligations, 1191
proliferation of nuclear weapons, 1430
See also Communist countries--polycentrism; Nonalined countries; Nonalinement
MUST THE BOMB SPREAD? [LEONARD BEATON], 1946
MUTUAL DEFENSE
Asia, 1232
Asian countries-United States, 1166
Australia-United States, 891
India-United States, 150
Latin America-United States, 201
Poland-U.S.S.R., 236
U.S. arms trade and dissemination, 251
West Germany-United States, 1193
Western Europe, 1160
See also Security, international; Security, regional
MUTUAL DETERRENCE. See under Deterrence
MUTUAL WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. See under NATO
MYRDAL, ALVA, 1959

N

NADGE. See NATO--Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE)
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORAD. See North American Air Defense Command
NAGASAKI
nuclear bombing
effects on survivors, 284
legal aspects, 775
radiation effects, 1837
NASSER, GAMAL A., 964
NATION, East German concept, 1532
NATIONAL INTER-RELIGIOUS CONFERENCE ON PEACE (1966), 1893
NATIONAL LIBERATION, WARS OF. See Wars of national liberation
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. See Sovereignty
NATIONAL STANDBY FORCES. See under Peacekeeping and security forces (proposed)
NATIONALISM, 436, 439, 444, 660, 1025, 1358, 1711, 1882
Europe, 1915
impediment to disarmament, 1477
Philippines, 1537
NAVAL WARFARE
France, 1134
Great Britain, 593
U.S.S.R., 155
See also Submarine warfare
NAVIES, 1106, 1602
air defense systems, 72
Great Britain, 1597
Latin America, 201
modern role, 1071
role during war, 101
role in deterrence, 1111
U.S.S.R., 1149, 1664
Warsaw Treaty Organization, 709
See also Navy under specific countries
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS, Litton LN-3, 1058
NEAR EAST
arms control in, 1933
arms race, 741, 1409, 1719, 1775
arms trade and dissemination, 862
British presence, 1125, 1148
CENTO-RCD role, 1196
Chinese Communist expansion, 1533
equilibrium, 503
NEAR EAST--Continued
military balance, 1508
nuclear policies and programs, 1445
Soviet relations with, 1520
Soviet strategy, 991
strategic oil resources, 938
tension, 1494
NEGOTIATION, ART OF, 376, 882, 940, 955, 1385, 1463
NEGOTIATIONS, 1426
arms control in space, 1934
Canadian participation, 915
Chinese Communist participation, 934, 1337, 1382-1383, 1417, 1425
complexity of, 1386
criticism, 344
effect of defense posture, 376
international participation, 1391
military view, 346
prerequisites, 1942
role of information, 1920
scientific participation, 1774
small-country participation, 1393, 1943
Soviet-U.S. disagreement, 1385
Soviet view, 342
U.N. General Assembly, 1855
U.N. role, 389, 885
See also Conferences; Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament; United Nations--Disarmament Commission
NELSON, R. E., 1825
NETHERLANDS, disarmament policies and proposals, 1397
NEUTRALISM, 15, 467, 944
See also Neutrality; Nonalined countries; Nonalinement;
NEUTRALITY
legal aspects, 1847
Soviet view, 1840
NEW SOUTH WALES RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES ACT, 1307
NEW STATES. See Developing countries
NEW ZEALAND, Air Force, 164
NIGERIA, coup d'etat, 1764
NIKE MISSILES. See under Missiles
NONAGGRESSION PACT, NATO-Warsaw Pact countries, 875, 877, 1363, 1413
NONALINED COUNTRIES, 316
Africa, 467
Asia, 467
Chinese Communist nuclear weapons test, 658
disarmament policies and proposals, 737, 883
French relations with, 15
Japan, 34
role in disarmament negotiations, 1943
Soviet policy toward, 502
world role, 514, 795
See also Multipolarity; Neutralism; Neutrality; Nonalinement
NONALINEMENT, 941
Chinese Communist view, 512
developing countries, 975
future, 473
Indian policy, 658, 1129
Indian-Yugoslav view, 526
U.S. policy toward, 478
See also Multipolarity; Neutralism; Neutrality; Nonalined countries
NONDISSEMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. See Proliferation of nuclear weapons
NONLETHAL WEAPONS. See Chemical and biological weapons
NONMILITARY DEFENSE, 809, 813, 826
NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (PROPOSED). See under Proliferation of nuclear weapons

NONVIOLENCE, 5, 332, 743, 809, 813, 816, 822, 826, 828, 833, 965, 1887, 1889
Grindstone Experiment, 1890
See also Pacifism; Violence
NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE COMMAND, 136, 198
Canadian view, 607
defense center, 921
Space Defense System, 1088
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, 24, 969, 1555, 1725, 1732
Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE), 182, 1199
civil-military applications, 1060
effect on French defense industry, 1056
air defense system, 182, 198
air forces, 1721
aircraft industry, 1222
armed forces, 190, 1035
East German view, 702
integration, 1227, 1733
military command structure, 205
requirements, 1217
West Germany, 578, 1168, 1741
Asian-Pacific nuclear-strategic agency, 1221
bibliography, 1738
British policies and programs, 1268
Canadian mobile task force, 1724
Canadian view, 700
control of nuclear weapons, 187, 688, 691, 704, 708, 909, 1122, 1190, 1197, 1217, 1228, 1386, 1434, 1750, 1964, 1966
bibliography, 1452
bilateral nuclear forces, 1209
Special Committee, 1710
West German view, 620, 697, 1158
criticism, 692, 1728
decisionmaking process, 700
defense policies and programs, 206, 686, 1225
East of Suez, 1148
limited aggression, 1033
See also Strategy
documents, 1747
East German view, 906
European unification, 1711
European-U.S. relations, 716, 1965
European view, 847
exchange of nuclear information, 238
financial contributions, 752, 1218
French Communist view, 1523
French nuclear policy, 1734
French Socialist view, 1939
French view, 970, 982, 1013, 1198, 1202, 1224, 1544, 1737
French withdrawal, 195, 1160, 1714-1715, 1718, 1720, 1730, 1736, 1751
German reunification, 499
global responsibility, 1726
guerrilla warfare, 541
missiles in West Germany, 211
mixed-manned nuclear force, 1957
Mutual Weapons Development Program, 1076
nonaggression pact (proposed), 877, 1363, 1413
nonproliferation treaty (proposed), 682, 878, 1462, 1953
Norway, 672
nuclear deterrence credibility, 675, 680, 1033, 1099, 1205, 1219, 1712
problems and prospects, 186, 212, 450, 680-681, 953, 1022, 1121, 1194, 1208, 1211, 1216, 1219, 1225, 1230, 1549, 1727, 1746
effect on Warsaw Pact, 1748
French view, 192
U.S. policy, 1201
West German view, 23, 210, 1229
prognoses, 1744
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION--Continued
relations with Eastern Europe, 1024
relations with Warsaw Pact countries, 1408, 1635
reorganization (proposed), 193, 208, 522, 685, 689-690, 696, 699, 1162, 1193, 1197, 1212, 1226, 1231, 1713, 1739
role in peacetime, 448, 675, 678
role of small nations, 1739
Soviet view, 1924-1925
strategic concepts, 1717
West German nuclear weapons acquisition, 1723
West German view, 196, 632, 664, 687, 1704, 1745
See also Alliance nuclear force; Atlantic nuclear force; Europe--defense policies and programs; European-U.S. relations; Multilateral nuclear force; Western countries; also NATO policy under specific countries
NORTHEAST ASIAN MILITARY ALLIANCE. See under Treaties, agreements, etc. (proposed)
NORWAY
defense policies and programs, 672
foreign policy, 1481
NATO policy, 1223
NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, 551, 767, 1307
effects, 1295
Spain, 1270, 1272, 1276, 1449, 1457
NUCLEAR DECISIONMAKING, 1197
Europe, 1750
NATO Special Committee, 1710
West German partnership, 664, 688, 697, 703-704, 1022, 1158, 1190, 1193, 1217
See also NATO--control of nuclear weapons
NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES
Communist China, 670, 1655
orbital, 563
proliferation of nuclear weapons, 1447
reduction or elimination, 358
West Germany, 559
See also Bombers; Missiles; Rockets
NUCLEAR ENERGY, 1624
impact on world, 1913
international control, 387, 396, 423, 1378, 1459-1461
peaceful uses, 556, 725, 918, 1235, 1244, 1277, 1815
clandestine military applications, 411, 581
Communist China, 1278, 1631
desalinization, 1234, 1290
international control, 1456, 1981
international cooperation, 347, 1252
merchant marine, 1661
military applications, 1446, 1962
Rumania, 749
shipping, 1085
social effects, 226, 232
U.S.S.R., 1290
West Germany, 1767
See also Atoms for Peace program
NUCLEAR ENERGY INDUSTRY, 231
diversification, Oak Ridge, 759
Europe, 1242
India, 1438
Italy, 1154
legal aspects, 1380
military uses, 731, 1448
safeguards system, 413
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
detection and measurement, 407, 929, 1976
effects, 1075, 1568, 1802
effects on communications systems, 922, 1450, 1793
effects on missile systems, 1042, 1077
ionosphere, 253
lower atmosphere, 257
peaceful uses, 248, 723, 1791
underwater, 1802
See also Hiroshima; Nagasaki; Nuclear weapons tests; Radiation; Radioactive fallout

NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, UNDERGROUND, 1838
detection and measurement, 1386, 1967
industrial uses, 723, 1815
military uses, 556
peaceful uses, 1801
seismic measurement, 415, 417, 420, 926, 1453, 1940, 1978
U.S. program, 1629
NUCLEAR FORCES, 1750
role in modern warfare, 1087
See also under specific countries
NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES, 873, 1387, 1956, 1985
Africa, 856, 859-860
Central Europe, 142, 672, 865, 1413
East German policies and proposals, 1500
Europe, 1386
Latin America, 861, 864, 1411
Scandinavia, 877
Soviet policies and proposals, 1412
space, 866
Tunisian view, 1403
U.N. discussion, 1916
NUCLEAR GUARANTEES, 966, 1116, 1383, 1963
Europe, 1202
India, 658, 910, 1129, 1426, 1441
Indian Ocean, 1109
NATO, 1227
Pakistani view, 1431
U.S. policies and proposals, 876, 920
NUCLEAR INFORMATION, international exchanges, 238, 396, 1076
NUCLEAR MATERIALS
international control, 1981
transportation, 890
See also Fissionable materials
NUCLEAR PARITY, 109, 579, 625, 1107, 1220, 1337, 1389, 1569
difficulties in determining, 111
proliferation of nuclear weapons, 894
NUCLEAR PHYSICS, 231
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, 387, 1085, 1235, 1248
NUCLEAR PROPULSION. See types of vehicles propelled, e.g., Ships, nuclear-powered; Submarines, nuclear-powered
NUCLEAR RADIATION. See Radiation
NUCLEAR REACTORS, 1068, 1244, 1290
safeguards systems, 1456, 1958, 1968
Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power (SNAP), 551
NUCLEAR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, 551, 1776
Belgium, 1773
Bulgaria, 560, 1093
Canada, 1377
Communist China, 1947, 1954
Europe, 1076, 1274
France, 1776
Great Britain, 1776
history, 347
U.S.S.R., 83, 1244
West Germany, 1776
NUCLEAR STABILITY. See Deterrence--mutual deterrence
NUCLEAR STALEMATE, 531
NUCLEAR STRATEGY. See Strategy
NUCLEAR SYMMETRY. See Nuclear parity
NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY, 1386
extension to underground testing, 844, 884, 1426, 1917, 1930, 1936, 1940, 1948, 1956, 1967
Indian view, 351
inspection by challenge, 1949, 1959
small nations detection club, 415
U.N. discussion, 1916
U.S. policies and proposals, 871
U.S. security, 934
NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY--Continued
general and complete disarmament, 1402
inspection and verification. See Inspection and verification
Israeli view, 892
national security, 360
peaceful nuclear explosions, 1962
radioactive fallout levels, 742
Sino-Soviet dispute, 1983
Soviet-U.S. relations, 1958
Soviet view, 853
space environment, 1934
Tunisian view, 1403
U.N. role, 837
U.S. view, 879
violations, 1457
weapons development, 1042
NUCLEAR UMBRELLA. See Nuclear guarantees
NUCLEAR WAR, 1027, 1103
airpower, 1614
alternatives, 536, 821, 979, 1031
battlefield radiation effects, 764
biological effects, 284
Catholic view, 1826
causes, 1295
Chinese Communist view, 497
civil defense, 735
demographic effects, 739
effects, 1667, 1982
French view, 1099
futility of, 114, 453, 965
future, 1568
legal aspects, 538
medical facilities, 262
moral and ethical aspects, 761-762, 1303, 1878
Catholic Church, 1328
nature of, 1354
prevention, 534, 743, 1313
British Socialist view, 1368
See also Deterrence
preventive, 1642
probability of, 1116
risk of, 109, 168, 381, 388, 498, 540, 1033, 1035, 1133, 1188, 1275, 1373, 1434, 1471, 1569, 1636, 1870, 1944
role of pharmacists, 1239, 1251
Soviet view, 168, 170, 539, 1183, 1700
strategy. See Strategy
survival. See Survival
See also Civil defense; War
NUCLEAR WAR: THE IMPENDING STRATEGIC DEADLOCK [NEVILLE BROWN], 1118
NUCLEAR WARHEADS, 109
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Asia, 1221
Australian acquisition, 891
balance of power, 1381, 1383
bibliography, 1407
Chinese Communist view, 1034, 1566, 1648, 1754
Communist view, 1638
control of, in NATO. See NATO--control of nuclear weapons
delivery vehicles. See Nuclear delivery vehicles
destruction (proposed), 1970
deterrent role. See Deterrence
development, 1956
Australia, 901
Communist China, 670, 899, 1177, 1652, 1947, 1954
Europe, 109
France, 624
India, 385, 895, 914, 1439, 1441, 1443, 1660
Israel, 892
Sweden, 383
Switzerland, 400-401

NUCLEAR WEAPONS--Continued
development--Continued
U.S.S.R., 83-84
dissemination. See Proliferation of nuclear weapons
effect on:
armed forces, 1895
international relations, 1471, 1486
military profession, 1322
NATO, 1202
West German policy, 970
effects, 74, 581, 743, 1378
See also Radiation; Radioactive fallout
European acquisition, 1224
France, 1675, 1697
French Protestant view, 1869
Great Britain, 994
Indian acquisition, 1952
information sharing. See Nuclear information
inspection and verification. See Inspection and verification
international relations, 12, 331, 453, 919, 944, 1317, 1434
Jewish view, 1830
limited war, 540, 631
moral and ethical aspects, 276, 1303
national security, 1433
"no first use" pledge, 429, 1418
ocean mines, 1149
principles, 1075
production, U.S., 731
prohibition on use, Soviet view, 342
proliferation. See Proliferation of nuclear weapons
psychological effects, 1479, 1777
reduction or elimination
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 1368, 1926
Canada, 607
East German view, 1436
international control, 1913
U.S. policies and proposals, 876
See also Nuclear-free zones
regulation, 339, 979
safety measures, 1276
strategy. See Strategy
tactical uses, 1640, 1944
Europe, 1644
France, 619, 1133
NATO, 1033
U.S.S.R., 542, 1183, 1188
U.S. capability, 1689
use, 1642, 1676
Chinese Communist view, 157
legal aspects, 775
U.S.S.R., 1700
warheads. See Nuclear warheads
West German acquisition, 131, 397, 664, 703, 906, 913, 1168, 1230, 1436, 1448, 1548, 1656, 1696, 1710, 1745, 1950
World War II, 839
See also Missiles; Rockets; Space weapons
NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS, 1387
cessation
ENDC discussions, 398
Soviet view, 342
Communist China, 768, 986, 1075, 1437, 1838, 1977
detection, 404, 417, 1625, 1971
France, 133, 365, 740, 1794, 1803
geomagnetic disturbances, 1790
public opinion, 243
simulated effects, 1077
underground, 556, 1797
U.S. capability, 1042
U.S. program, 1629
NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS--Continued
See also Nuclear explosions; Radiation; Radioactive fallout
NUREMBERG TRIALS, international law, 780

O

OAK RIDGE (TENNESSEE), nuclear energy industry, 759
OBSERVATION POSTS, 414, 1941
See also Detection stations
OCEAN, peaceful uses, 1845
OCEANOGRAPHY
military aspects, 89
research programs, 91-92
ODER-NEISSE LINE, 340, 494, 1524, 1538
German view, 1004
Polish view, 515-516, 527, 976, 1005, 1561
recognition, 1122, 1498, 1556
West German view, 520, 525, 1530, 1554, 1561
OELSSNER, FRED, 1532
OLSON, THEODORE, 1890
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 1555, 1600
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, 1761
peaceful settlement of disputes, 1431
peacekeeping and security operations, 1856
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, 457
ORGANIZATION OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION, 1555
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR, 955
U.N. peacekeeping operations, 1859
ORGANIZATIONS
Association of Los Alamos Scientists, 338
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 1368, 1926
Canadian Friends Service Committee, 1890
Canadian Peace Research Institute, 806, 1877
Christian Peace Conference, 325, 829, 1872
Committee for Nonviolent Action, 1879
Conference upon Research and Education in World Government (CURE), 1880
Dubna, Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, 560, 1093
Europe, 1555
European Atomic Energy Community, 1981
European Nuclear Energy Agency, 1981
International Atomic Energy Agency, 396, 423, 425, 787, 1981
International Civil Defence Organization, 223
International Peace Research Association, 330
international relations, 323
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1600
Organization of African Unity, 1431, 1761, 1856
Organization of American States, 457
Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America, 1411
Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), Near East, 1196
social sciences, 1336
Western European Union. Agency for the Control of Armaments, 405
Women's International Democratic Federation, 318
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 312
World Congress of Peace Defenders, 1875
World Council of Churches, 1872
World Federation of Scientific Workers, 844
World Peace Council, 328, 808
See also Peace movements
OTTAVIANI, ALFREDO, CARDINAL, 1304
OUR DEPLETED SOCIETY [SEYMOUR MELMAN], 969
OUTER MONGOLIA, 1023
OVERKILL, Soviet-U.S. competition, 1637

P

PACEM IN TERRIS [JOHN XXIII], 1346, 1364
PACIFISM, 1642, 1828
criticism, 290, 833, 1303, 1565
Japan, 935
Norway, 672
Scandinavia, 1223
war, 1563
See also Nonviolence
PAKISTAN
CENTO-RCD role, 1196
disarmament policies and proposals, 1431
effect of Kashmir War, 1271
relations with Communist China, 698, 1203
See also Indo-Pakistan conflict
PANAMA CANAL, 987
PARITY. See Military balance; Nuclear parity
PARTIAL MEASURES. See Limited measures
PASSIVE RESISTANCE. See Nonviolence
PAUL VI, 810, 1328-1329
U.N. speech, 818, 832, 870
world peace, 1346
PAULING, LINUS C., 724
PEACE, 1376
achievement and maintenance, 117, 681, 806, 833, 1362, 1868, 1881
collective defense, 686
deterrence, 1432
disarmament, 845
during GCD, 1914, 1931
East German view, 324
economic development, 1361
effect of nuclear weapons, 777
Europe, 1413
international law, 779, 1844
military power, 488, 852, 1313
nonalined countries, 514
nonviolence, 1887
prognosis, 963, 1492
role of Catholic Church, 1878
role of developing countries, 451, 1464
Soviet view, 1875, 1986
U.N. role, 299-300, 302, 304, 793, 796-797, 957, 1515, 1851, 1854
Vietnamese war, 1138
West German view, 687, 1530
women's role, 327
world government, 1876
approaches, 321, 743, 1344-1345, 1383, 1565
British Socialist view, 1926
British trade unions, 1001
Catholic view, 1826, 1829, 1873
communal eros, 1366
communality, 1929
constructive violence, 1341
contingent reinforcement, 1491
disarmament, 855
East German view, 492
economic, 821, 1871
individual responsibility, 952, 1876
interdependence of nations, 1892
international cooperation, 830-831, 1358, 1361, 1499
international peace force, 979
law, 1829, 1839
multilateral deterrence, 1632
multipolarity, 1401
mutual understanding, 1867
nonmilitary, 1919
NATO-Warsaw Pact relations, 1635
open dialogue, 1469
Pius XII, 1485
Polish policies and proposals, 1410
PEACE--Continued
approaches--Continued
reason, 1341
religion, 278, 810, 855, 1329, 1346, 1365, 1893
scientists, 1886
social sciences, 812, 851
spiritual revolution, 1870, 1883
supranationality, 1882
understanding war, 1563
unilateralism, 849
Welsh view, 1356
West European peace parliament (proposed), 790
West German view, 659
Yugoslav view, 1888
Asia, 194
British view, 1547
Catholic view, 1359
Chinese Communist view, 1546
Communist view, 472, 524
cultural effects, 277
definition, 950
economic aspects, 1985
Europe, 863
history, 334, 1472
Polish policies and proposals, 874
problems in achieving, 534, 824
religious view, 1363
See also Pacifism; War
PEACE CONFERENCES. See Conferences
PEACE FUND (PROPOSED), 308, 358
PEACE MOVEMENTS, 825, 1879
Christian Peace Conference, 325, 364, 811
criticism, 1929
Great Britain, 828
Japan, 477, 842
lawyers, 290, 1315
scientists, 329, 338, 355, 820, 1327, 1774, 1886
United States, 313, 805, 1342, 1348, 1889
women, 312, 318, 827
"PEACE OFFENSIVE," United States, 661, 1041, 1127
PEACE ORGANIZATIONS. See Organizations
PEACE RESEARCH, 334, 443, 824, 851, 1489
areas of investigation, 330
Canadian Peace Research Institute, 806
conflict resolution, 1780
financial support, 1877
international relations, 1
social sciences, 8, 320
U.S.S.R., 349
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, 322, 524, 831, 1179, 1319, 1401
Canadian view, 471
Chinese Communist view, 1558
Communist view, 519, 1003
criticism, 641
danger to the West, 978
Danube area, 1003
East German view, 492
East-West powers, 31, 317, 687, 1430, 1527, 1892
India, 35
Polish-Yugoslav relations, 992
Southeast Asia, 20
Soviet-U.S. relations, 14
Soviet view, 36, 168, 441, 460, 471-472, 501, 990, 1320-1321, 1548, 1889
types, 1472
U.N. role, 1335
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, 1314, 1319
Africa, 1856
during GCD, 1932
See also Arbitration, international; Conflict--resolution; Negotiation, art of; Vietnamese war--negotiated settlement

PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY. See Nuclear energy--peaceful uses
PEACEKEEPING AND SECURITY FORCES, 1941
general analysis, 1866
improvement, 1857
regional organizations, 1334
role in nonmilitary defense, 809
social science research, 1863
Third World, 1860
U.N. efforts, 838
U.N. force in Cyprus, 1858
U.N. General Assembly authority, 804
PEACEKEEPING AND SECURITY FORCES (PROPOSED), 308, 358
acceptance of, 294
British policies and proposals, 306
criticism, 426
during GCD, 1931-1932
"Earth's Nuclear Deterrent (END)," 1356
evaluations and recommendations, 801
Inter-American Peace Force, 310
international peace force, 979
national standby forces, 305, 802
Soviet proposal, 309, 422
permanent force, 803
Soviet criticism, 1862
PEACEKEEPING AND SECURITY OPERATIONS, regional organizations and the United Nations, 1852
"PEACESEEKERS," 833
PEACOCK, A.T., 1825
PENN, WILLIAM, 833
PHILIPPINES, nationalism, 1537
PHOTOGRAMMETRY, 1973
PHOTOGRAPHY, AERIAL. See Aerial photography
PHYSICIANS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, 1063
PIUS XII, 1485, 1873
PLOWDEN REPORT. See under Great Britain
PLOWSHARE, PROJECT, 248, 1815
relation to test ban, 1940
Soviet view, 723
POLAND
disarmament policies and proposals, 362, 874
foreign policy, 1481
Oder-Neisse Line, 1561
relations with Germany, 516, 527, 1005, 1015-1016
relations with West Germany, 26, 515, 781, 1554, 1556
relations with Yugoslavia, 1124
role in Communist bloc, 677
POLARIS. See under Missiles; Submarines, nuclear-powered
POLICYMAKING, 1517
and arms control, 1463
effect of research programs, 1921
POLISH-SOVIET MUTUAL AID TREATY (1965), 236
POLITICAL ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT, 427, 849, 1389, 1917
POLLS. See Public opinion
POLYCENTRISM. See Communist countries--polycentrism; Multipolarity
POTSDAM AGREEMENT (1945)
European security, 673
international law, 781
Oder-Neisse Line, 1561
West German nuclear weapons acquisition, 906, 1021
POWER (CONCEPT), 3
POWER, THOMAS S., 625
PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF LATIN AMERICA, 1411
PREVENTIVE WAR, 1640
PROJECT HARBOR, PROJECT PLOWSHARE, PROJECT SAINT, PROJECT "STUDY FAIR." See Harbor, project; Plowshare, project; Saint, project; "Study Fair," project
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, 934
ABM deployment, 1586
Asia, 1221
Australian view, 891
Canadian view, 1398
desirability, 1430
developing countries, 1447
Dutch view, 1397
East German view, 707
effect on civil defense policy, 735
effect on international relations, 1471
fissionable materials, 396
India, 910, 1426, 1439-1441
military balance, 894
multilateral nuclear force, 919
multipolarity, 941
nonproliferation treaty (proposed), 341, 394, 873, 913, 920, 1423, 1433, 1464, 1941, 1957
criticism, 217, 402, 1953
East German policies and proposals, 1444
East-West disagreement, 398, 902, 916, 1435
effect on disarmament, 1448
effect on NATO, 878
ENDC discussions, 1937, 1940, 1951
guarantees, 391, 893, 1432
Indian policies and proposals, 395
Italian policies and proposals, 1420
Polish view, 1442
Soviet policies and proposals, 896, 898, 907-908, 1419, 1422, 1462
Soviet-U.S. disagreement, 393, 399, 909, 1917 1959, 1961
Swedish policies and proposals, 383
Swiss policies and proposals, 384
texts of draft treaties, 911, 1420, 1937
U.S. policies and proposals, 386, 872, 898, 907, 1404, 1446, 1960, 1970
Vietnamese war, 961, 1426
West German policies and proposals, 131, 390, 397, 932, 1158
NATO, 681, 1197, 1727, 1750
political aspects, 1102
prevention, 392, 444, 844, 893, 917, 919, 939, 1337, 1345, 1383, 1386, 1389, 1404, 1424, 1434, 1919, 1956
British view, 1382, 1742
Canadian policies and proposals, 915, 1388
Danish view, 1390
East German view, 897, 1408, 1500
ENDC discussions, 373, 900
guarantees, 1116, 1963
Indian policies and proposals, 351, 904, 920
International Assembly on Nuclear Weapons (1966), 1949
International Atomic Energy Agency, 1945
IAEA safeguards system, 1458
Israel, 1409
Near East, 1933
NATO, 1190
Pakistani policies and proposals, 1431
prerequisites, 1942
Pugwash interest, 1886
safeguards system, 369, 413
Soviet-U.S. cooperation, 598, 933, 1507, 1958
Soviet view, 856, 1948
U.N. General Assembly, 1387
U.N. role, 389, 912
U.S. policies and proposals, 894, 905, 1417, 1425, 1946, 1955
West German policies and proposals, 659, 1538
probability of, 350, 388, 918
Soviet view, 1548
strategic contraband, 1785
Sweden, 642

PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS--Continued
U.N. discussion, 1916
West German view, 23
world order, 777
PROPAGANDA, 1495, 1875
Communist China, 1543
nuclear weapons, 1638
Soviet view, 1786
United States, 1778
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE, 973, 1277
Soviet view, 1786
PUBLIC OPINION
achievement of GCD, 854, 1923
anxiety, 1350
civil defense, 234, 239, 735, 1245
Communist use of, 1889
conflict resolution, 6, 889
disarmament, 1481, 1878, 1982
Europe, 1915
foreign policy, 37, 319
France
defense policies, 457
MRBM installations, 617
missile sites, 1684
Great Britain, 1547
international relations, 939
national security policies, 219
NATO, 1162
nuclear threat, 1479
nuclear weapons tests, 243
Sweden, national security policies, 642
Vietnamese war, 601, 841, 1645
war, 2
West Germany, 43, 480
PÜTZ, TH., 1825
PUGWASH CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS, 347, 820, 1327, 1357, 1774, 1886, 1923

R

RCD. See Regional Cooperation for Development
RADAR
hard-point demonstration array radar (HAPDAR), 1594
intelligence applications, 416
role in limited war, 1591
Switzerland, 171
RADIATION, 74
biological effects, 256, 279-280, 282, 284, 286, 1308, 1833
chromosome aberration, 281
contamination of food and water, 1795
cosmic, biological effects, 589
detection and measurement, 259, 283, 287, 764, 770, 927, 1975
effects, 551, 765, 767, 769, 1834, 1837
electronics, 746
foods, 1798
genetic effects, 282, 284, 763
human dosage, 1311
inhalation of isotopes, 1309
injuries, 1312
permissible levels, 766
protection, 1802, 1836
safety measures, 231, 244, 258, 745, 770, 890, 1248, 1260, 1273, 1307, 1835
RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT, 74, 285, 1883
Atlantic Ocean area, 1305
Australia, 252
central Pacific area, 1798
detection and measurement, 222, 742, 768, 771, 928, 1306, 1789, 1838, 1974, 1977, 1979
effect of solar radiation, 257
RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT--Continued
effect of terrain, 410
effects, 748, 1834
protection, 1260
public opinion, 243
sources, 1270, 1457
southern United States, 255
RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS, 745, 1307
RADIOACTIVE WASTES, 1312
contraband, 1785
RAND CORP., 1036
Chinese Communist view, 1781
RAPACKI PLAN, 362, 863, 1410
RASKIN, MARCUS, 522, 969
RECIPROCAL MEASURES. See Limited measures
RECONNAISSANCE
airborne ion-density measurement, 1976
electronic devices, 416, 1591
photogrammetry, 419, 930
satellites, 69, 923, 930
space stations, 1455
spacecraft, 408
U.S. technology, 1611
See also Inspection and verification
REGIONAL COOPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT (RCD), Near East, 1196
REGIONAL DISARMAMENT, 1389
Latin America, 861
See also Nuclear-free zones
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, peacekeeping and security operations, 1852
REGIONAL SECURITY. See Security, regional
REGIONALISM, 297, 954
arms race, 862
nuclear weapons, 798
United Nations, 302
RELIGION, role in world affairs, 1870
REMOTE SENSORS, 1455, 1980
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Communist China, 1241
comparative international figures, 1638
East-West balance, 573
FY 1967 budget, 1291
geographical breakdown, 274
international cooperation, 1076
Soviet-Western cooperation, 1529
United States, 93
West Germany, 1124
See also Defense research and development; Nuclear research and development; Space research and development
RESEARCH CONFERENCE ON BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATIONS (1962), 955
RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS, Denver Research Institute, 1808
RESEARCH PROGRAMS, 229, 428, 1351, 1780
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1921
gaming, 1502
organizational behavior, 955
U.S.S.R., 349
RESOURCE ALLOCATION. See under Defense policies and programs
RETALIATORY STRIKES
French capability, 144
See also Flexible response
REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS, 959, 1898
REVOLUTIONS, 59, 1564
role of nuclear weapons, 1034
RHODESIA, international intervention, 1843
RICHARDSON, LEWIS F., 2, 1897
RINFRET, PIERRE, 1813
RISK OF WAR. See War--risk of

ROCKETS
development, 582, 1083
France, 1078
infantry weapons, 1584
research and development, 1903
ship-launched, 103
types, 1620
U.S.S.R., 558, 1179, 1903
West Germany, 1819
See also Missiles; Nuclear delivery vehicles
ROSTOW, WALT W., 1495
RULE OF LAW, 290, 294, 774, 777, 779, 1313, 1315, 1317, 1430, 1842, 1844, 1876
world government, 1880
RUMANIA, nuclear policies and programs, 749
RUSSELL, BERTRAND RUSSELL, 3D EARL, 641, 1774
RUSSIA. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
RUSSIA AND GERMANY, A CENTURY OF CONFLICT [WALTER LAQUEUR], 991

S

SRAM. See Short range attack missile under Missiles
SABOTAGE, 1573
SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS
AEC programs, 1958
fissionable materials, 1970
See also Bilateral safeguards; also under European Atomic Energy Community; International Atomic Energy Agency; Nuclear energy industry; Nuclear reactors; Proliferation of nuclear weapons--prevention
SAINT, PROJECT, 566
ST. AUGUSTINE, 1828
SALTER, LEONARD M., 1313
SATELLITES, 1779
Cosmos, 82
France, 693, 1164, 1621
geophysical research, 1179
military uses, 550, 1708
nuclear test detection, 1625, 1971
surveillance, 923
types, 67, 1578, 1620
See also Antisatellite defense systems; Space communications--military systems
SATELLITES, RECONNAISSANCE. See Reconnaissance--satellites
SATURATION PARITY. See Nuclear parity
SCANDINAVIA
defense union, 1223
nuclear-free zone, 877
SCHMÖLDERS, G., 1825
SCHRÖDER, GERHARD, 183
SCHUETZ, W. W., 1498
SCHUMPETER, J. A., 1825
SCHWEITZER, ALBERT, 1873
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 1345
and lawmaking, 1380
Communist China, 1241
effect on:
arms race, 353, 579, 953
decisionmaking, 338
defense policies and programs, 221, 1653
international relations, 944
NATO defense policy, 716
policymaking, 360, 718, 722, 727, 999, 1357, 1471, 1569
Soviet disarmament policy, 1928
war, 1032, 1774, 1904
world order, 831, 1358
international cooperation, 329, 355, 1353
military influence, 339
role in GCD, 360
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY--Continued
sociological analysis, 1601
Swedish defense policies and programs, 613
U.S.S.R., 83, 579
vs. human factor, 1634
SCIENTIFIC ELITE, role in policymaking, 718, 1175, 1357, 1904
SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION, 727
SCIENTIFIC-MILITARY RELATIONS
achievement of GCD, 1923
France, 1612
McMahon Bill, 339
strategy formulation, 596
U.S.S.R., 1131
SCIENTIFIC-POLITICAL RELATIONS
disarmament policy, 1357
nuclear policymaking, 718
SCIENTISTS
political role, 1911
role in disarmament, 1354, 1774, 1923
SEAPOWER, 1692
Communist China, 1130
Communist countries, 1664
developing countries, 1579
France, 1153, 1606, 1647
Great Britain, 1628, 1639, 1680, 1705
role in counterinsurgency, 583
Soviet fishing fleet, 1405
U.S.S.R., 1664
United States, 564, 1074, 1111
U.S. Navy, 1607
See also Naval warfare; Navies; Submarine warfare
SECOND STRIKE, Great Britain, 994
SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL, 686, 1853
Africa, 948
and regionalism, 798
Asia, 20, 194
Australian view, 652
British policies and proposals, 335
during GCD, 342, 1931
Europe, 522, 1410, 1413, 1425
Polish policies and proposals, 362
West German view, 196
maintenance of, 1868
Near East, 301
Organization of American States, 457
regional guarantees, 861
Vietnamese war, 1522
See also Inter-American Peace Force (proposed); Mutual defense; North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Nuclear guarantees; Peacekeeping and security forces; Peacekeeping and security forces (proposed); Security, regional
SECURITY, REGIONAL, 954, 1853
Africa, 1856
effect on GCD, 1922
peacekeeping and security operations, 1334
SEATO'S role, 706
SEISMOLOGICAL RESEARCH, 421, 1978
See also Nuclear explosions, underground--seismic measurement
SENEGAL, disarmament policies and proposals, 1943
SHIMODA AND OTHERS V. JAPAN, 775
SHIPS
antiaircraft destroyer (Type 82), 1623
Great Britain, 1579
missile-firing, U.S.S.R., 1709
rocket launching capability, 103
SHIPS, NUCLEAR-POWERED, 1066
aircraft carriers, 1054
Communist China, 1631
SIKKIM, Chinese Communist expansion, 490

230-967 O - 66 - 10

SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 981, 1000, 1275, 1511, 1514, 1516, 1525, 1540, 1550, 1553, 1636, 1677-1679, 1891
Chinese Communist view, 1706
Fulbright hearings, 1526
SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE, 48, 537, 986, 1002, 1011, 1018, 1516, 1539, 1550, 1557, 1560
and Soviet-U.S. relations, 960, 977, 1155
Asia, 20, 989
Chinese Communist territorial claims, 486
defense policies and programs, 62, 203
disarmament policies and proposals, 1928
East German view, 1009
economic aspects, 47
effect on Eastern Europe, 1020
international law, 1316
international relations, 1470
nuclear test ban treaty, 1983
risk of war, 202, 694, 968, 1023
Soviet foreign policy, 1506
U.N. policy, 1026
U.S. exploitation, 215
Vietnamese war, 216, 1427
West German view, 23, 496, 1558
SMITH, A., 1825
SMUTS, JAN, 833
SOCIAL ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT, 824
SOCIAL REFORMISM, 959
SOCIALIST ALLIANCE OF THE WORKING PEOPLE OF YUGOSLAVIA. 6TH CONGRESS, 1888
SOHN, LOUIS B., 1929
SOKOLOVSKII, VASILII D., 1179
SOUTHEAST ASIA
anti-Communist alliance (Nationalist China and South Vietnam), 185
arms control in, 843
Australian position, 1643
British presence, 1125, 1148
Chinese Communist expansion, 194
Chinese Communist strategy, 604
Communist expansion, 1170
East-West strategies, 17, 474
risk of war, 1266
role of airpower, 592
security in, 20
sources of conflict, 949
U.S. policy, 523, 608, 638, 648, 706, 887, 1117, 1189, 1264, 1275, 1427, 1518, 1693
SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION, 706, 953
SOVEREIGNTY, 24, 1314, 1317, 1319, 1358, 1727
cause of war, 1892
European unification, 1017
French view, 982
Soviet view, 446
SOVIET STRATEGY AT THE CROSSROADS [THOMAS W. WOLFE], 726, 991
SOVIET UNION. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS, 19, 24, 967, 1171, 1492, 1495
and Communist China, 202, 501, 695, 960, 1155, 1201
ABM development, 1806, 1927
arms dialogue, 1402
background, 1910
Chinese Communist view, 1018, 1525
cooperation in Asia, 45
defense policies and programs, 1107
détente, 518, 1499, 1507, 1529
disarmament policies and proposals, 1357, 1385-1386
economic growth policies, 1871
effect on ENDC discussions, 373
future of Europe, 114, 522
German reunification, 14, 499
military balance. See Military balance
SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS--Continued
nonproliferation treaty (proposed), 961, 1958
progress toward disarmament agreement, 1467
risk of war, 168
space competition, 572, 586, 1105, 1110, 1695
space policies and programs, 662
United Nations, 800, 1026
U.S. policy, 493
Yugoslav view, 526
SPACE, 1344
arms control in, 1934
contamination, 869
European-U.S. cooperation, 1735
French policies and programs, 1621
international cooperation, 302, 693, 868, 1416
military uses, 69, 105-106, 553, 572, 586, 655, 934, 1069, 1083, 1105, 1415, 1583, 1593, 1627, 1654
effect on disarmament, 1142
France, 1164
manned orbiting laboratory, 557, 571, 616, 1091
National Communications System, 1779
U.S.S.R., 566, 1175, 1708
United States, 585, 1676
nuclear-free zone, 866
radiation, 589
Soviet policies and programs, 584
Space Defense System, 1088
SPACE BUDGETS AND EXPENDITURES, 1296, 1626, 1702
SPACE CENTER, Vandenberg Air Force Base, 585
SPACE COMMUNICATIONS
civil-military relations, 1779
European Space Vehicle Launcher Development Organization, 1590
global communications net, 923
military systems, 1451
military uses, 550
U.S.S.R., 82
SPACE LAW, 363, 867-868, 1318, 1414
Declaration of Legal Principles, 1415
Soviet policies and proposals, 869
U.S. legal declarations, 616
SPACE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS, ground support operations, 1625
SPACE RACE, 105, 584, 586, 662, 1415
effect on nuclear strategy, 550
France, 1287
function of cold war, 1110
Soviet-U.S. competition, 1695
SPACE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, 75, 1414, 1626, 1654, 1695, 1702
contribution to national security, 1583
Europe, 1192, 1590
France, 1587
U.S. Navy, 1603
SPACE STATIONS, 106, 586, 1105
military uses, 1708
SPACE VEHICLES, 549, 655, 866
development, 1083
missile detection, 408
types, 67, 1046, 1578
U.S.S.R., 1708
U.S. Air Force, 100
SPACE WARFARE, 550
SPACE WEAPONS, 79, 550, 662, 665
orbital, 1592
U.S.S.R., 1627
U.S.S.R., 563, 566, 572, 934, 1175
SPAIN
Gibraltar military base, 1213
Palomares nuclear accident, 1270, 1272, 1276, 1449, 1457
SPEAKING EUROPEAN [W. HORSFALL CARTER], 1017

SPRINT MISSILE. See under Missiles
STABLE DETERRENCE. See under Deterrence
STALIN, JOSEPH, 1532
STANFORD UNIVERSITY, crises analysis program, 8
STATISTICS OF DEADLY QUARRELS [LEWIS F. RICHARDSON], 1897
STONE, JEREMY, 1447
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, 714, 720, 1757
STRATEGIC BOMBING, 51, 1027, 1901
STRATEGIC DETERRENCE. See Deterrence; Missiles; Nuclear delivery vehicles; Nuclear weapons; Space weapons
STRATEGIC MATERIALS, 938, 1785
STRATEGIC PARITY. See Nuclear parity
STRATEGY, 591, 1108, 1568, 1632
  airpower, 1029
  Australia, 679
  changes, 1029
  Communist China, 62, 145, 157, 200, 513, 604, 615, 634, 671, 1145, 1514, 1518, 1648, 1652, 1655
  Communist countries, 112, 214
  Communist propaganda, 1638
  criticism, 54
  East Germany, 1233
  effect of space program, 1142
  Europe, 1712
  France, 529, 1099, 1729, 1734
  gaming, 1484
  geostrategy, 595
  Great Britain, 593, 994, 1639, 1671
  indirect, 1100
  influence of social and physical sciences, 1104
  influence of technology, 716, 1571
  influence of the humanities, 530
  middle powers, 1102
  moral and ethical aspects, 1303
  naval, 155, 1106
  nonescalative, 1944
  nonmilitary defense, 813, 826
  NATO, 708, 1035, 1197, 1225, 1227, 1717
  nuclear weapons, 1031, 1642
  political aspects, 1101, 1113
  role of armed force, 1381
  space warfare, 550
  U.S.S.R., 135, 139, 143, 170, 179, 539, 542, 663, 726, 1035, 1107, 1171, 1183, 1187-1188, 1664, 1700, 1908
  war games and gaming, 596, 714, 720
  West Germany, 1741, 1745
  Western countries, 192
  See also Countercity strategy; Counterforce strategy; Damage-limiting strategy; Deterrence; Flexible response; Second strike; Strategic analysis; War games and gaming
STRATEGY, U.S., 177, 488, 590, 633, 1036, 1103, 1157, 1519, 1651, 1699, 1752, 1757
  alternatives, 631, 1027
  Asia, 124
  assured destruction, 1667
  Communist China, 604, 1277, 1525
  Congressional hearings, 132
  containment, 484, 1514
  criticism, 1640, 1649
  formulation, 717, 1676, 1703, 1965
  influence of technology, 1653
  maintenance of superiority, 625, 1107, 1299, 1908
  naval, 676, 1674
  nuclear weapons, 1944
  position of strength, 1410
  power and politics, 1258, 1657, 1788
  resource allocation, 1294
  role of intellectuals, 734
  See also Damage-limiting strategy; Deterrence; Flexible response; Massive retaliation
STRAUSS, FRANZ JOSEPH, 1498, 1819, 1950
STRESS. See Tension
STRIDA-II. See under Air defense systems
STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD: THE COLD WAR, 1917-1965 [DESMOND DONNELLY], 969
"STUDY FAIR," PROJECT, 428
A STUDY OF WAR [QUINCY WRIGHT], 1118, 1473
SUBMARINE WARFARE, 101, 564, 580, 1053, 1066, 1595, 1599, 1602, 1661
  Communist China, 128
  detection devices, 86
  Latin American countries, 201
  research and development, 96
  Soviet view, 1777
  United States, 1111
  West Germany, 1685
SUBMARINES
  France, 1670
  Israel, 1494
  U.S.S.R., 588, 1111, 1149, 1580, 1709
  world survey, 1599
SUBMARINES, MISSILE-LAUNCHING, U.S.S.R., 552, 588
SUBMARINES, NUCLEAR-POWERED, 1066, 1599, 1602
  France, 624, 1071, 1647, 1661, 1670
  Polaris, 99, 564, 580, 1680-1681
  U.S.S.R., 1580
SUEZ, British military presence, 1513
SUPRANATIONALITY, 1882
  and world peace, 1477
  European unification, 1017
SURPRISE ATTACK, 1187
SURVIVAL
  fallout shelter simulation, 738
  fallout shelter studies, 1267
  moral and ethical aspects, 761, 1870
  nuclear war, 246, 1262
    analysis, 747
    demographic statistics, 739
  role of U.S. Strategic Air Command, 656
SWEDEN
  defense budget and expenditures, 268
  defense policies and programs, 613
  inspection proposals, 1948
  nuclear guarantees, 1963
  nuclear policies and programs, 383, 642
  world disarmament conference, 1400
SWITZERLAND
  air defense system, 171
  defense policies and programs, 400, 1165, 1704
  disarmament policies and proposals, 384
  nuclear policies and programs, 401
SYMMETRY. See Nuclear parity
SYMPOSIUM ON REMOTE SENSING OF ENVIRONMENT, 3D (1964), 1455
SYRIA, Soviet military assistance, 1709
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, aerospace industry, 1243
SZILARD, LEO, 1931

T

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. See Nuclear weapons--tactical uses
TAHITI, nuclear weapons tests, 740, 1265, 1794
TAYLOR, MAXWELL, 1036, 1787
TENSION
  arms race, 846
  Europe, 1644
  global, 464, 1358
  Latin America, 16
  Near East, 1494
  reduction, 117, 444, 1470
    Central Europe, 1408

TENSION--Continued
reduction--Continued
East-West relations, 517
Europe, 1214, 1226, 1500, 1939
Great Britain, 1547
role of anxiety, 1350
unilateralism, 849
Sino-Soviet border, 694
Southeast Asia, 949
Third World, 972
West German militarism, 880
TERMINOLOGY, 392, 1354, 1774, 1878
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES
effect on disarmament, 1919
Soviet view, 370
THAILAND, Chinese Communist threat, 611
THANT, U, 1376
THERMONUCLEAR WEAPONS. See Nuclear weapons
THIRD WORLD, 40, 451
arms race, 1255
Chinese Communist policy, 511
defense of, 521
East-West conflict, 972
international relations, 1492
nuclear policies and programs, 1259
Soviet policy, 502
tensions, 972
THIRTY-ONE HOURS [THEODORE OLSON AND GORDON CHRISTIANSEN], 1890
TIMM, H., 1825
TOLSTOY, LEO, 833
TOLUBKO, V. F., 1179
TRADE UNIONS, Great Britain, 1001
TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, ETC.
Antarctic treaty, 858
ban on space weapons, 1934
ban on West German production of nuclear weapons, 1950
Berlin, 1909
Central Treaty Organization, 1196
changing nature of, 4
codification, 1846
enforcement, 1454
Geneva agreements of 1954, 1375
international law, 292
Japan-South Korea treaty, 1221
Panama Canal treaties, 987
Polish-Soviet Mutual Aid Treaty (1965), 236
Potsdam Agreement (1945), 673, 781, 1021
role in international law, 1323
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 953
space regulation, 616
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (Japan-United States), 1166
Treaty of Versailles, 1906
U.S.-Soviet desalinization efforts (1964), 1234
violations, 1213
See also Alliances; Alinement; Bilateral safeguards; Central Treaty Organization; North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Nuclear test ban treaty; Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; Warsaw Treaty Organization
TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, ETC. (PROPOSED)
ABM deployment, 1424
anti-Communist alliance (Nationalist China and South Vietnam), 185
ban on use of force, 370
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, 871, 1426
exchange of nuclear information, 238
general and complete disarmament, 291, 424, 853, 1467
German peace treaty, 22, 781, 1122
effect on disarmament, 880
TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, ETC. (PROPOSED)--Continued
German peace treaty--Continued
Soviet prerequisites, 108
West German view, 507
Italian unilateral nonacquisition declaration, 1420
"no first use" of nuclear weapons, 429, 873, 920, 1418
nonproliferation treaty, 341, 389, 394, 1426, 1433, 1435
criticism, 217, 402, 1953
East German policies and proposals, 1444
East-West disagreement, 398, 902, 916, 1419
ENDC discussions, 1937, 1951
guarantees, 391, 873
Indian policies and proposals, 395
Soviet policies and proposals, 896, 898, 907-908, 1419-1420, 1422, 1462
Soviet-U.S. disagreement, 393, 399, 909, 1917, 1961
Swedish policies and proposals, 383
Swiss policies and proposals, 384
texts of draft treaties, 911
U.S. policies and proposals, 386, 872, 898, 907, 1404, 1420, 1446, 1948-1949
West German policies and proposals, 131, 390, 397, 932
NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression pact, 875, 877, 1363, 1413
Northeast Asian military alliance, 185, 1127
nuclear-free zones
Africa, 860
Latin America, 864, 1411
Treaty on the Establishment of Peace Throughout Christendom (1462/1464), 1905
Western Pacific alliance, 1232
TRETTNER MEMORANDUM, 172
TROTSKY, LEON, 1145
THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP: A REAPPRAISAL OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE [HENRY KISSINGER], 522
TRUMAN, HARRY S., 138, 338, 1549
TUNISIA, disarmament policies and proposals, 1403
TURKEY
CENTO-RCD role, 1196
foreign policy, 481
U.S. missile deployment, 1691

U

UGANDA, disarmament policies and proposals, 1393
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, 546, 958
Communist policies and programs, 973
intervention, 540
subversion, 1574
See also Antiguerrilla warfare; Counterinsurgency; Exotic warfare; Guerrilla warfare; Insurgency
UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. See Nuclear explosions, underground
UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT, 849, 1443
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ABM program, 1630, 1659
Arab-Israeli dispute, 1508
armed forces, 1035, 1131
arms trade and dissemination, Near East, 1709
cold war, 941
defense budget and expenditures, 1285
defense policies and programs, 135, 178-179, 199, 1030, 1108, 1175
antimissile defense systems, 1806
arms and armaments, 1187
Central Asia, 694
conventional forces, 1183

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS--Continued
defense policies and programs--Continued
Eastern Europe, 218
history, 143
limited nuclear war, 1700
Navy, 1149
tactical armed forces, 1179
23rd Congress of the CPSU, 1673
Vietnamese war, 1427
Warsaw Pact, 1206
Western countries, 214
See also Civil-military relations; Deterrence; Strategy; War
defense research and development, 555
disarmament policies and proposals, 169, 291, 342, 356, 853, 857, 1043, 1385, 1406, 1742, 1924-1925, 1928, 1941
ban on use of force, 370
bibliographies, 357, 1896
effect on developing countries, 1982
foreign troop withdrawals, 382
research programs, 349
space, 866
United Nations, 837, 856
U.N. Disarmament Commission, 377
economic policies and programs, 249
reorganization, 1529, 1760
effect on NATO reorganization, 1226
European unification, 1214
Far Eastern (Siberian) Army, 1765
foreign policy, 32, 169, 328, 990-991, 1171, 1482, 1535, 1548
bibliographies, 466
Communist China, 1437, 1510, 1560
France, 188
history, 1371
national interests, 518
Near East, 1520
nonalined countries, 502
NATO, 878
objectives, 31
peaceful coexistence, 168, 471, 519, 978, 1527
Third World, 972
West Germany, 254, 338, 971
See also Peaceful coexistence
German reunification, 188, 470
MRBM deployment in Europe, 1710
merchant marine, 227
military aid:
Communist China, 47
Cuba, 204
East Germany, 184
Navy, 155, 1592
nonproliferation treaty (proposed). See under Proliferation of nuclear weapons
nuclear explosions, underwater, 1802
nuclear policies and programs, 83, 139
Polish-Soviet Mutual Aid Treaty (1965), 236
press commentaries, 1924-1925
radiation protection, 1836
relations with France, 1007, 1010, 1121
Sino-American confrontation, 1269
space policies and programs, 572, 584, 1110, 1142, 1627, 1695
military uses, 566
submarines, missile-launching, 552
United Nations, 836, 1338, 1374
U.N. peacekeeping forces (proposed), 309, 422
See also East-West relations; Sino-Soviet dispute; Soviet-U.S. relations
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
defense policies and programs, 1445, 1494
foreign policy, 503
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC--Continued
radioactive wastes stockpiles, 1785
Soviet military assistance, 1709
UNITED KINGDOM. See Great Britain
UNITED NATIONS, 302, 1345, 1379, 1855
African participation, 1497
aggression, 783
and nuclear accidents, 1272
Canadian view, 1541
Charter revision, 1880
Chinese Communist membership, 1207, 1331, 1392, 1511, 1540, 1891
Chinese Communist view, 1026, 1512, 1546
Committee on Space, 1934
Disarmament Commission, 1388
1965 sessions, 371-372, 375
Soviet view, 377
world disarmament conference, 374
disarmament policies and proposals, 838, 859, 884-885, 957
contribution to world order, 784
GCD resolution, 1405
history, 837
role of developing countries, 435
East German membership, 509
economic assistance program, 1360
French nuclear weapons tests, 365
Indian role, 1440
international cooperation, U Thant Plan, 815
intervention in Dominican crisis (1965), 296
issues, 300
members, 302
19th General Assembly disarmament discussions, 1388
nonalined-country participation, 514, 795
nongovernmental organizations, 792
nonproliferation treaty (proposed), 389, 872, 911-912
organization and functions, 1850
peace fund (proposed), 308, 358
peaceful settlement of disputes, 1853
peacekeeping and security forces, 1842
enforcement authority, 804
improvement, 1857, 1864-1865
Indian view, 803
Soviet view, 1862
peacekeeping and security forces (proposed), 358, 786, 1417, 1425
British view, 306
national standby forces, 309, 422
U.S. policies and proposals, 1932
Vietnamese war, 1332
peacekeeping and security operations, 793, 957, 1211, 1344, 1849, 1860-1861
British contributions, 984
Cyprus, 1858
enforcement upon nonmembers, 295
financing, 302, 799
future, 305
general analysis, 1866
improvement, 304, 307-308, 369, 1339, 1854
legal problems, 789
problems and prospects, 797, 800-801
regional organizations, 1334, 1852
reorganization (proposed), 298, 802
sociological analysis, 1859
problems and prospects, 302, 788, 794, 796, 1338
reorganization (proposed), 1851
role in a disarmed world, 1335
role in the settlement of disputes, 850, 1314, 1332, 1337
role of law, 302
Security Council, 785
Soviet participation, 836, 1374

UNITED NATIONS--Continued
space force (proposed), 868
space policies and programs, 616, 1415
ban on nuclear weapons in space, 866
Special Committee on Friendly Relations, 1419
specialized agencies, 1849
20th General Assembly, 1333
disarmament discussions, 856, 1387, 1392, 1423, 1916, 1938
UNESCO, 1336
U.S. policies and proposals, 1326
universal membership, 1515
Vietnamese war, 298, 983, 1332
world role, 299, 303, 442, 779, 1325, 1330
UNITED STATES
Arab-Israeli dispute, 1508
armed forces, 1689
arms trade and dissemination, 104, 251, 1240, 1255, 1288, 1759
containment policy, 484, 1645
Communist China, 1201, 1511, 1514, 1518, 1526
Communist China, 989
contributions to international law, 1322
defense budget and expenditures, 173, 267, 1178, 1291, 1701
economic effects, 264, 760, 1298, 1658, 1817, 1822-1823
effect of Vietnamese war, 269-270, 275, 757-758, 1180-1181, 1300, 1809
FY 1968 proposals, 1585
weapons development, 1067
defense cutbacks. See Defense cutbacks
defense policies and programs, 170, 177, 359, 628, 1040, 1108, 1657, 1752, 1814
air defense system, 1683
antimissile defense systems, 1065, 1806
ABM deployment, 1424
Asia, 124, 1232
bilateral treaties, 706
chemical and biological weapons, 1613
Chinese Communist nuclear installations, 1146
civil defense, 735, 1135-1136
Communist China, 378, 1117, 1128, 1679
contributions of space programs, 1654
criticism, 1175, 1299
defense posture, 132
East of Suez, 130
effect of research programs, 1921
foreign military bases, 666, 1169
formulation and implementation, 221, 657, 717, 1258, 1653, 1769, 1965
history, 154
Indian Ocean, 1204
Military Airlift Command, 1095
military commitments, 680, 1167, 1689
nuclear war, 1389
Republic of China, 1367
Southeast Asia, 654, 843, 888, 1427
Vietnam. See Vietnamese war--U.S. policy
weapons development, 532, 562, 1608, 1807
West Germany, 1193
See also Civil-military relations; Damage-limiting strategy; Deterrence; Flexible response; Massive retaliation; Strategy, U.S.; War
defense research and development, 1781
disarmament policies and proposals, 350, 360, 367, 590, 625, 1313, 1404
ACDA achievements, 229
criticism, 366, 426
history, 341
limited measures, 348
military view, 346, 428
relation to national security, 879

UNITED STATES--Continued
disarmament policies and proposals--Continued
Soviet criticism, 1673, 1924-1925
United Nations, 837
world disarmament conference, 881
economic-military resource allocations, 1294
foreign aid policies and programs, 1294
foreign policy, 24, 501, 974, 1636, 1711
and international law, 776
Antarctic Regions, 858
anticommunism, 1495, 1501
Asia, 20, 1166, 1518
Atlantic community, 674, 1740
changing nature of, 958
Communist China, 513, 695, 981, 986, 1123, 1155, 1207, 1269, 1331, 1437, 1510, 1526, 1540, 1553, 1677, 1706, 1891
criticism, 33, 380, 641, 844, 1519, 1542, 1715, 1805
Cuban crisis (1962), 1691
developing countries, 40, 996, 1682
effect of Vietnamese war, 639
formulation and implementation, 265, 1517, 1651
France, 1013
international cooperation, 1499
intervention, 1522
Latin America, 16, 1531
law governing, 1848
nonalinement, 478
role of intellectuals, 814
Sino-Soviet dispute, 960
South Korea, 1215
Southeast Asia, 474, 523, 1139, 1144, 1189, 1264, 1275, 1693
Third World, 972
West Germany, 142, 199
"world police force," 626
German reunification, 470
military aid programs, 191, 1682
military aid to South Vietnam, 614, 1174
national security policies, 166, 1157, 1261
cold war, 493
review, 733
strategic analysis, 720
negotiation, art of, 882
nonproliferation treaty (proposed). See under Proliferation of nuclear weapons
NATO policy, 208, 1162, 1201-1202, 1219, 1231, 1549, 1718, 1721, 1736-1737
nuclear forces, 132
nuclear policies and programs, 633, 731, 898
bilateral safeguards, 1981
budget and expenditures, 1776
criticism, 134, 356, 537
history, 581
Indian Ocean, 1109
"no first use" pledge, 429
NATO, 708
scientific-military disagreements, 339
World War II, 336, 338, 839
role of science in government, 722, 727
space policies and programs, 67, 549, 807, 1110, 1142, 1192, 1416, 1451, 1578, 1626-1627, 1702
military uses, 69, 79, 105-106, 553, 571, 587, 1091
Soviet view, 655
trade policy, France, 1661
U.N. peacekeeping forces (proposed), 422
U.N. peacekeeping operations, 305
U.N. policies and proposals, 836, 1326
world role, 23, 979, 1200
See also East-West relations; European-U.S. relations; Sino-American relations; Soviet-U.S. relations

UNITED STATES (GOVERNMENT AGENCIES)
Agency for International Development, research program, 1351
Air Force, 176
Air Force Armaments Laboratory, 1070
Air Force Systems Command, 1070
Air Force Systems Command's Ballistic Systems Division, Norton AFB, Calif., 1622
airlift capability, 575
arms and armaments, 76
bases, 119
cost-effectiveness analysis program, 1581
future role, 88
major commands, 161
military air transportation, 1609
Military Airlift Command, 1095, 1589
R&D programs, 266
space activities, 100, 272
Strategic Air Command, 656
strategic force, 1907
Tactical Air Reconnaissance Center, 1611
Vandenberg Air Force Base, 585
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
contract studies, 1808
organization and functions, 229
research programs, 1351, 1780, 1921
Army, 120, 650
Ballistic Research Laboratories, 68
communications systems, 403
Limited War Laboratory (Aberdeen), 1611
sensor equipment, 1611
Atomic Energy Commission, 247, 1380
annual report, 1665
FY 1967 budget, 1696
nuclear test capability, 1042
research program, 1780
safeguards systems, 1958
Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament, 430-431
Congress, hearings on national security policy, 1261
Dept. of Defense, 657, 1752
Military Space Research and Development Program, 1654
Office of Trade Control, 1240
research program, 1780
scientific and technical personnel, 271
Dept. of State
Office of Munitions Control, 1240
research program, 1351
Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1783
Joint Target Planning Staff, 1965
Marine Corps, 56
civic action programs, 1668
rapid response capability, 85
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1603
European-U.S. cooperation, 1735
role in national security, 1583
National Institutes of Health, research program, 1780
Navy, 1073, 1692
Air Development Command, 1611
antisubmarine warfare program, 1053, 1595
arms and armaments, 81
flexible response, 1674
Naval Ordnance Test Station, 1096
nuclear-powered ships, 564, 1054, 1066
oceanographic research, 89, 92
research and development, 91
space activities, 1603
weapons systems, 1607
Public Health Service, 259, 283
United States Information Agency, research program, 1351

USE OF FORCE. See Force, use of
UTOPIAN WRITING, 345

V

V/STOL AIRCRAFT. See under Aircraft
VATICAN COUNCIL II
discussion of nuclear weapons, 276, 1328-1329, 1826
view of Eastern Europe, 1346
war and peace, 1359
VIETNAM, NORTH, 1762
defense policies and programs, 1185, 1575
reaction to U.S. policy, 887
U.S. "peace offensive," 1041
VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF, 1762
U.S. economic policy, 1174
U.S. policy toward, 523, 614
VIETNAMESE WAR, 329, 355, 1347, 1429
arms and armaments, 1038
chemical and biological weapons, 1047, 1310, 1596, 1792, 1796, 1800
Chinese Communist strategy, 604, 977, 1427
civil-military relations, 713
Eastern European view, 1716
economic effects, 475, 755, 757-758, 1283-1284, 1297-1298, 1809, 1813, 1817, 1822-1823
effect on:
aerospace industry, 1292
defense contracts, 1816
defense spending, 267, 1180-1181, 1300, 1658
disarmament, 1919
domestic welfare spending, 1289
East-West confrontation, 1277
Europe, 961
international relations, 1401, 1634
nonproliferation treaty discussions, 1961
NATO policy, 1201
U.S. economy, 269-275, 1266
weapons development, 102, 562, 1049-1051, 1070, 1074, 1089, 1096-1097, 1159, 1293, 1608, 1615, 1807
escalation, 378, 532, 608, 654, 844, 1119, 1170, 1787
North Vietnamese view, 887
United States, 1427
history, 55, 1375
Japanese view, 654, 995
limited-war concepts, 1081
missiles, 1061
negotiated settlement, 523, 526, 638, 882, 983, 1146, 1266, 1332
North Vietnamese view, 1184, 1800
public opinion, 601
religious view, 278, 811, 1832
role of U.S. airpower, 574
role of U.S. industry, 1174
Sino-Soviet dispute, 216, 639
Soviet view, 1171, 1698, 1763
U.N. role, 298, 1337
U.S. antiwar movement, 841, 1275, 1342, 1778
U.S. policy, 60, 88, 532, 603, 648, 1041, 1139, 1144, 1264, 1518, 1645-1646, 1827
Communist China, 1117, 1207
criticism, 314, 361, 381, 608, 626, 639, 661, 823, 888, 1036, 1127, 1138, 1189, 1501, 1522
legal aspects, 1672
Vietcong, 1036, 1575, 1577, 1762
West German military assistance, 1722
world antiwar movement, 1874
See also Flexible response; Limited war
VILMAR, FRITZ, 1098
VIOLATIONS OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, 1914
prevention, 1454

VIOLENCE, 5, 964, 1381
and disarmament, 1919
biological, 816
causes, 1341
developing countries, 1474
role in social change, 965
world role, 1350
See also Nonviolence
VISEK, WILLARD J., 1835
VO-NGUYEN-GIAP, 1575

W

WAGNER, A., 1825
WAR, 12, 51, 534, 834, 1028
alternatives, 332
and international relations, 1486
and politics, 1258
anthropological view, 9
bibliography, 1118
Catholic view, 1829, 1873
causes, 58, 321, 344, 952, 1487, 1493, 1515, 1563, 1565, 1892, 1897, 1926
changing nature of, 531, 533, 536, 965, 1031, 1033, 1120, 1564, 1657, 1788
Chinese Communist view, 148, 200, 1034, 1546, 1678
Communist view, 524
cultural effects, 277
demographic effects, 1302
East German view, 988
economic aspects, 265, 528, 1825
effects, 1799
Europe, 195
French view, 1099
historical view, 333, 1108, 1472
inevitability of, 57
just war, 818, 1303, 1826, 1828, 1831
Kashmir. See under Indo-Pakistan conflict
legal aspects, 292, 538, 775, 780, 1847
mobilization, 1113
moral and ethical aspects, 538, 1792, 1827, 1829-1830, 1832
predictability, 440, 1567
prevention
Western countries, 379
See also Deterrence
preventive war, 1641
propaganda, 53, 1875
psychological aspects, 438, 964
public opinion, 2
religious view, 278, 1237, 1304
risk of, 434, 599, 953, 968, 978, 1518, 1569, 1574, 1876
East German view, 1656
measures to reduce, 1941
Soviet view, 114, 1673
West German view, 23
social aspects, 943
sociology of, 1473
South African view, 1483
Soviet view, 460, 539, 1030, 1280, 1320, 1371, 1570
strategy. See Strategy
survival. See Survival
technology, 1492
termination, 841, 1567
types, 54, 135
Vietnam. See Vietnamese war
See also Antiguerrilla warfare; Civil defense; Cold war; Conflict; Conventional war; Counterinsurgency; Guerrilla warfare; Insurgency; Limited war; Naval warfare; Nuclear war; Peace; Submarine warfare; Unconventional warfare; Violence
WAR GAMES AND GAMING, 596, 712, 734, 747, 1784
comparison with real-world data, 1493
criticism, 730
France, 1133
general and complete disarmament, 1918
guerrilla warfare, 545
international conflict, 1484
international relations, 447
M.I.T. Center for International Studies, 107
nonmilitary defense, 813
organizational behavior, 955
policymaking, 1463
popularization, 455
research studies, 1502
resource allocation, 52
techniques, 1478
U.S.S.R., 962
U.S. Marine Corps, 56
WARHEADS. See Nuclear warheads
WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION, 63, 65, 148, 511, 537, 687, 1018, 1138, 1577
Asia, 1645
Chinese Communist view, 491, 1019, 1155, 1428, 1677
effect on U.S. strategy, 1674
international law, 783
moral and ethical aspects, 1827, 1831
probability of, 638
role of NATO, 1717
Soviet view, 460, 501, 1171, 1320
Third World, 1634
U.S. policy, 1036, 1778, 1827
WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION, 209, 1020, 1206
armed forces, 684
East German view, 707
navies, 709
nonaggression pact (proposed), 875, 877, 1363, 1413
nonproliferation treaty (proposed), 1462
political consultative committee meeting, 1716
relation to NATO, 1834
relations with NATO countries, 1408, 1635
Soviet influence, 218
Warsaw Colloquium (1965), 172
West German nuclear armament, 682
WEAPONS. See Arms and armaments; also specific types of weapons, e.g., Missiles; Rockets; etc.
WEAPONS PARITY. See Military balance; Nuclear parity
WEATHER MODIFICATION, war potential, 1618
WESTERN COUNTRIES
Chinese Communist policy, 968
civil defense, 1772
defense against Communism, 521
disarmament policies and proposals, 847, 1941
economic aid to developing countries, 1464
international law, 1844
multipolarity, 1506
Near East oil resources, 938
view of Communist China, 121
See also Europe; North Atlantic Treaty Organization
WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION, 1555, 1981
Agency for the Control of Armaments, 405
WESTERN PACIFIC ALLIANCE. See under Asia--defense policies and programs
WHEELER, EARLE G., 1804
WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (1965), 628, 807, 931
arms control recommendations, 1423
Committee for Research on the Development of International Institutions, 1351
Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, 1343, 1417, 1421, 1425
Committee on Development of International Law, 1322

WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION--Continued
Committee on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, 1352
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 1339
Committee on Science and Technology, 1353
Committee on Space, 1416
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, 1459
recommendations, 1349
WIGNER, EUGENE, 1249
WISEMAN, J., 1825
WOHLSTETTER, ALBERT, 1103
WOLFE, THOMAS W., 726, 991
WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FEDERATION, 318
WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, 312
WORLD ASSOCIATION OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH, 1336
WORLD CONFERENCE ON WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW (1965), 290, 778, 782, 1315
WORLD CONGRESS FOR PEACE, NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE, AND GENERAL DISARMAMENT (1965), 314, 825
WORLD CONGRESS OF PEACE DEFENDERS, 1875
WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, 1872
WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, 372, 374, 737, 856, 870, 881, 1387, 1392, 1404, 1423
Austrian view, 1395
British view, 1382
Cambodian view, 1394
Canadian view, 1398
Cypriot view, 1396
Czechoslovak view, 1384
Danish view, 1390
Dutch view, 1397
Lebanese view, 1391
Mali view, 1930
Sengalese view, 1943
Swedish view, 1400
Tunisian view, 1403
Ugandan view, 1393
WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE--Continued
U.N. discussion, 1916
U.S. policies and proposals, 885
Yugoslav view, 1399
WORLD FEDERATION OF SCIENTIFIC WORKERS, disarmament policies and proposals, 844
WORLD GOVERNMENT, 294, 358, 830, 1876
Clark-Sohn model, 1918
peace, 1472
role of United Nations, 1880
Soviet view, 446
WORLD LAW. See International law; Rule of law
WORLD ORDER, 442, 939, 941, 1003, 1358, 1362, 1469
African contribution, 1884
effect of nuclear weapons, 331, 1430
effect on culture, 436
international law, 1323
obstacles to, 1477
regionalism, 798
role of:
developing countries, 13
Europe, 863
international law, 1844
international organization, 1853
U.S. view, 474, 979
See also International relations
WORLD PEACE COUNCIL, 328
disarmament policies and proposals, 808, 1894
WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAW [GRENVILLE CLARK AND LOUIS B. SOHN], 1918, 1929
WORLD POLITICS. See International relations
WORLD REVOLUTION, Chinese Communist view, 145
WORLD WAR II, role of science and technology, 221
WRIGHT, QUINCY, 1118, 1473

Y

YUGOSLAVIA
disarmament policies and proposals, 1399
nonalinement, 526
relations with Poland, 992

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